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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Abstract.  The first independent air force, the Royal Air Force, was formed 
on 1 April 1918 during the First World War.  It was a merger of the Royal Flying 
Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service.  Its leaders and personnel brought cultural 
predispositions with them from their former services.  Unsurprisingly, many aspects 
of the new independent Service that they created were similar to those in the Royal 
Navy and British Army.  Despite that, a distinctive RAF culture emerged within a 
short time frame.  Many elements of that culture have subsequently been emulated 
by other nations as they formed their own independent air forces. 
Those who serve or have served in the RAF intuitively know the power of its 
culture.  RAF life is an immersive experience that evokes a range of assumptions, 
beliefs and emotions that can deeply affect combat performance.  Despite this, little 
academic study of RAF culture has been conducted.   This thesis will examine the 
history of the RAF from a new social angle.  It will establish why its culture is so 
important and why RAF culture became so distinctive given its very traditional 
foundations.  
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PART I - BACKGROUND 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
Coming into existence as a war-time expedient on 1 April 1918 as the first 
independent air force in the world, the RAF was an amalgamation of the Royal 
Flying Corps (RFC) and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS).  Its personnel came 
from military and naval backgrounds and had previously been accultured into their 
parent services.  With them, they brought their own cultural assumptions and 
predispositions.  Moreover, the RAF formed against the cultural backdrop of highly 
codified British class based society.  The leaders of the new Service represented a 
fairly narrow cross-section of that society and the way they set up the RAF was 
indicative of that.  They developed a fully functioning system of orders, regulations, 
doctrine, tactics and flying standards underpinned by a functional structure that laid 
out, for their personnel, the way to behave, fly and fight.  A range of artefacts was 
introduced including a new uniform, badges, coats of arms, memorials and an 
Ensign.  Many of the artefacts, processes, practices, traditions, rituals and customs 
that were instituted were, like their leaders, representative of a traditional military 
organisation of its era.  However, despite that largely traditional framework, this 
thesis will argue that a very distinctive RAF culture emerged within a short time 
frame.  The RAF model and many aspects of its culture were subsequently adopted 
by other nations as they formed their own independent air forces.  Those who have 
served, or been associated with the RAF, intuitively know the power of its culture.  
Service in the RAF is an immersive experience that evokes a range of deeply held 
assumptions, beliefs and emotions that are both positive and negative in nature and 
effect.  However, despite the obvious importance and impact of RAF culture, there is 
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a surprising lacuna of academic material that examines this important social aspect 
of RAF history that this thesis will address. 
The Importance of Military Culture 
Schein highlighted the power of organisational culture:  
Culture is an abstraction, yet forces that are created in social and 
organizational situations that derive from culture are powerful. If we don’t 
understand the operation of those forces, we become victims to them.1  
  
This powerful force plays a role in any organisation that involves human 
interaction including commercial organisations, the public sector, NGOs, religions, 
sects, clubs, societies and even non-state, terrorist and outlawed organisations.  
According to business theorists Kilmann, Sexton and Serpa: ‘culture is the invisible 
force behind the tangibles and observables in any organisation, a social energy that 
moves people to act’.2    
Military operations frequently rely upon co-ordinating large bodies of often 
geographically split personnel across a range of diverse functions in a timely 
manner whilst engaged in combat that could result in the loss of life of members of 
the organisation.  The prospect of ultimate sacrifice for the greater good greatly 
increases the stakes of membership of a military organisation for its members 
compared with membership of corporate organisations usually examined by 
organisational cultural theorists.  Aspects of culture that help inculcate the sense of 
belonging and mutual trust required to achieve success in this high-stake military 
context is highly visible.  The political scientist, Kier, wrote: 
                                            
1 Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey Bass 2004), 
p.3. 
2 Kilmann Ralf, Saxton Mary, Serpa Roy and associates editors, Gaining Control of the 
Corporate Culture (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1985), p.ix.  See also Kenneth Desson and 
Joseph Clouthier, ‘Organizational Culture - Why Does it Matter’, paper presented to 
Symposium on International Safeguards International Atomic Energy Agency 
Vienna, Austria (November 3, 2010), pp.1-2.  
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Organizations' perceptions of their world frame their decisions; this is 
particularly true of "total" institutions like the military.  Few organizations 
devote as many resources to the assimilation of their members. The 
emphasis on ceremony and tradition, and the development of a common 
language and esprit de corps, testify to the strength of the military's 
organizational culture.3 
 
Murray, Professor of Military History at the US Army War College, wrote that 
'military culture may be the most important factor not only in military effectiveness, 
but also in the processes involved in military innovation, which is essential to 
preparing military organizations for the next war'.4  Ultimately, an effective military 
culture enhances cohesion, which is vital to success on the battlefield.  English, 
wrote that: 
Culture, described as the “bedrock of military effectiveness,”… can help 
explain the “motivations, aspirations, norms and rules of conduct” – what 
might be called the essence of the…military.  History has shown that even 
when military forces have had access to the same technology, whether they 
developed the doctrine to use that technology effectively or not was largely a 
function of each force’s culture.5 
 
Surprisingly, despite the obvious investment by military organisations referred 
to by Kier, military culture remains an area that has not been extensively explored.  
Of military culture and sub-cultures, English wrote that: ‘many of these areas have 
received very little attention from either the academic or professional military 
communities’.6    
 Without an understanding of how culture affects an institution, well-meaning 
attempts at change often give rise to unintentional or unwelcome second and third 
order effects which can render the adaptive process much more difficult than 
                                            
3 Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine.  France Between the Wars’, International 
Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring, 1995), p.69.   
4 Williamson Murray. ‘Does Military Culture Matter’, Orbis, Vol 43, Issue 1 (Winter 1999), 
p.134. 
5 Allan English, Understanding Military Culture.  A Canadian Perspective, (Montreal, 
Kingston & London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, Ithaca, 2004), p.5.   
6 Ibid., pp.6-7. 
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perhaps it needs to be.  Kirke suggested that: 
Riding existing culture into the future in the face of change is better than 
confronting it.  A key weapon in improving the efficiency of any organisation, 
therefore, is the understanding of its current culture, especially before it is 
plunged into major change.7 
 
Harnessing the body of evidence on culture would appear to be a logical step 
in assisting RAF leaders to understand their people and organisation better, thereby 
increasing modern combat effectiveness, yet RAF culture has received almost no 
academic attention.  That which has been conducted has been thematically narrow 
and no baseline study of RAF culture has been established.  Whilst the RAF may, 
intuitively, invest in its culture, the level of academic reflection about what that 
culture means is quite lacking.   This thesis aims to address that; it is thematically, 
rather than temporally bound; however, it will predominantly concentrate on the era 
in which RNAS, RFC and RAF cultures emerged and matured between 1912 and 
the inter-war years. The thesis will be broken down into four parts in order to 
address this question: 
Part I:  Introduction including models, literature review and an  
  analysis of the aviator identity and the technical mind-set of  
  the RAF. 
Part II: Early Leaders 
Part III: Processes and Practices: artefacts, training, architecture  
  ritual, traditions and customs. 
Part IV: Conclusion. 
                                            
7 Charles Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture – the Unexpected Force’, Journal of Battlefield 
Technology, Vol 7, No 2 (2004), pp.11-15.  Charles Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture And 
Defence Acquisition: A Key Internal Factor For MOD’, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol.13 No.1 
(June 2010), pp.97-99.  
Charles Kirke, ‘Organisational Culture: A Key Internal Factor’, paper presented at RUSI 29-
30 (Sep 2009). 
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While the research is an historical work, it will also provide social scientists 
with a valuable case study of the emergence of an organisation for which early 
records are well preserved unlike most private sector organisations.  Histories of the 
latter usually only begin to be recorded as organisations becomes successful.  By 
contrast, the RAF’s history was being collated even prior to its formation.  This 
thesis will, therefore, make a significant contribution to Organisational Cultural 
theory by providing an analysis of the emergence of an organisation based upon 
rich archival records.  It will also be of practical use for RAF personnel; it will provide 
an academic lens through which to view their culture.  This introduction will now 
define culture and organisational culture; it will also examine the methodology 
behind the systematic analysis of RAF activity that allowed cultural deductions to be 
made.  Finally, a literature review will demonstrate that RAF culture is a virtually 
untouched area of academic research. 
 The etymological derivation of culture provided by the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary indicates that it originates from Latin 'cultura' implying growth or 
cultivation.8  This conveys the constantly evolving nature of culture but this does not 
sufficiently explain the word culture.  It is often used loosely and has a variety of 
interpretations in everyday language as well as in academe.  Given its importance 
across many academic fields including anthropology, psychology, sociology, human 
geography, history as well as what can be broadly termed the Business School, it is 
unsurprising that it is a highly contested area of study. 9   English wrote that: 
                                            
8 Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 10th Edition, 
1999), p.348. 
9 Spencer-Oatey examined a number of different and pertinent viewpoints of culture.   Helen 
Spencer-Oatey, ‘What is Culture?’ GlobalPAD Core Concepts, 2012,  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/al/globalpad/openhouse/interculturalskills/global_pad_-
_what_is_culture.pdf,  accessed 17 April 2017.   English also provided an analysis of culture 
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‘commentators acknowledge that no generally accepted definition of culture, let 
alone organizational culture, exists’.10  Alvesson, meanwhile, wrote that culture: 
 …is a tricky concept as it is easily used to cover everything and consequently 
nothing…Many people referring to culture seem to do so in a very vague way 
and it is important to use the concept without losing focus, direction and 
interpretive depth.11 
 
 In his seminal work, the leading anthropologist Geertz highlighted how 
contested and complex an area of study culture is: ‘the conceptual morass into 
which the Tyrolean kind of pot-au-feu theorizing about culture can lead, is evident in 
what is still one of the better general introductions to anthropology, Clyde 
Kluckhohn’s Mirror for Man’.12  He noted that in his twenty-seven pages on the 
concept of culture, Kluckhohn provided eleven different definitions. 13  Geertz’ 
semiotic view of culture described it in a manner that serves this study of RAF 
culture particularly well both in terms of its vivid description but, more importantly, in 
terms of the aim of the analysis of culture.  He wrote in line with the Weberian view 
that ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I 
take culture to be one of those webs, and the analysis of it is, therefore not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning’.14  Accordingly, throughout this research, wherever possible, aspects of 
RAF culture were analysed for their meaning.  This author has, in the course of this 
research, developed a model to use as a tool to make analysis of the data as 
                                                                                                                                       
and how it relates to organisational culture of the military.  English, Understanding Military 
Culture, pp.10-38. 
10 English, Understanding Military Culture, p.15-16 
11 Mats Alvesson, Understanding Organisational Culture (London: Sage, 2002), p.3 
12 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books Inc, 1973), p.4.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid., p.5.  
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systematic as possible.15  However, given that culture is such a contested subject, it 
was important to choose a definition in order to set a clear basis of reference for the 
thesis.  Spencer-Oatey’s definition of culture proved the most apt: 
Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, 
beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by 
a group of people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member’s 
behaviour and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s 
behaviour.16 
 
 This definition fits with Geertz’ interpretive approach but is also a reminder of 
the need to be cautious with modelling.  The word ‘fuzzy’ is not of academic register 
yet it conveys an important aspect of culture rarely found in other definitions that 
attempt to provide overly optimistic clear-cut explanations.  The ‘fuzziness’ of culture 
explains why it is so hard to understand or explain and also, perhaps, why there are 
so few academic works relating to RAF culture.  However, as with most definitions, it 
does not provide quite enough guidance to understanding culture.  Kirke provided 
some other useful principles that complemented Spencer-Oatey’s definition and, 
given his work was focussed on the British Army, they are pertinent to the British 
military context: 
Culture does not have a separate existence.  It exists only between the ears 
of the people in its group…It is always the property of the people. 
 
It gives us attitudes expectations and assumptions which are played out in 
behaviour. 
 
                                            
15 The RAF Roundel Model is explained from pp.13-17. 
16 Helen Spencer-Oatey, Culturally Speaking.  Culture, Communication and Politeness 
Theory (London: Continuum 2008), p.3.  Gibson used Spencer-Oatey’s definition 
emphasising that ‘individuals are influenced by the cultures of any number of other groups 
to which they belong’. Barbara Gibson, ‘Intercultural Competency and Global CEO’, paper 
presented at SIETAR Europa 2015 in ‘Refreshing the Cultural Paradigm’, eds Barbara 
Covarrubias Venegas, Merlinda Dalipi, Fidel Leon Darder,SIETAR Europa (2015), pp.9-19.  
See also Barbara Gibson, ‘Intercultural Competencies needed by Global CEOs’ 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, Birkbeck, University of London, 2014), p.16. 
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It is instinctive…This makes it very insidious – a force informing our 
behaviour that we do not see. 
 
It is massive – culture enters every part of our lives and has an effect on 
everything we think or see or do…. 
 
We all belong to a vast array of different groups, each with its own culture, so 
we are always trimming our behaviour to fit in with the culture of different 
groups at different times. 17 
 
 Kirke’s last point is particularly apposite.  The RAF developed very distinctive 
sub-cultures, referred to as silos by Gray, which will be considered in Part III.18 
 Organisational Culture is a theoretical branch of study that provided an 
ordered framework for examining RAF culture; it lies in the post-modernist era of 
Organisational Theory.  A brief examination of the concept of Organisational Culture 
will help demonstrate that it has a solid academic foundation and that it has validity 
for use as a tool to enable a considered evaluation of the history of the emergence 
of RAF culture.  This generally accepts that organisations are complex entities and 
that viewing an organisation as a culture is one way of understanding it. 
 Brown noted that organisational culture is both ‘a radical departure from the 
mainstream of contemporary organisational behaviour studies, and a continuation 
and elaboration of long established traditions’.19 
 
 
 
                                            
17 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture And Defence Acquisition’, pp.97-99. 
18 Peter Gray, ‘The Strategic Leadership and Direction of The Royal Air Force Strategic Air 
Offensive Against Germany from Inception to 1945’ (PhD Thesis, University of 
Birmingham,2009), p.3.  Seabright provided a valuable insight into the importance of sub-
cultures in the modern RAF, Squadron Leader Anthony J Seabright, ‘RAF Ethos and 
Culture in the 21st Century’, Air Power Review, Vol 7 No 1 (2004), pp.98-101. 
19 Andrew Brown A, Organisational Culture (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd, 1998 [1995]), 
p.5. 
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Modelling Organisational Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1 - Organisational Culture – Andrew Brown20 
 Brown’s representation of organisational cultural theories, at Fig 1, broke it 
down into two major groupings, the first defined it as a metaphor, the second as an 
objective entity.  The latter was further subdivided with organisational culture 
representing the organisation as a whole and a second category that defined the 
culture as a set of behavioural or cognitive characteristics.  It was this final sub-
group, based upon the work of Schein, that proved to be the most useful modelling 
and also gave the best interpretive explanation of RAF culture for this thesis.21  Ott, 
an organisational theorist, wrote that: 
Schein’s three level model provides the most useful TYPOLOGY [emphasis 
in original] published to date for classifying elements of Organizational 
Culture into usable groupings.  Separating Level 1 into Level 1A (artifacts) 
                                            
20 Ibid., p.5. and p.9. 
21 Edgar Schein, ‘How Culture Forms, Develops and Changes’ in Gaining Control of the 
Corporate Culture, eds Ralf Kilmann, Mary Saxton, Roy Serpa and associates, (San 
Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1985), pp.17-43.  Also Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and 
Leadership, pp.25-37. 
Organisational 
Culture 
Metaphor 
 
Objective Entity 
 
The Organisation as a 
whole 
 
A set of behavioural and or 
cognitive characteristics  
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[sic] and Level 1B (patterns of behaviour) appears to make it even more 
useful.22 
 
 While Schein’s model was simple, it helped identify and explain the deeper 
significance of elements of culture uncovered during this research. 
 Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner developed a similar model that 
suggested culture could be viewed in three layers.  The outer layer contained 
artefacts and products and is 'the observable reality of the language, food, 
buildings, houses, monuments, agriculture, fashions, shrines, and art.  They are the 
symbols of a deeper level of culture'.23  The middle layer represented the 'norms 
and values of an individual group.  Norms are the mutual sense a group has of what 
is "right" and "wrong"...values on the other hand, determine the definition of "good 
and bad", and are therefore, closely related to the ideals shared by the group'.24  
The inner layer, meanwhile, comprised the basic assumptions or deepest meaning 
that 'has escaped from conscious questioning and has become self-evident, 
because it is a result of routine responses to the environment'.25 
 Kirke linked this model to the work of Bordieu and Giddens establishing that 
‘the important common ground between these sets of ideas is that the behaviour of 
human beings is naturally informed by, and embedded in, sets of rules that are so 
deep that the actors are not aware of their existence’ and that ‘these rules form the 
                                            
22 Steven Ott, ‘The Organizational Culture Perspective’, 2012, 
http://www.slideshare.net/sandhyajohnson/the-organizational-culture-perspective-steven-
ott, accessed 12 June 2016. For greater detail see Steven J. Ott, The Organizational 
Culture Perspective  (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole, 1989), p.55. 
23 Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner Riding the Waves of Culture: 
Understanding Cultural Diversity in Business (London: Nicholas Brealey,1997), p.21. 
24 Ibid., pp.21-22. 
25 Ibid., p.24. 
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deepest layers of culture’.26  Kirke’s interpretation of Bordieu involved using the 
latter’s ideas that attitudes become ingrained and accepted as normal based upon 
the society in which they are immersed.27 
Kirke also made use of Gidden’s views on structuration.28  Giddens proposed that: 
The flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended 
by actors and these unintended consequences also may form 
unacknowledged conditions of action in a feedback fashion.  Human history is 
created by intentional activities but is not an intentional project.  It persistently 
eludes efforts to bring it under conscious direction.29 
 
 This gives rise to cultural rules that are not as simple as rules of a game or 
sport.30   They ‘are subject to far greater diversity of contestations than the rules of 
games’; they also represent both meaning and sanctioning.31  In addition to the 
influences of Giddens and Bordieu, Kirke also made use of a distillation of 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s Riding the Waves of Culture and Hoefstede’s 
Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind.32  The resulting model making 
use of these amalgamated theories was expressed in the form of an onion in which 
concentric layers represented increasingly deep cultural layers of an organisation: 
LAYER ONE (emphasis in original) is the surface layer, the observable 
elements that would form the raw data for social science research. We could 
divide these data into ‘artefacts’ and practices. 
                                            
26 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture – The Unexpected Force’, p.12.  Anthony Giddens, The 
Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity 
Press,1986 [1984]), pp.1-37. 
27 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture – The Unexpected Force’, p.12.  This is not to be confused 
with Kirke’s other model ‘Army Organizational Culture’ model based upon four social 
structures, five informal relationships, and bending and breaking of rules.  See Charles 
Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine.  Continuity in Change in the British Army, 1700-2000 
(London: Continuum UK, 2009), pp.30-45. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society Cambridge, p.27. 
30 Ibid., p.17. 
31 Ibid., p.18 
32 Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind: Intercultural 
Cooperation and its Importance for Survival (London: Profile Books Ltd 2003 [McGraw-Hill 
International 1991]), p.9.  Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves of Culture, 
pp.20-24. 
 12 
Artefacts’ comprise any observable resources that the human group or its 
members use or create. Such resources would include such diverse things as 
objects, clothing, and language. 
‘Practices’ comprise what the members of the group do. 
 
LAYER TWO is the attitudes and expectations that the individuals have which 
make them feel that the artefacts and practices are ‘right’. 
 
LAYER THREE is the deep structure from which the attitudes and 
expectations (and thus the artefacts and practices) are generated, as 
described by Bourdieu’s ‘ingrained dispositions’ and Goffman’s ‘frames’.33 
 
 For the purposes of this thesis, this interpretation of culture has been 
incorporated into the four ringed 'Roundel Model' of organisational culture as shown 
at Fig 2, giving it an RAF-specific identity.  This model builds upon Kirke’s work and 
also underlines the inward and outward effects that the layers of culture have upon 
each other that was identified in this research.34  It was used to distil, categorise and 
compare important facets of RAF activity for their effect on culture.  The Roundel 
Model will occasionally be referred to in the thesis.  However, its real value was in 
the research stage when it allowed a systematic comparative analysis of elements 
of RAF culture in order to determine their importance and meaning.   
 
 
 
 
                                            
33 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture – The Unexpected Force’, p.12.   
34 This uses a version of the RAF roundel commonly in use during World War II to depict the 
organisational culture of the RAF.  Inspired by Kirke’s onion model it demonstrates culture 
in an RAF context and diagrammatically highlights the forces at play within a culture.  The 
model added to Kirke’s model by introducing the idea of 2-way dynamic interchange 
between rings in an RAF specific context.  The Roundel Model also emphasises the blurred 
lines between the rings.  Kirke based his model upon previous work by Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, Hofstede, Bordieu, Giddens and Goffman.  Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture 
– The Unexpected Force’, p.12. 
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Fig 2 - Roundel Model of Organisational Culture35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observed Behaviour 
 Observed behaviour is the most obvious manifestation of RAF culture which 
signals membership of the culture and, as in the case of many other organisations 
with a strong cultural bias, extends beyond the work milieu.  Examples of observed 
RAF behaviour include appearance (both in and out of uniform), demeanour, 
language (professional jargon as well as ‘banter’), symbols (such as the eagle and 
the roundel), badges of rank, buildings, doctrine, orders and tactics. 
 
                                            
35 Bowyer provided a comprehensive account of aircraft markings from the Second World 
War.  Michael J F Bowyer, Fighting Colours; RAF fighter camouflage and markings, 1937-
1969 (London: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1970 [1969]), p,34, p.45, p.46, p.52, p.59, p.60, p.63.  
 
Fig 2:  The Roundel Model of RAF 
Organisational Culture using a WWII Roundel. 
NB This model is designed to convey thematic 
ideas. Whilst it delineates themes as rings, like 
most models the edges of the rings are blurred.    
Processes	&	
practices	
Observed	behaviour	
Deep Structures and Beliefs 
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expectations	
assumptions	
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Processes and practices 
 Processes and practices are those regular occurrences that take place within 
or around the RAF.  They are both formal and informal and are of great interest to a 
commander as they are the key instruments through which organisational changes 
are made.  They also infuse the other layers of culture thereby contributing to 
changes in the cultural landscape of the RAF.  Applying levers of change in a 
culturally inappropriate manner can, thus, be of great consequence, either positively 
or otherwise.  Examples of formal processes and practices in the RAF are: 
recruitment, training, wearing of uniform, rituals, traditions and ceremonies, honours 
and awards and security protocols.  Informal processes include participation in sport 
and social activity, adoption of unwritten rules and the breaking of existing rules 
and/or protocol. 
Attitudes, Expectations and Assumptions 
 Attitudes, expectations and assumptions may be formal or informal.36  For 
example, official ones, articulated in orders and regulations, lay out a series of 
official cultural standards that suggest that the RAF should have adopted smart and 
disciplined demeanour similar to the Army. However, informal attitudes, 
expectations and assumptions are important in the evolution of culture and often 
differ from those that are officially endorsed.  This played a significant role in the 
RAF developing more relaxed attitudes, assumptions and beliefs regarding its 
approach to dress and discipline.  This will be examined in Chapter II and in Part III. 
Deep Beliefs 
 Deep beliefs are those that are often so ingrained that personnel become blind 
                                            
36 Kirke examines these aspects in detail in Kirke Red Coat, Green Machine. 
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to them.  Three excellent examples of these are air-mindedness, the aviator identity 
and the RAF’s technical mind-set.  Air-mindedness was an officially promoted 
concept that remains a strong theme around which the RAF coalesces today.37   It 
suggested that only airmen can understand air power.   
 Meanwhile, this thesis proposes a theory that the romantic, adventurous and 
dangerous world of flying resulted in the emergence of an aviator identity that 
deeply affected the way the aviators of the British fighting services interpreted and 
acted in their world.38  Aviators elevated professionalism in the cockpit and flying 
skill over many of the more mundane aspects of military life with the consequence 
that this aviator identity had a deep influence on attitudes throughout the service 
about what was really important.   
 In parallel and encouraged by the establishment of a wide variety of ground 
trades and specialisations and through investment in quality training, RAF personnel 
assumed a highly technical mind-set. 39   Technical prowess within the different 
ground trades as well as in the cockpit became a deeply defined value across the 
Service. This allowed personnel to distinguish themselves from the other services 
and was often a source of pride especially for the Other Ranks (ORs) of the RAF. 
Application of the Model 
 It should be noted that the model’s distinctions, in common with most 
modelling processes, are blurred and that individuals within the culture will be 
mapped differently.  Additionally, cultural components of the model may be present 
in more than one ring or, indeed, move from one ring to another.  Notably, changes 
                                            
37 Hugh Montague Trenchard was the First Chief of The Air Staff of the RAF.  Themes on 
air-mindedness are clear throughout Boyle’s biography of Trenchard. Andrew Boyle, 
Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962).   
38 Chapter II examines this aviator identity phenomenon. 
39 The technical mind-set will also be examined in Chapter II. 
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in the rings in the Roundel Model have both inward and outward effects on the 
adjacent rings, as shown in Fig 3.  This model has allowed aspects of RAF culture 
to be examined systematically and allowed their meaning to be interpreted. 
Fig 3 - The Dynamic Nature of Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limitations 
 Before adopting a model or theory its limitations should be considered.  Meek 
provided some perceptive criticisms of Organisational Culture studies that helped 
identify potential weaknesses and guided this research to ensure that false 
conclusions were not drawn.  He cautioned that as Organisational Culture originates 
from a cross-section of disciplines ‘there is a danger that, when one area of study 
borrows key concepts from other disciplines, the concepts become either 
stereotyped or distorted in the transfer’ and that: 
Deep	structures	&	
beliefs 
Attitudes,	
expectations	
assumptions	
Processes	&	practices	
leading	to	observed	
behaviour	
Observed	behaviour	
 
 
Fig 3: The Dynamic Nature of Culture Processes and practices have both a 
marked inward and outward effect upon the adjacent rings.  Changing a practice 
or process can have a significant effect upon the observable behaviour or the 
attitudes and expectations.  The latter would, in turn, have a knock-on effect upon 
weakening or reinforcing deeper structures. 
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The concept of organizational culture can be a powerful analytical tool in the 
analysis and interpretation of human action within complex organizations.  
Alternatively, it can be misused to reify the social reality of organizational 
life.40 
 
 Throughout the research, it became obvious that some studies on culture did 
exactly that.  Kirke criticised definitions that ‘place more stress on the attitudes that 
the management would like to see manifested in the behaviour of the workforce and 
less in the attitudes that are empirically observed’.41  For instance, in the RAF 
sphere, Mahoney’s work on RAF culture is evidence of this; his research focussed 
only on the officer cadre.42  Meek highlighted this as a feature in a broader works on 
culture such as those written by Kilmann et al, Allen, and Martin.43  He wrote: 
Culture, if it is to have any meaning, needs to be related to the total 
organization, not regarded as phenomena solely vested in the hands of 
management.44 
 
 Organisational culture can be viewed in terms of ‘espoused culture’ as well 
as ‘culture-in-practice’. 45  The former is sponsored by the leadership, while the latter 
emerges from ‘between the ears’ of the entire membership of the organisation.46  
This proved important in this research: it will be demonstrated that culture-in-
practice played an important role in the divergence of RAF culture from that of the 
                                            
40 Meek, V Lynn Meek, ‘Organizational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses’, Organizational 
Studies, Vol 9 Iss 4 (1988), p.454. 
41 Kirke, ‘Organisational Culture – The Unexpected Force’, p.11. 
42 Ross Mahoney,  
 ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, 1892-1937: A Social 
and Cultural History of Leadership Development in the Inter-War Royal Air Force’ 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2014). 
43 Meek, ‘Organizational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses’, pp.457-8.  See also Brown, 
Organisational Culture, pp.31-32.  For Schein’s view of the effect of leaders and 
organizational culture see Schein E Organizational Culture and Leadership, p.22. 
44 Meek, ‘Organizational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses’, p.458. 
45 Brown, Organisational Culture, p.31-32. 
46 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture And Defence Acquisition’, pp.97-99. 
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other services as will be seen in Part III.  These terms will be used throughout the 
thesis. 
 Geertz wrote that ‘anthropological writings are themselves interpretations and 
second and third order ones to boot’ and that only a ‘native’ is able to make first 
order ones.47  Initially, the author, as a serving RAF officer, assumed a claim to 
‘native’ status.  However, it was realised this was only partially true; the RAF has 
evolved dramatically since 1918, rendering the author a second order interpreter of 
many aspects of early RAF culture.48  Nevertheless, some of the deeply held beliefs 
appear to have remained fairly constant.  Thus, the author claims partial ‘native’ 
status.  However, ‘native’ status brings with it cultural blindness.  That is mitigated 
somewhat as the author has conducted 3 exchange tours during his military career 
that allowed RAF culture to be viewed from a different perspective and through the 
lens of another military. 
Literature Review 
 Military History has a reputation for examining campaigns or military 
organisations in isolation.  Bond, a military historian, identified that ‘traditional 
military history was essentially concerned with tactics and strategy’ and that it 
‘tended to stress the significance of ‘great captains’ more than such aspects as war 
production, manpower allocation and civilian morale’. 49   There is an emerging 
realisation in the field of military history of the importance of social aspects of 
history.  The air power historian, Gray, wrote that: 
                                            
47 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p.15. 
48 For an understanding of problems associated with being an insider researcher see 
Charles Kirke, ‘Insider Anthropology: Theoretical and Empirical Issues for the Researcher’, 
in Qualitative Methods in Military Studies: Research Experiences and Challenges, eds 
Helena Carrerias and Celso Castro (London: Routledge, 2012).   
49 Brian Bond, in Michael Howard, ‘What is Military History?’ History Today, Vol 34, Issue 12 
(Dec 1984), pp.6-7. 
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One of the major challenges to all military, naval and air historians and for 
that matter, their planners and practitioners in real life, is the need to explore 
warfare in its wider context.  It is not enough to trot out the comfortable 
aphorisms from standard texts such as Clausewitz about war being an 
extension of politics, it is actually necessary to set the application of air power 
into the wider conflict taking due account of the political, legal, industrial, 
social and other factors.50 
 
 The lack of material covering the individual and society in military history is 
reflected in air power academic writing.  Gray continued: ‘the social and cultural 
aspects of military history have generally not been extensively covered for air 
warfare so there is a rich field for study’.51    The air power academic Mahoney wrote 
that: ‘apart from John James’ 1991 study The Paladins; little serious attention has 
been focused on the RAF’s human element from an organisational perspective or in 
terms of experience or development processes’. 52   That overlooks some other 
contributions, however, his point is well made; there is very little academic material 
in this area. 
Social History of the RAF 
 There is a small body of academic work that has touched on RAF culture but 
most academic work in this area is thematically narrow.  While James’ book The 
Paladins did not directly examine culture, it was the most pertinent work to this 
thesis.53   Despite its usefulness, it was poorly referenced and required significant 
work to cross-reference the material. 54  Francis’ The Flyer directly explored RAF 
                                            
50 Peter Gray, Air Warfare.  History, Theory and Practice (New York, London: Bloomsbury, 
2016), p.11. 
51 Ibid., p.13. 
52 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, p.18. 
Gray, Air Warfare.  History, Theory and Practice, p.13. 
53 John James, The Paladins.  A Social History of the RAF up to the outbreak of World War 
II (London & Sydney: Futura 1991 [1990]). 
54 James wrote that ‘I have kept references to a minimum, as far as possible restricting 
them to lesser-known books’. James, The Paladins. p.18.   
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culture.55  He drew particularly upon personal accounts but also made use of film, 
poetry and theatre that situated the RAF within broader British culture.  A repeated 
error referring to Halton in Buckinghamshire, as ‘Halston in Hertfordshire’ and a 
claim that RAF officers ‘prided themselves on their lack of knowledge of horses’ at a 
time when officers such as Brooke-Popham and Trenchard were actively promoting 
equestrian activities highlighted weaknesses of the book regarding the inter-war era, 
albeit that was outside its titled time-frame.56  Meanwhile, the book’s timeframe, 
1939-45, significantly limited its overall value to this thesis and it largely focussed on 
aircrew.   
 Wilkinson recently wrote an insightful thesis examining RAF Reserves and 
class structures.  This was a useful foray into social aspects of the Reserves, but it 
was thematically limited.57  Seabright’s article, ‘RAF Ethos and Culture in the 21st 
Century’, meanwhile, underlined the technical nature of the Service and also 
examined the importance of aircrew in RAF culture. 58  These are themes that will be 
developed later.  His article briefly, but perceptively, explored some of the historical 
origins of RAF culture and underlined challenges for the RAF culture in the modern 
war-fighting operations. 
 Lee’s article ‘Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos’ broached the subject of 
                                            
55 Martin Francis, The Flyer. British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945 (Oxford & 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
56 For ‘Halston in Hertfordshire’ error see Francis M, The Flyer, p.14 & p.261.  Equestrian 
error is found in Francis M, The Flyer, p.14.  Brooke-Popham was an Army officer who 
joined the RFC and, following transition to the RAF, was the first Commandant of the RAF 
Staff College.  He will be examined later. 
57 Frances Lousie, Wilkinson ‘The Territorial Air Force 1925-1957 – Officer Class and 
Recruitment’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Wolverhampton, 2017). 
58 Seabright, ‘RAF Ethos and Culture in the 21st Century’, pp.91-112 
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culture in the air power context.59  It was a perceptive piece of work that examined 
useful cultural issues.  It was mainly based upon oral testimony and personal 
account but backed up with Lee’s obviously strong academic background that 
included Cultural Studies.  However, it was aircrew-centric, not within the timeframe 
of this thesis and left broad RAF cultural issues untouched.   
 In ‘Tribal Warfare’, Wells examined a similar theme to that of Lee but it did 
not examine RAF culture in any detail. 60  However, Wells’ previous book, Courage 
and Air Warfare did include some valuable social research on the RAF.  Although 
the timeframe only covered the Second World War, it made useful observations, 
some of which had origins in the inter-war period.61   Chapters on selection of 
aircrew and morale allowed inferences to be drawn about the culture that 
surrounded them.  However, once again, this was also an aircrew-centric book that 
did not touch on some wider aspects of RAF culture. 
 Mahoney’s PhD chapter ‘Leadership and Royal Air Force Culture and Ethos’ 
was a valuable contribution to RAF social history but, with a focus on Tedder and 
the officer cadre, understandably it had a relatively narrow officer-centric focus.  
Social issues concerning the ORs and ground trades were not covered while RAF 
rituals, traditions and artefacts were mentioned in little detail. 62   Mahoney’s 
examination of the social makeup of Cranwell and the public school influence that 
pervaded the inter-war RAF was, however, very valuable.  
                                            
59 Lee P, ‘Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos’, Air Power Review, Vol 15 No 1 (Spring 
2012), p.4.  
60 Mark Wells, ‘Tribal Warfare.  The Society of Modern Airmen’, Air and Space Power 
Journal, Vol 29 Issue 3 (May-June 2015), pp.82-87. 
61 Mark Wells, Courage and Air Warfare.  The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second 
World War. (London: Frank Cass 2000 [1995]). 
62 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, pp.85-
112.  
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 Pugh included culture as a strand throughout his PhD thesis, ‘The 
Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’.63  This was a useful contribution to the 
historiography of the early cultural origins of the RAF for the purposes of this thesis.  
However, his examination of culture concentrated largely on doctrine and centred on 
a relatively narrow aspect of espoused culture leaving many wider aspects of 
culture-in-action untouched.   While he identified that doctrine is a reflection of the 
culture of the organisation, Gray cautioned that ‘using the formal doctrine 
publications themselves has to be done with care and a critical eye’.64  Given that 
Pugh and Parton have sufficiently covered early air-power doctrine, it was 
discounted as a specific area of research for more pressing culture-related subjects 
that have received little academic attention.65  Doctrine, will, however, be referred to 
at times throughout this thesis. 
 The challenge in researching for this thesis has been the need to extract 
culturally relevant material intertwined with other diverse RAF subject matter.  Kier 
offered the following guidance for examining a military culture: 
Determining the culture of a military organization requires an extensive 
reading of archival, historical, and other public documents, including curricula 
at military academies, training manuals, personal histories of officers, internal 
communications in the armed services, and leading military journals. It is 
important to look for who or what is considered deviant or taboo in the culture 
                                            
63 James Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air: British Military and Naval 
Aviation, 1911 – 1918’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012).  James 
Pugh, Oil and Water: A comparison of Military and Naval Doctrine in Britain, 1912-1914, in 
ed Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell.  A military Transformed?  
Adaption and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945 (Solihull Helion, 2014).   
64 Gray, Air Warfare.  History, Theory and Practice, p.21.  Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of 
the Control of the Air, p.6.  Parton, ‘The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine: 
1919 – 1939’, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2009), p.6. 
65 Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’. Parton Neville, ‘The Evolution 
and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine:1919 – 1939’.  Neville Parton, ‘The Development of 
Early RAF Doctrine’, The Journal of Military History, Vol 72 No 4 (October 2008), pp.1155-
1178. 
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and what it is about such people or beliefs that conflicts with the 
organization's culture.66 
 
 In line with Kier’s guidance, the research has included examination of many 
sources that are not traditionally considered by air power academics.  Gray 
cautioned, of the popular bookstand genre, that ‘it seems that popularity and 
accessibility are directly counter to intellectual rigour’. 67  Similarly, Paris highlighted 
that due to its ‘popular appeal, the war in the air has become very much the 
province of the journalist, the popular writer and the air war enthusiast’. 68  He 
suggested that the lack of academic rigour in the field has resulted in romanticised 
images and myths emerging surrounding air power. 69   This is borne out, for 
example, in Bishop’s Fighter Boys in which the narrative on the early emergence of 
air power used dramatic language, was unreferenced, apart from the quotations of 
participants, and made no mention of Sykes or Henderson.70  Nevertheless, the 
personal accounts provided some valuable insights particularly when considering 
culture-in-action of the Service.  When the populist narrative behind such 
publications is stripped away, they prove to be useful repositories of large numbers 
of interviews, letters and comment that can be used to gain an insight into important 
cultural trends worthy of further research.  It is also important to consider the effect 
the bookstand genre itself has had on RAF culture.  Romanticised literature, 
artwork, war stories, Biggles books and aeroplane magazines have all played a part 
                                            
66 Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine.  France Between the Wars’, p.70. 
67 Gray, Air Warfare.  History, Theory and Practice, p.7.    
68 Michael Paris, Winged Warfare.  The Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain 
1859-1917, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), p.7. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Bishop, Fighter Boys (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), pp.9-13. Sykes and Henderson 
will be examined in detail in Chapters III and IV. 
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in the development of how the RAF is perceived and, indeed, how RAF personnel 
perceive themselves.   
 Other sources, such as personal accounts, letters and biographies were 
useful in revealing the culture-in-practice, including counter institutional behaviour.  
The espoused culture, meanwhile, is more readily understood by researching official 
documents, doctrine, orders and regulations.  Nevertheless, accounts found in the 
popular literature needed careful vetting to ensure that they were not the 
romanticised views that Paris cautioned against. 
Background Material 
While Kier referred to militaries as ‘total’ organisations, Kirke and Seabright 
both highlighted that militaries are, nevertheless, influenced by broader society.71  
The RAF did not emerge in a vacuum, therefore understanding its culture required 
the organisation and its origins to be contextualised both in terms of its roots as well 
as the broader socio-political and geo-political environment in which it emerged.  
Both Meilinger and Gray wrote on the historiography of air power; their works 
are essential reading for anyone considering air power research. 72  Higham’s, The 
Military Intellectuals in Britain, analysed the inter-war years spanning political, 
military and social aspects of the era that affected the development of military 
                                            
71 Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine.  France Between the Wars’, p.69. Charles 
Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine, p.16.  Seabright, ‘RAF Ethos and Culture in the 21st 
Century’, Air Power Review, Vol 7 No 1 (2004), pp.93-94.  Goffman is commonly 
considered the originator of the term ‘total’ institution.  Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on 
the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (Harmondsworth Penguin Books 
Ltd, 1968). 
72 Gray, Air Warfare.  History, Theory and Practice.  Phillip S. Meilinger, ‘The Historiography 
of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine’, The Journal of Military History, Vol 64 Iss 2 (1 Apr, 
2000), pp.467-500.   
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thinking.73   Higham covered maritime, land and air power and emphasised the 
contextual understanding of the military intellectuals he chose to study: ‘they fitted 
themselves into the mainstream of intellectual history by becoming humanitarians, 
psychologists, economist, political scientists’.74  Gollin’s book The Impact of Air 
Power was contextually useful and considered the broad impact of air power but, 
frustratingly, stopped in 1914.75  Meanwhile, accounts from people involved in the 
emergence of the RAF, such as Slessor and Sykes provided useful personal 
insights into the culture of the Service as well as the RFC and RNAS. 76   Gray 
identified that the cultures of the aviation services were firmly rooted in those of the 
parent services: 
The World’s air forces came from parent services and brought with them 
elements of their culture, ethos, structure and staff systems.  Values and 
attitudes also came and approaches to thinking about the history traditions 
and practice were bound to be tainted.  That said, the advent of military 
aviation immediately before the First World War brought with it a heady 
mixture of factors that allowed it to set real distance between the fledgling 
services and the parents.77 
 
The culture of the RNAS and RFC would, in turn, be of great importance to 
that of the RAF.  Understanding the RN and the British Army, were, therefore, 
important tasks for this thesis. 
Essential contemporary reading, in the case of the Army, was Henderson’s 
The Science of War. 78  Kirke’s Red Coat, Green Machine was a cultural study of the 
                                            
73 Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 1918-1939, (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1966). 
74 Ibid,. pp.4-5. 
75 Gollin Alfred, The Impact of Air Power on the British People and their Government, 1909-
14.  London & Houndmills: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989. 
76 Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue, (London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1956).  Sir 
Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles (London: George Harrap & Co Ltd, 1942). 
77 Gray, Air Warfare.  History, Theory and Practice, p.11. 
78 Henderson GFR, The Science of War.  A Collection of Essays and Lectures, (London, 
New York, Bombay and Calcutta: Bilbliolife, [Longmans Green and Co1912]). See, in turn, 
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British Army over 200 years; that was particularly useful as it took an 
anthropological standpoint.79  Spiers’ The Army in Society as well as his contribution 
to the Oxford Illustrated history of the British Army provided excellent background to 
Army culture.80  Holmes’ Redcoat, although intended for the bookstand market, was 
a well-researched book by a respected academic that highlighted many of the 
underlying cultural norms of the British Army.81 
Understanding Military Culture by English was a useful academic 
assessment of military culture.82  Although biased towards a North American view of 
organisational culture and modern North American military organisations, elements 
of his approach provided an applicable amalgamation of organisational theory in the 
military context.  It remains one of the few deep analyses of military culture. 
Sheffield’s books Command and Morale and Forgotten Victory diverged away 
from Niall Ferguson’s and John Keegan’s views on the First World War in The Pity 
of War and The First World War.83  The importance of this in relation to British 
military culture is that it has allowed a much more objective view of the British 
military and its leaders to emerge concerning the years immediately prior to and 
including the First World War along with a reassessment of the ‘Lions led by 
Donkeys’ paradigm.  A result of the deeply emotional response to the First World 
                                                                                                                                       
Olsen’s view on Henderson.  Richard Olsen, ‘An Inspirational Warrior: Major-General Sir 
Thompson Capper’ in Stemming the Tide, ed Jones. Officers and Leadership in the British 
Expeditionary Force 1914, ed Spencer Jones, (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2013), p.189. 
79 Charles Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine.  Continuity in Change in the British Army, 
1700-2000 (London: Continuum UK, 2009),    
80 Edward Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London and New York: Longman 
1980). 
81 Richard Holmes, Redcoat.  The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London: 
Harper Perrenial, 2002). 
82 English, Understanding Military Culture. 
83 Gary Sheffield, Command and Morale.  The British Army on the Western Front 1914-
1918 (Barnsley: Praetorian Press, 2014), p.3. Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (London: The 
Penguin Press, 1998).  John Keegan, The First World War (London: Hutchinson: 1998). 
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War is that it became a preoccupation for historians and somewhat overshadowed 
other events from that era.  Bowman and Connelly referred to there being a vacuum 
in the historiography between the end of the Boer War and the First World War. 84  
The Cardwell reforms and the Boer War, for instance, had resulted in significant 
institutional, procedural and cultural changes within the British Military that are 
largely overlooked.  Thus, works such as Bowman and Connelly’s assessment of 
the Edwardian Army gave a rare and objective modern academic insight into the 
Army of that era and demonstrated that while it was very much geared towards 
Empire, it was engaged and modernising. 
Spencer Jones’ Stemming the Tide included a series of chapters that 
provided an understanding of leadership in the British Army in the formative period 
prior to the First World War.85  Robbins also wrote an excellent chapter entitled ‘The 
army’s ethos and culture’ in his book British Generalship on the Western Front 
1914-18 although disappointingly, he did not refer to the RFC in any meaningful way 
despite its enormous expansion during the period that he covered. 86 
The first commander of the RFC, Henderson wrote The Art of 
Reconnaissance which is essential background reading when exploring Army 
culture surrounding the emergence of air power.87  Originally written in July 1907 
                                            
84 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and 
Deploying the British Army 1902-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.3.  See 
also Sheffield’s view about the emotional response to the First World War. Sheffield, 
Command and Morale, p.4. 
85 Spencer Jones, Stemming the Tide.  Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary 
Force 1914, (Solihull, Helion & Company, 2013).   
86 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18.  Defeat into Victory. 
(Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2006).   
87 Henderson D Brigadier General, The Art of Reconnaissance (London: Kessinger Legacy 
Reprints (n.d. [John Murray, 1915 1907,1908,1911,1914]).  Henderson commanded the 
RFC throughout the First World War and was a key founder of the RAF.  He will be 
discussed in greater detail later. 
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prior to the author’s involvement in air power, it was widely circulated as a text for 
the British Army.  This is what the contemporaries and subordinates of the future 
commander of the RFC were reading, and is an important indication of how highly 
he was regarded in contemporary military circles, something that is lost in the 
historiography.  In its 3rd edition in 1914, it gave a direct insight into his early, and 
somewhat narrow, views on the application of air power, explaining why the 
technical advances within the RFC were less innovative than those of the RNAS.88 
In The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army the chapters by Spiers, 
Travers, Simkin and Bond highlighted cultural norms for the later exploration of the 
RFC within the context of the British Army and in comparison with the RN.89  Of 
particular interest was the evidence of Army reforms and gradual professionalization 
during the late Victorian and early Edwardian eras.90  However, class and tradition 
continued to exert significant pressure on military and naval culture and, despite 
reforms, amateurism and patronage remained strong in the British fighting forces.91 
RN and RNAS Cultures 
The ultimate influence of the RNAS on the RAF was less than that of the 
RFC given the fact that Henderson, Trenchard and Sykes were all of Army origin 
and the RFC was approximately three times the size of the RNAS at amalgamation.  
It was, nevertheless, important to establish a good understanding of the cultural 
disposition of both the RN and RNAS. 
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Mahan and Corbett were essential reading in order to understand the origins 
of RN pre-eminence, particularly given that Corbett was to become the official 
historian for the First World War and a lecturer at the Royal Naval College. 92  His 
influence on the RN was significant; his writings helped shape RN reforms in the 
pre- First World War era with his theories of Command of the Sea being of particular 
importance, especially given that aspects of air power bear some similarities to sea 
power.93 
The collection of essays edited by Till in The Development of British Naval 
Thinking was another valuable source of background information regarding British 
maritime thinking in the run up to the First World War.94  Till identified a lack of 
professionalism, much like in the Army.  This theme coincided with Mahan’s view.95  
Contextually, therefore, Parton’s assessment that the RAF developed an anti-
intellectual bias is unsurprising despite Brooke-Popham’s best efforts to develop an 
intellectual streak in the RAF.96  Lambert similarly reflected that the RN ‘preferred to 
work without a system, leaving the development and delivery of higher education to 
amateur scholars like Julian Corbett’ and that ‘In 1914 it went to war intellectually ill-
prepared, having failed to engage with experience of the past, trusting to a Nelson 
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talisman’.97  Schurman’s Education of a Navy provided a useful analysis of the 
development of strategic thought within the RN from 1867-1914 although, 
surprisingly, it provided no narrative about the emergence of air power. 98   Romans’ 
PhD thesis reflected the pre-eminence of the Executive officers within the RN.99  
This is very similar to the cultural ascendency of the RAF General Duties Branch.  
Pilots, in particular, were held in high regard when the branch based system 
eventually came into existence in the RAF.  According to Mahoney, this appeared, 
to have its roots in the RN approach to branches for officers that the RAF 
adopted.100 
Rüger’s Great Naval Game examined the place of the RN in the age of 
Empire and provided a valuable insight into RN culture that arose from the global 
hegemony it had enjoyed for 200 years.101  It outlined institutional assumptions of 
superiority over the Army that pervaded the RN.  This explains, perhaps, why the 
RN would not condone the emergence of a joint RFC, insisted upon RN control of its 
own aerial service and would become antagonistic towards the RAF in the inter-war 
period.  The book also provided a detailed exposé of how the RN fitted with national 
culture.  As fixed wing aircraft emerged, naval jingoism had reached fever pitch due 
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to the arms race with Germany cementing the RN’s place in the national psyche.102  
It provided a contextualised view of the RN and British society that is rarely 
considered in the historiography of the RAF, yet is important to both the culture of 
the RNAS and the wrangling between the RN and RAF.  Seuter’s book, Airmen or 
Noahs, meanwhile, projected a clear message about the resourcefulness, forward 
thinking and flexibility of the RNAS.103   It also underlined the frictions between the 
RN and the RNAS, although that did need to be tempered, somewhat, by the very 
clearly embittered view Seuter had of the RN.  However, the very fact that such a 
dedicated member of the Naval Service should feel that way underlined the distance 
that emerged between the RN and the RNAS. 
Roskill’s book The Naval Air Service provided a collection of important 
primary sources pertaining to the RNAS and is essential reading but it suffered from 
a lack of analysis.104  Roskill was a major post-war historian who wrote the official 
naval history of the Second World War and was a senior research fellow at Churchill 
College Cambridge.  His two volumes entitled Naval Policy Between the Wars, 
however, were only of incidental use in understanding the RN perspective on the 
RAF.105 
The most useful recent work regarding the RNAS is by Pugh both in his PhD 
thesis and in Oil and Water. 106   In addition to producing well-researched and 
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referenced work, his analysis of the historiography about the RNAS provided a 
salient warning that helped focus this research.  Whilst acknowledging that the work 
of Goulter, Paris, Grove and Parton redressed the imbalance in the historiography 
that The War in the Air had established, Pugh noted that Goulter and Paris, in 
particular, failed to contextualise their work with the wider historiography of the 
RN.107  
The final book to be considered pertinent to the RNAS was Benbow’s  British 
Naval Aviation. The First 100 Years. 108   Grove and Till contributed three valuable 
chapters that provided a balanced view of the emergence of the RNAS and 
acknowledged some of the rivalries and tensions that existed, not only between the 
War Office and the Admiralty, but also between the RNAS and the RN.  Grove noted 
that ‘the airmen chafed under firm Admiralty control and regarded the setting up of a 
fully independent air service in 1918 as something of a liberation’.109  That sentiment 
was reflected in the Ellwood recordings. 110   It is somewhat surprising that the 
members of the RNAS were far more accepting of the new service than perhaps a 
cursory observation of the inter-service rivalry of the inter-war years or, indeed, the 
era following the Second World War might suggest. 
RAF Leaders 
 Despite significant archival material concerning the emergence of the RAF, 
the historiography surrounding Trenchard, Sykes, and Henderson is disappointing.  
Many historians have commented on Trenchard and opinion on him is starkly 
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divided.111  His own written material is limited making it difficult to pin down where 
his motivations and ideas lay and where they overlapped with those of his staff.112  
He also avoided giving interviews and being filmed.   Consequently, despite his 
fame, he remains somewhat of an enigma.113  The official biography, Trenchard, by 
Boyle was factually useful but presented as a sycophantic hagiography that left 
much to be desired as did the more recent and much waited for biography by 
Miller.114  Allen’s book, The Legacy of Lord Trenchard, meanwhile, provided one of 
the few books that countered many of the accepted myths and organisational givens 
that abound in the RAF.115  However, Allen’s referencing was far from extensive 
requiring significant cross-referencing in order to prove his assertions.  This thesis 
will provide a new viewpoint on Trenchard that will help make him more accessible. 
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Despite Henderson’s importance in command of the RFC and his central role 
in the introduction of the RAF, Jordan noted that ‘Sir David Henderson, the first 
commander of the RFC, is almost unknown.116  This thesis will bring together a 
number of different threads that will contribute a more balanced view of early RAF 
leaders.  The only detailed contemporary writing on Henderson was by Seely and 
Jones. 117   More recently, Paris highlighted the stark lack of coverage of 
Henderson.118  The University of Glasgow has a small biography on him along with 
some brief archival records concerning his time there.119  Greenald wrote a short 
article on him in RAF Halton magazine and Henderson earned a paragraph in 
AP3003 the official Short History of the RAF.120  Greenald is currently writing a 
biography on Henderson that is yet to be published but should prove useful in 
highlighting Henderson’s role in British air power.121  Pugh, meanwhile, wrote a 
chapter on Henderson that is well researched and insightful.122  There is, therefore, 
a small body of academics that is slowly redefining Henderson’s contribution to the 
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emergence of British air power.  This thesis will contribute to that revisionist 
movement. 
 It was really only Ash, Pugh, Higham and, to a lesser extent James who 
acknowledged Sykes’ role in the establishment of the RAF. 123   Ash’s work 
demonstrates deep research.  His proposal that Sykes played a much more 
important role than the historiography suggests is sound, and supported by the 
archival evidence.  However, Ash’s writing was, in places, overly biased towards 
Sykes.  For instance, according to Pugh, he over-looked the similarity of Sykes’ and 
Haig’s views on the offensive in order to strengthen the idea that Sykes was an air 
revolutionary. 124   Despite this, Ash should be considered the current leading 
academic on Sykes.  This thesis will add to Ash’s work by underlining Sykes’ 
organisational brilliance and ability to integrate the new technology within existing 
Army structures.  Many of the processes and practices that he established had an 
enduring cultural effect upon both the RFC and the RAF. 
 Sykes’ autobiography was held up by Gray as an example of how a 
comment, unsupported by the wider body of evidence, can be ‘dangerous’ over his 
claim that Haig was not an advocate of air power. 125   This is a feature of 
autobiographical works that the researcher needs to be wary of.  Autobiographies 
also suffer from being written with hindsight and authors justify their actions or 
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positions.  Sykes’ autobiography was thus treated with due caution and cross-
referenced wherever possible.126 However, in defence of Sykes, Trenchard also 
referred to a contemporary perception that Haig was resistant to air power.127  This 
perhaps gives Sykes’ claim in his autobiography some credence; it is possible that, 
while Sheffield and Jordan have demonstrated Haig’s overall support of air power, 
that the message he portrayed may have waivered from time to time.  Views and 
positions do, after all, change with time. 
Training 
 The aspects of training considered for this thesis were the apprentice system, 
the RAF College and the Staff College.  Academic material of any real substance 
covering the apprentice system was lacking despite the fact that it was the most 
innovative aspect of RAF training.   Greenald, Armitage and Larkin wrote short, non-
peer reviewed, articles that involved an element of academic analysis but they 
barely exposed elements of RAF culture. 128   The Trenchard Museum archive 
proved a valuable source of published and unpublished personal accounts providing 
human commentary revealing evidence of a strong apprentice sub-culture and 
culture-in-action that will be exposed in this thesis.129 
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Despite its importance, The RAF College Cranwell, has also received little 
consideration from the academic community.130  Haslam’s The History of Royal Air 
Force Cranwell was a fairly simplistic chronology that provided some useful cultural 
observations, however, it was poorly referenced.131  Mahoney examined aspects of 
the College including analysis of social backgrounds.  Importantly, he highlighted 
Cranwell and Andover as ‘key enablers in the development of the assumption of 
independence as they established and nurtured a feeling of membership for the 
officer class of the RAF’.132  This thesis uses material available in TNA, the RAF 
College Archive and the Trenchard Museum in order to build upon Mahoney’s work 
and to establish a deeper understanding of this important institution.  Of particular 
value was the hitherto unused Character Book that provided an exciting window on 
the demography of the cadets.133 
Mason’s history of the RAF Staff College is probably the most complete work 
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on the subject.134  It was written whilst he served at the RAF Staff College.  Well 
researched and referenced, it did nevertheless exhibit an overly positive bias, which 
is unsurprising as Mason had an RAF chain of command to answer to.  Mahoney 
examined the Staff College and provided useful comment about its contribution to 
culture.135  Other writers such as Parton, Biddle, Gray and English wrote worthwhile 
academic analyses on the Staff College. 136  However, none of their work provided 
analysis directly related to RAF culture.  Thus, much like other aspects of this thesis, 
significant reliance has been placed upon drawing from such academic writing and 
primary sources material and melding them into a framework of cultural 
understanding.  The sources that were of most value with respect to the RAF Staff 
College were AIR 69 in TNA, material held at the Joint Service Staff College, audio 
files held at the Imperial War Museum and papers by Brooke-Popham from the KCL 
Archive along with personal accounts by Slessor. 
Artefacts, Traditions, Customs and Rituals 
 There has been virtually no academic analysis of RAF artefacts, traditions, 
customs and ritual.  Congdon, Hering and Sargent provided bookstand genre 
descriptions of the development of early RAF symbols while Hobart provided a more 
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specific overview of the history of badges and uniforms. 137   Stradling wrote 
enlightening contemporary books entitled Brass Hat and also Customs of the 
Service but they were largely descriptive with little analysis.138  James provided the 
most relevant academic work with respect to this subject matter.139   The dearth of 
academic material for this section required research that drew heavily upon archival 
and other primary source materials. 
Architecture 
 Architecture was key in Trenchard’s plan for making the RAF a permanent 
organisation in his 1919 White Paper.140  However, there is little academic material 
that dealt with infrastructure and the impact it had on RAF culture.  In Bases of Air 
Strategy, Higham covered the evolution of RAF infrastructure.  Curiously, for a 
professor of military history, he chose to provide no foot or endnotes, preferring only 
to provide two pages entitled ‘Notes on Sources’.141  The book is well researched 
but the lack of referencing makes his material frustratingly difficult to corroborate.  
The book concentrated on the operational functions of airfields along with the 
physical and organisational aspects of airfield construction.  It provided a clear 
picture of the scale of airfield construction but covered little of the cultural, 
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sociological or psychological impact that airfields had upon the millions of men and 
women who served on them.  The lack of contextualisation is odd given how 
assiduously Higham contextualised The Military Intellectuals in Britain.142 
 Francis, the archivist and chairman of the Airfield Research Group, wrote 
many books, articles and studies of military infrastructure.  His book, British Military 
Airfield Architecture included a promising chapter entitled ‘Domestic Buildings’ that 
had the potential to examine the human dimension.  However, while it provided 
excellent descriptions and plans of buildings, it proffered little on how humans fitted 
in.143  Congdon and Hering recognised the social aspects of life in the RAF and in 
their respective books both indirectly acknowledged a link between the infrastructure 
of the RAF and people who lived and worked in it.   Hering’s short chapter on mess 
customs described the life in officers’ messes and conveyed its importance as a 
cultural hub for officers.144  However, he only considered officers messes providing 
no comment on the much broader and deeper cultural effect of the technical estate, 
married quarters or other domestic accommodation. 
 Congdon recognised the importance of buildings and the civil engineers that 
designed and constructed them in his chapters ‘Construction Miracle’ and ‘RAF 
College Cranwell’. 145  His observation about personnel being familiar with life on a 
station thanks to the use of standardised building designs was important and he 
also noted the ‘personal comfort that station accommodation provides’.146  However, 
his analysis did not go much deeper. 
                                            
142 Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain.  
143 Paul Francis, British Military Airfield Architecture.  From Airships to the Jet Age (Yeovil: 
Patrick Stephens Ltd, imprint of Haynes Publishing,1996).  
144 Hering, Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force, pp.151-156. 
145 Congdon, Behind the Hangar Doors, pp.11-26. 
146 Congdon, Behind the Hangar Doors, p.11. 
 41 
 Once again, James provided the most valuable viewpoints; in addition to 
painting a clear picture of the thought that went into the Bulloch designed and Arts 
Council-approved plans for some of the key buildings, he succeeded in conveying 
how the buildings affected the people who lived and worked in and around them.147   
Sherbrooke-Walker, an Army Officer, made valuable observations about the way 
RAF stations worked and the effect that physical structures had upon personnel.148 
 Gray, Goulter and Grey highlighted the dangers of relying on official RAF 
histories.149  Works is an official history and is, therefore, prone to such weakness.  
However, along with James, it is one of the few documents that provided any real 
measure of analysis of the social impact that the expansion infrastructure had upon 
personnel.150 
Conclusion 
 It is clear that the RAF has a culture that runs deep, yet it has received little 
attention from the academic community.  Organisational Culture is a multi-
disciplinary school of thought that proved useful in explaining that culture.  
Meanwhile, the Roundel Model, derived from Kirke’s modelling, allowed archival 
material to be examined and interpreted in a systematic manner.  This helped the 
author interpret elements of RAF culture and their consequences and was 
particularly valuable in the research for part III. 
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148 Ronald Sherbrooke-Walker, Khaki & Blue (London: The Saint Catherine’s Press 
Ltd,1952). 
149 Gray, Air Warfare. History, Theory and Practice, p.20.  The author has had first hand 
experience in preparing F540 histories that commanders have subsequently ‘adjusted’ in 
order to present a positive report; Gray referred to this as “cover up”.  Cox at the AHB 
maintains a policy of restricting access to only the originating unit in order to try to prevent 
this occurring.  
150 AHB, Air Publication 3236, Works, Air Ministry,1956.  ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of 
the Royal Air Force 1934-1934, Air Historical Branch (1) Air Ministry. G 106,640. 
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 The lack of academic literature on the subject of RAF culture demonstrates 
that this area of air power is in need of research.  Keir’s guidance to look broadly in 
order to examine culture is important to this thesis.  While there may be a dearth of 
academic comment that deals directly with the subject, there is a plentiful supply of 
primary source material available.  Meanwhile, many areas of academic writing 
tangentially touch upon culture given the enormity of the subject.  The challenge lies 
in how broadly the researcher needs to look in order to draw the strands of culture 
together into a cogent and manageable entity that then allows meaningful analysis 
to be conducted.  Understanding the origins of RAF culture required a clear 
appreciation of the culture of the RNAS, RFC and, in turn, the RN and British Army.   
That appreciation also needed to be contextualised within the social and geo-
political paradigms of the era in which air power emerged.  Thus, as well as 
researching material that the air power theorist will recognise as serious primary 
sources or academic comment, the need to understand culture-in-practice has 
required examination of personal accounts, RAF magazines, unpublished material 
and the bookstand genre material.  Manifestations of espoused culture were most 
clearly identified in Air Publications, orders, regulations, official papers and 
correspondence. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE AVIATOR IDENTITY AND TECHNICAL MIND-SET 
The myth of Icarus, drawings by Da Vinci and Jules Verne’s fiction indicate a 
longstanding and popular fascination with manned flight.  Early aviators fulfilled one 
of mankind’s most elusive dreams.  In flimsy machines with unreliable engines they 
risked their lives to soar like birds.  They were pioneers of the third dimension and 
assumed heroic status to those on the ground.  Wells wrote that perceptions of 
physical and mental superiority of flyers were often linked to ‘characteristics 
associated with sportsmen, hunters or cavalrymen’ and militaries began to recruit 
accordingly.1   In Britain, he noted that selection was based on ‘naïve notions 
relating to the social and cultural background of flyers’.2 
 The RAF, politicians, the media and aircrew themselves reinforced, what will 
be referred to in this thesis as, the aviator identity.  With time, this would become an 
increasingly pronounced phenomenon that remains alive even today.3  Lee wrote: ‘ 
From the era of dog-fighting biplanes to the age of fly-by-wire, twin-engine 
fast-jets with stealth technology and satellite-guided weaponry, each iteration 
of technological advancement has seen its associated RAF aircrew – 
especially the pilots – construct their ethos in the shadows of those early 
pioneers. The heritage and heroics of their forebears have been claimed and 
selectively incorporated in the ethos of each new generation who would apply 
the increasing utility of air power in combat operations.4 
 
 This aviator identity was not restricted to the British aerial services nor was it 
exclusive to military flyers.  It was a global phenomenon that the media and general 
                                            
1 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, p.4. 
2 Ibid 
3 Rob Burgon, Piano Burning and Other Fighter Pilot Traditions (Utah: Slipstream 
Publishing, 2016).  For a perceptive psychologist’s view of how the Aviator Identity has 
been internalized and perpetuated within the military environment. ‘The Failing Aviator’, 
published online 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WecvU_QYt_c accessed 16 
April 2017.   
4 Lee, ‘Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos’  
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public bought into as much as the aviators themselves.5  It was sufficiently strong to 
create a bond between aviators that would even transcend the politics of war.  Not 
only did RAF aircrew belong to RAF culture but they also belonged to an 
international culture between aviators demonstrating Kirke’s point that ‘we all belong 
to a vast array of different groups, each with its own culture, so we are always 
trimming our behaviour to fit in with the culture of different groups at different 
times’. 6   This aviator identity was enormously important in the development of 
attitudes, assumptions and deep cultural structures of the RAF. 
 In parallel with the aviator identity, as the aerial forces emerged, leaders 
rapidly prized the idea that they were creating highly technical services. This was 
recognised and sponsored at the highest level and resulted in a mind-set that would 
have a profound effect across all ranks of the RAF. 7  Technical and specialist 
competence for pilots and within trades and branches became a strong and 
coalescing focus for the RAF that contributed to its identity and pride.  The 
apprentice scheme and RAF engineering, in particular, allowed the RAF to express 
                                            
5 See, for example, the panache of French aviators and its influence in Britain. Air Vice-
Marshal Peter Dye, ‘France and the Development of British Military Aviation’, Air Power 
Review, Vol 12, No 1, (Spring 2009), p.5.  See also heroic imagery and reporting of  ‘Les 
Triomphateurs du Michelin Grand Prix’ in La Vie au Grand Air No 652 (18 March 1911).  For 
a view of aviation enthusiasm in the United States see Aircraft Year Book, New York: 
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America Inc, (1924).  See also Popular Aviation, 
1927-1928 (this became Aeronautics and then Flying Magazine).  Looping the Loop shows 
poster art-work from various nations that underlines the spirit of adventure and glamour 
surrounding flight that transcended national borders.  Henry Serrano Villard, Willis M Allen, 
Looping the Loop.  Posters of Flight (California, Kales Press, 2008 [2000]). See also 
Dominick A Pisano, The Airplane in American Culture (USA, University of Michigan Press, 
2006 [2003]), pp.16-18. 
6 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture and Defence Acquisition’, pp.97-99. 
7 The technical nature of the RFC was clear in CAB 38/20/1 ‘Report of the Standing Sub-
Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on Aerial Navigation’.  The importance of 
training for this ‘highly technical service’ was underlined in Cmd. 467 ‘The Permanent 
Organization of the Royal Air Force’, p.4. Trenchard’s clear view on the RFC being a 
technical service will be referred to later and is in Alan Morris, Bloody April.  The Heroic 
Story of the Fliers of World War 1 (London, Arrow Books, 1968), p.144. 
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superiority over the other services on both a personal and institutional level.  It also 
helped attract high quality cadets and recruits.8  Underlining technical expertise in 
the delivery of cutting edge airpower also gave the RAF its means of expressing and 
defending its independence.  This chapter will examine the aviator identity and how 
a technical mind-set contributed to broader RAF culture and behaviour. 
Romance and Chivalry 
 Aviation was very risky, modern and perceived as romantic.9  This new mode 
of transport placed airmen at the forefront of technology, meanwhile, flying was 
restricted to a relatively small and elite band of people.    The ability to soar in the 
third dimension and to look down upon the earth, where mere mortals lived gave 
aircrew a privileged and elite existence.  Hamilton-Patterson wrote that: ‘in all but 
the most granitically [sic] unimaginative, a pilot’s aerial viewpoint could at 
unexpected moments become almost philosophically detached, even lordly’. 10  
Modernity and youthfulness defined the aerial services that were populated by 
young adventurous risk-takers.  A key feature of the new aerial services is that 
those who went into combat were few in number and predominantly officers.11  
Roskill noted of the RNAS that: 
There is no doubt that it attracted into its ranks many very gallant 
idiosyncratic characters.  And outstanding gallantry was often, perhaps 
usually, allied to idiosyncrasy.12 
                                            
8 Sherbrooke-Walker, Khaki and Blue, p.9. Lawrence referred to the higher standards 
required for entry into the RAF even outside the apprentice system.  He also referred to 
RAF standards with reverence.  TE Lawrence, The Mint (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), p. 
21 and p.195.  
9 Air Commodore Peter Dye, ‘The Aviator as Superhero’, RAF Air Power Review, Vol 7, No 
3 (Autumn 2004), pp.65-76.  Lee P, ‘Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos’, pp.1-19.  Paris, 
Winged Warfare.  Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, p.4. 
10 James Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death.  The First War in the Air (London Head of 
Zeus Ltd, 2015), p.152. 
11 Seabright, ‘RAF Ethos and Culture in the 21st Century’, pp.91-112 
12 Roskill S, Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, p.x. 
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 Pemberton Billing, an MP, and early member of the RNAS, said: ‘because of 
its gallantry and of the constant risks, not only war risks but peace risks, it attracts a 
temperamental type of man’.13 
 Writing in 1944, Brooke-Popham celebrated that ‘youthful adventure’ and 
‘idealism’ inspired the gallantry that RAF tradition was based upon.14  He wrote the 
following about youthful adventure: 
 For airmen experience the full joy of a fearless heart; they exhibit a certain 
joyous carelessness of life, perhaps because they can feel with Peter Pan 
that “to die will be an awfully big adventure” – just a big adventure nothing 
more.  This spirit is made evident in a special form of courage – the 
exhilaration of danger.15 
 
 That Brooke-Popham committed such comments in an official publication is 
important.  On the general subject of officer-like qualities on the ground and in the 
Mess, he was a traditionalist. 16   However, with respect to the aerial aspects of the 
Service, his views on youthful adventure demonstrate an official endorsement of an 
almost amateur approach to this risky profession.   Brooke-Popham wrote the 
following on idealism that underlines the sense of poetic insignificance induced by 
flying: ‘being brought into close contact with the great powers of nature’ realised not 
only that they were ‘weak puny’ creatures but also that they were ‘brought into 
contact with the other side of nature – beauty, certain aspects of which can only be 
                                            
13 Pemberton Billing, ‘Clause 3’, Hansard, HC Deb, 16 November 1917, vol 99 cc749-78, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1917/nov/16/clause-3-transfer-and-
attaching-to-air, accessed 13 Nov 2017. 
14 KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham 9/6/35, Brooke-Popham, ‘Notes on the Traditions of 
the Royal Air Force’, ATCP No 55, April 1944, pp.2-3. 
15 Ibid, p.3. 
16 For Brooke-Popham’s traditionalism see KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham Papers 
1/5/4 ‘Commandant’s Address, 4 April 1922’, p.4.  Biddle T, Rhetoric and Reality in Air 
Warfare, p.92.  See also English ‘The RAF Staff College, p.410.  
 47 
seen by those who fly.17  Aviation epitomised romantic adventuring that chimed with 
the well-entrenched tradition of contemporary jingoistic boys’ adventure literature 
typical of Imperial Britain such as Boys Own Paper.18  
 As well as the romance of flying, notions of chivalry also emerged in the First 
World War.   Military aviation came to represent a form of aerial jousting.19  Cecil 
Lewis wrote that: 
 To be alone, to have your life in your hands, to use your own skill, single 
handed against the enemy.  It was like the lists of the Middle Ages, the only 
sphere in modern warfare where a man saw his adversary and faced him in 
mortal combat, the only sphere where there was still chivalry and honour.20 
 
 Chivalry between opposing aircrew was most clearly demonstrated following 
capture during the First World War.  Grinnell-Milne wrote of his German captors: 
They did much more than spare our lives, they spared our pride…It may have 
been wholly that much exaggerated ‘comradeship of the air’ which linked us, 
but I prefer to believe that our mutual understanding ran deeper.  We wore 
the uniforms of our respective countries, we stood for different causes, but, 
beneath all the superficialities, we knew that we were actuated by the same 
motives.  Youth, adventure, high spirits – those things wound up for us the 
mainspring of life.  We would have fought just as well without propaganda; we 
had no need for bitter hatred.  So may it have been in the days of chivalry.21 
 
The sense of chivalric code was condoned and perpetuated by the hierarchy 
even at HQ RFC level; air dropped letters sanctioned by the HQ with news of 
downed crews of both sides were held in official files that also include orders for 
                                            
17 KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham 9/6/35, Brooke-Popham, ‘Notes on the Traditions of 
the Royal Air Force’, ATCP (No 55, April 1944) p.3. 
18 Boys Own Paper Magazine was published from 1879 to 1967 and emphasised adventure 
and British imperial hegemony.   
19 For an examination of chivalry see Dye P, The Aviator as Superhero.  Lee P, 
Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos. Paris M, Winged Warfare, p.6.  Wells, Courage and 
Air Warfare, p.4. 
20 Cecil Lewis, Sagittarius Rising (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2009), p.45. 
21 Duncan Grinnell-Milne, Wind in the Wires (London: Grubb Street Publishing, 2014 
[London: The Aviation Book Club, 1937]), p.151. 
See also Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death, p.169.  
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British crews to drop information over German lines.22  Meanwhile, the officially 
endorsed language adopted by aircrews was chivalric.  For instance, the First World 
War term ‘victory’ implied gallant duelling.   Pisano underlined that victory was ‘a 
euphemism that cloaked the more malign term “kill”’, although the term ‘kill’ would 
later become commonplace. 23   The chivalric code remained evident, although 
officially condemned, in the Second World War, as highlighted by the 1944 Tee 
Emm article ‘He Sold his Country for a Cigarette’.  The article articulated concerns 
that captured airmen were speaking freely with German aviators immediately after 
their capture and insisted it should stop.24 
The emphasis on chivalric behaviour was questioned by Paris who 
highlighted that the popular press had encouraged the emergence of a heroic 
narrative that Raleigh, in particular, strengthened by ‘virtually giving it the official 
seal of approval’.25  Similarly, Lee juxtaposed the mythology of chivalric behaviour 
that had emerged against the harsh realities of what actually took place during 
combat.26  Gould Lee’s contemporary account of his experiences in the First World 
War also demonstrated that the lived experience was somewhat removed from that 
portrayed in the popular press and by Raleigh.  Parker, an RFC pilot from 1915-
1918 wrote: ‘the war that started with no small amount of chivalry became a dog-
eat-dog affair before it reached the end and man was controlled by his most savage 
emotions & animal instincts’.27  Hamilton-Paterson wrote that ‘this careful skewing of 
reality has made it easy for later generations to retain a very limited and trivialised 
                                            
22 TNA AIR1/864/204/5/511, ‘HQ RAF BEF, Fate of German Airmen 14th April-8th Nov 1918’. 
23 Pisano, The Airplane in American Culture, p.19. 
24 See CFS Archive, ‘He Sold his Country for a Cigarette’, Tee Emm, Vol 4 No 9 (December 
1944), p.201.  Unaccessioned, 
25 Paris, Winged Warfare, p.6.  
26 Lee, ‘Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos’, p.9. 
27 CFS Archive, Major S E Parker, Memoirs Vol 1 (1962), p.77. 
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version of the first war in the air and, indeed, to mis-understand its significance ever 
since’.28  This misunderstanding is a result of the structuration effect induced by that 
‘careful skewing of reality’.  The reality involved long hours, terror, boredom and 
humour. 29  Dye’s article, ‘The Aviator as Super Hero’ underlined some of the very 
important and sobering realities of aerial combat in the First World War.30  The high 
attrition rates, long hours working in open cockpits, loss of colleagues and poor 
training all placed significant stress upon aircrew. 31   When those stressors 
overwhelmed aircrew, they were frequently removed to ‘Not Yet Diagnosed 
Nervous’ Centres.32  By the Second World War, neurological problems with aircrew 
were referred to as Lack of Moral Fibre (LMF) and dealt with severely.  LMF is a 
highly contested subject that has been extensively dealt with by English, Wells, 
Kingdon and Collins and will not be discussed in depth here.33  However, English 
wrote that ‘the LMF label did inspire fear in fliers, and it did keep some of them at 
their stations’.34  Meanwhile, Wells provided an interesting angle on RAF LMF policy 
that supports the idea that, through its actions, the RAF institutionally, although 
                                            
28 Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death, p.2. 
29 Arthur Gould-Lee, No Parachute (London: Grub Street, 2014 [2013]), p.68.  Lewis, and 
Bartlett, also highlighted the life in the aerial services involved a range of emotions beyond 
the simply chivalric.  See also Lewis, Saggitarius Rising and Squadron Leader C P O 
Bartlett, Bomber Pilot 1916-1918, ed Chaz Bowyer (London: Ian Allen Ltd, 1974).   
30 Dye P, ‘The Aviator as Superhero’ p.65.  For further comment about perceived 
superhuman status see also Wells, ‘Tribal Warfare’, p.83. 
31 Dye, ‘The Aviator as Superhero’, p.72.   
32 Christopher Kingdon, ‘Behind Closed Doors: Revisiting Air Command’s ‘Lack of Moral 
Fiber and Waverer Disposal Policy’ and its ‘Treatment’ of Neurotic Cases, 1941-1945’, 
Chicago Journal of History, Iss 2 (Autumn 2013), p.19..  
33 For analysis on Lack of Moral Fibre see English, ‘Leadership and Lack of Moral Fibre in 
Bomber Command 1939-1945.  Lessons for Today and Tomorrow’ in The Insubordinate 
and the Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience 1920 to 
Present, ed Howard Coombs (Kingston and Toronto: Canadian Defence Academy Press 
and Dundurn Group, 2007).  See also: Wells, Courage and Air Warfare.  Kingdon, ‘Behind 
Closed Doors’ and Michael D. Collins ‘A Fear of Flying: diagnosing traumatic neurosis 
among British aviators of the Great War’, First World War Studies, Vol 6. Iss 2, (2015), 
pp.187-202. 
34 English, Leadership and Lack of Moral Fibre, p.112 
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possibly subconsciously, promoted the myth of aviators being super-human.35  This 
was supported by Collins who wrote that as Medical Officers and the administrators 
blamed combat stress on failures of ‘physical and moral ‘character’’, so the ‘experts 
and bureaucrats forged the cult of the aviator as a military hero’.36 
In addition to this official promotion of the aviator identity, gallantry citations, 
the official history of the First World War, popular literature, poetry and press 
coverage all helped further to underpin it.37  Lee highlighted the importance of Lord 
Rothmere’s descriptions of aircrew as: ‘the breathless tones in his description of 
aerial derring-do would appear more at home in a romantic novel than in a 
ministerial message published in The Times’.38  The romantic super-human image 
of aviators endured, through structuration, as new generations of aircrew arrived in 
the RAF with pre-conceived ideas of flying and life in the Service.  In the interwar 
period, popular literature such as Biggles and magazines such as Popular Flyer, Air 
Stories and Boys’ Own Paper would also play a significant role reinforcing such 
imagery.39  Despite the realities Dye highlighted, Lee underlined how aircrew viewed 
themselves in line with the popular images that abounded: 
 The pilot’s identity as the brave superman of extraordinary physique and 
intelligence brought him affection from the public and envy from the trench-
bound Tommy. He ‘strafed the Hun’, contested aerial duelling, reconnoitred 
enemy territory, dropped bombs: all with remarkable skill, endurance in the 
face of physical and mental injury, determination and cunning. Usually until 
he died doing so.40 
                                            
35 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, p.194. 
36 Collins ‘A Fear of Flying’, p.188. 
37 For examples of how aircrew expressed such feelings see for example, eds John Pudney 
and Henry Treece, Air Force Poetry, (London: John Lane The Bodley Head Ltd, 1944).   
38 Lee, ‘Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos’, p.8. 
39 Biggles was written by WE Johns, a First World War RFC pilot and editor of Popular Flyer 
magazine.  Johns wrote prodigiously with just under 100 Biggles books and short stories.  
The first Biggles story was ‘White Fokker’ in the 1932 Edition.  W E Johns, ‘White Fokker’, 
Popular Flyer (April 1932). 
40 Ibid. p.8. 
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Officially Endorsed Dominance of Pilots 
 
 Given that the third dimension was accessible and understood only by a 
special few, so the RAF formed its General Duties (GD) Branch that, initially, was 
almost entirely composed of pilots.  This was akin to the RN’s Executive Branch in 
delivering the future leadership of the RAF as highlighted by Mahoney: 
Through the GD Branch, the RAF showed an evidential preference for 
pilots.  The RAF nurtured selected GD Branch officers as future leaders, as 
they exhibited the traits that the Service valued, which linked with the 
generation of a distinct culture and ethos…41 
 
 RAF leadership was, therefore, entirely dominated by pilots.42  Aviator identity 
combined with the need to be technically proficient were key to advancement in the 
officer cadre in this service that defined itself on technical superiority.43  This would 
later serve to create divisions in the officer corps as new branches were introduced 
but the GD Branch would remain dominant.44 
Discipline and Lackadaisical Attitudes? 
 In the aerial services, the officers conducted the fighting and often, at junior 
officer level, they were not responsible for large bodies of troops as they were in the 
Army and RN.  Combined with the atmosphere of chivalry, romanticism and a sense 
of fatalism that arose out of the clear dangers of flying, in peace as well as war, 
some interesting behavioural patterns emerged.  Francis wrote that: 
The air force was characterized by an apparently relaxed attitude towards 
discipline, uniform, and deportment which stood in marked contrast to the 
standards maintained by the army and navy.  Pilots adopted an extremely 
lackadaisical attitude towards drilling or saluting, and even senior officers 
                                            
41 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, p.111.  
Seabright also reflected upon this as the central difference between the RAF and the other 
services.  Seabright, ‘RAF Ethos and Culture in the 21st Century’, pp.98-101. 
42 To date, every Chief of the Air Staff has been a pilot. 
43 Cmd. 467 ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’, p.5. 
44 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, p.110-
111.   
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seemed oblivious to decorum or protocol….the pre-war RAF appeared to 
possess a carefree culture which was more reminiscent of a private flying 
club than of a focussed fighting service.45 
 
 This statement conforms with a populist view of the RAF but is a little 
overstated and needs to be unpacked and balanced.  Lewis identified that, unlike 
their infantry counter-parts, aircrew: 
…lived, as it were, either in the stretch or the sag of nerves.  We were either 
in deadly danger or we were in no danger at all and this conflict between 
something which was really more or less just like being at home and being 
in really quite a tight position.46 
 
Perhaps because of this and despite the demands of a doctrine that centred 
upon the relentless offensive, some First World War commanders adopted an 
approach with the aircrew under their command that was, indeed, relatively more 
relaxed than in infantry units and RN ships.  Daybell wrote that Trenchard was no 
‘Chateau General’ and that he did not expect infantry style “bull”.47  He also noted 
that RFC leaders ‘at all levels, imposed a relaxed and easy discipline that 
emphasised individuality and personal initiative and the result was a close knit corps 
that fought an aggressive campaign with courage and tenacity’.48  The focus was on 
the technical delivery of airpower.  This was supported by Morris in an account of 
Trenchard’s admonishment of an officer who ordered a mechanic on an early 
morning run. ‘This is a technical corps.  Our job is to shorten the war.  You’re not in 
                                            
45 Francis M, The Flyer, p.15. 
46 Cecil Lewis, ‘The Great War Interviews’, BBC, 31:22-31:56 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p01tczfx/the-great-war-interviews-4-cecil-arthur-
lewis#group=p01tbj6p, accessed 13 Nov 2017.  
47 Wing Commander P J Daybell, ‘Trenchard’s Undisciplined Mob’, Air Clues (October 
1997), p.372. 
48 Ibid., p.374. 
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the Army now, you know.  Get this into your thick head!’.49  Meanwhile, Hamilton-
Paterson wrote that: 
A regime of squadron life had been established with a unique flavour of its 
own, one that in many respects ran counter to many of the regular Army’s 
most sacred tenets.  Typical of this were matters of discipline and dress, for 
everyday life on an active squadron was often conducted in comparatively 
informal terms…Visiting brass were often surprised and occasionally 
scandalised that RFC airmen might not only dispense with saluting but came 
and went on the airfield in a motley assortment of clothes.50 
 
 Parker noted that, on arrival in the RFC in 1915, he demonstrated he could 
already confidently perform drill and was never called to perform ceremonial duties 
again during the War.51  A perception emerged, then, borne out in the archives and 
primary source material, that rules and regulations did not necessarily apply to this 
technical service.52  Such an approach was also evident in the RNAS which earned 
a reputation across the wider RN for a lack of discipline.53  However, the extent to 
which the RNAS, RFC and RAF should be considered a lackadaisical organisation 
should not be over-emphasised. 
 It will be seen that Sykes’ vision, in conjunction with Barrington-Kennet’s, was 
that the RFC, and subsequently, the RAF, would have all of the necessary 
disciplinary and behavioural standards of a highly disciplined army.54  This afforded 
the Service recourse to punishment that was as harsh as that in the RN or Army.   
                                            
49 Morris, Bloody April, p.144. 
50 Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death, p.157. 
51 CFS Archive, Major S E Parker, Memoirs, Vol 1 (1962), p.12. 
52 In addition to Hamilton-Patterson see, for example, CFS Archive, ‘They Want to Turn Me 
into a Guardsman’, Tee Emm Vol 4 No 2 (May 1944), p.52.  See also ‘Where’s that Zipped 
Lip?’, Tee Emm Vol 4 No 3 (June 1944), p.60.  Seabright, ‘RAF Ethos and Culture in the 
21st Century’, pp.97-98. 
53 See Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p.27 and p.36.  
54 Barrington-Kennet was an officer serving on the MW who was an advocate of high 
standards of dress and discipline.  Sykes, From Many Angles, p.96.  
 54 
This was reflected in the RFC, RNAS and RAF Orders and King’s Regulations.55   In 
addition to regulations, the RAF adopted organisational structures and practices 
such as Officer of the Day as well as the RN concept of an Officer of the Watch.56  
This was not, therefore, an organisation built on institutional ill-discipline and 
unprofessionalism ignoring all contemporary military norms.  Throughout the inter-
war years, the RAF placed significant importance on deportment, discipline and drill, 
particularly at institutions such as the RAF College, the apprentice schools and 
other training establishments.  The Ensign ceremony, meanwhile, was treated with 
reverence throughout the inter-war period at every RAF Station.57  Such was the 
formality of the RAF, James referred to an underlying stuffiness in the inter-war RAF 
officer cadre. 58   It will also be seen that, during the Second World War, the 
expansion period stations were viewed as flagships of RAF discipline and 
behaviour. 59   Meanwhile, the LMF policy was harsh.  It would, therefore, be 
misleading, to characterise the entire RAF as Francis did.  The reality was far more 
nuanced.  It is clear that many aspects he highlighted were, indeed, present in the 
                                            
55 King’s Regulations highlight the many documents indicative of structured discipline.  All 
officers were to be in possession of The King’s Regulations and Air Council Instructions for 
the Royal Air Force, The Manual of Air Force Law, practical notes on Air Force Law, The 
RAF Services Pocket Book, The Manual of Military Hygiene and the Manual of Military 
Sanitation in its application to Military Life, RAF Handbook on the Vickers Gun and the RAF 
Handbook on the Lewis Gun. AHB, ‘King’s Regulations and Air Council Instructions for the 
Royal Air Force 1924’, p.579. 
56 The Officer of the Watch was supported by an airman skilled at semaphore and log 
keeping, to oversee all aspects of flying on a station. RAFM, ‘RAF Terminology and 
Ceremonial’, Order 641, 18 July 1918, RAF Air Ministry Weekly Orders, 
57 The ceremony initially was detailed and involved the presence of a band or bugler and a 
guard of honour. Ibid. 
58 James, The Paladins, p.171. 
59 James, The Paladins, p.175. Richard Caygill, ‘Nearly a Somebody’, WW2 People's War, 
BBC, 22 Aug 2005, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/54/a5246354.shtml,  accessed 12 May 
2013. Essex-Lopresti made reference to formal RAF stations and less formal ones in Dr 
Michael Essex-Lopresti, ‘Memories of a Wartime Erk in the RAF’, WW2 People's War, BBC, 
23 Aug 2004, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/40/a2939240.shtml, 
accessed 24 May 2015. 
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RAF, in varying degrees. That depended upon a variety of factors such as the 
leadership, the type of aircraft, and the type of station.  However, much like the 
notions of chivalry, the popular perceptions of RFC, RNAS and the early RAF 
lacking discipline and being very relaxed were important as they would contribute to 
an image that, through structuration, would become amplified and then self-
sustaining. 
 Francis’ statement that ‘the RAF was ‘reminiscent of a private flying club 
rather than a focused fighting service’ appeals to the populist view typified by Monty 
Python or Blackadder sketches.  However, this undermines the RAF’s disciplined 
approach to flying and engineering.  The strict selection and training systems for 
aircrew and a need to fit in with the super-human aviator image encouraged high 
standards in the air.  Meanwhile, it will be seen that training for ground-crew, 
particularly the apprentices, encouraged a deep pride and competitive edge in RAF 
personnel towards the technical aspects of their work.  It will be demonstrated that 
the RAF was suffused with its own language and humour and that RAF personnel 
from some of the RAF sub-cultures did, at times, exhibit less regard for some of the 
processes and practices associated with military service such as drill and 
deportment.  However, RAF technical professionalism both in the air and on the 
ground can hardly be compared to that of a flying club. 
Conclusion 
 The aviator identity emerged, in no small part, because of a fascination with 
manned flight.  Throughout the period considered by this thesis, despite the advent 
of aeroplanes, few people had experienced flight.  Therefore, an aura emerged that 
surrounded those able to achieve what had previously been considered an 
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impossible dream.  They were considered adventurous and daring.  This was not 
without foundation; flying attracted many flamboyant risk takers and accidents were 
frequent.  The conditions were, therefore, set for eccentricities to be magnified 
during the intense pressures of warfare.  With the encouragement of the aerial 
services, the press and the establishment, a mythological image of aviators 
emerged that aircrew themselves subscribed to and reinforced.  The leaders set up 
the RFC, RNAS and then the RAF along largely traditional organisational lines 
based upon their own previous experiences and preconceptions.  However, the 
aviator identity and the technical mind-set resulted in these organisations adopting a 
different culture-in-practice despite the similarity in structures, rules and orders to 
those of the RN and Army that provided the framework for the RAF’s espoused 
culture.  Following amalgamation of the RNAS and RFC, this would become 
increasingly pronounced as the RAF did not have a parent service to answer to.  
The aviator identity and the technical attitude of the RAF will be important themes 
throughout the thesis and they had a profound effect upon the manner in which RAF 
culture emerged.   
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PART II 
EARLY LEADERS 
 Meek, in an extremely valuable and cautionary paper wrote that ‘the 
problem with some studies of organizational culture is that they appear to 
presume that there exists in a real and tangible sense a collective 
organizational culture that can be created, measured and manipulated in 
order to enhance ‘organizational effectiveness’. 1  He was particularly 
concerned with a trend that assumes that even ‘honest grapplers’ have 
produced studies that ‘seem unduly linked to the interest of management and 
which promulgate the idea that ‘culture’ is the collective consciousness of the 
organization, ‘owned’ by management and available to management for 
manipulation.’2  He added that ‘most anthropologists would find the idea that 
leaders create cultures preposterous: leaders do not create culture, it 
emerges from the collective social interaction of groups and communities’.3  
 Schein wrote: ‘I believe that cultures begin with leaders who impose 
their own values and assumptions on a group’.4  Meek cautioned that Schein 
overemphasized the importance of the impact of leaders on a culture 5 .  
However, Schein clearly articulated the importance of shared culture but also 
highlighted the importance of leaders in a newly formed organisation that still 
recognises that the culture ultimately emerges from the ‘social interaction of 
groups and communities’:  
                                            
1 Meek, ‘Organizational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses’ p.453.   
2 Ibid., p.453.   
3 Ibid., p. 
4 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, p.2, 
5 Meek, ‘Organizational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses’ p.459.   
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 Culture is created by shared experience, but it is the leader who 
initiates this process by imposing his or her beliefs, values, and 
assumptions at the outset.6 
 
 This thesis firmly contends that leaders do not directly create culture. 
Part II will, however, support Schein’s position. In the very hierarchical 
environment of the early Twentieth Century fighting forces, Henderson, Sykes 
and Trenchard initiated a process that, in due course, resulted in the 
emergence of RAF culture.  They set up processes, practices, symbols, 
traditions and rituals that were key to the emergence of the espoused culture 
of the RAF.   However, the distinctive overall RAF culture that eventually 
emerged was heavily influenced by how its members interpreted and reacted 
to the world that emerged out of the organisation that had been set up by its 
leaders; that culture-in-action will be examined in Part III. 
 RNAS leaders Seuter, Vaughan-Lee and Paine were considered for 
inclusion in Part II.  However, their roles in the development of the RAF were 
minor although the author recognises their role in developing the RNAS into a 
forward-looking organisation that drove developments such as the 
introduction of torpedoes, early RNAS offensive operations and building up an 
armoured car Division in France. 7  In the author’s opinion, the key leaders 
that need to be examined in Part II are Henderson, Sykes and Trenchard.  
  
 
   
  
                                            
6 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, p.225. 
7 Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm – or Armoured Corps?’, p.27-55.  However, their 
role in the development of the RAF was minor.   
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CHAPTER III 
HENDERSON - FATHER OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE? 
 Trenchard’s biographer, Boyle, describes Henderson, as a ‘singularly cool and 
far sighted man’.1  Yet history has largely overlooked the far sightedness that was so 
crucial to the formation of the RAF.  Greenald, pointed out that ‘the man who set out 
the blueprint for the creation of the Royal Air Force, is little known today’ and that his 
recognition amounts to not much more than ‘the Henderson Mess and parade square 
being named after him’.2   In ‘Short History of the Royal Air Force’ he was only 
accorded a short paragraph that described how his fortunes changed in the RFC 
following a series of ‘low-level’ staff appointments.3  It will be seen, on the contrary, 
that he was a well-respected high flying officer in the Army. Pugh described him as ‘a 
highly effective staff officer’ while Gollin referred to Henderson as the ‘moving spirit’ 
in the organisers of the Royal Flying Corps highlighting the esteem in which he was 
held by Buchan, Trenchard and Jones.4  In Winged Warfare, Paris attributed ‘many of 
the crucial decisions affecting the development of the air service’ to Henderson but 
wrote that ‘his role has never been fully explored’. 5   Meanwhile, Higham 
acknowledged Henderson’s contribution, albeit in a footnote about the official history, 
and explained a key reason for his lack of recognition was that both Sir Walter 
Raleigh and H A Jones: 
Fell heavily under the influence of Lord Trenchard as did the third of 
Trenchard’s official biographers, Andrew Boyle.  As a result, the work of Sir 
                                            
1 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.99. 
2 Greenald, ‘Sir David Henderson – Chief of the Royal Flying Corps and Architect of the 
RAF’, p.21. 
3 ‘Short History of the Royal Air Force’, AP3003, p.6.  
4 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’, p.269. Alfred Gollin, 
The Impact of Air Power, p.198. RAFM AC 71/4/2 Unpublished draft probably Jones 
(Forward by Maj Gen J Seely) 
5 Paris, Winged Warfare, p.214. The Life of Sir David Henderson, Chapter I, p.2. 
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Frederick Sykes, the real founder with Sir David Henderson of the Royal 
Flying Corps, has been carefully slighted.6 
 
 In rare criticism, Boyle noted the care Trenchard invested in choosing the 
official historian and that he ‘sternly refused to allow freeplay to his own capital role in 
its [the RAF] arrival and survival’.7  This chapter will add to Pugh and Greenald’s 
work to increase awareness of Henderson’s contribution to the RFC and RAF. 
 Henderson led the real work of the Technical Sub-Committee of the Standing 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on Aerial Navigation in 1912.8  
He was then the Director of Training at the War Office, with the RFC under his 
purview, until he was made Director of Aeronautics and deployed into the field in 
command of the RFC during its dramatic growth.  On 1 April 1918, the RFC had 
become a vast organisation comprising 15 522 officers, 98 738 ORs with 8350 flying 
machines. 9  Jordan wrote that ‘he deserves much greater prominence since he might 
reasonably lay claim to being the ‘father of the RAF’’.10  The transformation was 
impressive, not only in scale, but also in terms of rapid technological change.  Under 
Henderson’s command, the RFC developed its own uniforms, established orders, an 
early doctrine, manned airfields and aerodromes, developed training procedures and 
brought new technology into the British armed services.  Pugh wrote that the RFC 
was ‘an integral component of the BEF, and the Corps reflected the doctrine, 
                                            
6 Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, p.120.  
7 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.514. 
8 CAB 38/20/1 ‘Report of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
on Aerial Navigation’, War Office, 29 February 1912.  Also, TNA Air 1/119/15/40/62 in file 
entitled ‘Policy and Organization Memorandum on Naval and Military Aviation’. 
9 TNA Air 8/13 ‘Synopsis of British Air Effort During the War’, (London: HMSO, 1919), p.16.  
10 David Jordan, ‘Lieutenant-General Sir David Henderson: Forgotten Father of British Air 
Power?’, Air Power Review, Special Edition, (Spring 2013), pp.19-20.  This was similarly 
claimed in ‘The University of Glasgow Story, Lieutenant General Commanding David Y 
Henderson, Sir’, www.universitystory.gla.ac.uk/ww1-biography/?id=178, accessed 2 June 
2015.  
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practices and wider cultural identity of the British Army’. 11  However, Pugh did not 
acknowledge some of the cultural shifts of the RFC.  Air power represented a 
significant change in the way war was conducted.  The technology was new, RFC 
structures and bases gradually became more air power oriented and only a small 
number of individuals, mainly officers, conducted the fighting, the majority, mainly in 
the ORs, provided support.  This gave rise to a distinctly different sub-culture in 
which the aviator identity was crucially important.  The processes and practices 
required to conduct aerial warfare were different to many of those in the other corps 
and regiments and despite being part of the British Army and, contrary to Pugh’s 
view, the changes resulted in a significant divergence away from British Army culture.  
That culture transferred, in large measure, to the RAF on 1 April 1918.  In order to 
examine the culture of the RAF, Henderson’s important role in the growth of RFC 
culture needs consideration.  Another key aspect of Henderson’s impact on the RAF 
beyond his command of the RFC was the influence he had on the establishment of 
the RAF itself.  He was the main military adviser informing the Smuts report and was 
deeply involved in the transition process. 
 This chapter will examine Henderson’s early career and personality.  It will 
then examine the more important processes and practices that Henderson was 
responsible for introducing and how they affected the RFC organisational culture and 
also that of the RAF. 
 David Henderson was born on 11 August 1862, attended Clifton Bank School, 
St Andrews.12  He matriculated at Glasgow University in 1877 at the age of 15 where 
                                            
11 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’, p.266.   
12 Douglas Haig was one of his contemporaries at Clifton Bank.  RAFM AC 71/12/12, Jones 
H, ‘Sir David Henderson, Father of the Royal Air Force’.   
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he studied under Lord Kelvin and was in the company of some of the most 
progressive scientists of the Nineteenth Century. 13   Pugh underlined that 
Henderson’s very technical background was unusual compared to other more 
generalist educations of his contemporaries such as Haig.14 
 Commissioned into the Argyll and Southern Highlanders in Aug 1883 he 
served on imperial duties until 1894 in South Africa and Ceylon.15  Following a period 
of regimental duties in Edinburgh, he attended Staff College at Camberley. 16  Pugh 
identified the important point, as far as the future culture of the RFC is concerned, 
that Henderson attended the Staff College at a very important time when ‘the 
education provided at Camberley went some way to providing the British Army and 
its Staff College graduates with a shared language that reflected the corporate image 
of the organisation and the values and beliefs to which it gave precedence’.17  This 
was the Army that had emerged from modernisation of the Caldwell reforms and was 
getting its house in order; Henderson was a product of the significant changes that 
this caused.18  He graduated in 1896 and took up a position in the Mobilisation 
Section at the War Office from which, according to Jones, ‘most of the officers who 
                                            
13 Lord Kelvin after whom the unit of absolute temperature was named.  See Jones H, ‘Sir 
David Henderson, Father of the Royal Air Force’, Henderson Papers, RAF Museum AC 
71/12/12.  The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography also contends he studied under Lord 
Kelvin.  Smith R, ‘Henderson, Sir David’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxye.bham.ac.uk/view/article/33808?docPos=1.accessed 12 
June 2015.  Henderson made reference to his scientific background in the preface to 
Lanchester F, Aircraft in Warfare, the Dawn of the Fourth Arm (London: Constable and 
Company Ltd, 1916), ppv-ix. 
14 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’, p.267. 
15 RAF Museum AC 71/12/12, ‘Jones H A, Sir David Henderson, Father of the Royal Air 
Force’. See also ‘Air of Authority – A History of RAF Organisation’, Henderson biography, 
http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/HendersonD.htm, accessed 2 June 2015.   
16 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’, p.268.  
17 Ibid.   
18 For a broad understanding of the changes the British Army of the era underwent see 
particularly Henderson GFR, The Science of War.  Holmes, Redcoat. Holmes, The British 
Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket.  Kirke C, Redcoat, Green Machine.  Stemming the 
Tide, ed Jones. 
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passed through the Section, in its early days, achieved high command’ reflecting that 
he was a high flyer.19  The Mobilization Section surveyed the entire British Army 
establishing its capabilities and wartime roles. 20  Thus, in addition to his regimental 
duty in Empire, Henderson developed a broad understanding of how the Army 
functioned, how it was structured and how it was modernising.  In 1898, he took part 
in the Battle of Omdurman under command of Kitchener.  This was a key battle of 
Empire in the Nineteenth Century and resulted in Kitchener becoming a household 
name.21  Henderson also witnessed the effects of the newly introduced machine-gun 
technology at Omdurman.22 
 During the Boer War, as an intelligence officer, Henderson was besieged at 
Ladysmith but led troops on a daring mission on Gun Hill.  Despite being wounded, 
he and his men destroyed a key gun emplacement.  This was widely reported in the 
press and gained Henderson significant credibility.23 
 In South Africa, Henderson experienced rapidly changing tactics and the 
integration of new technologies.  He was appointed brevet Lieutenant Colonel, 
became Kitchener’s right-hand man, and totally reorganized the intelligence system 
that was being used.24   In doing so, he showed his flair for original thought and an 
ability to establish new organisational structures, processes and practices.  His 
                                            
19 RAF Museum AC 71/12/12 Jones H A, ‘Sir David Henderson, Father of the Royal Air 
Force’, p 9. 
20 Ibid. p.2. 
21 Ibid., p.3.  
22 Ibid. 
23 For more detail of Henderson and Siege of Ladysmith see: RAFM AC71/12/601-2 
Henderson Family Scrap Book Press Cuttings: ‘How Long Tom Was Destroyed’ also 
‘Position at Lady Smith. A Brilliant Sortie. Guns Captured’ also ‘New Director of Intelligence’ 
also ‘Map Showing the Position of the Boer Guns round Ladysmith’, The Times (Jan 24 
1900).  See also Brigadier Brian Parritt, The Intelligencers.  British Military Intelligence from 
the Middle Ages to 1929 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2011), p.193. 
24 RAFM AC71/12/601-2 Henderson Family Scrap Book Press Cuttings, ‘New Director of 
Intelligence’. 
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scheme would later form the backbone of the intelligence system used by the BEF in 
1914. 25   In addition, according to Pugh, ‘Henderson became a vital member of 
Kitchener’s “inner circle”, securing an important and influential patron in the 
process’.26  Patronage was an important aspect of the Edwardian Army that allowed 
advancement. 27  The British Army of the era was thus delineated into spheres of 
influence or camps.  Kitchener, would become a valuable ally to Henderson; it was 
Kitchener’s patronage, for instance, that called for him to be returned to the RFC 
when he had been sent by French to command the 1st Division in 1915. 
 Henderson returned to the UK and in 1904 was appointed Deputy Assistant 
Quartermaster General for the 1st Army Corps at Aldershot under the command of 
Lieutenant-General Sir John French who became another important patron to him in 
the RFC.  French’s patronage would be the reason for Henderson being chosen as 
the aviation specialist for the 1912 Technical Sub-committee. 
 In 1904, Henderson published two key books.  The first, Field Intelligence 
would, according to the Official History of the Intelligence Corps, ‘prove a vital 
document for the next war as the Field Intelligence Departments were disbanded at 
the end of the war in 1901’.28  The second, entitled The Art of Reconnaissance, was 
                                            
25 RAF Museum, AC 71/12/12 ‘Jones H A, Sir David Henderson, Father of the Royal Air 
Force’, p.4.  See also RAFM AC/71/12/12 Letter from de Bertodhaus to H A Jones p.2.  
26 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’, p.269.  He was 
mentioned in dispatches by Kitchener in July for his Intelligence work, and was also written 
up by him for a DSO that was awarded in November 1902.  DSO announced in The 
Edinburgh Gazette, November 4, 1902, p1086.  
https://www.thegazette.co.uk/Edinburgh/issue/11458/page/1086, accessed 21 Oct 2017. 
Mention in Dispatches with citation in The London Gazette, July 29 1902, p.4836.   
27 See Gary Sheffield, The Chief, Douglas Haig and The British Army, (London: Aurum Press 
Limited, 2011), p.24.  See also Travers, ‘The Army and the Challenge of War 1914-1918’, p. 
218. 
28 Henderson David, Field Intelligence: Its Principles and Practice (London: HMSO, 1904) in 
IWM LBY 80/1294. See also ‘History of The Intelligence Corps’, MOD, 
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published in 1907 and was widely used for Army infantry training.29   This gave 
Henderson’s ideas and intellect broad exposure across the Army.  His writing was 
not overly academic in nature and was acceptable in a military that did not treasure 
intellectualism.30  Pugh wrote: ‘he avoided the label and stigma associated with the 
term “intellectual”.31  Henderson was, therefore, well known, well respected and had 
strong patrons throughout the British Army. 
 Henderson’s first interaction with air power came in 1909.  He was appointed 
as French’s ‘expert on aviation’ in a submission to the Sub-Committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence on Aerial Navigation and he also accompanied 
French at the French Great Aviation Week in Reims in 1909.32    He enrolled for flying 
lessons and earned Royal Aero Club Certificate number 118 on 17 Aug 1911. 33 
 The 1912 report by the Technical Sub-committee to the Standing Sub-
Committee of the Imperial Defence on Aerial Navigation recommended forming a 
joint organisation to oversee the development of aerial services to be called the 
‘National Corps of Aviators’34.   It was through French’s patronage that Henderson 
was recommended as its main adviser.  French wrote that the officer to lead the work 
                                                                                                                                        
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/history_of_intelligence_corps.pdf, accessed 21 
Oct 2017.  See also ‘Henderson, Lieutenant General Sir David’, in Philosophers of War.  The 
Evolutions of History’s Greatest Military Thinkers, eds Daniel Coetzee and Lee W Eysturlid L 
(Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford: Praeger, 2013 [Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC]), p.447.    
29 RAF Museum AC 71/12/12 Jones H A, ‘Sir David Henderson, Father of the Royal Air 
Force’, p.4. Henderson D, The Art of Reconnaissance.   
30 Anti-intellectualism and amateurism in the British Army will be examined later. 
31 Pugh J, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’ p.270. 
32 Ibid, p.271. www.universitystory.gla.ac.uk/ww1-biography/?id=178, accessed 2 June 2015 
and RAF Museum AC 71/12/12, Jones H A, ‘Sir David Henderson, Father of the Royal Air 
Force’, p.5.   
33 ‘The University of Glasgow Story.  Lieutenant General Commanding David Y Henderson, 
Sir’ and ‘Air of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation’, Henderson biography. 
34 CAB 38/20/1 ‘Report of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence on Aerial Navigation’.  The Technical Sub-Committee was headed by Lord Haldane 
with Churchill, Seely, Esher, Chalmers, Battenburg, Samson, Haddon, Murray, Henderson, 
O’Gorman and Ottley sitting on it. 
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should be ‘without doubt David Henderson – for two reasons, the first that he has 
learned to fly, a very rare thing nowadays - and I suppose an air sense to an airman 
is important as sea sense to a seaman - secondly, he is a faithful man.  He will not 
fail you in a tight corner’.35   French understood the importance of having an air-
minded officer on the Sub-Committee. 
 While the Technical Sub-Committee submission was signed by 
representatives from both the War Office and the Admiralty, in reality the team 
comprised majors MacInnes and Sykes, led by Henderson.36 
The Impact of Henderson’s Personality on the Culture of the RAF 
 Henderson was extremely well respected in contemporary society in military 
circles, as well as in wider society, which played a major part in helping him secure 
understanding and patronage for air power.  Seely wrote that: 
 David Henderson was indeed a most remarkable and unusual man, and the 
outstanding service which he rendered to his country, in being the principal 
author of the Air Force which shattered Germany’s dreams of Air Supremacy 
was made possible by those qualities.  I judge those qualities to have been 
courage, consistency, charm and loyalty.  Each one of those qualities he had 
to an exceptional degree.37 
 
 The author of the biography itself, in which Seely wrote that introduction, 
referred to Henderson as follows: ‘he was a highly popular officer.  His brilliant gifts 
earned him the respect of all those with whom he worked, and the simplicity and 
charm of his character earned him their love.  “He never interfered with his 
subordinates, but one would give of one’s best just because it was David who 
                                            
35 Mason George, ‘The Forgotten Father of the Royal Air Force’, 28 April 2015, 
 http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/blog/the-forgotten-father-of-the-royal-air-forc/ , accessed 7 
April 2017.  Also, Greenald The First Air Chief, unpublished Draft (n.d.) p.45. 
36 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’, p 272.  Paris, Winged 
Warfare, p.214. 
37 AC 71/4/2 The Life of Sir David Henderson, Chapter I, p.2. 
 67 
asked”, said Sir George Milne’.38 
 However, one of Henderson’s most criticised characteristics was his lack of 
vision for air power in its earliest stages.  Until after the departure of the BEF for 
France, he was not broadminded enough to see the potential of air power outside the 
sphere of intelligence gathering; even Jones criticised him for a lack of vision for the 
RFC in its early days.39  Paris pointed out that: 
 General Sir David Henderson who saw only a limited auxiliary role for aircraft, 
and who above all, believed that bombing was ‘uncivilised’ and unacceptable 
in modern warfare.  If this was the attitude of its commanders, no wonder the 
RFC took so long to develop its potential.40 
 
 Pugh, meanwhile, wrote that the ‘MW’s narrow focus on reconnaissance, a 
direct result of Henderson’s influence and expertise, the Wing developed in 
something of a one-dimensional fashion’.41   Orange, Goulter and Gollin provided 
compelling evidence to highlight how the RN was developing a range of capabilities 
prior to and during the First World War while the RFC remained wedded almost 
entirely to intelligence and spotting for the Army.42  The innovative thinking by the RN 
was extensive.  For instance, by March 1914, Seuter, whilst in command of the 
RNAS, had already deposited a patent for the development of torpedoes.43  The RFC 
did not pay much attention to employing weapons on aircraft to provide a credible 
home defence, despite this being one of the RFC’s tasks.  The RFC also did not give 
much consideration to offensive action.  As well as only viewing aircraft for 
                                            
38 Ibid., p.1. 
39 Paris, Winged Warfare, p.9.  
40 Paris, Winged Warfare, p.163. 
41 Pugh, David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps, p.278. 
42 Vincent Orange, Churchill and his Airmen.  Relationships, Intrigue and Policy Making 
1914-1945. (London: Grub Street 2013), ch.1-2. Goulter C, A Forgotten Offensive, pp.2-10.  
Gollin, The Impact of Air Power, p.199.  
43  For Seuter’s innovative dedication to developing air power see, for instance, RAFM AC 
74/12/2/3 ‘Patent Office application for Torpedo patents’. 
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intelligence purposes, Henderson saw little value in developing bombing capabilities, 
in no small part because of his own moral objections to it.44  Thus the RFC arrived in 
France in 1914 with no tangible offensive capability.  This is perplexing; Sykes had 
noted the French developing bombing and arming aeroplanes with guns in 1911 and 
they even believed that the Germans did not attack France in 1911 for fear of the 
French destroying vital bridges with bombs. 45  Additionally, Sykes wrote of using 
aircraft as fighting machines in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground roles in Aircraft in 
War in 1914. 46   The RFC also carried out some missions at the Netheravon 
Concentration Camp using guns and bombs.  Offensive capability was, clearly, 
available but Henderson directed policy to favour reconnaissance.47  After the First 
World War started, the RNAS was able to mount an attack on Dusseldorf on a 
Zeppelin hangar as early as 8 October 1914 in what Orange highlighted as being part 
of Churchill’s plan to prevent German aircraft reaching the British Coast.48  Orange 
also highlighted that while the War Office was responsible for Home Defence, the 
RFC was not equipped to do so and that Churchill took on that role for the RNAS.49  
These criticisms of Henderson are valid when considering his early views on air 
power.  However, they fail to recognise Henderson’s more progressive approach to 
air power that emerged with the passage of time and experience.  It was Henderson 
who had the vision of establishing an independent air force that made him probably 
                                            
44 Paris, Winged Warfare, p.166 & p.215. 
45 RAFM AC73/35/1/7/1, Sykes F, ‘Notes on Aviation in France, Nov 1911’. 
46 RAFM AC 73/35/1/16, Sykes F, ‘Aircraft in War’, Quarterly Review, April 1914, Article 13, 
p.567.  
47 Sykes, ‘Notes on Aviation in France’.  Also ‘Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing) at 
Netheravon.  The Concentration Camp’. Flight, No 288 (No 27, Vol VI) (July 3 1914), p.698, 
https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1914/1914%20-%200698.html accessed 7 May 
2017.  Also, RAFM AC 73/35/1/18. 
48 For more detail on RNAS development see Seuter, Airmen or Noahs.  
49 Orange, Churchill and his Airmen, pp.18-19. 
 69 
the most forward thinking air power protagonist of his era. 
 However, while the historiography concentrates on Henderson’s lack of air 
power vision, his fundamental contribution to air power and the culture of the RFC 
was the manner in which he introduced it.  Respected, well connected, forthright and 
conventionally successful in the British Army, Henderson was able to promote air 
power from within the establishment, dressed up in an acceptable manner to both 
external and internal audiences.  He developed what today would likely be termed a 
multi-stranded corporate communications campaign exploiting aviation’s novelty to 
seduce the press and garner interest upon his personal contacts including the 
Asquiths and Royalty.50  In both his staff work, and broader published material, he 
was not afraid to express his opinion nor to dress up hard-hitting truth where 
required.  His forthright approach and obvious technical and organisational skills 
earned him a reputation for dependability both with Kitchener and French.  Pugh 
wrote that it was ‘cautious and deferential progressiveness that Henderson utilised to 
further the cause of aviation within the British Army’.51  Through his persuasive yet 
conformist approach, he succeeded in gaining acceptance within the establishment 
of what was one of the most important revolutions in the history of the British military. 
 Pugh wrote that ‘Henderson was not of the Herbert Richmond or J.F.C Fuller 
school of reform and innovation’.52  However, although Richmond and Fuller were 
both brilliant theorists whose writing had great effect upon modern warfare, neither 
were implementers of practical innovation like Henderson.  Seely pointed out that ‘it 
has seldom, if ever, fallen to the lot of any man to be principally responsible for the 
                                            
50 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’, p.275. 
51 Ibid., p.270. 
52 Ibid. 
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creation of a new Army, and almost at once to find himself in Command of it in 
battle’.53  While Henderson may have had a narrow view of air power, in the early 
stages of RFC development, his skill lay in the translation of concept and theory into 
a structural and operational reality.  His conservative approach ensured that air 
power was accepted by the establishment, but a consequence of that was that it 
would have many structural and cultural similarities with its parent services.  The way 
in which he established the acceptance of the RFC within the Army is contrasted by 
the RNAS’ more troubled relationship in the RN.54  Roskill highlighted that RNAS 
officers: 
…tended to rub the more conventionally minded senior naval officers up the 
wrong way – chiefly by their alleged lack of discipline.  The emancipated form 
of discipline practised among airmen was certainly not understood by the 
regular Navy of those days.55 
 
 Admiralty Weekly Orders in 1916 highlighted clear irritation by the Admiralty at 
RNAS officer behaviour.56  Meanwhile, Joubert de la Ferté wrote that: 
 The Admiralty’s adventure into aviation still remained of a tentative nature.  
There did not seem to be a clear conception of the part that aircraft could play 
in naval warfare, although many junior officers had strong views on the 
subject…57 
 
 The credibility Henderson established for British air power was key to its 
relatively smooth integration into the British Army. 
Organisational Structure 
 Henderson’s contribution to the Technical Sub-Committee is important.  The 
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Sub-Committee had a mandate to recommend broad principles for ‘the future 
development of Aerial Navigation for Naval and military purposes’ for which terms of 
reference already laid out a broad framework. 58  This included the establishment of a 
Naval Aviation Service, a Military Aviation Service, a National Corps of Aviators, a 
State School of Aviation (including staffing and housing) as well as the provision of 
aeroplanes and hangars and the development of an aircraft factory.59  Henderson’s 
task was to lead his Sub-Committee and build upon this agreed, but scant, proposal 
for the development of British air power.  His report produced two important results.  
Firstly, it painted an extremely bleak picture about the state of British aviation with the 
French possessing 250 military aircraft while the British owned fewer than a dozen.60  
That hard-hitting statement counters Pugh’s view that Henderson was deferential.61  
Secondly, the report provided a detailed working framework from which the resultant 
RFC would be formed.  It incorporated a very early doctrinal basis for the use of 
aircraft and established the principle of jointery for British air power.  In borrowing 
terms such as squadron and introducing new ones such as wing, it introduced a new 
lexicon, that would enter into common parlance within the air services.  It laid out an 
organisational structure including numbers of squadrons to be employed. 62   It 
proposed courses and training syllabi that would be required, including for ground 
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personnel, advice for the selection of airfields, and pay proposals.63  This was a 
detailed report that provided a roadmap upon which the RFC would form and 
incorporated all the basic processes and practices necessary for the evolution of a 
new espoused culture. 
 Of note, at this nascent stage, Henderson underlined the importance of 
developing technical skills in the RFC.  He and the Technical Sub-committee 
identified a need to ensure that enough well-trained mechanics to support military 
flying for starting the RFC but also in order to expand if required.64  The first function 
of the Aircraft Factory, as outlined in the Technical Sub-Committee Report, was ‘the 
higher training of mechanics for the Flying Corps’.  This established what would 
become a mantra for the RFC and subsequently one of Trenchard’s key themes; that 
the Service was primarily a technical one. 
 Following ratification of the Report’s recommendations, the RFC was 
established on 13 April 1912 and an Air Committee was established, on 25 April 
1912, designed to oversee activity between the RN and the Army.65  According to 
Geenald, ‘Henderson, with political backing from Asquith, Haldane and Seely, ably 
supported by Sykes and Macdonough, had set out the blueprint for the next three 
years of British military aviation’.66  In fact, Henderson had set out a plan that would 
shape not only the next three years, but one that envisaged expansion and called for 
aviation to be dealt with as a joint service.  That was a theme to which he would 
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return to when he realised the potential of independent action and also the immense 
frustration and friction that evolved between the RNAS and RFC. 
 In July 1912, Henderson, having operated under the temporary position as the 
Chair of the Technical Committee, was formally appointed to the position of Director 
of Training at the War Office and the RFC was officially placed under him.  Aviation 
was only one aspect of his duties; Greenald wrote that ‘Henderson was overworked, 
unable to delegate to the degree that the situation called for and was under some 
pressure often working day and night’.67  That view denigrated a highly professional 
soldier whose powers of delegation appear very good.  He was supported, in no 
small measure, by Sykes whose work ethic was equally high.68  The division of duties 
saw Sykes rapidly build a highly functional MW that enabled the cultural development 
of the RFC and was the platform for mobilisation of the RFC in 1914 and its 
subsequent enormous expansion. 
 Henderson and Sykes’ early commander/subordinate relationship appears, at 
first sight, to be one of efficiency, good communication and mutual trust.  Henderson 
dealt with higher-level policy and political matters while Sykes dealt with the detail 
and daily routine of the MW.69  Even Boyle wrote that Sykes, in Spring 1914 ‘held the 
confidence of his chief’.70  However, Henderson’s wife expressed a very low opinion 
of Sykes in August 1914.71  It is likely that Henderson’s view of him at that stage was 
similar, but that he maintained cordial professional relations.  Working with Sykes, 
Henderson took an active role in the development of the MW.  He recognised the 
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importance of badges, mottos, insignia and markings and their role in corralling 
Esprit-de-Corps.  He took an active role in decisions such as providing approval for 
the ‘Wings’ flying badge, the uniform and the motto proposals.72  Jordan wrote that 
he ‘was clearly aware of the creation of the clock code and the squaring of maps’ and 
that ‘it is worth commenting on the willingness of Henderson to listen to his 
subordinates’.73  Henderson, was also directly responsible for the development of the 
Roundel.  He wrote to the French and included a small hand-drawn picture to request 
approval for the RFC to make use of aircraft insignia similar to the cockade carried 
on French aircraft.74  That design remains one of the most enduring and strongest 
insignia of the RAF. 
 Henderson had responsibility for the Royal Aeroplane Factory and the Central 
Flying School (CFS), but from a cultural perspective, the developments forged on the 
MW in the run up to the First World War are the most important for consideration.  
Sykes was the main power behind the MW Training Manual part II (1914). 75  
However, Henderson was, ultimately responsible for it.76  Dye wrote that the Training 
Manual ‘provided the foundation for all future British Air Power Doctrine’.77  Pugh 
highlighted that it ‘embraced the core themes of moral superiority and the importance 
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of the offensive, and put forward its ideas based on a language and philosophy that 
would be reassuringly familiar to the Army as a whole’.78  It successfully introduced 
the new technology into the scheme of manoeuvre of the Edwardian Army that 
respected traditional Army expectations.  However, while it may have been 
recognisable to the Army, the introduction of the novel technology and changes in 
processes and practices associated with it were, nevertheless, enormous.  The 
subtle manner in which Henderson did this was impressive and supports Kirke’s 
proposal that ‘it is better to ride the organizational culture that exists, and cannot 
change rapidly rather than to confront it with change that will challenge it’.79  Seuter’s 
confrontational approach was less successful than Henderson’s more subtle one 
perhaps indicating that Henderson had a better intuitive understanding about 
implementing cultural change. 
 Following deployment of the BEF, the applicability of air power soon resulted 
in calls for RFC expansion. 80   Henderson prepared a new scheme for the 
organisation of the RFC.  Archival evidence shows a letter from Brackner in which he 
identified two ‘quite spontaneous and independent’ suggestions that had been 
submitted to him by Trenchard and Marindin.81  Those letters suggested how the 
RFC should be organised, further indicating that Henderson was prepared to listen to 
his subordinates.  This was a fairly progressive approach given the intensely 
hierarchical nature of the Army in the First World War.   
 Under duress from Army units, Henderson chose to decentralise the RFC and 
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also applied to institute the rank of wing commander, previously applied for by the 
RNAS as a rank for its command of flying units.82  Wing commanders would take 
command of 2-3 squadrons each encouraging faster tasking chains and closer co-
operation with Front Line army units.  Henderson maintained a vestige of centralised 
control to ensure that technical expertise, logistics, standardised operating 
procedures would be maintained.  He also, vehemently insisted on maintaining his 
HQ in France with him in command.83  The degree of centralised control he chose 
was pragmatic given the methods of communication at the time.  However, it was 
over the decentralisation of the RFC that Sykes felt particularly strongly and would 
form part of the letter that caused a schism between him and Henderson. 84  
Centralised control and decentralised execution would become a basis upon which 
the RAF would subsequently, and still does, operate.  Thus, while he was 
responsible for establishing what would become a deeply held tenet of air power, it 
was Sykes who really understood and promoted it. 
 Henderson’s role in establishing organisational aspects of the new Service 
was an important influence on the emerging espoused culture.  Henderson and his 
staff in the War Office were responsible, in conjunction with the politicians, for 
drawing up the legal and organisational framework for the new Service.  Jordan 
wrote that Henderson was:  
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…in prime position to influence General Smuts when he was commissioned to 
conduct his investigation into the organisation of British air power.  
Henderson’s advice played a considerable part in Smuts’ decision to 
recommend the creation of an independent air service’.85   
 
 This involved: establishing the legal basis of the RAF through the Air Force 
Act; establishing King’s Regulations for the RAF; determining the branches of the 
new service to deal with discipline and administration; instituting the amalgamation of 
the twin procurement and training systems; transferring of officers and men to the 
new service; establishing rates of pay and pension and equalising the rate of 
progression through the ranks. 86   This was a detailed and enormous task.  In 
organizational terms, then, Henderson played a major role the organisational 
establishment of the RAF for which he receives little credit 
Training 
 Henderson was in no doubt that the CFS would be a key pillar in building the 
RFC up to allow British air power to catch up with that of competing nations.  
Administered by the War Office, command of the School was given to Captain Paine 
RN to ensure that it was joint.87  The beginnings of the School were typified by a 
sense of urgency as described by John Salmond: 
As usual England had been asleep during the past years when America and 
France were striving to develop aeroplane flight and Germany had leaped 
ahead of both when the Kaiser and people had passionately supported the 
building of airships….Once again we had been outstripped by our continental 
neighbours and would have continued so, until some commercial profit from 
this quixotic invention became visible, had it not been for the war clouds 
looming on the horizon.  Now they were visible for all to see, and England was 
alert and the government aware of the danger, put in its weighty official push. 
Our job at the Central Flying School was to turn out pilots to fill the squadrons 
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that were now forming. We started at sunrise and finished at sunset with 
intervals for lectures and practical work in the shops.88 
 
 With time, CFS became more than a basic training organisation.  Building on 
the instructional techniques that had been developed by one of its CFS alumni, Major 
Smith-Barry, CFS took on the role of training flying instructors. 89   As the RAF 
expanded, other flying schools were established with CFS taking on the mantle of the 
specialist school honing instructional skills and setting standards; CFS began to build 
a reputation for expertise and standardisation.   From 1937, CFS assumed the task 
of evaluating handling characteristics for every type of aircraft in development for 
prospective RAF use.90  CFS was responsible for setting and maintaining standards 
provided the foundation for RAF training throughout the inter-war period and endures 
today.  Indeed, the CFS that was recommended in the Technical Sub-Committee 
Report and introduced and nurtured during Henderson’s time has proved to be one of 
the most enduring specialist organisations in military aviation in the world and has 
inspired the establishment of CFSs with similar structures and organisational aims 
throughout many of the Commonwealth nations.91 
 Henderson had learned in the Boer War that representative training was vital 
to operational effectiveness.  That was an area that had been lacking for the British 
and accounted for some of the early poor performance in South Africa.  He sought to 
professionalise the RFC by training alongside other arms in a representative 
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manner.92  He ensured that the RFC was based close to Salisbury Plain at Upavon to 
allow the MW to train with troops and he strove to ensure that integrated training with 
other arms took place.  He also ensured his patrons and contacts were abreast of the 
major exercises the RFC took part in such as the 1913 manoeuvres and the 
Netheravon Concentration Camp under Sykes.93  At Netheravon, he drove the air 
power publicity programme by hosting some extremely senior guests observing the 
capabilities of the RFC including the Prime Minister Asquith, Churchill, Lord Roberts 
as well as foreign military air attachés from Germany, Italy and Japan.94 
Doctrinal Beginnings 
 In military organisations it can be difficult to track exactly who was the 
originator of a particular idea, doctrine, process or practice.  While commanders 
might be the signatory of a paper or proposal, such work is frequently the product of 
various inputs from the staff surrounding the commander.  Establishing the exact 
provenance of an idea can, therefore, be a challenge for the researcher.  However, in 
Henderson’s case, so new was air power and such was his pre-eminence as one of 
the few military thinkers in the field of British aviation, that many of his strands of 
doctrinal thought and emphasis can be tracked through a number of documents.  
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Henderson’s influence in the ‘Report of the Standing Sub-Committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence on Aerial Navigation’ has already been 
demonstrated.95  A further example of his direct influence can be established by 
comparing his early work on aerial reconnaissance in the second edition of his book 
The Art of Reconnaissance with the ‘Training Manual, Royal Flying Corps’.96  The 
wording, particularly regarding reconnaissance is strikingly close.  In The Art of 
Reconnaissance he addressed the value of aircraft for reconnaissance as follows: 
 The principle value of aerial reconnaissance lies in the distance which can be 
covered; in the speed with which the objective can be reached, and the 
information brought back; in the fact that there are no obstacles to be met with 
except hostile aircraft; and in the consideration that the enemy’s dispositions in 
depth as well as in front can be observed’.97 
 
 The ‘Training Manual’ written two years later by Sykes highlighted similar 
tenets of aerial reconnaissance suggesting Henderson’s influence over early 
doctrinal development: 
First it is very rapid… 
Second, it is not stopped by natural obstacles such as rivers, or by artificial 
obstacles in the shape of fortresses. 
Third, it can ascertain the movements, position and approximate strengths of 
the enemy’s main bodies instead of the mere contour of covering troops. 
Fourth, it is a comparatively simple matter to bring back the information gained 
in time for it to be used.98 
 
 Henderson’s doctrinal summary of the value of aircraft has endured well 
beyond the formation of the RAF.  Although his writing was restricted to air power’s 
potential contribution to reconnaissance his basic tenets of what he perceived can 
still be identified in modern doctrinal documents such as Air Publication AP3000, 
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‘The UK Air and Space Power Doctrine’ still articulates the core characteristics of air 
power as speed, reach and height and uses remarkably similar terminology to 
Henderson to explain them.99 
Independence 
 Henderson firmly believed in the need for the RN and the Army to work 
cooperatively in developing air power as expressed in the Technical sub-committee 
report.100  During the First World War, he became acutely aware of the frictions and 
inefficiencies that emerged as the RFC and the RNAS vied to operate in the third 
dimension. 101   His frustrations were clear from the recommendations that would 
emerge, firstly in his ‘Memorandum on the Organization of the Air Services’, and 
subsequently in his contributions to the Smuts Report.102 
 After Henderson returned to London, Trenchard took command of the RFC 
and adopted a highly offensive approach in order to support Haig’s intent.  
Henderson defended Trenchard’s approach even when the scale of RFC losses were 
severely attacked in the press.103  Trenchard was delivering air power in a manner 
that suited both Henderson and their ultimate commander, Haig, and it required all of 
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the RFC assets to achieve the task.   
 However, despite his earlier disappointing narrowness of vision, Henderson 
began to extend his views on the potential of air power.  A memo, signed in July 
1917 demonstrated that he was already thinking about independent action but also 
acknowledged the need for both land and maritime forces to be supported.104  He 
estimated that the RFC would not have the capacity to conduct strategic long range 
bombing until early 1918, however, he saw its potential and highlighted the need for 
an independent body to adjudicate on how army, navy and strategic demands should 
be met. 105   He wrote that if an Air Ministry were in existence, ‘it would be its duty to 
look ahead and consider the best means of employing this Service, that is to say, 
considering for instance whether it could be better employed under the direct 
command of the Commander-in-Chief, in France or only under his nominal 
command, if serving in France, but strategically directed by the General Staff of the 
Air Ministry’.106  But this expansive thinking came at personal cost. 
 According to Boyle, Robertson removed Henderson from the Army Council for 
‘having assisted Smuts during ‘school hours”.107  Similarly, Brancker highlighted that 
Henderson was considered by Robertson to be ‘outspoken adherent of the policy of 
an independent the Air Service’ and that Robertson took an opportunity to ‘get rid’ of 
him.108  It is clear that he placed the advancement of air power ahead of career and 
service loyalties.  This brings into question the suggestions in the historiography by 
Ash that Henderson had a ‘pre-occupation with personal motivations’ and supports 
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Pugh and Boyle’s more generous views on his selflessness.109 
Boyle reported that Trenchard said: 
Henderson had twice the insight and understanding that I had…he was 
prepared to run risks rather than lose a chance which he saw might never 
come again.  He did so with no thought of self-interest, and it is doubtful 
whether the R.A.F. or Britain realises its debt to him, which is at least as great 
as its debt to Smuts.110 
 
 In his ‘Memorandum on the Organization of the Aerial Services’ Henderson 
highlighted the inefficacy of the Air Committee as well as the first and second Air 
Boards and pointed out that despite the Second Air Board adopting a policy, ‘the 
responsibility of carrying it out is completely divided’.111  He had identified that the 
majority of the officers: 
 …sit on the Board mainly as representatives of the Board of Admiralty and the 
Army Council… All investigations of the kind at present are purely Naval or 
Military, and it is not to be expected that the opinions expressed should be 
entirely free from the Naval or Military bias of these separate departments’.112 
 
 In his 1917 Memorandum he suggested the ‘formation of a complete 
department and a completely united service dealing with all operations in the air, and 
with all the accessory services which that expression implies’.113  The document 
concentrated on efficiency and economy as the reasons for the existence of a unified 
force rather than forming it based upon either an implicit strategic need or, indeed, 
the premise of the pervasiveness of air power which he had already demonstrated as 
early as 1914 in the second edition of The Art of Reconnaissance.114 
 In a further memorandum dated 12 September 1917, Henderson provided a 
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description of long range bombing capacity.  However, he also noted that ‘I have little 
doubt that this programme could be accelerated, but in order to carry this out, it will 
certainly be necessary for air production in its various branches to have a higher 
measure of priority than it is at present allowed.’115 
 As has been seen, the historiography rightly concentrates on Henderson’s 
lack of vision in the early days of the RFC but his vision for an independent force in 
1917 for which he deserves just credit is largely overlooked.  Similarly, when it came 
to the practicalities of unification of the services, Henderson was visionary.  In a 
speech in 1917 he underplayed the frictions that existed between the RNAS and the 
RFC as healthy rivalry and said: 
I have never lost faith in the advantage of unification, nor lost hope of its 
possibility.  Now it is agreed that the time is ripe.116 
 
 Brancker wrote that: ‘David Henderson became his [Smuts’] military assistant 
and was, I think, responsible for most of the details of the new organization which 
eventually came into being.  It was just the type of work at which he excelled’.117   
 Henderson was not chosen to lead RAF.  Joubert de la Ferté wrote that he 
lacked ‘the ruthlessness that was needed in the lead of a new service that was 
fighting for recognition as a separate entity’.118  With a reserve RAF commission, he 
was appointed Vice-President of the Air Council in January 1918.  However, he 
resigned when Sykes’ was appointed as CAS.  He wrote to Bonar Law to highlight 
that he was not resigning because he could not work with Sykes but for the good of 
the RAF as his ‘previous relations with Sykes’ and his ‘view of him, were not 
                                            
115 TNA 8/2 CAS Archives, ‘Separate Air Force’, Section 7, ‘Bombing Operations’, dated 12 
Sept 1917. 
116 RAFM AC71/4/4, Notes for speech, dated 14 Dec 1917. 
117 Macmillan, Sefton Brancker, p.156. 
118 Joubert de la Ferté, The Third Service, p.28. 
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secrets’.119  Henderson wrote that he wanted to remove himself ‘from the atmosphere 
and falsehood which has enveloped the Air Ministry’.   Sykes had a toxic relationship 
with Trenchard and by 1915 a previously productive relationship with Henderson had 
also soured.  Sykes’ prickly personality is often cited as the reason for this but all 
three officers were partly culpable and it appeared there was not room for all three 
officers to work together once Trenchard arrived in the RFC.120  In a rapidly growing 
Corps under the pressures of war, tensions were inevitable.  Sykes patronage with 
Sir Henry Wilson also did not help relations and Devine even referred to Trenchard 
having a personal vendetta against Sykes.121  Thus trifling disputes grew into a 
breakdown of relations.  Sadly for British air power, the RAF would not benefit from a 
collegiate approach from these three pioneering officers as highlighted by Jordan.122   
Conclusion 
 Henderson’s successful career, influential network, an ability to deliver 
intellectual argument and concepts in an acceptable manner and a selfless 
dedication to the greater good of the British military ensured that aviation gained 
acceptance.  He was somewhat limited in his vision of the wider application of air 
power prior to the First World War but, by 1917, he had seen the potential for air 
power and was one of the few prophets able to see the future of independent action.  
He decided to recommend the formation of an independent service to Smuts that 
                                            
119 RAFM AC71/12/75, Letter from Henderson to Bonar Law, dated 26 April 1918. 
120 Miller, Boom, p.101 and p.116.  Boyle A, Trenchard p.115-117 and p.139. David Divine, 
The Broken Wing.  London: Hutchinson & Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1966, p.48 and p.68.  For 
Henderson’s resignation: RAFM AC73/35/121/2RAFM AC73/35/1/23/1 Letter exchange Ref 
No A/508 notably Henderson dated 20/11/14.  For Sykes’ view, see Sykes, From Many 
Angles p.144.   
121 David Jordan, ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’, Air Power Review, Special Edition (Spring 2013), 
p.75.  Devine, The Broken Wing, p.68.  Higham made a similar implication, Higham, The 
British Military Intellectuals, p.124. 
122 Ibid., p.75. 
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was seen as disloyal by some in the Army.  His most important legacy to RAF culture 
lies, then, in the skilful manner in which he convinced the military, politicians and 
public of the need for the aerial services in the First World War and, later, the need 
for it to be independent. 
 The organisational structures, processes and practices that were introduced 
under Henderson’s tenure as Director of Military Aeronautics and as the Commander 
of the RFC were very important to the espoused culture that would emerge in the 
RAF.  The RFC, structurally and organisationally, was not much different to other 
elements of the British Army except for sea going elements.123  However, aviation 
related processes and practices, heavily influenced by the aviator identity and the 
technical mind-set of the RFC resulted in a very different culture-in-action; the RFC 
quite rapidly became a distinctive sub-culture within the British Army.  This could 
have interfered with the successful integration of air power within the Army, however, 
Henderson appeared to limit this quite well.  His influence, standing and clever 
handling of media ensured that air power was accepted in the British Army.  His 
conservative approach ensured the basic tenets of RFC culture largely conformed 
with an Edwardian Army outlook; he rode the existing culture well.124  In contrast, the 
tactically more exploratory RNAS did not have officers of the political calibre of 
Henderson or, indeed, Sykes to judge how to integrate air power into the Senior 
Service.  None of the RNAS senior commanders was Staff College trained, nor did 
any achieve Flag Officer rank.125  Accordingly, the RNAS did not achieve the same 
level of acceptance within the RN.  Indeed, Seuter referred to it as the ‘Cinderella 
                                            
123 Admiralty Telegram Mar 23 1918 Addressed to C-in-C Mediterranean (ADM 1/8512) in 
Roskill, The Naval Air Service, p.645. 
124 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture – the Unexpected Force’, pp. 11-15 and Kirke, 
‘Organizational Culture And Defence Acquisition: A Key Internal Factor For MOD’, pp.97-99.   
125 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’ p.306.   
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Service.126    
 Goulter wrote that ‘at the time of amalgamation of the Royal Naval Air Service 
and the Royal Flying Corps in 1918, the latter was the larger of the two aviation 
branches and, therefore, provided most of the senior staff.’127  She went on to say 
that ‘the new Service was closer in character and outlook to the Royal Flying 
Corps’.128  However, Henderson was concerned that the transition should recognise 
traditions of both Services: ‘it is a good start that the heads of the R.N.A.S and the 
R.F.C. are to be members of the Air Council, and so will start the new Service on the 
old traditions’.129  Thus, despite being conceived by an RFC officer, the RAF would 
assume some RNAS processes and practices.130 
 The biggest and most tangible cultural contributions Henderson made to the 
RAF took place in the early establishment of the RFC with Sykes as his most 
important collaborator.  These were: overseeing of the RFC’s organisational 
structure, introduction of the idea that the service was centred on technical expertise, 
training, development of an air spirit including uniforms, badges, and symbols, laying 
down the basis of a doctrine, establishment of a disciplinary procedure, ordering the 
writing of the RFC Manual and the establishment of orders.  Subsequently, 
Henderson’s vision and advice to Smuts to deliver a separate air power organisation 
and his involvement in its establishment was central to the development of RAF 
                                            
126 Grove, ‘Air Force, Fleet Air Arm or Armoured Corps’, p.39 
127 Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive, p.xvi. 
128 Ibid., p.22 
129 RAFM AC 71/4/4 File entitled ‘Henderson Letters’ extracted from Henderson Minute File.  
‘Remarks on Sir Doulas Haig’s Dispatch’, 20 September 1917. 
130 This was not down to Admiralty demands.  It will be seen later that, rather than trying to 
influence the shape and culture of the RAF in its own image, the Admiralty was extremely 
resistant to the borrowing of its practices and traditions on matters such as the use of naval 
ranks and also expressed objections to the RAF copying Naval tradition by adopting an 
ensign. 
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espoused culture.  Accordingly, Henderson, rather than Trenchard, deserves the 
moniker ‘Father of the Royal Air Force.131  However, it is disappointing that this 
pioneering officer’s influence on British air power was prematurely cut short over 
niggling intrigues with Sykes for which he must bear some responsibility. 
                                            
131 ‘Short History of the RAF’, AP 2003, p.6. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SYKES 
 As commander of the MW, Sykes established many of the RFC structures, 
documentation, disciplinary procedures, training routines, uniforms, mottos and 
badges that helped establish a sub-culture within the British Army. 1   According to 
Jordan: ‘Sykes seems to have been the driving force behind all the staff decisions 
that were required and day-to-day affairs, whilst Henderson presided over the whole 
assembly as the Director of Military Aeronautics.2 
 Sykes’ had hoped to command the high-profile deployment of the RFC to 
France as Henderson had promised.3  He was, however disappointed; Henderson 
took command of the RFC.  As Chief-of-Staff, he was, nevertheless, involved in the 
decision making and changes that inevitably came out of the RFC’s first war fighting 
experiences.  Later, he assumed command of the RFC in the field during a period 
when Henderson was ill and also when the latter was briefly posted away from the 
RFC to command the 1st Infantry Division.4  However, following the breakdown in 
relations with Henderson, Sykes proceeded to command the air campaign in the 
Dardanelles.  His ranks of temporary Colonel Second Commandant RM followed by 
temporary Wing Captain whilst in the Dardanelles, reflect the joint nature of his 
                                            
1 CAB 38/20/1 ‘Report of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence on Aerial Navigation’. 
2 Jordan, ‘The Army Co-Operation Missions of 
The Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force 1914-1918’, p.18. 
3 Sykes From Many Angles, p.122. Jordan, ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’, p.75.  Devine, The Broken 
Wing, p.48. 
4 RAFM AC 73/35/1/23/2 Sykes Papers. Telegram dated 23 Nov 1914 approving 
assumption of command on 22 Nov 1914.  Also RAFM AC73/35/1/23/3, ‘List No 2.  
Appointments, Commissions Rewards etc’, 28 Nov 1914.  This decision was later reversed 
by Kitchener.   
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assignment.5  In the Dardanelles, he gained a new insight into the potential of air 
power having seen it used in combined land and maritime operations.   
 After a period away from aviation, including setting up the Machine Gun 
Corps, he was called back to assume position as the second CAS at a crucial time.   
As CAS, he set in motion organisational plans and instituted practices and 
processes, many of which would later be used by Trenchard and would have 
significant impact upon RAF culture.  However, Sykes has received even less credit 
than Henderson for the former’s work in the RFC as well as while he was CAS.6  In 
official histories Sykes is often passed over.  For example, in AP3003 A Short 
History of the RAF, Sykes’ role in the RFC was not mentioned, while his contribution 
as CAS was reduced to highlighting when he was appointed and that it was decided 
he was not the right man and was replaced by Trenchard.7  In C.F.S., Taylor made 
no comment about Sykes’ period as CAS in his description of the establishment of 
the RAF.8   Sykes is also discredited by academics and military officers.  For 
instance, Meilinger dismissed Sykes’ proposals for the RAF when he was CAS as 
‘fanciful at best, irresponsible at worst’.9  Joubert de La Ferté, meanwhile, made 
only passing and disparaging comment about Sykes contributions.10  His place in 
history was particularly affected by the bitterness between him and Trenchard and 
                                            
5 The London Gazette, 21 September 1915, Issue 29304, p.9324.  
https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/29304/page/9324, accessed 21 Oct 2017. 
6 Meilinger, ‘Trenchard and “Moral Bombing”’, p.243.  
7 ‘Short History of the RAF’, AP 2003, p.28 and p.41. Higham, The British Military 
Intellectuals 1918-1939, p.120 and p.124.  
8 Taylor, C.F.S. 
9 Phillip S Meilinger, ‘Trenchard, Slessor and Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II’ 
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also in the way in which the history of the RFC and the First World War was written.  
Paris wrote that: 
 Sykes has never received the credit due him for his part in the creating the 
British air service and, indeed, because of the eventual dominance of his rival 
Hugh Trenchard and the latter’s influence over early RFC/RAF 
historiography, has been virtually written out of the official histories and those 
over which Trenchard had some sway.11 
 
 Higham wrote that the ‘work of Sykes was carefully slighted’ by Jones, 
Raleigh and Boyle and even wondered if Trenchard played a role in the 1914 
records that were missing from Farnborough and had been written by Sykes.12  
Higham included Sykes as one of his British Military Intellectuals, but for many years 
was a lonely supporter of his role in the development of British air power until Ash 
and Pugh published work on him.13   
 The groundwork that Sykes invested in the MW in 1914 would be a 
fundamental and enduring building block of RAF espoused culture and a framework 
in which RAF culture-in-action would emerge.  However, in addition to recognising 
that, this chapter will also serve to restore some credit to Sykes for the extremely 
important part he played in establishing the RFC and the RAF.  
 Frederick Hugh Sykes was born on 23 July 1877 to Henry and Margaret.  
Henry was a mechanical engineer who died two years after Frederick’s birth, an 
event that would establish what Sykes’ called a ‘financial struggle’ that affected how 
the family lived, how Frederick was educated and set him on a path of 
                                            
11 Paris Winged Warfare p.214.  Also Higham, The British Military Intellectuals, p.120.  
12 Higham, The British Military Intellectuals, p.124. 
13 Ibid., p.120 and p.124.  
Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of The Control Of The Air’.  Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the 
Air Revolution.  Ash, ‘Air Power Leadership: A Study of Sykes and Trenchard’ 
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unconventionality. 14  Sykes left school at 15 and went to live in Paris with ambitions 
of entry into the Diplomatic Service.15  In Paris he attended lectures at various 
institutions and took private language lessons.  Forced into positions below his 
station, such as working in a shop, Sykes felt the brunt of disadvantage caused by 
the Victorian class system, but continued to recognise and respect its strictures.  His 
autobiography exuded yearning to regain the social status lost through the death of 
his father.  He worked in Ceylon and travelled widely, including to the United 
States. 16    Although he followed an unconventional path and, through struggle, 
learned to deal with ambiguity, he possessed a deeply rooted conservatism.  This 
was an important factor in the way he later approached the task of setting up the 
MW of the RFC.  His unconventionality ensured that he was armed to navigate the 
uncharted path of bringing a new technology into service.  However, his 
conservative side ensured that the structures that he put in place around that new 
technology were conformist and recognisable to the Edwardian Army. 
 His autobiography conveyed a contemporary middle-class idealistic sense 
that the British Empire was a permanent and a civilising force for good.17  He had a 
vision of air power underpinning the economic as well as military security of the 
Empire.  He wrote: 
                                            
14 Sykes F, From Many Angles, p.15.  Sykes, ‘Sir Frederick Hugh’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography. 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxye.bham.ac.uk/view/article/36393?docPos=1, accessed 
22 Jul 15.   
15 Ash E Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918, p.10. 
16 David Jordan, ‘Sir Frederick Sykes’, p.75.  
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view prevalent amongst the British middle classes.  See Ward who examined Britain’s 
relationship with Empire.  Paul Ward, Britishness since 1870, (London, Routledge, 2004), 
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Just as the naval supremacy of Britain was won because commercially we 
were the greatest seafaring people in the world, so will air supremacy be 
achieved by that country which, making aviation a part of its everyday life, 
becomes an air faring nation.18 
 
 Sykes’ opportunity to serve Empire came during the Boer War.   He joined 
the Imperial Yeomanry Scouts in the ranks.19  Captured during his first engagement, 
he spent time as a POW.  Later in the Boer War, he was commissioned into the 
Cavalry, became a regular soldier and was injured.  Ash wrote that ‘Sykes had 
witnessed war from some of its worst perspectives ‘as a line soldier, as a prisoner, 
and as a casualty.  Yet he embraced those experiences as valuable lessons in life, 
and they would shape his character and approach to a future war’. 20   Sykes 
highlighted that South Africa exposed a lack of preparedness of the British Army.21  
In South Africa, he also learned the importance of the moral component of fighting 
power that became a theme of his career.22  At Staff College, he wrote of the 
supreme importance of moral qualities of an officer.23  The importance he placed on 
the moral component is clear throughout his biography as shown in his writing on 
Haldane’s reforms: 
It never seems to me to be sufficiently realized by the man in the street that 
any organization is almost entirely dependent upon the quantity and 
numerical superiority of its officers, NCO’s and leaders.  And they need time 
to select and train.24 
 
                                            
18 Sykes, ‘Aircraft in War’, p.569.  See also Sir Frederick Hugh Sykes, Aviation in Peace and 
War (London: Edward Arnold and Co, 1922), p.7. 
19 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.25. 
20 Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, p.13. 
21 Sykes, From Many Angles, pp.32-33 
22 This is the modern interpretation of fighting power which identifies three components: 
Moral, Physical and Conceptual. ‘UK Defence Doctrine’, Joint Services Publication 0-01, 5th 
Edition (2014), p.25.  
23 RAFM Sykes Papers AC 73/35/1, Sykes F, ‘Outlines of Strategy’, Staff College Paper, 31 
October 1908, p.16. 
24 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.85. 
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 Sykes’ attended Staff College in Quetta in 1908. 25   Gray cautioned that ‘the 
degree of influence emanating from the reading, teaching, or the wider learning 
environment, can easily be overstated’.26  However, in Sykes’ case the Staff College 
experience appeared profound.  Ash wrote that through the experience he was 
‘indoctrinated into the accepted contemporary military theory of European powers 
during the pre-war period’.27  Pugh also wrote that ‘it becomes clear that Sykes was 
heavily influenced by the teaching and education he received at Quetta’.28  The 
depth of the Staff College influence is also supported by Sykes’ autobiography.29  
Ash also underlined the importance of this experience and directly linked Capper’s 
teachings on the offensive to Sykes’ decision to take all of the MW aircraft to France 
in 1914.30  However, it is of note that he eventually moderated his traditional view on 
the offensive and developed a more expansive and strategic view on the application 
of air power that also recognised the importance of defensive action.31 
 In 1911, Sykes learned to fly and gained Aviator’s Certificate No 95.32  He 
was appointed to the Operations Directorate at the War Office and specialised on 
Europe.  Almost immediately, he was sent to France in October 1911 to visit French 
aerodromes.  His observations gave an insight into how the French were using their 
                                            
25 RAFM Sykes Papers AC73/35/1/Vol I, Letter from Brigadier General T Capper to Captain 
F Sykes Date December 1909.  The importance Sykes placed on the value of Staff College 
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machines and how they structured their organisation. 33   In particular, the visit 
formulated, in his mind, how aerial fighting units should be structured for warfare.  
The squadron concept that emerged remains the standard fighting unit in the RAF 
today.34  Subsequently chosen to be a member of the Technical Sub-Committee he 
played a key role supporting Henderson in shaping the RFC.35 
 Sykes commanded the RFC MW at its inception while Samson commanded 
the Naval Wing and Paine the CFS.36  Sykes was the key player in this context 
given that he produced the lion’s share of the staff and organisational work that 
resulted in concrete establishment of the key processes and practices that would 
transfer to the RAF.  The following account highlights Sykes’ recollection of 
challenges ahead: 
 The organization of the Corps to its smallest detail in technical stores, supply 
and transport had to be thought out.  The type of machine required; the 
method of obtaining it from a struggling industry; its use and maintenance; 
the personnel, its training and equipment; these, and a thousand other 
aspects of the question, required the employment of a large staff of experts.  
But the experts did not exist and the duties were carried out almost entirely at 
Farnborough, where in addition time had to be found to compile the official 
training and other text books and regulations required for an entirely new 
arm’.37 
 
Esprit De Corps 
 Sykes’ Staff College experience, his time in the Boer War and a brief, but 
instructive, period observing German manoeuvres taught Sykes the importance of 
                                            
33 RAFM AC 73/35/1/71 Sykes F, ‘Notes on Aviation in France’. 
34 Ash, ‘Air Power Leadership: A Study of Sykes and Trenchard’, p.163.  
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‘moral’ and how to inspire an esprit de corps.38  Capper’s views on the ‘moral’ were 
particularly ardent. 39   For Instance, in 1908 at a Staff College lecture Capper 
underlined both the importance of ‘moral’ as well as the contemporarily important 
theme of offensive action: 
 The art of war consists almost entirely in the application of one principle; that 
never changes.  It is the principle that determination to conquer or die must 
pervade all ranks from the leaders to the simple soldiers; and that principle 
must not be the mere enthusiasm of the moment, but it must be a principle 
nourished and cultivated by moral training and intelligent preparation 
throughout the whole of his military career.40 
 
 The basis upon which Sykes built the MW demonstrates understanding that 
the new organisation needed more than flying machines.  He recognised that the 
people would be fundamental to success and was particularly cognisant of the need 
to encourage a bespoke esprit-de-corps. This was especially important as the RFC 
brought together RN and Army personnel as well as civilian technicians.  In Aviation 
in Peace and War, he wrote: 
All was new.  A new Corps.  A new element in which to work.  New conditions 
in peace akin to those in war.  And there had to be developed a new spirit, 
combining the discipline of the old Army, the technical skill of the Navy, and 
the initiative, energy and dash inseparable from flying… Esprit de Corps was 
of vital importance, but as officers and non-commissioned officers were 
drawn from every branch and every regiment of the army this was no easy 
matter.41 
 
 This indicates that Sykes understood both the need for the RFC to be a 
technically oriented organisation and also the importance of actively incorporating 
the aviator identity into the structures and processes of the organisation.  He later 
wrote of the importance early RFC spirit would have on that of the RAF:  
                                            
38 RAFM Sykes Papers AC73/35/1/Vol I, Sykes F, ‘Outlines of Strategy’, Staff College 
Essay, dated 31 Oct 1908. 
39 Olsen, ‘An Inspirational Warrior: Major-General Sir Thomas Capper’, p.189.  Also  Sykes, 
From Many Angles p.71. 
40 Olsen, ‘An Inspirational Warrior: Major-General Sir Thomas Capper’, p.197.  
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 The fine spirit of the personnel of the R.A.F. today was built up upon the strict 
selection and sound training of the recruits of those first years.  The highest 
standards throughout had to be secured and retained...Barrington-Kennet 
vowed that he would make the R.F.C. “as smart as the Guards and as 
efficient as the Sappers.”. 42 
 
 This also demonstrated that Sykes recognised the role his staff played in the 
emergence of the early RFC spirit.  He particularly attributed Herbert, Becke, 
Longcroft, Chinnery and Barrington-Kennett as the key protagonists in helping him 
develop the spirit, badges, mottos and uniforms.43   
RFC Training Manual and RFC Standing Orders. 
 Sykes outlined his expectations regarding routines, discipline and 
comportment to the Corps.  Orders and manuals were of profound importance in 
this and Sykes conducted most of the order writing.   The RFC Training Manual was 
particularly important.44  Ash wrote: ‘Sykes had produced and personally written 
most of that manual during the winter of 1913-14’ and that ‘it was a typical Sykes 
product – massive in size, detailed and focused entirely on the goals of achieving 
organizational efficiency’.45  Higham also reflected on how hard Sykes worked on 
the Training Manual.46  Ash referred to it as the ‘air power bible the RFC carried into 
battle’, and that:  
 In addition to great technical detail on aspects of aircraft and engine 
assembly and repair, it included the RFC regulations on instrumentation, 
navigation, meteorology, transport and flight training.  It outlined the RFC 
organization and established administrative guidelines’. 47   
                                            
42 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.96.    
43 Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War, p.27.  Barrington-Kennet had two brothers who also 
perished in the First World War.  To understand the inspirational effect of the Barrington-
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44 ‘Training Manual, Royal Flying Corps, 1915’.   
45 Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, p.40.  
46 Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, p.124. 
47 Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, p.40. 
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 The Training Manual was far more than a book of rules and regulations.  It 
established the ‘Characteristics and Principle Duties of Aeroplanes’ and outlined 
how aeroplanes should interact with other arms, in particular Artillery.  It also 
detailed how offensive action should be conducted as well as action of aeroplanes 
when fired upon by anti-aircraft guns.48  A theme throughout the Manual is the clear 
obsession with the offensive that was common British military thinking of the era and 
is, perhaps, further evidence of Capper’s influence on Sykes. Olsen referred to 
Capper’s ‘outspoken belief in the offensive’.49  Meanwhile, Pugh highlighted Sykes’ 
commitment to the offensive that is reflected clearly in his autobiography, 
particularly in the early stages of his career.50 
 Sykes wrote RFC Standing Orders at the same time as the Training Manual 
but they were not published until 1915 whilst Sykes was commander in the field of 
the RFC. 51   Standing Orders dealt with aeronautics, the organisation and 
administration of the MW establishing detailed duties of the headquarters, aircraft 
parks and squadrons.  This provided a clear administrative structure and laid out 
processes and practices to be followed by the entire RFC MW used terminology 
common to other corps in the Army.  Standing Orders also firmly established the 
centrality of air power to the fledgling Corps and set in train artefacts, processes and 
practices that would become the basis of RAF identity.     
                                            
48 ‘Training Manual, Royal Flying Corps, 1915’. 
49 Olsen, ‘An Inspirational Warrior: Major-General Sir Thomas Capper’, p.73.  
50 Pugh highlighted Sykes’ commitment to offensive action, Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins 
Of The Control Of The Air’, p.104.  Sykes, From Many Angles. 
51 RAFM AC 73/35/1/14 ‘Standing Orders Royal Flying Corps, Military Wing’, HMSO, 1915. 
 99 
 Standing Orders laid down standards and types of dress and the variety of 
accompanying new badges and gilt miniatures for aircrew and ground-crew. 52  
These were all recognisable to the contemporary military establishment with just the 
major differences being the maternity dress uniform, the introduction of brevets and 
the fact that officers in the RFC full dress uniform were not to carry swords.53 
 RFC Orders included ritualistic novelties regarding ceremonial procedures 
that integrated the new technology into existing drill such as incorporating 
aeroplanes into parade procedures in which aeroplanes were taxied through the 
middle of a parade, before turning to take off and fly past the saluting base at 80ft.54 
Mess rules would normally be determined by individual messes but Sykes published 
officers’ and sergeants’ mess rules at Corps level in RFC Orders.55  In doing so, he 
clearly set behavioural norms for a very disparate group of personnel.56  This is an 
indication of both Sykes’ attention to detail and also that he was an astute judge of 
how to encourage cohesion amongst groups of personnel with diverse backgrounds.  
Mess rules such as the mess committee structure, requirements of the constitution 
of the mess, relationship between the commanding officer and the various messes, 
expected attitudes towards mess staff would survive transition into the RAF and 
bear a much closer relationship to Army messing rules than those of the RN.57 
                                            
52 Ibid. pp.39-41. 
53 Swords would later be introduced to the RAF Dress regulations. 
54 RAFM AC 73/35/1/14, ‘Standing Orders Royal Flying Corps, Military Wing’, p.82. 
55 RAFM AC 73/35/1/14 ‘Standing Orders Royal Flying Corps, Military Wing’, pp.42-52. 
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15th Hussars.  Sykes From Many Angles, p.40. 
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Lieutenant Commander John Irving, Naval Life and Customs.  Tradition, Lore and 
Language of the Royal Navy (Altringham: Sherratt and Hughes, 1944).  ‘Officers’ Mess 
Rules’ at RAF Wittering, RAF Linton-on-Ouse, January 2017 and RAF Leeming, November 
2015, continue to have threads that have a link back to RFC Officers’ Mess rules.  
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 Sykes also chose to emphasise discipline in the RFC Orders.  King’s 
Regulations should have been sufficient to cover the disciplinary needs of the 
Corps. 58  However, by providing a more digestible guide to discipline than King’s 
Regulations, RFC Orders explicitly set out RFC expectations and standards.  
Included in RFC Orders are references to saluting, personal appearance including 
facial hair and haircuts that would form the basis of RAF standards.59 
Training 
 Sykes’ experience in the Boer War demonstrated the importance of ensuring 
that training was relevant, appropriate and conducted in conjunction with other 
arms.  Sykes also used training opportunities to prove the value of air power: 
 We had to prove our value to the other arms, many of the leaders of which, 
owing to a long period of peace, found difficulty in differentiating between the 
normal usages of peace and war and in understanding the right use of 
aircraft.60 
 
 In September 1913, Henderson’s patron, French, took elements of the RFC 
under command during annual field manoeuvres.  Sykes wrote a memorandum that 
contributed to orders for this major exercise and thus gained the RFC exposure to 
the wider Army.61  When French subsequently became the commander of the British 
Expeditionary Force in 1914, he had an understanding of contemporary air power 
                                            
58 RAFM AC73/35/1/14, ‘Standing Orders Royal Flying Corps, Military Wing’, pp.30-38. 
59 RAFM AC73/35/1/14, ‘Standing Orders Royal Flying Corps, Military Wing’, pp.33. 
60 Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War, p.26. 
61 See RAFM AC73/35/1/13 ‘Instructions for the participation of Royal Flying Corps Military 
Wing, in the Army Manoeuvres and the Divisional Operations preceding them’, 1913.  In his 
autobiography, Sykes referred to Rawlinson being in Command for the manoeuvres in the 
South with Haig in the North.   However, the archived ‘Instructions’ referred to French as the 
commander in the South.  Sykes, From Many Angles, p.110.  See also Andrew Whitmarsh, 
‘British Army Manoeuvres and the Development of Military Aviation, 1910-1913’, War in 
History, Vol 14 No 3 (2007), pp.325-346.  
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capabilities and also knew Sykes and Henderson.  Accordingly, the RFC was 
included in BEF Orders; this was notable given how undeveloped the RFC was.62 
 Sykes biggest contribution to training was the Concentration Camp held at 
Netheravon in June 1914 which tested the RFC’s ability to deploy, refined logistical 
arrangements and proved the concepts developed in the RFC Training Manual, 
RFC Orders and Field Service Regulations.  Sykes saw ‘those two precious months 
as a godsend, not only to the RFC but to the whole Army’.63  Sykes was widely 
given the credit for being the driving force behind the Netheravon Concentration 
Camp in contemporary press reports such as Flight, the Morning Post and the Daily 
Telegraph. 64  This is one area of the historiography that does acknowledge Sykes.  
Ash wrote: ‘historians are unanimous in crediting Sykes with the initiative and 
direction of the ‘Netheravon Concentration Camp’. 65  Higham, wrote that it was 
brought together ‘on his own initiative’ and that: ‘at Netheravon they held the final 
practices and training for war’.66  From the cultural perspective, the RFC exercised 
its end-to-end processes and practices under pressure for the first time. 
 
 
                                            
62 RAFM AC73/35/1/20/2 French J Field Marshal, ‘Standing Orders for the Expeditionary 
Force’, Southampton 9 August 1914, p.9 
63 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.111. 
64 ‘Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing) at Netheravon. The Concentration Camp’, Flight, No 
287 (No 26 Vol VI) (June 26 1914), pp.670-677 in RAFM AC 73/35/1/18 
https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1914/1914%20-%200670.html, accessed 7 
May 2017. ‘Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing) at Netheravon. The Concentration Camp’. 
Flight, No 288 (No 27, Vol VI) (3 July 1914), pp 698-701, 
https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1914/1914%20-%200698.html, accessed 7 
May 2017,  ‘The Royal Flying Corps’, Flight No 289, (No 28, Vol VI) (10 July 1914) pp.723-
726 (including useful photograph listing all officers present).  
https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1914/1914%20-%200722.html, accessed 9 
Jan 2016.  Flight article also available in Sykes Papers at RAFM AC 73/35/1/18. For The 
Morning Post and The Daily Telegraph reports see: Sykes, From Many Angles, pp.112-118.  
65 Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, p.43. 
66 Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, p.125. 
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Publicity and Press 
 Sykes, like Henderson, understood the need to convince politicians, the 
public and high-ranking officers of the Army of air power’s value.  Sykes wrote that 
he helped ‘the cause of aviation by means of lectures and articles in the current 
journals, and by inviting representatives of the Press to visit our centres and 
observe the progress being made’.67  In addition to Netheravon he gave lectures at 
the Royal Aeronautical Society in 1912 and 1913, presided upon by General 
Grierson and Sir John French, thus reinforcing air power at senior Army levels.68 
 Pugh referred to the difference in messaging between the leaders of the RFC 
and the RNAS.  That helps explain the fractious nature of the relationship between 
the Admiralty and the RNAS compared with the more productive relationship 
between the Army High Command and the RNAS: 
Trenchard and Sykes skilfully utilised the press, whilst providing digestible 
and appealing visions of air power to their professional and political seniors.  
Sueter made little or no use of the press, and failed to articulate a coherent 
vision of naval air power to the Board and other senior naval officers.69 
 
 Sykes also ‘saw a good deal’ of Churchill and engaged him in air power 
discussions.70   Sykes wrote an article in the Quarterly Review that explained the 
structure, equipment, manning and roles of the British air services.71  He crafted it to 
highlight that aeroplanes would assist the cavalry and was careful to say that 
aeroplanes ‘cannot supplant it in its rôle’ thus avoiding expressing a direct threat to 
                                            
67 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.107. 
68 Sykes, ‘Military Aviation’, The Royal Aeronautical Society Journal (July 1913), pp.127-
139.  See also Sykes, From Many Angles, pp.107-108. 
69 Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins Of The Control Of The Air’, p.102 and p.308. 
70 Sykes had quite a close relationship with Churchill until their views on air power diverged 
in 1919 on what Sykes called ‘his disastrous Air Policy’.  Sykes, From Many Angles, p.106.  
Higham contended that Churchill’s opinion of Sykes was altered in 1917 when he opposed 
Sykes’ views on Strategic Bombing.  Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, p.124.  
71 RAFM AC73/35/1/16.  Sykes F, ‘Aircraft in War’, Quarterly Review, April 1914, Article 13, 
pp.558-569.  
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that particularly important arm of the Army.72  He was less averse to taking aim at 
RN capabilities pointing out that: 
The entire vote for the Air Service for the current year would not purchase a 
single Dreadnought, yet there can be no doubt that the expenditure 
represents a better insurance return.  From the point of view of national 
safety, a paramount air service is the most economical form of national 
insurance.73 
 
 The idea of air power representing value for money would later enter into the 
RAF psyche; ‘substitution’ formed a pillar of Trenchard’s Imperial Policing policy that 
under-wrote RAF survival during the inter-war period. 
 Henderson and Sykes had engaged in an ‘Information Operation’ such that, 
by the time the BEF was mobilised, the RFC was understood by politicians, the 
Press and senior Army commanders as highlighted in French’s letter to the War 
Office.74  They recognised the need broader cultural acceptance of air power. 
Organisational Structure 
 Dye wrote that Sykes ‘would soon provide the organizational blueprint for the 
RFC’ and that he ‘set about creating an effective air service drawing heavily on 
French practice’.75  Sykes was part of the Joint Air Committee that established the 
Squadron of 12 aircraft as the primary fighting unit fighting unit of the RFC.76  This 
allowed the squadron to be tactically self-sufficient and ‘homogenous unit, with its 
                                            
72 Ibid. p.564. 
73 Ibid, p.569. 
74 Letter from French RAFM AC73/351/21/1 Letter from French to the Secretary, The War 
Office dated 17 October 1914. 
75 Dye, ‘Air Power’s Midwife’, p.43 and p.47.  See also Dye, ‘France and the Development 
of British Military Aviation’, p.4. 
76 TNA Air 1/118 ‘Mobilization Store Table – Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing).  An 
Aeroplane Squadron (12 Aeroplanes)’, 1913.  Also Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War, 
pp.27-28 and Sykes, From Many Angles. p.95. 
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own field-repair, store and transport services, and self-supporting as regards 
cooking, supplies etc’.77 
 In 1942, Sykes pointed out the legacy of decisions taken in 1912: ‘this 
organization, with few modifications, was the one with which the R.F.C. took the 
field on mobilization in August 1914.  It stood the test of war, and is the basis of the 
Royal Air Force to-day’.78  This structure born out of Sykes’ vision of espoused 
culture continues not only the basis for organising fighting units for war but is a 
structure for culture-in-action to emerge.  Despite a constant turnover of personnel, 
the culture ‘between the ears’ of sqn personnel has caused squadrons to develop 
their own quite distinct histories, traditions and very deep allegiances and they oddly 
retain their own character. 
 Sykes commissioned Mobilization Store Tables that established the range of 
items a squadron would need for a deployment from 12 aircraft and 129 personnel 
down to items and tools such as 18 twist gimlets, 20 lbs of beeswax and 2 lbs of 
asbestos packing.79  More importantly, he understood the need to exercise the 
logistic chain in realistic scenarios such as the Netheravon Concentration Camp.  
Sykes’ assumption that air power would need to be expeditionary was timely; the 
ultimate scale and complexity of RFC expeditionary operations was described by 
Dye as follows: 
 All of this required the creation of an extensive ground organization, 
employing large numbers of skilled and semi-skilled personnel, underpinned 
by a supply chain that stretched from the front line, via the repair depots and 
air parks, to the factories at home80 
 
                                            
77 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.95. 
78 Ibid., p.95. 
79 TNA AIR 1/118 ‘Mobilization Store Table – Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing).  An 
Aeroplane Squadron (12 Aeroplanes)’, 1913. 
80 Dye, ‘Air Power’s Midwife’ p.16.   
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 Sykes’ contribution to the organisational effectiveness of the RFC was 
highlighted by Henderson in 1914: ‘The excellent organization of the RFC in the field 
and its system of reconnaissance are largely due to Lieutenant-Colonel Sykes’ 
admirable management in peace-time’.81  Meanwhile, a letter from French gave 
early endorsement of the RFC reflects Sykes’ success developing the structure of 
the RFC: 
Such efficiency as the Royal Flying Corps may have shown in the field is, in 
my opinion, principally due to the organisation and training.  It is therefore 
most desirable that any reinforcements should be organised, trained and 
equipped in the same manner as the squadrons now in the field.82 
 
 In addition to establishing the organisational building blocks that allowed RFC 
espoused culture to develop, Sykes also established the importance of training and 
the need for the force to have an expeditionary capability.    
Dardanelles 
 The intrigues surrounding Sykes were many in the difficult three way 
Trenchard, Sykes and Henderson relationship. 83   Ultimately, this lost him his 
position in France.  Ash wrote that the ‘posting to the Dardanelles was probably 
more a case of Henderson giving Sykes the command that he wanted’. 84  This is 
doubtful; Ash himself later highlighted that the ‘Trenchard-Sykes controversy has 
eclipsed the relationship between Sykes and Henderson’ and that it was actually 
                                            
81 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.138.  Presumably, prior to the Sykes/Henderson rift. 
82 RAFM AC 73/35/2/21/1 Letter French to Secretary of the War Office dated 17 Oct 1914.  
83 On Henderson’s ‘sacking’ of Sykes see Miller, Boom, p.101 and Boyle A, Trenchard, 
p.139.  On the strange incident Trenchard reported about Sykes leaving a locked 
confidential box with shoes in it see Miller, Boom, p.116 and Boyle A, Trenchard, p.115.  
See also Devine, The Broken Wing, p.48.  For an insight into Henderson’s view of Sykes 
see letters concerning Henderson’s resignation: RAFM AC73/35/121/2RAFM 
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84 Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918, p.67. 
 106 
more bitter than that between Trenchard and Sykes.85  Although neither Brancker’s 
biography, nor Sykes’ autobiography, registered suggestion that Sykes had been 
sacked, Henderson’s opinion of Sykes were clear in his letter to Bonar Law following 
the former’s resignation from the Air Council. 86  It is also clear that privately held 
views from their earlier relationship had become public knowledge.87  On balance of 
archival evidence, it appears likely that Sykes’ posting to the Dardanelles was at 
least a sideways move that suited Henderson following the breakdown of their 
relationship. 
 However, the Dardanelles experience transformed Sykes’ views of the 
potential for airpower that informed the vision he had for the RAF as CAS and 
influenced later RAF doctrinal development.  His temporary ranks of Colonel 
Second Commandant RM and Wing Captain RN in the Dardanelles reflect the 
emerging joint nature of airpower in that theatre. 88    He wrote to Churchill 
envisioning multi-arm support and outlining plans for bombing and reconnaissance 
of Constantinople well beyond the battlefield.89  He wrote that this was:   
 The first occasion on which the conception of an Independent Air Force, 
always latent in my mind, was tested in the field.  The RNAS at Gallipoli was, 
in practice, an independent unit.90  
                                            
85 Ibid. p.194. 
86 Macmillan, Sefton Brancker.  Sykes, From Many Angles.  RAFM AC 71/12/75 Letter of 
Resignation from Henderson to Lord Rothmere dated 26 April 1918 and subsequent letter 
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71/12/147-148 ‘Lady Henderson Notes’ covering early deployment period of 1914, dated 
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89 RAFM AC 73/35/2/24 Letter from Sykes to Churchill dated 4 Nov 1915. For combined 
operations and his views on the requirement for aerial offensive see Sykes ‘Memorandum 
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 He also described having the capability to either serve more than one theatre 
or, if only operating in one, ‘we shall be able to supply all naval and military 
requirements with ease and be in a position also to undertake an aerial offensive on 
a large scale’.91  He came to believe that bombing had significant moral impact 
through evidence from prisoners; this became a central air power tenet in the inter-
war era. 92  He also refused to allow RNAS assets to be directly attached to Army 
and RN units, thereby preventing inefficient tasking through centralised control.93  
This would also become a key RAF doctrinal tenet.   
 To Sykes, independent action appeared to have real possibilities, however, 
he was probably ahead of his time.  RNAS aircraft were not robust enough to deal 
with long-range maritime operations in poor weather.  He also tried to impose 
Western Front RFC experiences and processes on the RNAS. 94   Rather than 
exploiting RNAS culture, he tried to confront it and met stiff resistance that doubtless 
affected his success.   
 However, Sykes’ approach to air power at that time was more visionary than 
Trenchard’s view that the RFC was purely a supporting arm.  The evidence supports 
Ash’s contention that: 
The revolution in air power was in the new uses of technology and in new 
organizations, where Sykes was hard at work.  His concepts of strategic 
interdiction and combined-arms attack were as revolutionary as the idealistic 
visions of the Italian Giulio Douhet.95 
                                            
91 RAFM AC 73/35/2/24 Letter from Sykes to Churchill dated 4 Nov 1915. 
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93 For centralisation of command see AC 73/35/1 ‘First Report on the requirements of the 
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 Ash highlighted that historians have concentrated on Sykes’ personal battles 
but ‘missed his achievements and shortcomings’. However, the personal battles and 
cannot be ignored.  In the Dardanelles, his uncompromising temperament reduced 
his stature as a leader and prevented him from implementing his vision for air power 
there to its fullest extent.    
Sykes as CAS96  
 Ash wrote: ‘the air service Sykes was about to inherit had endured 
substantial losses, poor leadership, unfavourable press reports and Parliamentary 
inquiries’.97  He continued that ‘until Sykes arrived as CAS, the RAF and the Air 
Ministry had failed the test of independence’ and, in doing so, he underlined a lack 
of vision by Trenchard who had doggedly pursued his offensive-morale doctrine. 98   
While Sykes had not contributed to the actual formation of the RAF, his time away 
from the RFC in the Dardanelles and had broadened his command experience and 
his position creating the Machine Gun Corps gave him further organisation building 
experience. 
 Sykes was not ‘in a rush to be dragged into the vortex at the Hotel Cecil’ 
where the atmosphere was ‘not a happy one’.99  The aerial services had been 
transformed since Sykes’ departure.  In addition to the vast increase in size, the new 
transition to being independent saw the RAF and the Air Ministry beset with issues.  
                                                                                                                                       
publication is in Royal Air Force Quarterly, April 1936, pp.152-159.  Slessor had not heard 
of him whilst at Staff College in 1924.  Slessor, The Central Blue, p.41. 
96 Sykes was CAS from April 1918 to January 1919. 
97 Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918, p.208 and p.206 p.106.  For 
an example of press coverage on the Air Ministry see RAFM AC73/35 Vol III Part I ‘Air 
Service Organisation’, Daily Telegraph, April 15, 1918. 
98 Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918, p.112.  For insight into 
Trenchard’s view on offensive action see RAFM MFC76/1/73 ‘Offence versus Defence in 
the Air’ and also Ash, Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution 1912-1918, p.105.  
99 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.217.  Hotel Cecil was the Air Ministry. 
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The Air Ministry was a place of friction, excessive committees and was prone to 
overbearing treasury interference.  For all of its intrigue and subterfuge, it earned 
the moniker ‘House of Bolo’ after the spy Bolo Pasha.100  Sykes lamented the quality 
of civil servants at the Ministry and also noted the number of older officers ‘with a 
tradition of the air’ were not sufficient to conduct necessary work.  Sykes perceived 
that he had three tasks ahead of him: 
 (1) The Amalgamation of the R.F.C. and the R.N.A.S. into the R.A.F.… (2) 
The formation of an independent air force’ and (3) The evolution of the Air 
Service of the future.101 
 
 In June 1918, he articulated his immediate concerns in ‘Review of the Air 
Situation and Strategy’ and wrote a second, more comprehensive, document 
entitled ‘Air Power Requirements of the Empire’ in December 1918.102  The latter 
envisaged both military and civil air power being used to unify the Empire.  It is 
largely dismissed by the historiography simply for being unaffordable in the face of 
fiscal adversity compared with Trenchard’s plan.103  However, James highlighted, 
with the benefit of hindsight, the fact that numerous elements of the document would 
be ‘found relevant and resurrected’.104  Devine wrote that ‘it is only in the light of 
after-knowledge that Sykes’ plan is seen to possess virtues that were lacking in 
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Trenchard’s brusque memorandum’.105  Cox highlighted a more fundamental point;  
Sykes had originally proposed 154 squadrons but had already revised that down to 
62 Squadrons by January 1919.106  The plan that Trenchard proposed to Churchill in 
February 1919 actually required 82 squadrons.107  Sykes also clearly articulated 
some of the enduring tenets of RAF doctrinal thinking such as the fundamental 
basis of centralised control, doubtless formulated through his experiences in France 
and the Dardanelles.108  Thus, the commonly accepted view that Sykes’ plans were 
extravagant compared to Trenchard’s is wrong.  Sykes’ philosophy of utilising civil 
and military air power to underpin the economic and military security of the Empire 
was far more exploratory than Trenchard’s narrower plans that only explored the 
military application of air power.  However, Cox pointed out that Sykes already had 
a reputation for extravagance based on his original figures and also, probably more 
fundamentally, he was simply not viewed as the right man for the job.109 
 While Sykes’ tenure as CAS was short, a great deal of progress was made 
regarding organisational development that is almost entirely overlooked by the 
historiography except by Cox and Ash, neither of whom broached the cultural 
significance of his achievements.110   
 Sykes’ roles and responsibilities were specifically established by the Air 
Council on 8 June 1918 and included developing policy, advice on conduct of air 
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operations, handling of the press and interviews, censorship and publicity, air 
organisation, employment of Air Signal and Meteorology Departments, schemes for 
development of the Air Force, Air Force organisation, training policy and Air Staff 
publications.111    
 Sykes’ purview was vast and required him to bring the RAF into being whilst 
fighting the First World War.  Inspection of Air Council minutes revealed that many 
aspects of early RAF development arose during Sykes’ tenure and also involved 
deep discussion between the Air Council and CAS.  For instance, it was during 
Sykes tenure that RAF Uniform, establishment of the Chaplain Department, RAF 
Ensign, RAF cap badges, RAF training policy, RAF Bands, the RAF Standard, 
appointing Sir Walter Raleigh to write the RAF history, growth of facial hair, RAF pay 
and RAF disciplinary policy were all agreed.112  Many of these aspects were his 
areas of expertise from having contributed to establishing the espoused cultures at 
the MW and the Machine Gun Corps. 
 The most pressing of all tasks was to attempt to reduce losses of men and 
machines.113  Sykes, recognised that improvements in training policy would reduce 
both combat and accident losses.  The need to institute reforms in the training 
system stemmed not only from concern amongst aircrews and the press, but was 
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probably influenced by a concerning aspect of Rothmere’s letter to him when he 
took command. 
 One day soon I will tell you some facts (added later) – I believe them to be 
facts –about training that will require inquiry and action. They are of such a 
damning nature that if any way true that I have refrained from incorporating 
them in any Government minute.114 
 
 In the early RFC days, Sykes had advocated robust training and, as CAS, he 
reinstated that.  Initially, he concentrated on aircrew training and results were 
quickly felt with ‘a reduction not only in casualties, but in what had been one of the 
most tragic results of the previous policy, crashes behind the lines’.115  By the time 
Sykes and his staff prepared ‘Air Power Requirements of the Empire’, his ideas on 
training had been developed and included:  ‘pilot training (including the training and 
tracking of commercial pilots), technical officer training, Air Staff and administrative 
officer training and training of the ‘rank and file’.116 
 Unlike Trenchard, Sykes placed no emphasis on establishing a separate RAF 
college for training officers.117  However, he did plan to establish a separate RAF 
Staff College.118  Trenchard was doubtless aware of ‘Air Power Requirements of the 
Empire’ and, given the similarity in themes, it is likely that Trenchard’s plans built 
upon those that Sykes proposed.119 
 In ‘Air Power Requirements of the Empire’, Sykes proposed two alternative 
terms of service to cover a post-war environment including national service and 
voluntary service.  Volunteers would be employed in a way that would be ‘attractive 
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and to carry substantial pension rights’ to satisfy the underlying technical needs of 
the RAF.120  The technical needs of the Service would subsequently be central to 
Trenchard’s philosophy.  Additionally, Sykes proposed to recruit Boys of 14½ to 15 
for three years technical training.  When Trenchard introduced the 1919 
Memorandum 12 months later, it would include both a proposal for reserve service 
and a very similar proposal to train boys under an apprentice scheme.  The latter 
proved to be probably one of the most successful and innovative aspects of RAF 
training both for the RAF and for the British aviation industry.  The apprentices 
would be called ‘Trenchard’s Brats’ overlooking their original inspiration. 
 Trenchard, had concentrated on tactical support to the Army for the majority 
of his time in France.121  While three Squadrons had been established in Oct 1917 
dedicated to long range bombing, the creation of the RAF demanded a much 
greater emphasis on the use of strategic bombing.122  Sykes developed concepts for 
strategic action for the RAF and by June 1918 laid this out in Chapter IV of the 
‘Review of Air Situation and Strategy for the Information of the Imperial War 
Cabinet’.123  His views on the strategic application of air power were subsequently 
further developed in ‘Air Power Requirements of the Empire’:  ‘Highly specialised air 
forces are now essential components of all fighting efficiency, and aviation also 
provides a distinct and separate striking force of tremendous potentiality’.124  With a 
detailed explanation of the increasing potential of aircraft capability, likely continuing 
instability and the ability of aircraft to strike at the ‘nerve centres, the armies and 
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123 Sykes, ‘Review of Air Situation and Strategy for the information of the Imperial War 
Cabinet’, Sykes, From Many Angles, p.544-554. 
124 Sykes, ‘Air Power Requirements of the Empire’, p.1. 
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navies of the opponent, the population as a whole, his national moral and the 
industries, without which he cannot wage war’.125 
 In addressing the potential and problems associated with strategic air power, 
he recognised both a need for offence and defence but also formally expressed a 
distinctly strategic outlook.  For offence, he advocated 8 squadrons of day bombers 
and 9 squadrons of night bombers with an additional 3 squadrons of flying boats to 
cover the needs of the British Isles.  His highly detailed scheme also provided a blue 
print for the strategic needs across the entire Empire.  In order to defend against 
strategic attack he advocated 20 squadrons ‘on a cadre basis’ would be required.126  
This established probably one of the most enduring RAF policies that gave the RAF 
its real raison-d’être.  Independence would become one of the deepest facets of 
both espoused and culture-in-action of the Royal Air Force for the next two decades. 
The ability to conduct independent and strategic action would delineate the RAF and 
air power’s place as a separate entity within the British military rather than simply an 
adjunct to land and maritime activity. 
 As has already been pointed out, his plans for the third task of building the 
RAF for the future were cut short by his move sideways by Churchill to allow 
Trenchard a second chance as CAS.  Trenchard, upon his return, took over an RAF 
that was in better shape than it had been when he left; Sykes’ penchant for 
organisation and vision for policy had delivered.  Indeed, had Sykes not been 
appointed as CAS, the RAF might have withered on the vine with Trenchard’s 
approach to the Service and apparently limited doctrinal vision during his first short 
tenure.  However, Sykes’ less well developed leadership skills and inability to avoid 
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intrigue meant that Trenchard was probably a better prospect for the long fight for 
survival.  The latter simply fitted in better and his charisma as a leader ensured that 
people followed him.127 
Conclusion 
 The contribution that Sykes made to the RFC and also directly to the early 
running of the RAF and the espoused cultures of both organisations was immense 
and is underrated in the historiography.  Throughout his career he became very 
experienced at setting up organisations: the MW, the RNAS in the Dardanelles and 
the Machine Gun Corps.  He was also, in reality, the first CAS of the RAF that 
executed any real function.128  The provenance of many of the RAF processes and 
practices can be traced directly back to Sykes.  He ensured that the MW was highly 
organised with a credible and exercised logistics plan, a nascent doctrine and a set 
of largely imported processes and practices that made the RFC look and feel like an 
Army corps but with a number of modifications around which its own distinct sub-
culture would grow.  Sykes recognised the ‘initiative, energy and dash’ of flying and 
managed to fold in new elements, such as ‘Wings’, a new uniform and adapted 
parades to involve aeroplanes thus playing up to the aviator identity’ whilst also 
maintaining an acceptable framework in the eyes of the British Army.  The more 
conservative aspects of his work revolved around his attention to detail with training, 
the Netheravon Concentration Camp, RFC Military Orders and MW Standing 
Orders.  That, combined with his deft information campaign, ensured that the RFC 
integrated cutting-edge technology into a very traditional environment.  Through his 
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Revolution, p.199. 
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organisational work, training, development of clear documentation, establishment of 
discipline and transmission of information, he succeeded in setting in motion the 
necessary processes and practices for a new organisation to function efficiently. 
 Sykes had been concerned by Britain’s poor performance going into the 
Second Boer War.  He attributed it to poor organisation and to inappropriate training 
during peacetime.  It is clear that his early work concentrated on the need for 
training and solid organisation.  Both of those aspects would endure throughout his 
career.  He was inspired by contemporary military thought and the Staff College 
resulting in predictable Edwardian views on moral and the offensive.  However, the 
archival evidence supports that his views matured and gives credence to Ash’s final 
position that he ‘envisioned a new war that extended beyond the front to ‘areas’’.129  
‘Air Power Requirements of the Empire’ along with much of his other work laid down 
air power concepts that would endure much like the organisational processes he 
established. 
 However, Sykes’ uncompromising personality and unconventional arrival in 
the Army also meant that he was always considered an outsider.  He had a habit of 
irritating colleagues that would hold him back, but, crucially, also stunted the 
development of British air power.  The intrigues interfered with the senior 
leadership’s ability to engage constructively on air power at a time when the limited 
capability of aircraft meant that translating the First World War experiences into 
coherent air policy for the future was a difficult task.  Had Trenchard, Sykes and 
Henderson been better able to manage their relationships, British air power could 
have been more constructive than it was.  Many of Sykes’ processes, practices and 
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concepts laid the foundations of RAF espoused culture but have, subsequently, 
been attributed to Trenchard.  As Ash pointed out, ‘ironically much of Trenchard’s 
success resulted partly from the efforts of Sykes’.130  Of his own achievements, 
Sykes said: 
 I could claim to have been the original founder of the R.F.C, and I had gone 
with it to France with a favourable position; during the last year of the War, as 
Chief of the Air Staff, I had been instrumental in the transformation of the 
Royal Air Force into a third Service of immense and far-reaching potential.131 
 
 Much of what he said in that statement was true, however, his unabashed 
self-promotion grates with the reader.  And therein lies the issue with Sykes that lost 
him recognition:  he was a prickly character with a tendency to say the wrong thing, 
although he also had the misfortune of sparring with Trenchard and Henderson.  It is 
a shame that Sykes was unable to control his own personality.  He did a good job of 
promoting the RFC but with his personal relationships within the service he did not 
fare as well.  And that is what robbed the man who was such an important influence 
on the RAF of the recognition he deserved. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
TRENCHARD 
 Trenchard was an overbearing, thick-skinned officer with little academic 
education who had appalling communication skills, entertained some dubious ideas 
about the employment of air power and had not been considered as a high flyer in 
his early Army career.  Yet he drifted into the newly formed RFC, rose to its highest 
command, reigned over the RAF as its CAS of the RAF for 11 years, became a 
peer, grew to be one of the most influential leaders of the British fighting forces in 
the Twentieth Century and assured the survival of the first independent air force that 
became a model for air forces around the world.  In 1919, he prepared ‘The 
Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’, a seminal memorandum that was a 
plan for the physical and intellectual development of the RAF and of great 
importance to RAF espoused culture.1  That paved the way for the RAF to develop 
along traditional military lines with its own processes, practices, artefacts, traditions 
customs and rituals.  Throughout the Second World War, ‘The Few’ supported by 
well-trained ground personnel overcame odds stacked against them and 
demonstrated the importance of air power to the British public.  RAF culture had 
been tested under the most enormous strain and Trenchard had played a significant 
part in consciously developing the ‘Air Force spirit’ that contributed to it. 
 Following a brief examination of his early years, this chapter will explore the 
effect Trenchard’s personality and policies had on RAF culture.  It will examine the 
importance of the 1919 Memorandum as a blueprint for the development of the RAF 
and air-mindedness whilst explaining the emergence of Trenchardian thought.  
                                            
1 Cmd 467. ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’.  
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Trenchard is the RAF’s most important hero and the organisation continues to 
venerate him with little dissent.  This thesis will highlight that some aspects of 
Trenchard are myth but it will also examine the importance of that myth to RAF 
culture.  Thus, in addition to providing an insight into how Trenchard set the 
conditions for RAF espoused culture to emerge, this chapter will also examine him 
from a new angle that will enrich the historiography. 
Early Years 
 There is a profusion of literature that covers Trenchard’s early life, little of 
which is contested and need not be discussed in depth here.2  Suffice to say, he 
performed poorly at school and scraped into the Army, according to Joubert de la 
Ferté, ‘through the back door’ via the crammer system as he was too academically 
poor to pass exams.3  His path in the Army saw him serve in India where he met 
Churchill with whom he played polo; his later life and the fortunes of air power would 
become deeply entwined with Churchill. 4   Like Henderson and Sykes, he was 
wounded in the Boer War.5  Following recuperation, he returned to South Africa and 
then served in Ireland and Nigeria.  His Army career was not promising, although he 
had served with distinction, especially in Nigeria and the Boer War.  Indeed, he had 
been awarded the DSO in Nigeria in 1906 for having ‘commanded 800 men in the 
field for five months and shown energy, resource and powers of organisation far 
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above the average’. 6   His sporting ability earned him respect but he was, 
nevertheless considered somewhat odd.7  Upon the recommendation of Eustace 
Lorraine, he tried his hand at flying and whilst a student on CFS was appointed its 
Deputy Commandant.8 
 His performance in South Africa, Nigeria and in the First World War 
demonstrate strong leadership skills and a determined adherence to the 
contemporary military doctrine of the relentless offensive.9  Bowman and Connelly 
described forward movement as being considered ‘essential for victory in any battle’ 
while Travers wrote that ‘the British Army developed no particular doctrine before 
1914 except that of the offensive under almost all circumstances’.10  Gray also 
stressed the contemporary importance of offensive doctrine. 11   By the time he 
arrived in the RFC, he was an experienced soldier and leader.  With the nickname, 
‘Boom’, his drive, personality, leadership and patronage by Haig saw him ascend 
and become GOC of the RFC.12  Ash wrote that: 
By 1917 Trenchard had created a powerful following.  His reputation was 
such that he could survive scandals; but he had not obtained that status on 
his own.  Trenchard had the wisdom to recognize his limitations and surround 
himself with capable people’.13   
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 Baring and Spaight, in particular, were sources of advice and helped him 
frame his message and compensate for some of his weaknesses.14  Despite their 
best efforts, Trenchard’s weaknesses were still obvious.15  His almost divine status 
in the RAF is, therefore, somewhat perplexing and deserves some explanation.  
Morris provided the following insight into Trenchard’s visits to the squadrons during 
the First World War: 
Trenchard’s tours were never light-hearted occasions.  He had no small talk, 
and could deal with work only in clipped and barely intelligible terms.  Blame 
was apportioned in that terrible boom, praise blurted in sixth-form jargon…To 
many a youngster he was marked as the snorting brass hat who had sent the 
subaltern’s best friend to death in flames hours before.  But others drew 
strength from, and felt abiding affection for, this indifferent flyer who by 
courage and perseverance had gained RAC ticket No 270 at twice their 
age.16 
 
 He was a man of his era; he grew up in the hierarchical British Army of 
Empire that should be considered contextually.  Bowman and Connelly contested 
Edmonds’ official history of operations on the Western Front which claimed that the 
BEF was: ‘incomparably the best trained, best organized, and best equipped British 
Army which ever went forth to war”.17  The British Army had undergone significant 
modernisation including the Cardwell and Haldane reforms.  However, Bowman and 
Connelly highlighted problems in the officer corps including a poor standard of 
training at Sandhurst and Woolwich, talent in the ranks remaining untapped due to 
the need for an officer to have an income supplement, a promotion system that was 
                                            
14 Baring was Henderson’s and Trenchard’s Staff Officer in France.  Spaight was a lawyer 
who worked in the Air Ministry and became a Principal Assistant Secretary.  For more detail 
on Spaight’s influence on Trenchard, the RAF and the RAF Staff College see Gray, The 
RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception to 1945, pp.54-56 and also Gray, Air Warfare. 
History, Theory and Practice, pp.53-54.  See also Meilinger, ‘The Historiography of 
Airpower’, pp.484-485. 
15 IWM Audio Catalogue 3176, Interview Slessor John, Reel 1, 12:17-12:19 and IWM Audio 
Catalogue 3176, Interview Slessor John, Reel 1, 1330:13:33 
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 122 
tied to seniority combined with patronage and the fact that regular army officers 
came from a very narrow section of British Society.18  The British Army was an 
organisation set in a class-conscious Britain that viewed everything through the lens 
of the World’s largest Imperial power.  The British military was emerging from a 
tradition of purchase of commission, and comprised regiments and corps that were 
extremely traditional in outlook and tradition.19  Army life was harsh; in 1881 flogging 
was replaced by Field Punishment No 1, that was, in itself, a brutal punishment, and 
was part of a disciplinary process that included court martials, fines, detentions and 
the death penalty.  According to Sheffield, ‘the Regular Army combined exemplary 
paternalism with a rigidly hierarchical approach to discipline and distant, although 
generally mutual respectful, relations between officers and men.20   Trenchard’s 
gruffness should not, therefore, be overly conflated or misconstrued as bad 
leadership for the era.  When measured against his peers he was, in fact, a 
progressive leader for his time despite having a bark that had earned him the 
nickname ‘Boom’.  James wrote that Trenchard: 
…did what the other Heads of Arms did, and spent a great deal of his time 
visiting the subordinate formations but with a difference.  His colleagues kept 
visiting at a high level, Army, and perhaps Corps.  Trenchard visited 
squadrons.  The Chief, Royal Artillery, for example, did not talk with the 
troops: he might talk to them, in set piece speeches at parades and great 
occasions.  He might occasionally be affable to such low life as battery 
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commanders, but like other generals he did not associate with the men who 
did the actual fighting.21 
 
 James suggested that it might even have been Army policy to maintain a 
distance following Buller’s unwillingness to press the attack home in Natal while 
watching British casualties being brought back from the front in the Boer War.22  
However, James wrote of the RFC: 
 The men who did the fighting were few in numbers, and almost all were 
officers.  Trenchard visited squadrons, and let it be known early in his 
command that when he did this he did not want brigade staff getting in the 
way…the pilots felt they knew him.  He was their commander, they were his 
pilots, in a way in which no one else above battalion commander had his own 
men.  It was Trenchard who created the atmosphere of the Royal Flying 
Corps.23 
 
 According to Boyle, he attended briefings, learned the names of the aircrew 
and would frequently stay up to await their return.24  Trenchard’s gruff but personal 
humour was underlined when he told Parker he was ‘a bloody fool’ for returning 
from Paris after only one day of leave and that ‘If there had only been one cloud in 
the sky I should have had an excuse for staying longer’.25  The fact that he visited 
his fighting men was of note in an era when, as Sheffield wrote when referring to 
Haig: ‘the informal style of mixing with his men adopted by Montgomery in the 
Second World War would not have worked in 1914-18 when social conventions 
were very different’.26  Trenchard clearly understood that his tactics were sending 
aircrew to their deaths and it weighed heavily upon him.  In his own words, he 
recognised that his airmen had been ‘tossed head first into the most impersonal 
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24 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.305. 
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type of battle any group of men had ever faced in history which helped them rise 
above the risks and write their own traditions in the skies’. 27   He intuitively 
understood that a different leadership style needed to be adopted.  This strong, 
instinctive leadership is, doubtless, why he was considered as the obvious choice to 
be the first CAS.  Jordan wrote: ‘Trenchard’s success and reputation as the leading 
airman of his day led to his appointment as the first CAS of the Royal Air Force’.28 
 Trenchard’s apparent lack of academic talent and his appalling 
communication skills are frequently referred to throughout the archives, personal 
accounts, the historiography and, indeed, by himself.29  Slessor, who worked for him 
in the Air Staff said of his academic prowess that ‘he was not by any means a clear 
thinker’.30  Slessor continued that ‘he was almost unintelligible’ and that the ‘process 
for writing papers involved writing them, having Lady Trenchard provide corrections 
until they were right’. 31   Trenchard was terse, taciturn, lacked the ease of 
expression one would expect of a great leader and had an apparently chaotic mind.  
His life-long rift with Sykes demonstrates that he also bore a grudge.  Nevertheless, 
his personnel appeared spellbound by his strangely charismatic and strong 
leadership.  Meilinger wrote that ‘Trenchard has attained near mythic proportions in 
the literature and traditions of the RAF’.32  Slessor, for instance, displayed an almost 
unquestioning faith in Trenchard as he underlined Trenchard’s role in the battle to 
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defend the RAF whilst acknowledging how unrealistic some of the strategic 
posturing of the RAF had been: 
At that time we were mainly mainly [sic], I think I would say, mainly concerned 
in defending the existence of an independent Air Force, which I always 
disliked the word, against the attacks of particularly the Navy and I mean, if it 
hadn’t been for Boom we should have lost that battle.  No doubt about it.  But 
looking back on it it [sic] is quite extraordinary to think how we exaggerated in 
our own minds about what the air could do with the weapons it then had.33 
 
 Harris, meanwhile, said that ‘for nearly 20 years I watched the Army and the 
Navy… engineer one deliberate attempt after another to destroy the Royal Air 
Force… time after time Trenchard, and Trenchard alone, saved us.’34  Joubert de la 
Ferté, who knew him at CFS and served under him during the First World War 
described him thus: 
Trenchard, brusque and abrupt in his manner, had little time for politics and 
less for people who were thus engaged.  Never very clear in his exposition of 
a case he often confused people he was trying to enlighten or persuade.  But 
his transparent honesty, his great admiration and his ability to come to a just 
conclusion by an apparently erroneous process of thought, endeared him to 
those who worked under him – though his manner often repelled or 
frightened them.35 
 
 Lawrence’s The Mint underlines that the loyalty Trenchard engendered 
spread well beyond his immediate inner circle and was evident even in the junior 
ranks.36   
 Zweigle highlighted that some historians had ‘begun to question how vital 
Trenchard was to the establishment of the RAF as an independent entity’, citing in 
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particular, Cooper.37  However, Cooper’s writing about Trenchard’s early lack of 
enthusiasm for establishing the RAF should not be confused with his later 
dedication to the RAF and how vital he was to its survival.   Archival evidence 
highlights that Trenchard originally objected to the Independent Force in the First 
World War as it represented the splitting up of air assets at a time he did not think 
was appropriate. 38   By the end of Cooper’s article, Trenchard’s dedication to 
maintaining an independent RAF was clear; Cooper argued that Trenchard and 
other senior airmen’s fervour to develop the new Service arose because ‘naval and 
military attacks upon the RAF actually constituted a serious threat to the 
development of the aircraft as a weapon of war’.39  Gray similarly wrote that ‘the 
senior staff officers had no doubt that the dismemberment of the fledgling Service 
would not just mean a simple return to the days of the RFC and the RNAS; air 
power would be totally stripped of resources so that the other two forces could fund 
more congenial programmes of expenditure’.40   
 The historiography is largely unanimous in recognising Trenchard’s strong 
leadership skills and drive; they were amply represented through the ten-year fight 
for survival of the RAF. 41  Ash summed up Trenchard’s leadership as follows: 
‘commanders have no business being ‘one of the boys’, but great commanders 
                                            
37 Zachary J Zwiegle, ‘The British Royal Air Force: 
A Faulty Foundation and the Decision to Survive, 1918-40’, Hindsight Graduate History 
Journal Vol. VI (Spring 2012), pp.96-121.  See also Cooper, ‘Blueprint for Confusion, p.447.  
38 TNA AIR 8/179, CAS Archives, ‘Interview with Lord Trenchard 12/30-3pm’, p.5. 
39 Cooper, ‘Blueprint for Confusion’, p.450. 
40 Gray, ‘British Air Power from Potential to Fully Fledged Service, 1914–45. 
41 Ash, ‘Air Power Leadership: A Study of Sykes and Trenchard’, p.164. Malcolm S Smith, 
British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).  Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Richard Johns, ‘The Trenchard Vision and its Relevance in an Age of Joint 
Warfare’, Trenchard Memorial Lecture, The RUSI Journal, Vol 142 No 5 (October 1997), 
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inspire a sense of respect, admiration, and even love from subordinates.  Sykes did 
not do this.  Trenchard did’.42  In short order the RAF assumed a self-confidence 
that was instilled across the rank structure, in large measure, by its larger than life 
and seemingly unassailable leader. 
The 1919 Memorandum and Spirit 
 Trenchard’s take on how the RAF should develop and, particularly the vigour 
with which he intended to do so was encapsulated in his 1919 Memorandum 
entitled, ‘Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’. 43   Air Chief Marshal 
Johns, a former CAS, said: ‘his far-sighted Memorandum, setting out the framework 
for the post-war Royal Air Force, became one of the most constructive plans for air 
power ever’.44  However, Higham highlighted it as a political document that ‘was 
designed to be used on either tack’ and that ‘the bulk of the Memorandum is 
innocuous in that it deals primarily with the organization of the air services and not 
with their role’.45  Higham’s point is well made regarding the role of the RAF.  As 
previously highlighted, Sykes’ plans for the roles of the RAF were far more 
expansive and went well beyond the solely military sphere.  However, the 
organisational aspects Higham referred to are precisely what made the document 
such a seminal one regarding the origins of the espoused culture of the RAF.  As 
well as laying down the organisational and functional priorities that would ensure 
that the RAF would develop into a permanent force, it called for the development of 
an RAF specific culture to be formed that he called the ‘Air Force spirit’.  Mahoney 
                                            
42 Ash, Air Power Leadership: A Study of Sykes and Trenchard, p.164. 
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45 Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, p.165.  
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astutely identified the 1919 Memorandum as an ‘important cultural artefact’.46  It is 
clear that Trenchard believed that ‘spirit’ would underpin the organisation and the 
first of three postulates articulated in the 1919 Memorandum explicitly stated that: 
Firstly, to make an Air Force worthy of the name, we must create an Air 
Force spirit, or rather foster this spirit which undoubtedly existed in a high 
degree during the war, by every means in our power.  Suggestions have 
been made that we should rely on the older service to train our cadets and 
Staff officers.  To do so would make the creation of an Air Force spirit an 
impossibility apart from the practical objection, among others, that the 
existing naval and military cadet and staff colleges are not provided with 
aerodromes or situated in localities in any way suited for flying training.47 
 
 That important postulate was the preamble that paved the way in the 
memorandum for the establishment of the College at Cranwell, the Air Force Staff 
College and an apprentice school.  Those three institutions were of cultural 
significance; they allowed the RAF to train but also instil espoused culture in future 
generations of RAF personnel. 
 It is important to try to establish the contemporary meaning of the word 
‘spirit’.   The word was used in military circles and more broadly in the civilian world 
in the Edwardian and Victorian eras to articulate the moral qualities required in a 
man, unit or formation to deliver success on the battlefield.  The British use probably 
emerged from the French term ‘Esprit-de-Corps’.  It has been demonstrated that 
Sykes recognised the importance of esprit-de-corps, however, Trenchard appeared 
even more obsessed with developing it.48  Paris wrote that Trenchard’s obsession 
resulted in placing the need for developing an ‘RAF spirit ahead of motive’ in the 
                                            
46 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, p.92. 
47 Cmd. 467 ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’. 
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War in the Air. 49    He frequently underlined that the ‘Air Force spirit’ was an 
extension and strengthening of that formed in the First World War in the RFC.50   As 
late as 1944 he continued to emphasise the importance of having promoted early 
RAF spirit and particularly stressed the value of having established separate 
institutions to inculcate this.51  So important was spirit to Trenchard, he was even 
prepared to accept a reduction in the number of aeroplanes in order to develop the 
training system and build the infrastructure that would allow the ‘Air Force spirit’ to 
thrive separately from the RN and the Army.52  However, spirit seemed to have no 
precise definition in Trenchard’s time.  The Victorian and Edwardian middle and 
upper classes appeared to have an intuitive grasp of certain vague entities as 
commented upon by Gray referring to leadership. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, leadership was more a question of 
what one did, rather than what was studied.  Officers tended to come from a 
higher social class than their men and ensuring the well-being of their troops, 
along with achievement of the task and maintenance of discipline, was an 
intuitive process.53 
 
 Spirit similarly appears to be something that the contemporary officer cadre 
intuitively knew the value of and also how to achieve it.  Robbins wrote that ‘the 
Army’s code was largely implicit and unwritten’.54  Although Trenchard repeatedly 
underlined the importance of spirit, paradoxically, he never defined what he meant 
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by it.  At the Airship Officers’ Dinner, he referred to it in characteristically unclear 
and rambling manner: 
The Air Spirit and pride in our Service is common to us all and must be 
cultivated by us all, and I look to you who have done so much to found this 
service to consolidate it and to see that its foundations are well and truly laid.  
We are a small Service and what we must have is the all round man capable 
of turning his hand to anything.  You have all heard the tale of the man who 
built a magnificent house but made the small omission of neglecting to 
provide any stairs.  The Air Service is like a house and we must cultivate the 
all round man otherwise we run the danger of having very fine rooms but no 
means to ingress them.  If Icarus had only had a knowledge of the 
temperature at which wax melted he would never have got too near the Sun, 
his wings would not have fallen off and he might have been alive now and a 
Marshal of the Air at the very least.  I know you realise all this and I want you 
to see that it is realised and to cultivate cultivate (sic) and maintain the Air 
Spirit and pride in the Royal Air Force which is so essential to us all.55 
 
 Thus, spirit remained poorly defined, abstract and with no apparent scientific 
basis.  For the purposes of this thesis, Trenchard’s ‘Air Force spirit’ has been 
assumed to equate approximately to espoused culture.  Trenchard clearly saw the 
importance of culture and the need for a framework for it comprising institutions, 
symbols, processes, practices, traditions and even architecture.  Whilst he may not 
have defined spirit, he intuitively understood it. 
 Trenchard’s other postulates also called for the RAF to develop in other ways 
that would make important contributions to the overarching ‘Air Force spirit’, or 
espoused culture, that he searched for.  The second postulate in the 1919 
Memorandum read as follows: 
We must use every endeavour to eliminate flying accidents, both during 
training and subsequently.  This end can only be secured by ensuring that 
the training of our mechanics in the multiplicity of trades necessitated by a 
highly technical service, is as thorough as can be made.  The best way to do 
this is to enlist the bulk of our skilled ranks as boys and train them ourselves.  
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This has the added advantage that it will undoubtedly foster the Air Force 
spirit on which so much depends.56 
 
 Henderson and Sykes originally espoused that the RFC was a technical 
Service.  However, Trenchard played a major role in reinforcing this as a deeply 
held belief this for the RAF through the 1919 Memorandum and in his ensuing years 
as CAS.57  The apprentice scheme was an expensive way to provide technical 
expertise, however, it proved to be exceptionally successful and safeguarded RAF 
engineering practices and standards until the early 1990’s by establishing deep 
pride and a sense of superiority amongst the boy entrants that will be examined in 
Chapter VI.  The sense of superiority of the ORs of the RAF over the other services 
also became a deeply held belief structure in the inter-war RAF.  Sherbrooke-
Walker observed this whilst attached to the RAF.58  Zwiegle contended that there 
was ‘a deliberate attempt by the leadership of the RAF to create and nurture an 
attitude of unity and superiority among the men and officers of the air force’.59  
Meanwhile, James wrote, ‘These fellows (soldiers) have joined up as a last resort, 
because they have failed and were not qualified for anything else. The airmen, on 
the other hand, saw their service as the beginning of a real career’.60  Training the 
apprentices and ORs in separate RAF institutions helped internalised the belief that 
air power could only be conducted by a specialist and independent organisation and 
will be examined later. 
 The third postulate was: 
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Thirdly, it is not sufficient to make the Air Force officer a chauffeur and 
nothing more.  Technical experts are required for the development of the 
science of aeronautics, still in its infancy.  Navigation, meteorology, 
photography and wireless are primary necessities for safety, even on the 
chauffeur basis.61 
 
 This emphasised the importance of developing technical skills in the officer 
corps as well as in the ranks.62  But it also was clear that developing such a complex 
technical service would mean that officer careers would not be full term ones for all 
RAF officers.  The short service commission system was introduced with a plan for 
only 50% of the officers to be given permanent commission. 63   The 1919 
Memorandum also outlined a plan for an entry method via universities rather than 
via Cranwell.  Given Trenchard’s priority to train the officers and men of the RAF in 
its own institutions, this may seem counter-intuitive, however, he also sought to 
bring a breadth of expertise to the RAF.  At a Cambridge University Aeronautical 
meeting he underlined that: 
 We want the mathematical genius – there is work for him.  We want the 
literary genius – there is work for him, especially in my office.  We want the 
scientific brain – there is more than enough work for him.  We want the man 
of brains, and we want the man of common sense and little brains.64   
 
 From a cultural perspective, this would blend the officer corps intake and 
encourage university graduates to bring their specialist knowledge to the technical 
service.65   Despite his own poor academic credentials, it appeared Trenchard, or 
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perhaps the Air Staff advising him, sought to establish a well informed, thinking 
Service by inducting some of the brightest students in the country.  
 The 1919 Memorandum was also the basis for the formation of the Auxiliary 
Air Force.  It is clear from Wilkinson’s PhD that this helped establish a broader 
cultural base than the traditional officer intake might otherwise have provided.66   
 When these methods of entry were combined with a small but innovative 
system of assuring the best apprentices with a place at Cranwell, there emerged, in 
the RAF, a putative move towards a more meritocratic system than in the other 
services.  This was visionary in the extreme and represented social engineering at a 
time when the British middle classes were terrified by the potential overthrow of the 
established order following universal British male suffrage, partial female suffrage 
and the downfall of traditional order in Russia, Germany and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.67 
 Trenchard recognised the disadvantage of being financially embarrassed 
following the death of his father and deliberately located the College far from the 
expensive temptations of London to ensure that cadets without means would not be 
disadvantaged.68  By 1925, AP1100, The Royal Air Force as a Career, officially 
articulated that the RAF pursued a progressive approach to recruiting its officer 
corps and, in its opening paragraph, stressed that ‘with all the vistas before him a 
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boy may be excused for not wishing to follow in his father’s footsteps’.69  It also 
stressed that an RAF officer career did not require a private income.70  In a speech 
to officers in 1926, he further expounded notions of meritocracy: ‘in the past the 
fighting services were largely drawn from and supported by what I may call the 
squires who had the money, the brains and the men.  Now the centre of influence 
has shifted…we have tapped and are tapping…the scientific brains of this nation, 
the intelligent class who can learn and absorb quickly’.71  Despite this, it will be seen 
later that, in reality, Trenchard, the recruiting staff and the staff at Cranwell still tried 
to ensure that the RAF attracted officers from Cranwell from the best public schools 
in the country and that notions of meritocracy would take a long time to gather pace 
in the RAF.72 
Air-mindedness 
 A key strand in safeguarding the RAF would be to try to educate as many 
people as possible to the value of air power and the need for this to be delivered by 
a focussed independent force.  Trenchard achieved this internally through separate 
training as outlined in the 1919 Memorandum.  This provided an environment in 
which Gidden’s process of structuration took place.73  In separate institutions across 
the rank structure, RAF personnel were inculcated with the idea that, as air 
specialists, only they truly understood the air environment and its demands. 
 But air-mindedness was not just something that Trenchard required of his 
personnel; he also needed influential decision makers and the public to understand 
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the RAF.74  Trenchard had a life-long aversion to the press and being in front of 
cameras. 75  He came from an Army background that, as Robbins pointed out, 
‘disliked and distrusted showmanship of the type which generals such as 
Montgomery would indulge in the Second World War’.76  Despite this, Trenchard 
exploited the media with remarkable skill.  Whilst everyone understood the land 
environment and significant numbers of the British public had experienced sea 
travel, the air environment was entirely alien to all but a very small group of 
adventuring aviators. 
 Two key initiatives directed by Trenchard, as part of his plan to develop air-
mindedness and media exploitation, were the development of University Air 
Squadrons and also the establishment of the Hendon Air Pageants.  These 
enterprises proved both effective and popular and had a deep effect on the RAF 
itself as well as the broader British people. 
 The first University Air Squadron was established at Cambridge on 1 Oct 
1925 and was quickly followed by the establishment of the second at Oxford, also in 
1925. 77   Other University Air Squadrons were then subsequently established 
ultimately providing coverage of all universities across the country after the Second 
World War.  These organisations gave undergraduates an insight into the exclusive 
world of aviation with an opportunity to fly RAF aircraft and helped recruit the 
university-educated officers with the range of skills the technical Service required.   
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This provided a source of intelligent recruits for the technical service, but also 
inculcated air-mindedness in students who did not join the RAF but would become 
influential British establishment decision-makers.  In 1935, an entry in The 
Aeroplane gave an insight into how popular they had become.  It highlighted the 
great RAF investment of effort and influence at the Cambridge University Air 
Squadron Dinner that was attended by the Under-Secretary of State for Air, CAS, 
DCAS and Brooke-Popham.78 
 The second key initiative that encouraged air-mindedness was the 
introduction of the RAF Air Pageant that helped educate the broader public about 
aircraft and the roles of the RAF.79  The first pageant was held in July 1920 at 
Hendon which was close enough for spectators to come out from London.  Boyle 
wrote: ‘The Hendon show embodied Trenchard’s conception of practical 
propaganda at its best’.80  It attracted the public and VIPs including HRH Prince 
Henry and Churchill.81  Flight referred to it as ‘the most successful aerial affair which 
has ever been held, in this country’.82  Originally conceived as a one-off event it 
became an annual event following its outrageous success.  Pathé, reporting on the 
second Pageant in 1921, noted that 100 000 people were ‘thrilled at realistic 
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bombing and destruction of ‘enemy headquarters’ at R.A.F. Pageant’. 83   The 
pageants became increasingly professional and a 3000-person grandstand was 
eventually built.84  In the inter-war period, pageants allowed the RAF to put on 
demonstrations that highlighted, in particular, imperial air policing, substitution of RN 
and Army roles and air defence of London thereby transmitting key messages about 
the RAF.  In 1922, the bombing of an Eastern ‘stronghold’ included co-operating 
with armoured cars and was intended to demonstrate how the RAF responded 
quickly and represented value for money in the imperial policing role over more 
costly deployment of ground troops.85  This substitution was a key principle of 
defence of the RAF as an independent entity.  In 1924, the RAF highlighted the 
value of aircraft in the maritime role by bombing a model of a cruiser.86   In 1937, a 
spectacular reconstruction of a port for the ‘set piece’ attack was seen by 200 000 
visitors.87  Overall the pageants were seen by over four million people who were 
influenced by Trenchard’s rather clever media campaign.88   
Trenchardian Thought 
 Whether fighting in the Veld, over the Trenches or in Whitehall, the defining 
feature of Trenchard’s career lay in his semi-hypnotic personality and ability to lead 
military personnel on the relentless offensive.  Given the strongly hierarchical nature 
of the British fighting forces combined with this larger-than-life and daunting 
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demeanour, it is unsurprising that the RAF developed what Biddle called 
Trenchardian thought.89   It has already been established that his personality and 
leadership inspired immense reverence towards his opinions but this also served to 
create a vacuum in which there was very little questioning or dissent.  This is where 
danger lay for the RAF, for Trenchard was not particularly visionary; rather he was 
very good at taking other people’s ideas and transforming them as the previous two 
chapters have identified.  On the subject of strategic bombing, for instance, 
Stephens highlighted that Smuts, Sykes and Groves all supported the idea of 
strategic bombing before ‘Trenchard took up the cause’.90  The transcripts of an 
interview with H A Jones, reveal he recognised his own narrowness of thought.91  
While he had heard that Haig was a disbeliever in the air, when discussing the plans 
for the battle at Neuve Chapelle, Haig’s ideas on the application of aircraft were 
actually even more expansive than his own. 92   This recognition of his own 
conceptual weakness perhaps explains his enthusiasm at creating an RAF Staff 
College and how closely he followed the first courses.  It has already been 
established that Trenchard surrounded himself with experts such as Spaight, Baring 
and the Air Staff.  Gray wrote that ‘it may be more productive to regard Trenchard as 
the centre point of a school of thought from which his staff officers and so forth 
produced a collective wisdom’.93  Stephens wrote that: 
It was Trenchard who adapted whatever he needed from the work of others, 
added his own forceful ideas and unique experience, and then provided the 
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leadership which was necessary to turn beliefs firstly into policy and then into 
force structure.94 
 
 Trenchard hoped that the RAF Staff College would become a cradle of 
thought for the RAF and he called for ‘free discussion with the young officer as well 
as with the senior officer to be encouraged just as I encourage it in my own 
room…’.95  He appeared to show great enthusiasm for the College and closely 
followed the first courses.   However, he simultaneously called for the RAF to speak 
with only one voice and strongly discouraged the publication of dissenting voices: 
It is essential that the Royal Air Force should speak with one voice, and 
thereby assist to form opinion in the other Services…The C.A.S. looks to all 
officers to support him in this matter.  In the present stage of the development 
of aviation individual ideas and opinions are of great value and their 
expression in the proper quarter is invited and welcomed, but outside the 
Royal Air Force it is essential to present a united front in support of the policy 
approved.96 
 
 Such was the strength of Trenchard’s personality, that those outside his inner 
circle him did not appear to recognise their part in the need for the RAF to develop 
an Air Force that thought deeply and questioned the nascent and untried theories 
and paradigms that were building around air power.  Even Slessor who worked for 
him in the Air Staff appeared to have an unquestioning belief in his views on air 
power: ‘he was far more far seeing than most of us were as to what it [air power] 
could ultimately become’.97  However, his strong personality conflicted with his need 
to create a thinking force to counter his own lack of original and creative thought.  
This resulted in the emergence of unquestioning ‘Trenchardian thought’ that stunted 
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the intellectual development of the RAF.98  Biddle noted that the lack of challenge to 
Trenchardian ‘tenets’ contributed to flawed RAF air power thinking had significant 
consequence in the Second World War. 99   Similarly Cooper wrote of Trenchard 
and senior RAF hierarchy that 
…their search for an independent role to give the RAF full doctrinal legitimacy 
drove them first to imperial policing and then to strategic bombing, 
operational forms in which their wartime experience was limited. The final 
product of this process was an air force wedded to a poorly thought-out 
doctrine, and dangerously isolated from the remainder of the defence 
community’.100 
 
The Mythology of Trenchard 
 Did a bobsleigh ride on the Cresta Run miraculously cure his Boer War 
paralysis?  Did he or did he not receive a box with shoes in from Sykes in lieu of one 
with plans in it?  Did he actually sit on a bench in Hyde Park pondering his future?  
Was the architect of the RAF and its Chief for 11 years really such a poor 
communicator?  Was air power as decisive as it was made out to be in the Official 
History of the First World War?  Such questions beg answers and despite deep 
research through the archival material, it is not possible to find conclusive answers 
to some of them. 
 Boyle’s semi-official biography needed to be carefully interpreted when 
attempting to understand Trenchard.  It was heavily influenced by Trenchard himself 
and cannot be considered impartial.  While it provided a comprehensive account of 
Trenchard’s life and appears, from cross-referencing with the archives and other 
accounts, to be largely true there are, some areas that cannot be accurately cross 
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referenced.  Boyle’s style was somewhat grating and incorporated a slightly strange 
mix of interesting fact, with sycophancy.  Jordan highlighted that ‘despite the extent 
of the work it is not completely accurate’.101  Meanwhile, Trenchard’s hand in the 
writing of the official history of early air power combined with a distinct lack of 
directly attributable writing by Trenchard and a lack of an autobiography helped to 
create an aura of mystique and myth around Trenchard.102  Zweigle wrote that: 
The esprit-de-corps that was cultivated among the airmen and cadets was 
partly the result of Trenchard’s mystique.  Many within the air service began 
to form a cult of personality around him; it was as though these men saw him 
as a sort of deity or legendary figure.103   
 
 In this regard, Zweigle was perceptive; few other academics refer to this 
near-deity but it is clear that Trenchard did achieve quite a remarkable following 
throughout the RAF.  Slessor’s comment referred to in the last section demonstrates 
that this was the case within the Air Staff.  Meanwhile, it will be seen in Chapter VI 
that the apprentices revelled in their moniker ‘Trenchard’s Brats’, meanwhile, T E 
Lawrence’s descriptions of Trenchard in the Mint highlight the feelings shown 
towards him in the ORs: 
The word Trenchard spells out confidence in the RAF and we would not lose 
it by hearing him decried.104 
 
 While The Mint provided one of the few and valuable accounts of life in the 
RAF from the airman’s perspective, it must be treated with some caution given the 
very strong friendship between Trenchard and Lawrence that saw Trenchard 
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personally intervene to secure Lawrence’s position in the RAF in the ranks.105  
However, more broadly across the literature, the impact of Trenchard is clear and 
has endured.  ‘A Short History of the RAF’ is an example of strong internalised 
hagiographic RAF view of Trenchard: 
Characteristically, he cured his paralysis by taking a convalescent break in 
Switzerland and winning the Beginners and Freshmen’s’ toboggan race down 
the Cresta Run… However, the same spirit that had taken him to success 
down the Cresta Run now led him to learn to fly and he was granted his 
pilot’s licence with a grand total of just 1 hour and 14 minutes in the air!’.106 
 
 Trenchard’s mystique and its role in the emergence of RAF ‘esprit-de-corps’ 
played a greater role than, perhaps even Zwiegle perceived; the manner in which it 
emerged needs greater examination.  Trenchard’s hand in the myths that shaped 
RAF as well as influencing his own position is important.  The official history written 
by Raleigh, entitled ‘The War in the Air’ was probably the first document that 
explained air power in the First World War including Trenchard’s role in it.  Jordan 
noted Trenchard’s influence in the writing of this.107   Meanwhile, Mahoney wrote of: 
…Trenchard’s hands on style of leadership as well as his role in controlling 
key ‘artefacts’, ‘histories’ and ‘stories’ that underpinned RAF culture. These 
sources ranged from formal doctrine like ASM and capstone publications like 
AP1300, through to external and informal ‘stories’, such as the official history 
of the RAF in the First World War, articles in JRUSI and RAFQ, and key 
books on air power that emerged during this period.108 
 
 The controlling influence is important because it amplified the aura of 
Trenchard.  Paris contended that The War in the Air was biased by Trenchard and 
that Raleigh lost a certain amount of objectivity as he: 
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…became enamoured with the romantic aspects of aerial warfare.  He came 
to feel that the ‘spirit of England’ was now embodied in the RAF: in the ‘young 
gallants who were gay and reckless’.  Almost certainly he came under the 
influence of Sir Hugh Trenchard.109   
 
 He went on to say that ‘it seems likely, then, that Raleigh, an ardent admirer 
of the third arm and under Trenchard’s influence, produced very much the history 
that the latter wanted – a history that would support the Service in its fight against 
absorption by the War Office and the Admiralty’.110  As Paris pointed out: 
A history which admitted that the major developments in air warfare were 
made by the enemy, that the RFC only revised and extended its own role as 
a counter measure to German initiatives, would hardly lend support to the 
view of a dynamic new service under the command of imaginative and 
resourceful men.  Even worse would be to admit that theories for the 
offensive use of air power had been formulated before 1914 but had been 
ignored by those charged with developing the Flying Corps in its early 
years.111 
 
 The hand of Trenchard had a lasting effect upon air power writing over the 
next twenty years.  Paris pointed out that the most influential works on British air 
power ‘leaned heavily’ upon Raleigh’s work and included the J M Spaight history, 
the Air Ministry’s Short History, the works of C.F Snowden Gamble, A J Chamier 
and Hillary St George Saunders.112   
 However, an organisation needs its heroes and, through manipulation of the 
official history and very strong leadership skills the RAF found its hero in Trenchard.   
The mythology that emerged about him proved to be a powerful force around which 
the RAF still coalesces.  Nevertheless, while his leadership saved the RAF, it also 
induced a troubling lack of questioning in the RAF that gave rise to flawed 
conceptual and doctrinal thinking. 
                                            
109 Paris, Winged Warfare, p.4. 
110 Ibid, p.5. 
111 Ibid. p.5. 
112 Ibid. p.5. 
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Conclusion 
 Trenchard transformed from an officer with little chance of progression into 
one of the most revered military leaders of the Twentieth Century.  Despite having 
appalling communication skills, with the help of his staff, he succeeded in convincing 
people inside and outside the Service that the RAF should survive as an 
independent entity.  A highly successful leader, he seemed, intuitively, to 
understand people and organisations.  Despite enormous losses as he drove the 
RFC using the Edwardian principle of the relentless offensive, he built a somewhat 
extraordinary following amongst his RFC personnel.  However, he was not a true 
visionary regarding the application of air power.  Indeed, by his own admission, Haig 
and Henderson appeared to have a deeper understanding of its utility than he did.  
Sykes was also more visionary in that respect.  Devine, a critic of the RAF, provided 
the following useful assessment of Trenchard: 
In the ten years of his authority he established the existence of the Service – 
with the indispensable assistance of Winston Churchill – as an independent 
entity.  He secured, by his insistence on the fundamental principle of separate 
training, its individuality.  Its esprit de corps was built up largely out of the 
ferocity of his defence of its interests against threats, real and imagined, from 
the Army and the Navy. 113 
 
 Similarly, Stephens wrote that: 
Under his leadership the essential building blocks were put in place or 
consolidated: a central flying School to set and maintain standards; research 
and development establishments for the technological edge; a cadet college 
at Cranwell to produce the future leaders; a staff college at Andover to give 
those leaders the finishing touches and an apprentice scheme to train the 
mechanics.  The Trenchard model has been emulated by effective air forces 
ever since.114 
 
                                            
113 Despite having served in the RAF, the central theme of Devine’s mid-1960’s argument 
was the very creation of the RAF, as a single Service, was ‘ill conceived’. Devine, The 
Broken Wing, p.174. 
114 Stephens, ‘The true believers between the Wars’, p.21. 
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 As the previous two chapters demonstrated, the ‘building blocks’ were largely 
the ideas of others.  Henderson was the visionary who foresaw the value of an 
independent Service and Sykes was the leader who established the majority of the 
processes and practices around which RAF culture would emerge.  Sykes also 
wrote an expansive vision for the RAF in his 1918 Memoranda. 115   While 
Trenchard’s 1919 Memorandum focussed exclusively on the military aspects of 
British air power, it was, nevertheless, an inspired blueprint centred on what 
appears to have been an intuitive understanding of the need to establish an ‘Air 
Force spirit’.  Although he never defined or articulate what spirit meant, his plan 
established an effective framework for the development of espoused culture of the 
RAF that held the RAF together whilst under intense external attack and later in total 
warfare.  This is probably Trenchard’s biggest legacy.  Indeed, the framework laid 
out by these three leaders remains largely intact a century later and supports 
Schein’s argument, certainly for a hierarchical organisation, that ‘cultures begin with 
leaders who impose their own values and assumptions on a group’.116   
 The 1919 Memorandum established a training environment that would allow 
the RAF to build an independent outlook and acculture its personnel in its own way.  
It provided the RAF with the basis for the deeply held belief that it was not only a 
highly technical force but also that entering it was, in many ways a superior career 
choice, particularly for the ORs.  The Memorandum also introduced an element of 
social mobility that was ground-breaking given the contemporary fears of the middle 
                                            
115 ‘Review of Air Situation and Strategy for the Information of the Imperial War Cabinet’, 
Sykes, From Many Angles, pp.544-554, TNA Air 8/6 Sykes, ‘Air Power Requirements of the 
Empire’.   
116 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, p.2, 
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classes. 117   Trenchard’s aloof persona, a clever media campaign and the 
determination he displayed in the fight to keep the RAF alive served to enhance the 
mythology surrounding him.  That semi-divine status spread through the ranks of the 
new Service and gave it what appeared to be a clear mission, confidence and a 
sense of permanence.  Indeed, the plan forsook aircraft in order to build both 
figurative and real foundations upon which the Service could be considered 
permanent and also upon which it could be enlarged thanks to developing its own 
training system, a reserve and a strong body of internally trained mechanics and 
specialists. 
 Trenchard hoped to establish a thinking Service particularly through the 
separate training structures, especially the Staff College.  However, his personality 
clashed with that ideal.  The result was that thought and doctrinal development were 
stifled by hierarchy.  Thus, the RAF developed into an organisation that subscribed 
to a fairly narrow body of Trenchardian thought.  While the RAF survived and 
developed a very strong culture that would see its personnel fight the Second World 
War with immense pride and courage, it also arrived in that conflict with some 
questionable strategies and equipment.118 
 
                                            
117 Cannadine, Class in Britain, p.127.  Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society.  
Waites, ‘The effect of the First World War on class and status in England’, p.31. 
118 These will be examined later. 
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PART III 
PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 
 Part I established the importance of organisational culture to a military 
organisation such as the RAF while Part II demonstrated the important role of the 
leaders in setting the conditions for RAF espoused culture to emerge.  Part III will 
examine some of the specific processes and practices that rapidly gave rise to a 
distinct RAF organisational culture.   Chapter VI will examine the elements of 
training that were responsible for the indoctrination of new RAF recruits as well as 
the on-going training of senior RAF officers at the RAF Staff College.  Chapter VII 
will examine RAF artefacts that set the conditions for the emergence of a distinct 
identity.  Chapter VIII will explore how custom, ritual and tradition affected the 
development of the RAF.  Part III will continue to consider elements of espoused 
culture but will also highlight the power of culture-in-action and its effect on RAF 
norms, attitudes, values and deeply held beliefs that had both positive and negative 
outcomes for the RAF.1  Finally, Chapter IX will examine RAF architecture which 
had a strong influence on the organisation’s culture.  
                                            
1 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture And Defence Acquisition’, pp.97-99. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TRAINING THE NEW ENTRANTS: 
APPRENTICES AND THE RAF COLLEGE 
 Trenchard’s 1919 Memorandum advocated that an apprentice school be 
established at Halton and an RAF College at Cranwell.1  Those two institutions 
acted as powerful RAF symbols of independence both to serving members of the 
RAF as well as to the outside world.  In both the apprentice system and the RAF 
College, processes and practices emerged that played a significant role in 
developing the deeper values and beliefs within the institutions themselves as well 
as more broadly across the RAF.  Francis referred to the speed at which the RAF 
developed ‘a distinct culture and ethos’ and that ‘the RAF adopted a highly self-
conscious aura of modernity’.2  He pointed, in particular, to the contribution of the 
officer training at Cranwell and the apprentice system in the development of that 
culture and ethos.3 
 The RAF officer cadre that emerged from the RAF College was conservative 
but inculcated with an air-mindedness that underpinned the RAF’s raison-d’être.  
The College was also partly responsible for the reinforcement of the aviator identity 
within the RAF given the centrality of flying skill in the syllabus of the College.  
Training RAF personnel separately was deemed essential by Trenchard in the 1919 
Memorandum in inculcating an ‘Air Force spirit’.  In addition to moulding new 
entrants into the RAF system, the imposing buildings of these two institutions were 
                                            
1 In the 1919 Memorandum, Trenchard referred to Halton alone.  However, the apprentice 
system comprised a number of schools based at various locations.  Halton was, however, 
the flagship of the apprentice schools. Cmd. 467 ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal 
Air Force’. 
2 Francis M, The Flyer, p.14. 
3 Ibid.  
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also physical manifestations of RAF permanence and independence.  Within the 
walls of these institutions, meanwhile, culture-in-action would emerge; distinct sub-
cultures and counter-institutional activity would take place at both Cranwell and 
Halton. 
 The RAF College represented the RAF’s method of demonstrating parity with 
the other services, thereby explaining its traditionalism.  The apprentice scheme 
however, expressed the opposite.  The apprentice scheme was a revolutionary 
development that helped underline the technical expertise of the RAF and affirm a 
deep sense of superiority over the ORs in the other services. 
THE RAF APPRENTICE SYSTEM. 
 The RAF apprentice system was a progressive innovation of the training of 
boys established under the RFC.  The centre of gravity of the apprentice system 
was already at Halton, but apprentice schools also existed at Flowerdown, Cranwell, 
Ruislip, Cosford, Hereford, Locking and Eastchurch.4  But it was not simply the 
establishment of an apprentice system that made such a significant contribution to 
RAF culture over the next 70 years, but the innovative manner in which it was done.  
Trenchard would later refer to Halton as having been an experiment as it departed 
from the existing Army and RN programmes both in terms of scale and the way the 
programme was run.5 
 When it was realised that a limiting factor hindering expansion in the First 
World War was a lack of trained aircraft mechanics, the RFC introduced Boys’ 
                                            
4 Kimber, Son of Halton, p.79.  A full list of training schools in 1919 can be found at TNA Air 
8/19 ‘Memorandum on the Shortage of Rank and File Personnel of the Royal Air Force, 
Annex B: Schools at Home’. 
5 HC Debate. ‘Defence: Post-War Organization’. Hansard, HL Deb, 6 Dec, 1944 vol 134 
cc131-89, 
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Training.6  Adverts appeared in the May 1917 Aeroplane Magazine for boy service 
between the ages of 15 and 17 leading into four years in the colours followed by an 
additional four years in the reserve.7   Initially boy mechanic training in the RFC was 
spread across different sites but mainly at Blandford and Farnborough.  400 boys 
enlisted at Farnborough in May 1917 while another cohort started at Blandford at 
about the same time with Blandford gaining a reputation for extremely poor 
conditions. 8   The disparate and dislocated boy’s apprenticeships became more 
coherent following Brancker’s decision to consolidate training at Halton. 9  On 20 
June 1917, the Farnborough boys arrived at Halton and were greeted by 
Regimental Sergeant Major whose appearance, according to Ross: 
 …frightened us to the tips of our army boots.  He was the first RSM of the 
Boys Section at Halton and scared us all by his tremendous military bearing 
and disciplinary demands’.10 
 
 A programme that involved severe discipline was established, was passed on 
to the RAF and remained its feature until it ended in the early 1990s.11  The School 
of Technical Training at Halton initially involved no technical training as ‘there was 
not an aircraft within miles, no aircraft parts, not a spanner or even a file’. 12  
However, the boys were schooled in elements of military discipline, drill, PT and 
fatigues.   Ross contended that the origins of RAF drill were established in the first 
Boys Section of the RFC by disciplinary NCOs who pooled different regimental drills 
                                            
6 RAF apprenticeships were not new when Trenchard outlined his plans in his 1919 
Memorandum, however, the commonly held RAF narrative tends to overlook this. ‘Short 
History of the RAF’, AP 2003, p.53-54 
7 Armitage, ‘The Origins of the Boys’ Service in the RFC and the RAF’, p.29. 
8 Ibid. p.29. 
9 Ibid. p.29. 
10 Ross, The Royal Flying Corps Boy Service, p.54. 
11 This is a common theme in personal accounts of apprentices held at the Trenchard 
Museum spanning this entire period. 
12 Ross, The Royal Flying Corps Boy Service, p.73. 
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from their respective cap badges in order to provide the Boys with a common drill 
standard.13  Ross also wrote about the first apprentice songs being written as well 
as the formation of a band being formed and a Camp March being created.14  These 
were the precursors to the band and songs books that were artefacts indicative of 
the strong culture that emerged in the apprentice system.  Years later, they formed 
part of the entertainment for the apprentices that also reinforced their sense of 
belonging within their austere environment.15 
 Following the First World War, Sykes expressed the need for Boys’ training to 
be continued.16  However, the vigour with which Trenchard promoted the apprentice 
system resulted in him receiving the credit.  It did not take long for apprentices to 
become known as ‘Trenchard Brats’.17  This is an example of unofficial culture-in-
practice that made apprentices feel they had a direct link to CAS.  It also amplified 
Trenchard’s aura among a significant body of personnel by giving the impression 
that he, personally, was sponsoring them.  The following highlights Trenchard’s 
reason for placing such emphasis on Halton in the 1919 Memorandum: 
 The most difficult problem of all in the formation of this force is the training of 
the men.  Demobilization has removed most of our best mechanics, and the 
efficiency of the squadrons to be formed depends on the most thorough 
instruction of those who are to take their place.18 
 
 There had also been some significant labour frictions during the First World 
War that made internalising as much aircraft engineering as possible an attractive 
                                            
13 Ibid.  p.71. 
14 Ibid., p.78. 
15 Trenchard Museum Archive Library Original Halton Songs, unaccessioned. It holds 74 of 
what it terms ‘original Halton Songs’ along other more broadly sung contemporary songs. 
16 TNA Air 8/6 Sykes, ‘Air Power Requirements of the Empire’, p.16.  
17 The term ‘Trenchard’s Brats’ was widely used see, for example Weston, A Trenchard 
Brat. 
18 Cmd. 467, ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’. 
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proposition. Indeed, Brancker advised ‘not recruiting from the classes who are 
protected by the trade cards’.19   Trenchard’s aim was to: 
 …enlist the bulk of those belonging to long apprenticeship trades as boys, 
who will undergo a course of three years’ training before being passed into 
the ranks.  With a preliminary training of the nature contemplated and the 
practice of their trade during their subsequent service, it is confidently 
anticipated that these mechanics on passing to civil life will have no difficulty 
in securing recognition as skilled tradesmen.  This is an important 
consideration since any tendency for the Air Force to be regarded as a blind 
alley occupation, would be fatal’.20 
 
 Halton was conceived as a training programme but soon became a tangible 
demonstration of RAF technical pre-eminence in the armed forces.  This was a 
source of great pride for the ORs in the RAF who began to place themselves 
socially above the ‘Brown Jobs’ in the Army and especially the ‘PBI’ (Poor Bloody 
Infantry)’. 21   Entry to the apprentice school was highly competitive.22  Bishop wrote 
that ‘the high standard at entry meant that many of the mechanics servicing the 
aeroplanes would be educationally equal, and superior in mechanical skill, to the 
men flying them’.23  The Highest performing boys would then receive either rapid 
promotion to corporal or be commissioned and attend Cranwell.24  It will be seen 
that as well as creating a cadre of highly trained mechanics, the apprentice system 
                                            
19 Macmillan, Sefton Brancker, pp.147-150.   
20 Cmd. 467, ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’. 
21 For example: Emm T Tales of an Ancient Airman, Trenchard Museum, Hand written 
personal account (n.d.).  Trenchard Museum Archive, unaccessioned, p.17.  Blacklock, Half 
a Life, Half Remembered.  Porter, One of Trenchard’s Brats.  Rawlinson, Chronicle of a 
Trenchard’s Brat, 24th Entry by 565663. 
22 Cmd. 467, ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’.  TNA AIR2/129.  Air 
Ministry Pamphlet ‘Entry of Boy Mechanics to the Royal Air Force’, October 1919 outlined 
the entry requirements for boy mechanics that was already underway when Trenchard 
wrote ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’:  see Larkin Min Gp Capt, ‘The 
RAF Halton Aircraft Apprentice Scheme’, Old Haltonians, 
http://www.oldhaltonians.co.uk/pages/news/Halton%20Story.pdf, accessed 21 Oct 2017.  
For original suggestions for admission policy see Trenchard Museum Archive, ‘Suggestions 
Regarding the Entry of Boys as Mechanics in the Royal Air Force’, 12 May 1919, 
unaccessioned.  
23 Bishop, Fighter Boys, pp.33-34. 
24 Cmd. 467, ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’. 
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also began a movement of increasing meritocracy which had far reaching cultural 
consequences for the RAF. 
Recruitment 
 The RAF wanted candidates who had ‘received a good general education 
such as will enable them to undertake with profit the course of technical and general 
education included in the apprenticeship training’25  Local Education Authorities 
were contacted to help promote the scheme in 1919 with selection held in London 
and 14 other centres around the country.  The first intake of 235 boys began training 
at Cranwell in January 1920 while permanent Halton buildings were erected.26  The 
vision was for the boys to complete an apprenticeship in only 3 years, compared to 
the usual 5 that it took in the civilian world, in order for them to then form 40% of the 
RAF groundcrew and 60% of its skilled tradesmen.27  Trenchard later articulated the 
importance of this training in defence of proposed Geddes cuts.  In his mind, the 
plan satisfied both the need to meet the demand for mechanics and also to help 
build an ‘Air Force spirit’. 
From the point of view of the future efficiency of the R.A.F. the system of boy 
training is vital.  Under the system we exercise considerable control over 
enlistment by obtaining the large majority of the boys on the individual 
recommendation of local education authorities throughout the country and 
have charge of them for three years during the most impressionable age 
between 15 and 19½.  We can thus improve them both mentally and 
physically, and can imbue them with an esprit de corps and pride in their 
service, which will not only be of the greatest value during their subsequent 
career in the R.A.F. but will make them better citizens when they return to 
civil life.  If, on the other hand we rely on the enlistment of skilled men, 
assuming we could obtain them, they would have already been imbibed with 
the spirit of trade unionism, which, in its present form at all events, is neither 
                                            
25 Trenchard Museum Archive (loose document - not accessioned), ‘Regulations in Regard 
to the entry and Training of Aircraft Apprentices’, Royal Air Force, AM Pamphlet 15.  4th 
edition, August 1927. 
26 Taylor, Halton and the Apprentice System, p.11. 
27 Ibid., p.11. 
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conducive to keen endeavour nor easily compatible with the necessary 
discipline of the fighting services.28 
 
 The aim was to attract boys of good character and the recruiting drive 
unashamedly targeted their parents by offering a high quality of education.  By 
1927, interest in the scheme was such that Candidate Porter, who would later 
become Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Porter, was surprised at how stiff the competition 
was to gain a place on the 17th Entry.29 
 Bishop wrote that 5000 applicants responded to the initial adverts for the 
scheme and noted that ‘they were mostly boys from the lower middle and upper 
working classes who saw the RAF as a means of advancement and a gateway to 
the intoxicating world of aviation’. 30   The Character Book supports Bishop’s 
demographic assessment; apprentices largely came from the upper echelons of the 
working class as well as lower middle class backgrounds.31  Examination of trades 
of fathers of the apprentices in the RAF College Cranwell Character Book shows 
only one gentleman with the majority of the fathers being either small businessmen 
(butchers, bakers, tobacconists, confectioner and a draper), officer workers (civil 
servants, clerks, registrars), middle management (Assistant Manager estates, GPO 
Officer, Supervisor Mechanical Engineer, Insurance Broker), non-commissioned and 
commissioned officers, commercial travellers and farmers.32  There were very few 
apprentices from working class backgrounds; all of those according to the Character 
                                            
28 TNA AIR 8/42 CAS Archives, Section 4, Appendix to ‘Memorandum on the 
Recommendations of the Committee on National Expenditure Prepared by The Air Ministry 
for Mr Churchill’s Cabinet Committee’, p.12. 
29 Blacklock, Half a Life, Half Remembered, p.1.  
30 Bishop, Fighter Boys, pp.33-34. 
31 RAF College Museum, CRN/D/2011/71, RAF College Character Book. 
32 Ibid. 
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Book were skilled working classes: a joiner, a waggon lifter and two chauffeurs.33  
Before the First World War the class system was highly complex with many 
complicated stratifications existing between upper, middle and working classes.  A 
common delineation between upper working classes and lower middle classes, for 
instance, was not based on income but whether the employee worked with his or 
her hands.34  According to Waites, that class system simplified between 1910 and 
1920 when a three-tiered class system emerged.35  However, it is clear that there 
was a significant class differential between those boys at Halton and the boys 
recruited to Cranwell.  It will be seen later that the RAF actively targeted the best 
public schools in the country when choosing boys to become cadets at the RAF 
College.  Therefore, apprentices selected for the RAF College were from a 
noticeably lower social background compared with their colleagues.  Thus, it will be 
seen that Trenchard’s plan to send the highest performing apprentices to the 
College at Cranwell and the later moves to give apprentices opportunities to transfer 
to flying duties represented the innovative beginning of an officially sponsored 
means of social mobility that was rare in the services and, indeed, in contemporary 
British society. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
33 Ibid. 
34 Waites used the social position of the clerk to outline this.  Waites, ‘The Effect of the First 
World War on Class and Status in England, p.45. 
35 Ibid.  For additional material on inter-war aspects of the British class system see Robert, 
Snape ‘The New Leisure, Voluntarism and Social Reconstruction in Inter-War Britain’, 
Contemporary British History, Vol 29 Iss 1 (2015), pp.1-33.  See also Cannadine, Class in 
Britain. 
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Processes and Practices 
 A good account of the life at Halton in its early days can be gleaned from 
articles, orders and personal accounts.36  Known to apprentices as The System, 
apprenticeship involved a short sharp shock to the new arrival.37  Like most arrivals 
into a military system, the apprentice was exposed to drill, marching on camp, 
communal living in a barrack room, cleaning or ‘bull’ of the barracks, regimented 
arrangement of personal effects and group punishment for the errors.  This lasted 
for three years and, in the 1920’s, the suspension rate was high.38  The severity of 
the system is epitomised by an account with drawings in the Trenchard Museum 
that highlights a punishment ceremony involving 1000 apprentices paraded in order 
to witness a corporal beating of a boy who had stolen food.39  Indeed, The System 
would be considered brutalising by today’s standards.  Such was the hardship, 
Group Captain W.T.H. Nichols, who spent much of the Second World War in a 
Japanese POW Camp said ‘after three years of that, the N*** [contemporary 
derogatory term for Japanese] could not shake me’.40  There were, doubtless, many 
boys who were adversely affected by the hardship of The System, however 
personal accounts are remarkably positive about the overall experience.  Indeed, 
                                            
36 ‘No 1 School, Halton.  The Technical Training School for Aircraft Apprentices (R.A.F)’, 
Flight, No 771 (No 40 Vol XV), (October 4 1923), 
https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1923/1923%20-%200612.html?search=halton, 
accessed 26 January 2016. Trenchard Museum Archive, ‘Standing Orders for Apprentices’ 
Wings Stationed at Halton Camp, 1927’. See also Blacklock, Half a Life, Half Remembered, 
p.7.  James also referred to the social complexities of the Apprentices, James, The 
Paladins, p.110. 
37 Kimber, Son of Halton, p.102. 
38 See Appendix I – F540 RAF Halton copy in Trenchard Museum Archive.  
39 Trenchard Museum Archive unaccessioned.  Drawing is by W G Rogers, apprentice on 
23rd Entry Jan 1931-Dec 1933.   Descriptions of similar events by Kimber and are also in the 
Trenchard Museum Archive by Kimber (possibly from the same event).  Additionally, a 
further unaccessioned Trenchard Museum Archive personal account by TG Mahaddie 
details a public caning.   
40 That referred to his time on the 9th Entry at Flowerdown.  Kimber, Son of Halton, p.107. 
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the hardship appears to have had a unifying effect.   It should be noted, however, 
that the accounts available are only from those who successfully passed their 
apprenticeships.  There is no apparent archival material that exposes the brutalising 
effect of the system on those that were suspended. 
 Life at Halton was all consuming.  Apprentices had free time only on 
Saturdays from mid-day until 2100 hours and on Sundays from after church parade 
until 2100 hours. 41    They were only allowed off the camp on Saturdays and 
Sundays and restricted to a radius of 5 miles and were only allowed to smoke 
outside the camp with a smoking ‘chit’ at age 18.42  The Halton Camp routine 
published in Standing Orders 1927 gives an idea of the standard day for both 
apprentices and the ORs.43  By today’s standards both groups had limited freedom, 
although the apprentices were kept on a tighter leash than the airmen.  The room 
inspection routine was probably the most shocking initial experience for a boy 
arriving from a normal home environment.  All clothing was set out in regulation 
manner in open cabinets as Fig 4 demonstrates. 
 
                                            
41 Kimber, Son of Halton, p.41. 
42 Trenchard Museum Archive, ‘Standing Orders for Apprentices’ Wings Stationed at Halton 
Camp, 1927’, p.16.  For restrictions see also Tams, A Trenchard Brat, p.31. 
43 Trenchard Museum Archive, ‘Standing Orders for Apprentices’ Wings Stationed at Halton 
Camp, 1927’, p.23. 
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Fig 4 - McDonald bed at Halton ‘made up’ for inspection in the morning. 
 An apprentice ‘Macdonald’ bed was ‘made up’ for inspection in the morning 
by reducing it in size by sliding the slightly smaller half of the bed under the other 
half.  The ‘biscuits’ that formed the mattress were then arranged on the reduced bed 
size in regulation manner.  The reverse process was conducted when ‘making 
down’ the bed to sleep upon at night. 44 
 The Halton Magazine in 1939 shows that there was time for some fun within 
the programme and also that the editor appears to have a genuine interest in the 
                                            
44 For more detailed description see: Trenchard Museum Archive, Blacklock, Half a Life, 
Half Remembered, p.2 and Trenchard Museum Archive, Porter, One of Trenchard’s Brats, 
p.2.  For the daily routine see Appendix II. 
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activities that he was set. 45   Meanwhile, the anonymous poem Barrack Room 
Thoughts from 1932 includes the following verse: 
 But money does not matter here – friendship takes its place. 
We face our daily duties with a cheery smiling face. 
Halton life is wonderful, although we grouse of “binds,” 
We do our work and have our fun and rest with peaceful minds.46 
 
 Apprentices were allowed to hold dances in their dining halls and institutes at 
which they were required to wear regulation service dress, however, perhaps 
disappointingly for them orders dictated that ‘no females are allowed to attend the 
A/As dances’.47   
 The Halton Magazine was published from Spring 1924 until the Second 
World War.48  It gives an insight into the breadth of both espoused culture as well as 
culture-in-action that emerged at the Station.  Articles written by, and for, 
apprentices include a wide variety of subject matter: engineering and service related 
subjects, popular subject material, sports, poetry, cartoons, book reviews and 
information about entertainment and events on the Station. 49    The magazine 
reflects that the education received by the boys was broad and not limited purely to 
engineering. 
 Apprentices were part of formal and informal hierarchies and practices.50  
The staff/student divide was very clear from most of the personal accounts 
examined.  Similarly, there existed official apprentice/apprentice stratification 
                                            
45 ‘An Aircraft Apprentice’s Day’, The Halton Magazine, Vol XI, No 2, (Christmas 1939), 
p.22. 
46 ‘Barrack Room Thoughts’, The Halton Magazine, The Daedalus (Christmas 1932), p.31. 
47 Trenchard Museum Archive, ‘Standing Orders for Apprentices’ Wings Stationed at Halton 
Camp, 1927’, p.23. 
48 Kimber, Son of Halton, p.116.  
49 Trenchard Museum Archive holdings include a full set of Halton Magazines.   
50 For useful theorectical understanding of formal and informal hierarchies see Kirke’s ‘Army 
Organizational Culture’ model in Red Coat, Green Machine, p.33. 
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between the different intakes.  Kimber wrote of a Leading Apprentice cubicle in the 
barrack rooms of the lower intakes. 51  The Leading Apprentice from a higher intake 
had official powers over subordinate apprentices.   
 Despite the austere environment and the very formal stratification that existed 
between the different intakes as well as between staff and apprentices, informal and 
unspoken rules existed that bonded these different groupings.  These occurred 
particularly during recreational activity or during intermissions between the more 
formal aspects of training.  Out of the informal and unspoken rules, a rich humour 
and language emerged that is a clear indication of the depth of the culture-in-action 
in the apprentice system.  Despite very distinct formal distance between various 
groups, it is clear from magazines and personal accounts that they were bound by a 
common purpose.  This highlights the importance of unwritten rules and informal 
bonds identified by Kirke. 52  Informal structures and processes, including slang (erk, 
brat), humour and songs, emerged between apprentices and staff would play out to 
strengthen this sub-culture, in line with Giddens’ structuration theory, that helped 
external manifestations of culture, values and deep beliefs to emerge and become 
reinforced.  The resulting sub-culture was marked, strong and very clear in the 
archives.  Taylor referred to the ‘Halton Tradition’ as follows: 
As old as the RAF itself, Halton has inspired a strong and creative  tradition 
of many facets which refuses to be bound by rank, time or service.  It is 
difficult to define that tradition, which is in part the sense of belonging to a 
club or society…In most ex-Haltonians there is gratitude: there is pleasure: 
there is pride.53 
 
                                            
51 Kimber, Son of Halton, p.39. 
52 Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine, p.33. 
53 Taylor, Halton and the Apprentice System, p.29. 
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 Hobbies and leisure activities were wide and varied and included sport, going 
to the cinema, billiards.54  Some were closely interlinked with activities on the camp 
at Halton such as taking part in ‘shows’, practicing for the various bands, speaking 
in the Debating Society or activities such as making amateur film plays.55  A curious 
development at Halton was the development of pipe bands which became a part of 
official life and seemed to feature in many aspects of life such as during drill, 
marching around the camp and also for official functions.56  Meanwhile, the Halton 
Light Aeroplane Club saw apprentices designing aircraft such as the Clarke 
Cheetah and the HAC3 Meteor.57  Apprentices taking part in such activities engaged 
in informal structures as they worked and played alongside serving officers either 
from the staff or from the wider station community at Halton. 
 Such was the feeling of association with Halton, an Old Boys Association 
(OBA) was formed with a ‘two-fold object of keeping in touch with one another ex-
Aircraft Apprentices from Halton, and of looking after their interests throughout their 
Service career’.58  Originally established as the Old Haltonian Association it was 
changed to be known as the OBA to incorporate all ex-apprentices who had taken 
part in other apprentice locations.59  The OBA briefly published its own magazine 
called the Daedalus from Summer 1927 until November 1928 when it joined forces 
with the Halton magazine.  The Daedalus included articles, poems, obituaries, and 
                                            
54 ‘An Aircraft Apprentice’s Day’, The Halton Magazine, p.22. 
55 ‘Suggested Amateur Film Play’, The Halton Magazine (Christmas 1932), p.27.  
56 In 1939 ‘An Aircraft Apprentice’s Day’ described apprentices being marched back to 
duties in the afternoon. An Aircraft Apprentice’s Day, p.22.  The emotional importance of the 
pipe bands is clear in ‘Mater’s Day at Halton’ The Halton Magazine. The Daedalus, 
(Christmas 1932), p.41.  See also IWM Audio Files Ellwood Catalogue 3167 Reel 3 8:40. 
57 The Clark Cheetah was an air worthy aircraft. Taylor, Halton and the Apprentice Scheme, 
p.14. 
58 ‘R.A.F. Old Boys’ Association’, The Halton Magazine, Vol III No 3 (Xmas 1926), p.67. 
59 ‘Editorial’, The Halton Magazine, Vol III No3 (Xmas 1926), p.5. 
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accounts of current life through the RAF aimed at maintaining links between the ex-
apprentices.  The articles also give an insight into the lived experience of the ex-
apprentices and provide firm evidence of how deeply the experience at Halton 
affected the boys.60 
 The apprentices wore a service pattern uniform in order to make them easily 
recognisable from the ORs given that some were not far removed in age from the 
regulars also at Halton, the uniform gained some delineating adornments.   A brass 
badge was worn on the left sleeve and authorised by Air Ministry Order 17 April 
1919.61  Metal numbers were attached to the hat/beret badge denoting the wing to 
which the apprentice belonged and different coloured hatbands were introduced to 
denote the wing they belonged. 62   Halton orders highlighted that ‘unauthorised 
alterations to clothing are forbidden’ yet it was commonplace for apprentices to 
‘adjust’ their uniform and caps.63  Such counter-institutional expression within a 
uniformed organisation is an important aspect of culture-in-action and will be 
discussed in chapter VIII.64 
The Iconic First Engineering Task 
 The indoctrination of a military recruit often involves executing tasks that 
have little actual application or purpose but become rites of passage.  Apprentices 
were required to ‘bull’ barrack blocks, conduct drill, maintain regulation standard 
personal spaces and conduct themselves as many other basic military recruits from 
                                            
60 For an example of poetry, see:  Anon, ‘Barrack room Thoughts’, The Daedalus 
(Christmas 1932), p.31. For an insight into life including some linguistic oddities see Halton 
see ‘Other Annoyances’, The Daedalus (Summer 1927), p.18. 
61 Taylor, Halton and the Apprentice System, p.12-13. 
62 Ibid.   
63 Trenchard Museum Archive, ‘Standing Orders for Apprentices’ Wings Stationed at Halton 
Camp, 1927’, p.15. 
64 The significance of uniform alteration will be discussed in Chapter VIII. 
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any service would need to do.  However, the first engineering task that the 
apprentices were presented with took on special significance.  It was a path along 
which every apprentice would need to embark to belong to an elite team.  Deere, a 
former apprentice, wrote that it came in the form of ‘a piece of cast iron and a lump 
of brass of roughly cubical shape, with sides measuring something over an inch’.65  
 
Fig 5 - The brass cube and steel block:  Exercise Number One 
 The apprentice would use all the issue tools to produce a one-inch brass 
cube that could pass through a machined hole in the piece of iron without rattling.  
Deere speculated about the somewhat pointless nature of the task and the: 
…whereabouts of thirty-five thousand brass cubes, which perhaps are buried 
somewhere in the area.  It would have been sensible if each Entry’s finished 
cubes were then melted down to be re-cast in time for the next entry 66 
 
Kimber referred to how this particular rite of passage: 
                                            
65 Deere, A Brat’s Progress, p.28.  See also Trenchard Museum Archive, Blacklock, Half a 
Life, Half Remembered, p.7. 
66 Deere, A Brat’s Progress, p.28. 
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 …brought training and skill in the use of the hacksaw, cold chisel, hammer, 
files of different cutting surfaces and marking-out tools.  At the same time, 
and without being aware of it, we were unconsciously being introduced to the 
disciplines of patience, self-control and tenacity’.67 
 
 This task taught the apprentices self-discipline and allowed them to explore 
all of their tools and also introduced a knowledge of tolerances which is an important 
part of many trades’ apprenticeships.  Such was the iconic association of this task 
among the apprentices, it formed the basis of a sculpture known as ‘The Tribute’ 
that was unveiled by HM Queen Elizabeth II on 31 October 1997 at Halton as a 
lasting memorial to the 35 000 successful candidates who passed through the 
apprentice system.68  It is a strong delineating symbol of the apprentice sub-culture 
that bonded apprentices throughout their Service lives.  
Humour 
 Humour is a very strong trait of the Service.  It is often dark but it also 
demonstrates how informal structures exist alongside formal ones.  Humour can 
often transcend rank and social class barriers within the RAF.  For instance Boyle, 
as Marshal of the RAF, in his otherwise serious foreword to Hering’s book, chose to 
make reference to the apocryphal airman who thought that the RAF Motto, Per 
Ardua ad Astra meant ‘by hard work to the cinema’.69  That someone of that rank 
should choose to lightly mock the organisation’s motto is indicative of irreverent RAF 
humour. 
 Similar manifestations of humour are clearly evident throughout the Halton 
and the Old Boys’ magazines as well as in the personal accounts held in the 
                                            
67 Kimber, Son of Halton, p.46. 
68 The Tribute statue is located at RAF Halton. 
69 Many RAF Station cinemas were called ‘The Astra’.  Hering, Customs and Traditions of 
the Royal Air Force, p vii. 
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archives.  The 1933 Halton Magazine shows an example of irreverent humour whilst 
also highlighting apprentice irritation about smoking restrictions. 
Officer (pointing to cigarette): “Is that yours?” 
A/A on fatigues: “No sir!  Not if you saw it first.”70 
 
 The magazine readership included Station Commander, staff and 
apprentices and demonstrated that humour transcended barriers of rank and also 
that it was acceptable to the hierarchy that the apprentices had a slightly rebellious 
side.  The poem The “Old Boy”, meanwhile, shows that the humour remained with 
the old boys after they left: 
The ex-apprentice quits the School, 
Where life, he thought, was “’ard and crool,” 
And, filled with vitamins and pep, 
Enters the world with jaunty step, 
To taste that glory justly due 
To L.A.C. (or A.C.2).71 
 
 Further evidence that humour crossed the staff/apprentice divide was evident 
in Borg’s book Stop Cryin’ in the Rear Rank.72  He referred to an apprentice passing 
out parade in which following the official march past, the apprentices reformed and, 
dressed in home-made top hats and tails, marched past the crowd, tapping canes in 
unison and performing a dance.  They then proceeded to the corner of the parade 
square and formed up to pull a howitzer that ‘for many years had been anchored by 
rusty steel chains to shackles embedded in the concrete’.  Having previously 
partially sawn through the chains and oiled the axles, when they pulled in unison, 
the Howitzer broke free, trundled across the parade ground and passed through two 
walls of the gymnasium.  Despite the material damage, and in front of the crowd 
                                            
70 Cartoon in The Halton Magazine. The Dadalus (Summer 1933), p.55. 
71 ‘The “Old Boy”’, The Daedalus (Summer 1927), p.12. 
72 Borg, Stop Cryin’ in the Rear Rank. 
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watching the passing out parade, ‘all the officers and the Air Chief Marshal were 
laughing and cheering the lads on’.73   Humour is usually shared and is, therefore, 
one of the important contributors to structuration as it helps reinforce acceptance of 
changing cultural norms within a culture.  Humour forms part of RAF culture-in-
action underlines both the presence and importance of informal structures.74  
Importance of Halton to the RAF. 
 In 1921, the total cost per apprentice for three years was £237 per annum, 
including maintenance of land and buildings but excluding capital cost.75   The boys 
were paid at a rate of 1/6d per diem.76  This was expensive and exceeded fees for 
an elite public school education.77  Thus, Halton came under intense scrutiny during 
the first Geddes assessment of the RAF.  The following letter shows the deep 
concern of the Air Staff and CAS that Halton was likely to come under further attack 
and highlights the importance of Halton to the Service: 
 The C.A.S. is quite confident that the result of the Geddes Committee’s 
Report will be entirely favourable to the R.A.F.  At the same time he would 
like you to be prepared for an attack on Halton, from the point of view of its 
expense…The C.A.S. is very strongly of opinion that Halton, and the system 
of enlisting and training recruits for which it stands, is essential to the real 
efficiency of the R.A.F.  The C.A.S. has no faith whatever in the assumption 
that it is possible for the R.A.F. to enlist its skilled personnel in the same way 
in which the Army and Navy enlist their personnel.  The R.A.F. requirements 
are too different.  The R.A.F. require the finished product …efficiency is 
absolutely essential, and efficiency can only be obtained by highly skilled 
                                            
73 Ibid., Ch 2, p.1. 
74 For more on informal structures see Kirke Red Coat, Green Machine. 
75 TNA AIR 8/42 CAS Archives, Geddes Committee Memoranda Air Ministry ‘Memorandum 
for Committee on National Expenditure’, October 1921, Section V, p.31. 
76 Ibid. See also See also TNA Air 8/42 CAS Archives, Section 4, Appendix to 
‘Memorandum on the Recommendations of the Committee on National Expenditure’, 
prepared by The Air Ministry for Mr Churchill’s Cabinet Committee, p.12. 
77 ‘Effective Striking Strength’, Hansard 
(HC Deb 25 February 1926 vol 192 cc820-824), 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1926/feb/25/effective-striking-
strength#S5CV0192P0_19260225_HOC_402, accessed 19 May 2015 
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personnel, which, in its turn, can only be obtained under existing conditions 
by the system of which Halton is the embodiment.78 
 
 Trenchard and the Air Staff’s submission to Geddes was unequivocal about 
the value of Halton and expressed both economic and the wider value of the 
system: 
The original decision to adopt a system of boy training was not based on the 
high rate of wages prevailing in civil life at the time but on the conviction that 
the highly skilled mechanic who had passed through a civil apprenticeship 
would always command wages which, combined with the other advantages of 
civil employment such as freedom of movement and avoidance of service 
discipline, would, except in a comparatively few cases, outweigh any 
advantages offered by the R.A.F.79 
 
 The report went on to say that: ‘There is no reasonable doubt that the 
abandonment of the scheme at this stage would strike a fatal blow at the future 
efficiency of the R.A.F.’80.   It recommended: 
 (a) that skilled men could not be enlisted in anything like the numbers 
required:- 
 (b) that even assuming they could be enlisted there would be a large capital 
loss by the abandonment of Halton and no compensating economy, but 
rather the reverse in recurrent expenditure; 
 (c) that, even if skilled men could be enlisted and economy result, the 
curtailment of boy training to the number which can be accommodated at 
Cranwell would have a disastrous effect on the future of the R.A.F.81 
 
 CAS’ defence of Halton to the Geddes Committee was, ultimately successful, 
although some economies were demanded.  The careful articulation by the Air Staff 
                                            
78 TNA AIR8/42 CAS Archives, Vol 3 Letter from Air Staff to Sec State, dated Dec 3 1921. 
79 TNA AIR 8/42 CAS Archives, Geddes Committee Memoranda Air Ministry ‘Memorandum 
for Committee on National Expenditure’, October 1921, Section V, p.29.  For more detail on 
the presentations made in the defence of Halton see also TNA AIR 8/42 CAS Archives, 
Section 4, Appendix to ‘Memorandum on the Recommendations of the Committee on 
National Expenditure’, prepared by The Air Ministry for Mr Churchill’s Cabinet Committee, 
pp.9-10. 
80 TNA AIR 8/42 CAS Archives, Geddes Committee Memoranda Air Ministry ‘Memorandum 
for Committee on National Expenditure’, October 1921, Section V, p.31. 
81 See also TNA Air 8/42 CAS Archives, Section 4, Appendix to ‘Memorandum on the 
Recommendations of the Committee on National Expenditure’, prepared by The Air Ministry 
for Mr Churchill’s Cabinet Committee, p1.3. 
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ensured that the principle of the apprentice system was understood and vindicated 
on economic grounds by the Geddes Committee.  However, attacks on Halton 
would continue as they did on the RAF more widely.  In 1926, Sir Frank Nelson 
complained, to the House of Commons, that the cost of the apprentice system at 
£230 per annum was well in excess of the amount that he was paying for his 
children to attend Winchester at a cost of £60-70 per term.82  He pointed out that 
7000 teas had been served to the parents of the apprentices on Families’ Day and 
also believed that the pay of 1s per day was excessive.83  This was despite his 
admission that Halton was delivering probably the best apprentice training in the 
world. 84   The Under-Secretary for State, Major Sir Philip Sassoon’s reply was 
robust: 
 The hon. Member for Stroud asked me a few questions about Halton. So far 
as I can remember, one of the questions was the disproportionate amount of 
staff as compared with air apprentices there. He will, of course, remember 
that Halton is a very special school. There are so many highly technical and 
various schemes of training going on at once that those can only be carried 
out by very small classes.  It is also in process of expansion, and at the end 
of this year there will probably be 3,000 apprentices there.  He will be the first 
to realise that it would not be fair to compare a school of that kind with an 
ordinary public school, where the curriculum is less variegated.85 
 
 Trenchard’s vigorous defence demonstrates the extreme importance of 
Halton to the RAF.  It was essential for producing suitably qualified personnel but it 
was also an essential part of Trenchard’s plan to develop the ‘Air Force spirit’ and 
appeared to be recognised as the best apprentice system in the country. 
 
 
                                            
82 ‘Effective Striking Strength’, Hansard, cc820-824,  
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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Silos 
 The creation of apprentices was not all positive and resulted in frictions and 
cultural silos emerging in the RAF.  As the first apprentices went into the wider RAF, 
they began to mix with, and overtake, other personnel who had not been through 
the scheme.  Taylor attributed the nickname ‘Brat’ having its origins in existing 
tradesmen finding them to be like a ‘troublesome child’.86  The friction between 
apprentices as they worked with existing tradesmen was also highlighted by 
Lawrence in The Mint: ‘the kid is clever with words, and has passed out L.A.C. from 
school: the old hand can hardly spell, and will be for ever an A.C.2.  He teaches his 
better ever so grumpily’.87 
 Apprentices were also inculcated with a sense that they were superior which 
could ruffle feathers of their superiors as the poem The “Old Boy”  highlights: 
The ex-apprentice runs his Flight; 
He puts the Sergeant Major right; 
With self-assurance hard to match 
He keeps the Air Force up to scratch, 
Well knowing that, if he did not, 
The bally show would run to pot.88 
  
 This sense of expertise in the hangar underlined the technical attitude of the 
RAF and reinforced the sense of superiority over ORs in the other services.   
Social Mobility 
 Bishop wrote that: ‘the path from the NAAFI to the officers’ mess was wider 
and more frequently trodden than any of the other services, and many a rigger and 
fitter ended up as a pilot’.89  The RAF was not alone in this increase in social 
mobility in the inter-war period.  Romans highlighted that RN recruitment to the 
                                            
86 Taylor, Halton and the Apprentice Scheme, p.13. 
87 Lawrence, The Mint, pp.195-6. 
88 ‘The “Old Boy”’, The Daedalus, p.12. 
89 Bishop, Fighter Boys, p.34. 
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officer cadre was increasingly meritocratic due to political pressure between 1919-
1939.90   The publicity material aimed at parents entitled Starting a Career Second 
to None highlights broad social mobility developments that were in place by 1942.91  
However, there is clear evidence that the institutionalised social mobility in the RAF 
started earlier for apprentices and was particularly fruitful for the boys from the 
apprentice system.  Initially this path was limited to 6 apprentices per year attending 
the RAF College, however, during the expansion and Second World War years, a 
significant number of apprentices was selected for aircrew duties that further 
enhanced social mobility within the RAF for apprentices.  The following statistics 
demonstrate the extent of institutionalised social mobility of the apprentices in the 
RAF:  over 20% of all 50 000 apprentices who went through the scheme were 
commissioned.  Of those about half achieved the rank of squadron leader or higher.  
Over 100 ex-apprentices achieved air rank.  Of the rest 80% became Senior NCOs.  
In the mid-1980s there were 5 serving ex-apprentice air marshals including Marshal 
of the Royal Air Force Sir Keith Williamson and the Chief Engineer Air Marshal Sir 
Eric Dunn.  42 ex-apprentices were listed in ‘Men of the Battle of Britain.92 
 The Gallantry medals awarded to ex-apprentices also highlight that many 
served with distinction in combat and flying roles:  Victoria Cross 1, George Cross 6, 
George Medals 6, Military Cross 2, Distinguished Flying Medals and Distinguished 
                                            
90 This was for the Executive branch.  Romans noted a subtly different background for the 
Engieering Branch. Elinor Romans, ‘Selection and Early Career Education of Executive 
Officers in the Royal Navy c 1902-1939’, p.32 and p.35.  
91 Trenchard Museum Archive, Hammerton, A.B.C of the R.A.F, p.10, Apprenticeship in the 
R.A.F.  See also TNA AIR 10/1112 Starting a Career Second to None which provides a 
good insight into the ‘offer’ to parents in 1940s. 
92 Trenchard Museum Archive, ‘Trenchard’s Brats’, Information sheet.   
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Flying Crosses 500, Military Medal 3, Distinguished Flying Medal 249.93  In all, 2002 
decorations were awarded to ex-apprentices and they received 2400 Mentions in 
Dispatches.94   
 The wider effects of this institutionalised social mobility are interesting.  
Bishop claimed that RAF ORs were less deferential to their officers than the Army 
whose ORs came from the ‘uneducated working class’.95   Sherbrooke-Walker’s 
contemporary Second World War observations support this more relaxed 
relationship.96  However, it is too simplistic to ascribe this entirely to the apprentice 
scheme.  The emphasis on the RAF being a technical service and the more relaxed 
atmosphere that surrounded the aviator identity were doubtless also significant 
factors in the emergence of this more relaxed relationship.  But the novel apprentice 
system had successfully attracted a demographic with aspirations but insufficient 
financial means for what amounted to a top-quality equivalent of a private school 
education.  This helped with recruitment.  Sherbrooke-Walker noted that, ‘as far as 
“Other Ranks” were concerned, the Air Force appealed to, and secured, a 
disproportionate number of the intelligent type of man’.97  The standards required for 
entry to the apprentice scheme were high.  Thus, an officer on a squadron would 
meet and work alongside intelligent ORs and the qualification gap between them 
was far less marked than, for example, between a subaltern and a private in the 
                                            
93 Trenchard Museum, Trenchard’s Brats, Information sheet.  With similar statistics see also 
Taylor, Halton and the Apprentice System, p.29 and Kimber, Son of Halton, p.94. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Bishop, Fighter Boys, p.34. 
96 Sherbrooke-Walker, Khaki and Blue, p.6. 
97 Sherbrooke-Walker, Khaki and Blue, p.9. 
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Infantry.  There was, however, still a gap between the type of schools they were 
likely to have attended.98 
 Lawrence articulated how the RAF prized the spread of technically minded 
airmen: 
 The Air Ministry recognises a rightness in our worship of the technical 
engineer, by promoting sergeant or sergeant-pilot the best men from the 
ranks: those who have understanding of the souls of engines, and find their 
poetry in the smooth tick-over.  They form our aristocracy of merit.99 
 
 Deliberate commissioning from these ranks engendered a revolution in social 
mobility for the era that was not common place in the Edwardian Army where those 
commissioned from the ranks before the First World War were almost entirely sent 
to ‘dead-end jobs’.100  Whilst sending six apprentices as cadets at the RAF College 
was a small beginning, the apprentice system effectively created a career fast track 
from within the ranks that would see proliferation of the technical knowledge and 
understanding of the importance of maintaining engineering standards throughout 
the commissioned ranks. 101   The Cranwell College Character Book shows, for 
instance, that Dawson, the first apprentice to commission,  did not end up in a dead-
end position.  Educated at Sunderland Technical College, he achieved the rank of 
group captain in 1941 and was appointed CBE in 1943.102  Both the Character Book 
and the RAF Cranwell Cadet Register of 1931 entry show that the system of 
sending apprentices to Cranwell worked well with apprentices achieving impressive 
                                            
98 The interwar norm for RAF College cadets to be from a public school background is clear 
from the Character Book and will be discussed later in this chapter.  RAF Cranwell College 
Archive, CRN/D/2011/71, Character Book. 
99 Lawrence, The Mint, p.195. 
100 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, p.29-32. 
101 The numbers of aircrew and air rank officers who had an apprentice background was a 
significant factor in this and will be discussed later. 
102 RAF Cranwell College Archive, CRN/D/2011/71, Character Book, Entry dated 26/8/20. 
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final rankings and pursuing fulfilling careers. 103   Thus, the apprentice scheme 
initiated a gradual move towards meritocracy in the RAF.   
 The system also offered apprentices an opportunity to become airmen 
aircrew following training thereby enriching the non-commission aircrew cadre with a 
deep understanding of aviation engineering.   
Conclusion 
 In a speech in The House of Lords on 6 December 1944 Trenchard referred 
to the impact that the spirit that emerged at Halton: 
 I feel justified in saying that the experiment has richly justified itself.  There is 
no doubt at all, in my opinion, that Halton and the Halton spirit have been a 
pillar of strength to the Royal Air Force all over the world.  The Halton-trained 
men have provided the nucleus on which the great expansion of the Air Force 
was centred.  They have set and maintained an extraordinarily high standard 
of efficiency.  You only have to look at the promotions and the honours 
gained.  Over 1,000 high honours have been gained, and a large number of 
those men are very senior Air Vice-Marshals and Air Commodores, running 
the highest technical offices in the Air Force.  Surely the efficient 
maintenance of aircraft has also been one of the outstanding features of this 
war and that has been made possible by the Halton training of our men.104 
 
 The evidence from the archive is that the Halton experiment did, indeed, 
have a profound cultural impact upon the RAF.  It provided the very solid basis of 
technical excellence that facilitated RAF expansion necessary to fight the Second 
World War.  However, it provided more than that.  The harsh regime instilled grit and 
determination into a group of very young boys at a most impressionable stage of 
life.  The loyalty towards the RAF as well as their colleagues and even Halton itself 
was immensely deep.  Earl Mountbatten underlined the cultural effect in the review 
of the 93rd Entry: 
                                            
103 For example: RAF Cranwell College Archive, CRN/D/2011/72 Cadet Register, 1931 
Entry. 1st (Pope), 3rd (Robinson), 5th (Patmore) and 6th (Porter).  The success rates of the 
apprentices who continued on to the RAF College will be examined later in this chapter in 
more detail.  
104 ‘Defence: Post-War Organization’, Hansard, cc131-89  
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 ...one thing is absolutely true, the Battle of Burma was won here in the 
classrooms and workshops of Halton: won not just by the knowledge and skill 
that your maintenance crews produced, it was won by the spirit that Halton 
produce.105 
 
Kimber wrote of the deep feeling that the ‘System’ inculcated: 
 Halton might have been located anywhere.  It was never a place but an 
experience.  It was an anvil on which a generation of young boys were forged 
and hammered out to their manhood; shaped and tempered to meet the 
demands and the holocaust of war.  We came to Halton as callow, young 
boys and left it as men…When we lift our heads with pride and say ‘I was 
there’, remember those who forged us and inscribed within us a meaning of 
service and tradition.106 
 
 Bishop wrote that: ‘Trenchard was as proud of Halton as he was of Cranwell.  
He was aware that by engineering a new class of educated other ranks for the first 
time in British military history, he was doing something radical, almost 
revolutionary’.107  Similarly, James referred to ‘the innovation of an educated body of 
non-commissioned officers and airmen was itself a social revolution.  It was very 
much a favourite project of Trenchard, and it is unlikely that he failed to understand 
the implications’.108 
 The Halton apprenticeship scheme was probably the most successful 
element of the training schemes that Trenchard advocated for establishing the ‘Air 
Force spirit’ in his 1919 Memorandum.  Trenchard’s vision and drive regarding the 
apprentice scheme had a marked impact on the resultant espoused culture at 
Halton as well as more widely across the RAF.   However, the way the apprentices 
interpreted and reacted to their environment also demonstrates the power of culture-
in-action.   
 
                                            
105 Kimber, Son of Halton, p.xix. 
106 Kimber, Son of Halton, pp.103-104. 
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108 James, The Paladins, p.111. 
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ROYAL AIR FORCE COLLEGE CRANWELL 
 Royal Air Force College Cranwell is a most striking institution; The main 
building is high domed with a clock tower topped by an incongruous inland 
lighthouse whose sweeps can be seen from many miles.  Designed by James West 
the building draws on the influence of Sir Christopher Wren’s Royal Hospital in 
Chelsea.109  It boasts imposing colonnades, large faux Georgian windows and is set 
in well-tended grounds with an impressive red parade ground and cricket pitch 
known as the Orange.  Architecturally, it is impressive and is on a par with 
Sandhurst and Dartmouth.  Cranwell was preferred, as a location, by Trenchard due 
to his concerns about the RAF not being an attractive option for the upper and 
aristocratic classes.  According to Boyle, Trenchard said that it was: 
Marooned in the wilderness, cut off from past-times they couldn’t organise for 
themselves, they would find life cheaper, healthier and more wholesome.  
And they’d have less cause to envy their contemporaries at Sandhurst or 
Dartmouth and acquire any kind of inferiority complex.110 
 
 There is no doubt that the College has had a significant long-term impact 
upon the culture of the RAF.  Trenchard succeeded in creating an almost hallowed 
centre of initial indoctrination for the RAF officer corps which endures, as 
demonstrated by the following recent comment about the college by a wing 
commander who has not served there for more than 20 years:  'I have an ingrained 
respect for the place as I see it as the guardian of RAF ethos'.111  In the introduction 
to his history of RAF Cranwell, Haslam highlighted:  ‘This narrative seeks to tell the 
                                            
109 ‘RAF College Cranwell.  Building the College’,  
https://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcollegecranwell/recruitment/buildingthecollege.cfm, accessed 27 
May 2017. 
110 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.361. 
111 Interview on Attitudes Towards Training Institutions Wg Cdr P Godfrey, Jul 2010. 
Statement made by Wg Cdr P Godfrey 13 Jul 10.  Godfrey is now an Air Commodore. 
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whole story of Cranwell which together with Halton has been one of the enduring 
centres of tradition in the Royal Air Force’.112  Bishop, meanwhile, claimed that 
Cranwell succeeded from the start in generating an air force spirit, the cadets 
knew what was wanted.  Aerial warfare they understood, had created a need 
for a hybrid warrior who combined the mastery of the latest technology with 
the mental bearing of a classic champion.  It was a new military caste and 
Cranwell was its spiritual home.113 
 
 This section aims to highlight how the College at Cranwell achieved this and 
to distil the key effects that the College had on the culture aside from providing the 
RAF with an impressive edifice.114 
 Having articulated the need for a separate College in the 1919 Memorandum, 
Trenchard and the Air Staff remained resolute in the desire to guard separate 
training and also to ensure that the College would be as grand as possible befitting 
the new service.115  In the first edition of the College Magazine, Trenchard and 
Churchill wrote missives to the new cadets.  Trenchard’s was as follows: 
 It was decided to form this Cadet College because it was realized from the 
first that such a College was the essential foundation of a separate Air 
Service.  This College, in conjunction with the School of Technical Training 
for Boys at Halton, will have the making or marring of the future of our great 
Service, which was built up during the war by all the gallant Pilots and 
Observers and other ranks who fought through it, and won a name in the air 
second to none in the world’.116 
 
 The College was established at Cranwell, in Lincolnshire, which had 
previously been the RNAS Central Training Establishment under Commodore 
Godfrey Paine.117  By 1917 the Station had expanded and was a busy aerodrome 
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operating both fixed wing and lighter-than-air craft.  Cranwell had become the key 
training facility for the RNAS flying training and, in addition, delivered observer, 
wireless operators, mechanic and engineer training.118  This was an RNAS facility 
and its processes and practices reflected that.  In 1918, on amalgamation of the 
RNAS and the RFC, change would be inevitable.  Given its naval roots, it would 
retain a few vestiges of naval heritage, notably the names of some of the roads and 
some of the original naval buildings.  When the College was built, the clock tower 
design included a nod to its naval heritage, a lighthouse that shines out over the 
fields of Lincolnshire that is reputed to be the most inland lighthouse in Britain.119 
Target Audience 
 Unlike Halton, the cadets were charged a fee to attend the College.  The 
resultant make up from 1920 until 1938 was boys predominantly from public and 
independent Schools.120  Of the British Army, Bowman and Connelly noted that 
‘reinforcing the class consciousness of the Edwardian officer corps was the small 
number of schools which cadets came from’.121  The RAF similarly actively targeted 
a narrow range of schools.  In consequence, its permanent officer cadre, destined 
for high command, was drawn from a very narrow section of society.  Indeed, a 
                                                                                                                                       
C17C8FEA187.pdf, accessed 27 May 2017.  Commodore Paine had previously been the 
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public school background was considered the assumed path for the leaders of the 
Empire.122  As Mahoney pointed out: 
 The Victorian Army, despite meritocratic aspirations through the abolition of 
purchase in 1871, maintained a socially restrictive officer class that remained 
in place throughout the Edwardian era, as upper class, and by default public 
school educated, recruits were perceived as having natural leadership 
abilities.123 
 
The importance of public schools in Edwardian psyche was further underlined by 
Kirke who noted that: 
 In Edwardian Britain, for example, the public schools were considered to be 
the best source of leaders of all kinds (political, military, diplomatic, colonial 
and so on) for the prosperity and expansion of the Empire.  Some of these 
leaders naturally went into the Army and as a consequence, the vast majority 
of individuals joining to be officers came from public schools.124 
 
 Slessor, a Haileybury Old Boy who was CAS from 1950-1952 had strong 
upper middle-class views about public school and high-level leadership: 
 The glory of the public school system in the past and its prime justification 
today is that it is the best known method of producing leaders of men.  It is 
unfashionable nowadays to talk about an Officer Class.  No-one will be so 
bold or foolish as to deny that, in horses, breeding and training are 
indispensable if one wants to produce winners; and I have never been able to 
make out why anyone should think that does not apply equally to men.  I am 
sure it is a good thing that we should have broadened the base from which 
we draw our officers…some of our greatest military leaders have risen from 
the ranks but if we believe in the public school system, if we continue to claim 
its privileges, let us admit that it does, and I believe always will, produce a 
very high proportion of the best leaders of men in Britain. 125 
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 Further reflecting the accepted upper middle-class norms of the era, he went 
on to say that ‘one of the best possible methods of selection of officers is by 
selective and controlled nepotism’.126 
 The RN was much less wedded to public school influence than the British 
Army or the RAF; it preferred to take its future officers in at a much younger age. 
The Fisher-Selborne Scheme that ran from 1902 until 1939 took 13-year-old cadets 
in for a four-year training course; the bulk of the RN officer corps entered service in 
this manner.127  From 1913, a small proportion of Naval officers entered via the 
Special Entry Scheme that took 17 year-old boys into the RN for an 12 or 18 month 
course before they were made into midshipmen.128  There was also a small Mate 
scheme, introduced in 1913, that allowed ratings to become officers.129 
 Much like the British Army, at the beginning of the twentieth century RN 
officers came from the upper and upper middle classes, although, Romans noted 
that there was an increase in meritocratic approaches to recruitment from 1919-
1939.130  Robbins wrote that the British Army officer cadre became less aristocratic 
in the 1930s.131  However, these changes were slow.  In the inter-war RAF, despite 
the social upheaval of the First World War and an increased social mobility due to 
the innovative apprentice system, great emphasis was still placed on recruiting boys 
from public school for the RAF College.132  This is clear from the Character Book in 
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the RAF College archives. 133   This was a most useful document that tracked 
parental background, schooling, rank at entry and upon graduation as well as other 
information such as rank progression and award of decorations following 
graduation, psa annotation and reports those officers reported missing or KIA.134  
Mahoney, meanwhile, used a 1931 paper written by Wg Cdr Evill, the Deputy 
Commandant of Cranwell to demonstrate the RAF’s preponderance towards the 
public school background for the Cadets.135  The report divided schools up into 
Grade 1 Institutions eg Eton, Harrow and Marlborough; Grade II Institutions eg Mill 
Hill, Oundle, Fettes and Grade III institutions…’the others’.136    Thus, the RAF 
appeared somewhat schizophrenic in its approach to recruitment.  On one hand, the 
RAF had a progressive approach to encouraging social mobility in its recruitment of 
apprentices as well as sending the best to Cranwell and encouraging others to take 
up flying.  On the other hand, the logic behind recruiting for the College seemed to 
reflect an extremely traditional public school oriented mind-set as typified by the 
earlier Slessor quotation. 
 Mahoney pointed out that the Cecil Committee Report discounted the RN’s 
method of training at Osborne and Dartmouth despite the fact the RAF was 
emphasising its technical nature.137  The RAF thus adopted an Army model for 
recruiting and training for its future leaders.138  Higham wrote that before the Fisher-
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Selborne reforms, RN Engineers were ‘hardly considered officers’.139   However, 
following the reforms in 1902 that emphasised science and engineering, the RN 
came to recognise the value of engineer officers and a more progressive and 
slightly more meritocratic view of backgrounds emerged within the RN than the 
British Army.140  This supports Roman’s view of recruitment of the RN officer corps 
becoming gradually more meritocratic.141  Meanwhile, Higham noted that ‘in the 
British Army of the interwar years gunners, for instance, were a lesser breed of 
officers and “did not hunt”.142  This reflected traditionalism and rejection of technical 
trades in the Army.  To an extent, the RAF officer cadre appeared to cling onto that 
traditional mind-set regarding officer recruitment and training despite being entirely 
founded on technology.   The traditional mind-set endured throughout the interwar 
period in the face of some quite compelling evidence that suggested that coming 
from a top public school was not necessarily a precursor to good performance at 
Cranwell.   
 Between 1920 and 1938, the best performing group of students came not 
from Evill’s first or second groups but from the apprentice cadre that was, itself, to 
be found within school group three: ‘the others’.143  With only two or three airmen 
apprentices on each Cranwell intake, it is startling to see how well they performed at 
the College at Cranwell.  The Character Book identified that airmen apprentices 
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came top on 17 of the 37 courses that ran between 1920 and 1938.144  That is all 
the more impressive, given that airmen apprentices were not present for five of the 
courses and also numbered only 124 out of a total of 1173 attendees of the College 
or 10.5% between 1920 and 1938.   Meanwhile, of the 464 boys or 39.5% who 
attended the Class I and Class II Public Schools (228+236 respectively), only 9 
achieved first place on the course.  Of the remaining 50% of the overall intake for 
the period which came from tier 3 or ‘other schools’, 11 achieved first place 
positions on the course. Additionally, throughout the period, the airmen apprentices 
rarely fell below the rank of 10th for each course indicating that their quality was 
reliable.145 
 From Evill’s report, the apprentices’ ‘average place on graduation’ was 5.7 
with Grade III schools 13.2, Grade II schools 14.0 and Grade I schools 15.2.146  Evill 
wrote that ‘whatever the cause, apprentices have established a remarkable lead 
over the school-boys, whose results vary inversely with the grade of school from 
which they come’.147  Evill’s report broke down two other aspects of the course: 
‘Officer-like qualities’ and Flying skills. 
 For ‘Officer-like qualities’, 68% of apprentices achieved a ‘Class A’, Grade II 
Schools 53%, Grade 1 Schools 51% and Grade III schools 39%.148  The apprentices 
were clearly well in the lead in that respect, yet Evill chose to discount their 
performance in that area highlighting that more Class I schooled cadets had been 
appointed as under-officers or sergeant cadets thereby underlining their suitability 
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for leadership.  The report highlighted that 33 % of Class I schooled cadets were 
under-officer or sergeant cadets vice 25% for apprentices.149  However, given the 
very small numbers of apprentices, Evill’s figures in this respect are a little 
misleading.  Had only 3 more apprentices been given such leadership positions, 
they would have equalled the Grade I schoolboys.   Choices for under-officer and 
cadet sergeants at the college may also have been influenced by ingrained social 
bias of the Directing Staff rather than on evidence of marks achieved in ‘Officer-like 
qualities’ of the cadets. 
 In flying performance the Class I cadets did perform best: 58% of Class I 
schooled cadets achieved ‘above average’, Class II schooled cadets 55%, 
Apprentices 42% and Class III schooled 38%.150  Once again, ingrained social bias 
in the one-on-one flying environment could have resulted in improved scores for the 
public schoolboys given that their instructors most likely came from a similar public 
school background. 
 The strength of contemporary belief in the public school system’s ability to 
prepare an individual for leadership and command is demonstrated by the 
conclusions drawn by Evill.  Despite the overall poor performance of the Class I 
schooled cadets Evill wrote: ‘boys from the higher grade schools, whether due to 
heredity or training, have in particular valuable qualities which the service must still 
seek, and it seems that the answer to the question at the end of para. (2) is that we 
must still seek to maintain a high proportion of these boys at Cranwell’.151  Evill 
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chose to concentrate upon the statistics for flying and leadership in order to qualify 
his statement.  However, that is somewhat flawed.  It should be remembered that 
Cranwell was designed to select and train officer for permanent commissions, 
hence, higher command positions.  Thus, while flying was an important aspect of 
the training, probably the most important aspect should have been on the leadership 
and staff work aspects of the course; the purist flyers were to be provided by the 
short service commission system.  The best performing in Officer-like qualities were, 
clearly, the apprentices.  This suggests that, despite the conscious moves by the 
RAF towards being more meritocratic than the other services, the deep class biases 
of the inter-war society remained ingrained in the RAF officer cadre.  A truly 
objective conclusion to be drawn from Evill’s paper, without considering 
contemporary class pre-dispositions, would have recommended that the Grade I 
schooled cadets should have been offered short service commissions to make use 
of their better pure flying skills while more apprentices should have been channelled 
to the College at Cranwell.  However, when viewed through a 1930s lens, such was 
the strength of contemporary culture with respect to public schooling, it is 
understandable that Evill drew the conclusions he did and that the report was 
accepted and recruitment from Class I schools continued.  The safest option for 
recruiters at the time was to recruit from the tried and tested public school pipeline 
that was perceived to be the best preparation for future leaders of Empire. 
 A demographic group that the RAF failed to attract in any numbers was the 
aristocracy.152  Trenchard was frustrated by the: 
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…patronising view of the R.A.F. held by people in the upper spheres of 
society except in some of the Auxiliary Air Force squadrons.  It was a 
common whisper that “nobody who was anyone” would disgrace himself or 
his family by joining, or encouraging a near relative to join, this “upstart 
Cinderella of the services.153   
 
 This concern is vindicated in the Character Book that lists few parents as 
‘gentlemen’.  The vast majority of cadets were either sons of military families or from 
the upper middle classes that were able to pay for the public school education as 
well as for Cranwell. 
 During the inter-war period, and as the RAF arrived in the Second World 
War, the RAF officer cadre was, then, distinctly middle class and traditional in social 
outlook.  However, some chimeric attitudes emerged in which very traditional 
standards of behaviour were juxtaposed against the romanticism and devil may care 
approach to danger that emerged from the aviator identity that imbued the Service.  
James wrote that that officers 'were in manners and behaviour rather stuffy: this 
stuffiness even underlay the rake-hell image cultivated by the short service 
officers'. 154   However, even very traditional officers such as Brooke-Popham 
appeared to derive a sense of freedom from flying as the earlier reference to flyers 
being like Peter Pan indicates.155 
 As the reserves built in numbers, the complexity of the social make-up of the 
RAF increased further.  Wilkinson pointed out that the ‘the prevailing thesis is that 
the Auxiliary Air Force (AAF) was a “gentleman’s flying club”’ and that, due to the 
AAF being unable to recruit to a sufficient level that ‘a new reserve, the Royal Air 
Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR), was then developed to remove the social and 
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class barriers to recruitment which those choosing to enter the AAF faced by 
creating what was to be a “citizen’s air force.”’ 156   
 The popular view of the AAF is likely to have grown from personnel of 600 
and 601 Sqns in London that Wilkinson noted ‘had been educated, in the main, 
within the public school sector and had been groomed to fulfil leadership roles’ and 
were employed in well paid city jobs and often took part in elite sports such as 
rowing, polo flying and racing car driving’.157  However, her research, which is the 
most comprehensive demographic study of the reserves to date, demonstrated that 
nationally, ‘the Auxiliaries were less exclusive than previously suggested while the 
RAFVR were in fact more exclusive than had been thought’.158  She highlighted that 
20% of the AAF were from public schools with 19% Oxbridge educated which does 
not conform with the commonly accepted view associated with the Millionaire 
Squadrons of London.  Meanwhile a rather surprising 39% of the RAFVR were 
publically schooled with 54% Oxbridge educated indicating a relatively high number 
of upper middle classes in the organisation that is commonly considered to be the 
people’s Air Force.   Throughout Wilkinson’s thesis, the personal accounts from the 
inter-war period, describe social conventions that were in common with those of the 
regular service in which the officer cadre were separated from the ORs. 159  
However, the accounts also reveal that the aviator identity had spread beyond the 
regulars and that attitudes towards flying and discipline were comparable and that 
counter-institutional behaviour was similarly prevalent.160 
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 In the regulars, the system was not yet ready to gamble the entire future of 
the RAF leadership based entirely upon increased meritocracy.  Trenchard referred 
to Halton as an experiment and so was the idea of sending its top few apprentices 
to Cranwell.  However, contemporary wisdom still saw a public school background 
as a pre-requisite for high command.  Only once those early apprentices reached air 
rank and proved themselves in high command, however, would their true value be 
demonstrated.  The effect of the apprentice system in this regard was significant but 
it was not the only factor for this move towards increasing meritocracy, the influx of 
officers from the dominions and from a broader cross-section of society in the late 
expansion period and during the War also demonstrated that flying and leadership 
were not only the preserve of public school officers.  Additionally, the short-service 
and reservist system helped diversify the officer cadre.  Furthermore, following the 
Second World War, the RAF would become gradually less wedded to the notion that 
a public school background was an essential criterion for high command.  Kirke 
pointed to a ‘Cultural Stripe’ effect of wider society being responsible for a declining 
emphasis by the 1980s on the need for publically schooled officers for high 
command in the British Army.  However, the empirical results show that this was 
much more marked in the RAF.   
 However, the starting point for the RAF, as was demonstrated by the RAF 
Cranwell Character Book, was that 50% of Cranwell cadets were from tier 1 public 
schools with the vast majority of the rest from other fee paying schools.  By 2005, 
out of the 10 most senior staff in the three services, 9 out of 10 in the Army were 
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independently schooled, 6 of 10 in the RN and only 3 out of 10 in the RAF. 161   In 
2006-7, of those chosen for Advanced Command and Staff Course, an ‘indication of 
the likely composition of the future leadership of the Services’, 58% of the Army, 
70% of the RN and 75% of the RAF attended state school.162  Thus, the RAF, 
having been broadly similar to the Army in demographic make up in 1918 has 
evolved in quite a different manner. 
Syllabus and Life at the College 
 The 1919 Memorandum proposed a 2-year course at the College followed by 
an air pilotage course at Andover before progression to a squadron that they ‘can 
regard as their home…as the sailor does his ship or the soldier his regiment’.163 
Life at the College at Cranwell between the wars was rather like an extension of 
public school.  Indeed, in Reach for the Sky, one of Bader’s new colleagues 
commented on the first night: ‘like school, isn’t it’.164  The two-year course was 
divided into two terms, a short one comprising a ’12 week session’ starting in 
September and a second longer term comprising two ’12 week sessions’ starting in 
February in order to make use of the better summer flying weather.165 
 Upon arrival, cadets underwent induction that had a different emphasis to 
that of the apprentice school.  Boyle’s account of life at Cranwell indicated that this 
was a much more gentlemanly affair than Halton.  In Boyle’s years of the College, 
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the batting staff conducted duties such as polishing the linoleum and keeping the 
First World War huts clean, although the cadets would later do that.166  Cadets 
dined in mess kit four or five times each week.167  They were also issued with a 
Service motor bicycle in order to learn about maintaining combustion engines.168  
Cadets also conducted drill training and spent significant amounts of time on the 
parade square. 169   Much like in the apprentice system, an official cadet/cadet 
hierarchy was instituted with the establishment of the cadet ranks of Under Officer 
and Cadet Sergeants through which the cadets maintained their own discipline.170  
This was not far removed from a school prefect system and was open to similar 
bullying and self-imposed rules seen in public schools. 
 The overall aim of the College at its inception was articulated as follows: ‘The 
object of the training given to a Flight Cadet is to fit him in every way to take his 
place as an officer in the R.A.F.’.171  It aimed to give ‘the Flight Cadet a thorough 
grounding in Aeronautical and Service subjects as a basis for further instruction 
given at the College’.172  Imparting the Air Force spirit was outlined to instructors in 
the third paragraph of the Introduction to the Provisional Syllabus: 
 The Staff and Instructors at the College have also to keep constantly in mind 
the importance of establishing and maintaining a high standard of esprit-de-
corps and professional keenness amongst all ranks at the College.  These 
qualities, allied with self-respect and reliability are essential to Officers of the 
Air Force and therefore form a most important part of the education of an Air 
Force Cadet.  The reputation and efficiency of the Force depends almost 
entirely upon the conduct, bearing and ability of the permanent Officers to 
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whom the remainder of the Service look for example and leadership.  In no 
other Service is high morale, esprit-de-corps and an unfailing sense of duty 
more essential than in the Royal Air Force.173 
 
 The majority of the cadets were probably attracted to join the RAF to fly.174  
However, in 1921 the Commandant highlighted that being an RAF officer meant far 
more than simply being a pilot: ‘although an officer who could not fly was useless to 
the Air Force, yet the mere ability to fly by no means qualified an individual to 
become an officer in the Royal Air Force’.175  This was borne out by Boyle, who 
would later become CAS, in his biography: 
 Although I went to Cranwell because I wanted to fly, probably that activity 
was the least important of the lessons I learned.  I left with an absolute 
dedication to the Royal Air Force which I retain to this day.  It was made quite 
clear to us why the new service had come into being, what was expected of it 
and the part we had to play.176 
 
 The idea that the individual was an officer first, and a pilot only by 
specialisation, would become an enduring feature of RAF officer employment that 
exists today.  In the early days of the RAF all officers were part of the General 
Duties Branch and were also all to be pilots.177  Cranwell targeted the half of the 
officer corps that were offered permanent commissions and who would be the 
officers who were needed to rise to the highest ranks in the RAF and run the 
organisation.  That required more than just being a pilot; those who just flew were 
the short service commission officers.  However, this notion was somewhat turned 
on its head as new branches were established in the 1930s and some officers 
belonged to non-flying branches.  It soon became clear that pilots were considered 
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first among equals with all other branches having a glass ceiling in terms of 
progression to the top command jobs.178  Mahoney highlighted the General Duties 
Branch was of major cultural significance in that it underlined the pre-eminence of 
pilots within the Service in what he termed the ‘Pilot Ethos’ of the RAF.179  He 
proposed that the GD Branch was, in many ways, similar to the development of the 
divisional branches of the RN and that the ‘evolving branch system that sought to 
bring together the best of the Army’s and RN’s systems while avoiding the 
pitfalls’.180  However, the GD branch also brought together pilots who ‘held a shared 
identity, encouraged by pilot ethos’.181  That paved the way for pilot pre-eminence in 
the eyes of the Service that remains a feature of RAF culture today. 
 The syllabus set out to produce a balanced officer who could fly.  But 
Cranwell required more than a syllabus to achieve this.  Cranwell was an immersive 
experience for both the Cadets and the Staff.  Military service at the time was far 
more all-consuming than it is today.  Haslam wrote that : 
Oral testimony from surviving members of the early courses at Cranwell is 
unanimous in its acclaim of the full life they led – mainly extrovert, fit young 
men proud of the new way of life they were exemplifying and eager to join the 
squadrons in the Royal Air Force…The priorities were clearly defined.  First 
came flying, then came physical fitness and discipline, and drill, and then 
came academic subjects especially those supporting the skills of aviation’. 182 
 
 Sport was of great importance at the College and the emphasis came from 
the very top.  Trenchard thought that Rugby ‘“was the best game on earth” for 
                                            
178 Although Air Marshal Peach, a Navigator, recently served as Chief of Defence Staff, to 
date, only pilots have been appointed as CAS.   
179 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, p.106 
180 Ibid., p.108. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Haslam, The History of Royal Air Force Cranwell, p.32. 
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developing team spirit and manliness’. 183   He wrote to all RAF Commanders 
encouraging them to help their men develop a taste for winter sports and believed 
that ‘silver trophies were more than prizes for skill and ability in his eyes.  They were 
symbols of permanence, possessions to be coveted and treasured’.184  In Odd Hint 
to the RAF, the anonymous author referring to the expense of drinks, wrote that that 
officers should prioritise sport and that ‘every officer should be an all-round sports-
man.  Drink is optional’.185  This importance placed on sport was also clear from the 
archival records in which judgement was passed on each cadet in the Cadet Archive 
on arrival.  Sporting ability appears as the main frame of reference in these single 
line cadet summaries: 
 Hardy S, 1923 Entry: ‘Clifton XV. House XI Cricket. Swimming. VG Type.  
Should do well’. 
 
 Ford R, 1923 Entry:  Soccer XI + Cricket XI. Sgt OTC.  Not Bright. 
 
 Williams R 1926 Intake: ‘Rugger (scrum) Sailing a little. Quiet. Nice type’. 
 
 Worstell W, 1926 Entry: ‘Rugger and Soccer at Boys’ Wing (King’s Cup 
Team).  Very keen and intelligent.  Should do well’.186 
 
 The College occasionally exhibited a more perceptive and broader view of its 
cadets and succeeded in identifying skills other than sporting ones.  Frank Whittle, 
the inventor of the jet engine was described thus: 
Whittle F 1926 Entry: ‘Aeroplane designer. Squadron Commander should 
watch him carefully.  Should ultimately specialise in engineering’.187 
                                            
183 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.359.  Robbins highlighted the importance placed on sport in the 
British Army in 1914.  Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, pp.5-6.   
184 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.359. 
185 The Odd Hint to the RAF, written in the early days of the existence of the RAF, provided 
a valuable insight that traces the origins of the Customs of the Service from 1918. ‘Wing 
Commander’, The Odd Hint to the RAF (n.d. although a handwritten date of 1918 is in the 
cover of RAFC Archive copy), RAFC Archive unaccessioned. 
186 RAFC Cranwell Archive, CRN/D/2011/72 Cadet Entry Book. 1923 and 1926 entries. 
187 RAFC Cranwell Archive, CRN/D/2011/72 Cadet Entry Book. 1926 entry.  Sir Frank 
Whittle went on to invent the jet engine. 
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 Whilst this may have been extremely perceptive, it is one of the few isolated 
comments in the Character Book that refers to qualities other than sporting 
excellence.  This highlights an espoused culture amongst the officer cadre that was 
very traditional and did not really embrace engineering to the same extent as the 
ORs in the RAF.  The sporting bias was very evident in the College magazines 
throughout the inter-war period with traditional sports including horse riding, hunting 
and rugby being of particular importance.188   Cranwell expected to develop an 
officer cadre in line with the other two colleges.  This was an officer class which 
would maintain the spirit and traditions of the Royal Air Force that were recently 
inherited from Britain’s Air Services in the First World War.  The idea that the 
College was on an equal with Sandhurst and Dartmouth and also the importance of 
the history of the First World War were clearly articulated to the cadets by Churchill 
in his address at the College in December 1920 by Trenchard’s message in the First 
College Magazine and by Haig’s 1921 letter to the Gentlemen-Cadets of the RAF 
Cadet College.189  Cranwell was intended to be a centre from which the RAF Spirit 
would grow.  Time has demonstrated that it did just this, although it created an inter-
war officer cadre that was surprisingly traditional in outlook. 
 
 
                                            
188 For a brief history of the Britannia Beagle Pack see ‘Full Cry: A Hound Blog’,  
https://houndwelfare.wordpress.com/tag/britannia-beagles/, accessed 7 Mar 2016 while that 
of the Sandhurst Hunt can be found at: ‘Staff College & Royal Military Academy Sandhurst 
Draghunt’,  http://www.sandhurstdraghunt.co.uk/about.html, accessed 7 Mar 2016. 
189 ‘Trenchard’s Message’.  Royal Air Force College Cadet Magazine, Vol 1 No 1 (Sept 
1920), p.5.  RAFC Cranwell Archive CRN/D/2013/37 Haig D, ‘To the Gentlemen of the RAF 
Cadet College, Cranwell’. R.A.F Cadet College Cranwell Record March 1920-July 1932.  
‘Report on the Inspection of the RAF (Cadet) College December 20th, 1920 by the Secretary 
of State For War (the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.)’, CRN/D/2013/37, R.A.F Cadet 
College Cranwell Record March 1920-July 1932.   
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated that the RAF College and the Halton 
apprentice school were two extremely powerful symbols of RAF independence and 
expressions of RAF technological pre-eminence.  Whilst they represent outer layer 
Roundel Model symbols, their effect was much deeper.  They helped to reinforce 
deeper attitudes and assumptions of independence and air-mindedness for the 
Service. That unique air-mindedness helped form part of the case for continued 
independence of the Force and was, therefore, an extremely important message to 
transmit, symbolically, to politicians, the public, the press as well as internally to 
RAF personnel.  The internal message that the institutions highlighted to the 
personnel of the RAF was that it really was standing on its own two feet and was not 
reliant on the other two services to train its people.  The informal and less formal 
processes that were clearly evident from archival evidence are particularly indicative 
of how deeply the institutions affected RAF culture.  The bands, sporting activities, 
the formation of the OBA, magazines and humour that suffused both Halton and 
Cranwell are evidence that the two new RAF institutions were succeeding in 
developing a deep and all-embracing culture and that they were indeed far more 
than symbolic edifices. 
 The processes and practices that emerged at both institutions had a deep 
effect on their respective cultures.  The formal processes of military indoctrination 
were traditional and strong, as is to be expected at any first point of entry into a 
military system, and included wearing of uniform, drill, discipline and exposure to 
formal command structures.  These resulted in development of the usual military 
values such as loyalty, leadership, respect, selflessness, integrity, determination 
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and teamwork.  In that sense, both institutions were traditional in their approach.  
For the College, traditionalism was particularly important.  The dome, columns, 
parade-square and pack of hounds of the RAF College were affirmation of a 
traditional approach for the cadets.  At the deeper cultural levels for the officer 
cadre, the college inculcated a feeling that the RAF was on a par with the other 
services; rather than being trained by and, therefore, subservient to, the other two 
services; the RAF was able to go it alone.  The College also had a defining ‘value 
added’ feature: air-mindedness.  This is what gave the RAF College a cutting edge 
over Dartmouth and Sandhurst and, indeed, would become one of the central pillars 
in the explaining why the RAF should exist as a separate service. 
 Meanwhile, the apprentice system was probably the best and most expensive 
one in the country.  It attracted a very high calibre of personnel that gave the ranks 
in the Service a higher intellectual status than the majority of those of the other two 
services.  Thus, while Halton, externally, was a symbol of RAF engineering 
excellence, at the deeper cultural levels, it embedded a belief of technological 
superiority in the organisation.  That, in turn, equated to a deep-seated sense of 
perceived superiority and pride in the RAF ranks. 
 RAF College recruiting deliberately targeted public schools in accordance 
with the contemporary belief that a public school education was the best preparation 
for the future leaders of the Service.190  This was in line with Trenchard’s thinking; 
he wanted the RAF to be considered a suitable career for the very best young men.  
Inter-war RAF officers with permanent commissions were from a very traditional 
public school background, which rendered them rather ‘stuffy’.  However, Chapters 
                                            
190 Slessor noted a disproportionately high number of RAF high commanders had come 
from Hailerbury including himself and Brooke-Popham.  Slessor, The Central Blue, p.3. 
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II and VIII highlight that the aviator identity also encouraged a carefree youthfulness.  
Thus, RAF behavioural patterns exhibited an interesting duality in which 
traditionalism was counterbalanced by an exuberant modernity combined with 
occasional youthful humour.   The extra-curricular activities, notably sport, also 
underlined that the RAF College had an emphasis which was not dissimilar to that of 
the Edwardian Army; both in terms of academic approach and the idea that sport 
helped inculcate notions of the relentless offensive in this new officer cadre.  When 
those junior pilots matured and it came to leadership and running the organisation, it 
was clear that the product of Cranwell was quite homogenous and conservative in 
outlook.  In terms of deeply held beliefs, therefore, it is not surprising that 
conservatism was a feature of the leadership at headquarters, stations, squadrons 
and in messes.  That also extended to thinking matters; the bounds of doctrinal 
thought in the inter-war period were somewhat limited by the narrowness of the 
officer cadre.  This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  It would 
take an influx of new blood during the final period of expansion and then during the 
Second World War to alter that.  The exception, of course, was the ten per-cent of 
Cranwellians who had come up through the apprentice system.  The performance of 
the ex-apprentices spoke for itself.  The selection and training they had been 
through proved to be very successful and vindicated what was a revolutionary idea 
of promoting the best from the ranks in an organised and institutional fashion.  This 
chapter proposes, therefore, that the apprentice system was revolutionary and that it 
played a role in the RAF gradually becoming an increasingly meritocratic 
organisation. 
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 Another very important cultural aspect of the Service shaped by the aviator 
identity was the fact that all officers were to be pilots in the General Duties 
Branch.191  It set in motion a very deeply held and immutable belief within the 
Service of the importance of the General Duties branch and the need for being a 
pilot in order to progress.  The inter-war College played a key role in reinforcing this 
aspect of the aviator identity.  The College syllabus underlined the importance of 
flying for those chosen to progress to the highest ranks.  It became a mantra such 
that when the new branches were eventually formed, once Trenchard had left the 
Service, there remained a deeply held belief that only pilots should be in a position 
to reach the very highest levels of the RAF.  That institutional belief remains intact in 
the RAF today. 
 A final point worth mentioning is that both institutions developed their own 
humour and language.  This was taking place across the entire RAF and will be 
discussed later.  However, the extent of this was clearly evident in the magazines 
and personal accounts at both Halton and Cranwell.  It is a clear indicator of the 
time that cadets and apprentices spent in each other’s company, the pride they had 
in their own institutions and also the depth of their cultural engagement in their 
respective organisations. 
 This chapter has demonstrated the powerful cultural effects of the both the 
RAF College and the apprentice system.  Both institutions were far more than 
symbols, they were responsible for developing deep beliefs and values both in those 
who would be selected for high command and also in those who would have a 
                                            
191 Mahoney offered a useful view on this in which he refers to the pilot ethos of the RAF.  
Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, pp.206-
210. 
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profound influence on the way engineering would develop.  These two institutions 
did, indeed, play a major role in developing an ‘Air Force spirit’ in a largely positive 
manner, although they both set the stage for some negative cultural developments. 
 
 199 
CHAPTER VII 
THE STAFF COLLEGE 
 The 1919 Memorandum established that forming an RAF Staff College was a 
priority.  ‘An Air Force Staff College must be formed as soon as possible’.1  The RN 
and the Army had their own staff colleges at Camberley and Greenwich. 
Establishing an RAF one was a logical extension in establishing independent 
institutions to express the individuality and permanence of the new Service.  The 
Staff College also offered an opportunity for the RAF to explore air power and to 
create a bespoke school of thought within the RAF.  The Staff College has been 
examined in the historiography, albeit in a limited manner, however, its impact on 
RAF culture is almost entirely unexplored. 
 Bond wrote that ‘in considering the influence the Staff College on 
commanders and chiefs-of-staff in the First World War there is little point in going 
beyond the Spring of 1915’ due to the ‘annihilation’ of the officer cadre.2  However, 
for the RFC this was not the case.  Henderson, Sykes, Brooke-Popham, Brancker, 
Musgrave and Ashmore were all Staff College graduates who survived beyond 
1915.  Pugh highlighted, that they had a deep influence on the RFC that resulted in 
‘a remarkably cohesive philosophical outlook, based in no small part on the 
influence of the Staff College experience’.3  It has been established that Sykes, in 
                                            
1 Cmd 467. ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’. 
2 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.305.  Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins Of 
The Control Of The Air’, p.90. 
3 Brooke-Popham would go on to be the first Commandant of the RAF Staff College, Sholto-
Douglas and Salmond G would become Marshals of the RAF, Musgrave was the officer in 
charge of technical experimentation in the RFC and Ashmore was in charge of London Air 
Defence Area in the First World War.  Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the 
Air’, p.88-89.  
 200 
particular, was profoundly influenced by his Staff College experience at Quetta.4  
Contrary to the majority of the narrative in the historiography, including the Staff 
College Operations Book, it was during Sykes’ tenure as CAS, rather that 
Trenchard’s, that a separate RAF Staff College was suggested.5  Mason incorrectly 
wrote of Sykes’ ‘Air Power requirements of the Empire’ that: ‘there is no mention 
anywhere of the establishment of a Staff College’. 6 However, ‘Air Power 
requirements of the Empire’ specifically referred to an RAF Staff College .7  James 
also incorrectly attributed Trenchard with the idea in The Paladins.8  It appears that 
Mahoney is the only academic in the historiography to have acknowledged Sykes as 
being the first to recommend an RAF Staff College.9  It was, however, Trenchard 
who implemented the plan.  Staff College had a valued place in the British Army, 
consequently, Trenchard, or possibly his Staff, considered it an essential institution 
for the new Service.  However, this seems at odds with the British fighting forces in 
which intellect was not widely cherished.  An examination of the Staff College 
tradition in Britain will provide useful context prior to exploring how the RAF Staff 
College grew and the impact that it had on the RAF Culture.   
                                            
4 For his views on his own Staff College experience see Sykes, From Many Angles, pp.70-
73.  Copies of his work at the Staff College in Quetta are available in RAFM Sykes Papers 
along with a letter from Capper.  RAFM Sykes Papers AC73/35/1/Vol I, ‘Letter from 
Brigadier General T Capper to Captain F Sykes, December 1909’. 
5 TNA 8/6 TNA Air 8/6 ‘Air Power requirements of the Empire’, Part III, Dec 1918, p.15.   
According to Sykes, he proposed this in June 1918, although this is not present in the 
document to which he referred in Sykes, From Many Angles, p.261.  However, an RAF Staff 
College was being openly discussed between the War Office and the Air Ministry in Dec 
1918, see RAFM Sykes AC73/35 Vol III, War Office Letter to the Air Council dated 13 
December 1918, signed by B B Cubitt.   
6 Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1972, p.2.  
7 TNA 8/6 TNA Air 8/6 ‘Air Power requirements of the Empire’, Part III, Dec 1918, p.15. 
8 James, The Paladins, p.150. 
9 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, p.216.   
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 The historiography provides significant evidence of an amateurism and anti-
intellectualism that suffused the British Army and the RN throughout the Eighteenth, 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries.10  In The Education of a Navy, Schurman 
wrote that ‘until 1867, naval history, other than a record of battles, could hardly be 
said to have existed’. 11   Mahan similarly underlined the RN’s unwillingness to 
engage with the theory of warfare compared with the French who ‘had devoted 
themselves to the careful study of their profession’ and that, referring to the RN and 
French Navy respectively in the US War of Independence, ‘the practical and the 
theoretical man were pitted against each other’.12  Bond wrote that: ‘to be sure, 
intellectuals and cultured types were rather rare in the pre-1914 British regular 
Army’.13  However, while anti-intellectualism was significant in the early Nineteenth 
Century, there was not a total void of intellectual thought concerning military 
matters.  Military thought in British Society was evident in some measure following 
the Napoleonic wars.  Randall wrote of a ‘home grown body of authors of military 
theory’ such as Sir William Napier, John Mitchell, Edward Yates and some British 
military professionals, such as Wellington, who took a deep interest in their 
                                            
10 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, pp.10-11. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in 
Air Warfare, p.91. Parton, ‘The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine: 1919 – 
1939’, p.99.  Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, p.132.  Slessor, The Central Blue, 
p.83. 
11 Schurman, The Education of a Navy, p.1. 
12 Mahan, ‘”Theoretical” versus “Practical” Training.  A Historical Instance’ in Mahan on 
Naval Warfare ed Westcott, p.9.  For a useful synopsis of British naval thinking, see Till, 
‘British naval thinking a contradiction in terms?’, pp.1-18 
13  Bond Brian, The Victorian Army and the Staff College (London: Eyre Methuen,1972), 
p.269. 
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writings. 14   Randall, noted that Napier, in particular, would heavily influence 
Mahan.15  He also demonstrated that: 
There was a (sic) wide reading and debate concerning Jomini’s Treatise of 
Grand Military Operations and, to a lesser extent, Clausewitz’s On War in 
Great Britain during the period.  Additionally, a native body of theoreticians 
existed who attempted to examine military theory in the light of the 
experiences of the Napoleonic Wars.  This demonstrates that there was a 
genuine effort to engage with contemporary military theory in Britain’.16 
 
 Although public interest and writers were present in Britain what was missing 
were the institutions for the British fighting forces to encourage intellectual thinking 
compared, for example, to France and Germany.17  The Army Staff College, for 
instance, did not form until 1858 and the RN lagged further behind.  The Naval 
College at Greenwich that opened in 1873 concentrated on scientific study until 
1902 when the War Course was established to examine broader strategy.18  It was 
not until 1912 that the Naval staff course for lieutenants, lieutenant-commanders 
and commanders was established and in 1919 the RN Staff College was finally 
established.19  The lack of an RN War Staff until 1887 and an Army General Staff 
until 1906 also caused a lack of oversight of intellectual, strategic and doctrinal 
development.20  However, the Boer War at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, 
                                            
14 Peter Randall, Changes and Obstacles in Reforming the British Army, 1815-1854, in Eds 
Locicero M, Mahoney R, Mitchell S, A Military Transformed? Adaption and Innovation in the 
British Military, 1792-1945 (Solihull: Helion, 2014), p.45.  
15 Ibid., p.44-45. 
16 Ibid. p.43. 
17 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp.8-21. 
18 Till, ‘British Naval thinking: a contradiction in terms?’ p.12-14.  Lambert ‘Education in the 
Royal Navy: 1815-1914’, pp.49-55.  The Naval War Course transferred to Portsmouth in 
1906. 
19 Staff College establishment date from Till, ‘British Naval thinking: a contradiction in 
terms?’ p.14. 
20 For establishment of the Army General Staff see Halik Kochanski, ‘Planning for Wars in 
the Final Years of the Pax Britannica, 1899-1903’, in The British General Staff. Reform and 
Innovation 1890-1939 eds David French and Brian Holden Reid (London & Portland, Or: 
Taylor Francis e-library, 2005 [Frank Cass Publishers, 2001]), pp.8-22 (Staff College date 
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combined with a strategic pivot away from the Great Game towards possible 
Continental conflict demonstrated that such a system needed to be changed.  The 
Haldane reforms and introduction of the General Staff gave the Army Staff College a 
more important role: to prepare Army officers for staff roles.21   While the anti-
intellectual tradition in the services endured, attendance at Army Staff College would 
become increasingly important for progression, particularly after the introduction of 
the policy of requiring members of the General Staff to be Staff College graduates.22  
Indeed, Robbins pointed out that Staff College was a passport to high command.23   
Furthermore, the fact that attendance was selective gave the Staff College an 
additional ‘prestige’ that helped career progression.24    For a small body of officers, 
there was a genuine interest in intellectual aspects of warfare in the Victorian and 
Edwardian Army and RN.  For instance, Capper, GFR Henderson, Wilson, 
Rawlinson and Fisher were all deep thinkers. 
 Of note, none of the higher echelons of RNAS officers had attended a staff 
course which, perhaps, explains why the RAF Staff College would resemble the 
Army colleges rather than the more technical Naval Staff College. 25   The RN 
appeared to attribute less importance to the broad intellectual education of its 
                                                                                                                                       
specifically p.21).  For Establishment of RN War Staff see Lambert ‘Education in the Royal 
Navy: 1815-1914’, p.48.  
21 For Haldane reforms see Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, pp.205-212.  See also Edward 
M Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980).  See 
also Simon Higgens, ‘How was Richard Haldane able to Reform the British Army? An 
Historical Assessment Using a Contemporary Change Management Model’, (Unpublished 
MPhil Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010). 
22 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, p.10. Higgens, ‘How was 
Richard Haldane able to Reform the British Army?’, p.37. 
23 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, p.10.  See also Pugh, ‘The 
Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p.77. 
24 Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from 
Inception to 1945, p.42. 
25 Pugh, ‘The Conceptual Origins of the Control of the Air’, p.162. 
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officers than the Army.  Pugh highlighted a ‘technologically based ethic’ thereby 
explaining Lambert’s view that ‘the work of the Royal Naval College before 1914 
was limited, dominated by technical issues and made little contribution to the 
development of naval thought’.26 
 In the Army, the Wilsonian era at Camberley and the role of the Staff College 
in supplying officers for the General Staff was important.27  According to Bond, 
Wilson was pre-eminent in emphasising the term ‘School of Thought’ at Camberley 
and highlighted that this involved ‘training of a body of staff officers imbued with 
uniform methods of work and a common approach to staff problems’. 28   This 
supported the goal of the Army Staff College to produce efficient staff officers to 
man the newly established General Staff.  Jeffrey wrote that the  ‘School of Thought’ 
established  ‘common, and constructive, habits of thinking and working throughout 
the staff’.29  Bond underlined Wilson’s ideas of developing a ‘School of Thought’ at 
the Staff College went far beyond the functional aspects of staff officer training and 
was intended to prepare officers for higher command.30  The provenance of the idea 
that Staff College should be a broadening experience is clear from GFR Henderson 
who wrote of the Army Staff College: ‘something more than the regimental 
experience was indispensable for those who provided the brains of the Army’.31  
From 1906-1910, Wilson, in particular, encouraged thinking at the Staff College that, 
somewhat controversially, involved going beyond studying within the confines of 
                                            
26 Pugh, Oil and Water, p.130.   
27 Wilson arrived as Commandant at Camberley on 1 January 1907.  The London Gazette 
No 27982, p.32,  https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/27982/page/32, accessed 26 
April 2016. 
28 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.259. 
29 Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p.69. 
30 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p.264-265. 
31 Henderson GFR, The Science of War, p.897. 
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military themes exploring political aspects pertinent to the era and preparing officer 
for their staff duties as well as for higher command further down the line.32 
The RAF Staff College 
 Documents such as the 1919 Memorandum and Aspects of Service Aviation 
indicate that Trenchard, who was not a psc graduate, was, apparently, a keen 
supporter of the Staff College and the potential for it to establish a ‘school of 
thought’ similar to the Army Staff College.33  However, on inauguration day, on 4 
April 1922, he did not make an appearance for reasons that are not clear in archival 
material and have not been adequately explained in the historiography.34  It is 
possible that the enthusiasm for the Staff College in the 1919 memorandum came 
more from his staff.  However, his enthusiasm and engagement with the first three 
Staff Courses suggest a genuine early interest in the potential for the RAF Staff 
College.   
 The College was established with an £18 000 budget for making alterations 
to the existing huts.35  The result was, in Mason’s words, a Staff College housed in 
‘scarcely elegant buildings’.36  This was not an establishment with the physical 
presence of either the RAF College or Halton.  However, having a college at least 
gave the RAF a physical location where air power could be discussed and taught as 
the dominant theme underlining both the importance of air power as well as the 
independence of the new force.  Brooke-Popham highlighted, in his inaugural 
speech, that the new RAF Staff College would be unlike the other two that 
                                            
32 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp.263-64. 
33 Trenchard, ‘Aspects of Service Aviation’, pp.10-21.   
34 RAFM MFC 76/1/21 (2 of 9), ‘Royal Air Force College Opened.  Sir Hugh Trenchard’s 
Address’, Royal Air Force Intelligence, No 57. 
35 AIR29/527 Staff College Operations Record Book under Nov 1919 entry.  
36 Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1972, p.4.   
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predominantly examined their respective service roles.  He said that ‘in ours we 
have to learn many details of the other two services as well as our own’.37  This 
recognised that, as well as having independent utility, air power was likely to play an 
integral part in all future military and naval operations.  Had there not been an 
independent RAF Staff College, it is highly likely that the discussions on air power at 
the RN and Army Staff Colleges would have continued along the lines of Joubert de 
la Férte’s experience in which he ‘had to refute arguments against a separate 
Service which were both unfair and ill-informed’.38  This was underlined by Boyle 
who referred to Wilson’s contemptuous descriptions of the RAF at Camberley.39 
 The attitude of students towards the RAF Staff College was, according to 
Mason, one of ambivalence and, perhaps, not what Trenchard had somewhat 
idealistically hoped for.  Mason quoted Air Marshal Baldwin, a first course attendee, 
as follows: 
 It would be fair to say that the majority of us approached the Course with fear 
and trepidation, viewing the possibility of being detailed for duty on the Staff 
with dismay.  We were of the age and seniority group which had acquired a 
war time antipathy to Brass Hats and Staff Tabs.40 
 
 Parton wrote that ‘the anti-intellectual bias that had always seemed to exist 
within the British military establishment had also found a place within the junior 
Service’.41  However, despite such antipathy there were some thinkers in the RAF 
who should not be overlooked such as Sykes, Brooke-Popham and Slessor.42 
                                            
37 KCLMA, Liddell Hart Brooke-Popham Papers 1_5_4, ‘Address given by Commandant, 4 
April 1922’, p.3 
38 Joubert de La Ferté, The Third Service, p.73, also Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff 
College 1922-1972, p.3.   
39 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.383.  
40 Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1972, p.12.   
41 Parton, ‘The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine:1919 – 1939’, p.99. 
42 On Brooke-Popham see Meilinger, ‘Trenchard and "Morale Bombing"’, p.263.  On Slessor 
see Meilinger, ‘The Historiography of Airpower’, p.485. 
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 Referring to course content, Biddle wrote that ‘the course was designed to 
'draw lessons from World War One to form doctrine'.43  However, that interpretation 
was too narrow.  The Notes on the Course of Study clearly laid out two broader 
aims: 
 The Course of Study at the Staff College is at present devised with two 
objects in view; firstly to train officers in staff duties whether in peace or war; 
secondly, to afford a general education which will serve as a sound 
foundation for the building up of a school of thought in the Royal Air Force.44 
 
 Brooke Popham, in his address at the RAF College opening Ceremony, laid 
down three objectives of the College: 
(a) To train officers for work on the staff not only in war but in peace. 
(b) To give future commanders some instructions in the broader  aspects 
 of war whether on sea, on land or in the air. 
(c) To found a school of thought and to assist in solving problems  
 regarding the organisation, training or employment of the Air Force.45 
 
 How these objectives were achieved is useful to the analysis of what the 
impact of the Staff College was on RAF Culture. 
 The first objective required officers to learn the skills, processes and 
practices for an officer to conduct RAF staff duties.  The first course included 
subjects entitled General Principles of Organization of the Staff, Responsibilities of 
the Staff Officer, Orders and Instructions, Service Writing and Signal Systems in the 
3 Services including codes and cyphers.  It also included Air Force Organization 
incorporating the Administrative History of the RAF and its Predecessors, The Air 
Ministry, Air Force Law and Courts Martial.46 
                                            
43 Biddle Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, p.92. 
44 AIR29/527 Staff College Operations Record Book, ‘Notes on the Course of Study: 1922’.  
Also reproduced in Annex A to Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1972, p.A-1.  
45 KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham Papers 1/5/4, ‘Commandant’s Address 4 April 
1922’, p.1.  
46 AIR29/527 Staff College Operations Record Book. ‘Notes on the Course of Study: 1922’.  
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 This functional training was very important to RAF espoused culture.  The 
RAF had only recently emerged from being run as two separate organisations and 
this aspect of the course reinforced RAF methodology for middle ranking officers 
enabling cultural structuration to take place.47  This helped them to align to, and 
reinforce, the RAF’s newly formed processes and practices.  Ellwood emphasised 
the staff training elements of the Staff College including appreciation and order 
writing and how useful they were to the staff officer following graduation.48 
 In addition to the purely functional lessons, lectures on the RAF’s short 
history also linked it to its two founder services.  This helped to reaffirm the basis 
behind, and need for, independence of the RAF by asserting that only air-minded 
RAF personnel had the expertise to deliver air power and provided them with the air 
power training necessary to substantiate that.  This all took place in an environment 
that viewed everything through an air power lens and was a part of RAF promotion 
of air-mindedness.  This is in line with Gray’s point that: 
The central thesis behind the ‘Air Force spirit’ was, and arguably still is, 
essentially that air power, in peace and war, is best commanded and 
controlled by airmen who have been specifically trained, educated and have 
acquired the necessary experience in warfare in the third dimension’.49 
 
 The course also provided practical organisational skills and understanding for 
executing elements of RAF policy and doctrine.50  The course syllabus taught the 
processes and practices that fell out of higher level doctrine and policy.  These had 
a very real effect upon the daily running of the Service and were, therefore, 
                                            
47 RAFM AIR 69/19 ‘Programme of Work 1st Course’. 
48 IWM Audio Files, Catalogue 3167, Ellwood A, Reel 3, 13:55-17:21.   See also RAFM AIR 
69/19 ‘Programme of Work 1st Course’. 
49 Gray, Air Warfare History Theory and Practice, p.46. 
50 RAFM AIR 69/19 ‘Programme of Work 1st Course’. Also, AIR29/527 ‘Notes on the Course 
of Study: 1922’.  Staff College Operations Record Book.  See also AIR 69/30 ‘Programme 
of Work – Second Course’.  AIR 69/47 ‘Notes on Fifth Course’. 
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important at staff officer level.  The policy of economy was an example of this.  It 
formed the cornerstone of how the RAF would operate throughout the interwar 
years and was included in Trenchard’s opening address to the officers of the First 
Course: 
 Many officers will pass through this College both as instructors and pupils, 
and in the future from their brains, I hope, will emanate new and brilliant ideas 
for the development of the Air and its power…I want you to have that one 
thing permanently in mind in your studies for the development of the Air.  
That way lies in economy.  I want you to think of all the possibilities of 
substitution of one form of force for another.51 
 
 Culturally, that policy would run deep, particularly at the RAF Staff College.  
As Mason noted ‘that particular plea was to haunt the college for the next 50 
years’. 52   Incorporating and examining policies such as that, substitution and 
independence into the course was an important part of indoctrinating the middle 
management and future high commanders of the RAF. 
 Brooke-Popham’s second objective was ‘to give future commanders some 
instructions in the broader aspects of war whether on sea, on land or in the air’. 53  
Gray wrote that the Staff College was designed to educate and broaden future 
senior commanders’. 54   In addition to the formal lectures, the Staff College 
reinforced the importance of joint operations and that the RAF was technical 
service. The syllabus also encouraged thinking beyond the military sphere that 
helped contextualise air power with the political and scientific developments of the 
                                            
51 RAFM MFC 76/1/21 (2 of 9), ‘Royal Air Force College Opened.  Sir Hugh Trenchard’s 
Address’, Royal Air Force Intelligence, No 57, p.2. 
52 Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1972, p.5. 
53 KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham Papers 1/5/4, ‘Commandant’s Address 4 April 
1922’, p.1.  
54 Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from 
Inception to 1945, p.43. 
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era.  The social aspects of the course, meanwhile, helped reinforce the relatively 
new norms of the young service.  All these aspects are worthy of examination. 
 James had a narrow view of the RAF Staff College. He incorrectly wrote: 
‘…the RAF Staff College trained officers mainly in the making out of Task Charts’.55  
The Staff College syllabus not only situated air power’s role in warfare but there 
were also lectures on more general scientific subjects such as: Wireless – General 
Principles, Aerial Transport Air and Medical aspects of flying, Photography as an Aid 
to Field Archaeology, The Organization for Scientific Research in Great Britain and 
Structures of the Atom. 56   Mason identified that the course involved looking more 
broadly at the world in order to understand ‘knowledge of scientific progress beyond 
the confines of aeronautics’.57  Biddle saw the Staff College as a ‘disseminating 
station for the accepted organizational view point’ rather than a forum for 
constructive thought. 58   Parton, however, wrote that the Staff College did help 
identify the lessons of the First World War and that it produced a cadre officers that 
were able to think for themselves and that the College ‘began to lead the doctrine’.59  
Certainly, the Staff College concentrated on air power thinking which was the RAF’s 
speciality.  Like the RAF College and the apprentice system, this helped propel the 
notion that the RAF was a highly technical service into the deeper layers of culture 
identified in the Roundel Model.  The Staff College was also a forum for conceptual 
development of air power and helped develop early doctrine.  However, it will be 
                                            
55 James, Paladins, p.150. 
56 RAFM TNA AIR 69/19 ‘Programmes of Work – First Course’, RAFM TNA AIR 69/30 
‘Programme of Work – Second Course’.   
57 Mason R, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1972, p.7.   
58 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, p.92  
59 Parton, ‘The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine:1919 – 1939’, p.99. p.223.  
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seen later that this was largely restricted to the first three courses.  After that, it will 
be demonstrated that Biddle’s view on the Staff College sadly prevailed. 
 The Staff College also aimed to broaden the Student’s understanding of the 
world and military theory in order to understand how the RAF and air power fitted in 
and could be optimised.  The early lectures on the First Course included 
Transportation – Shipping, Jackson’s Valley Campaign Technology, The English 
language, Labour Problems from the Trade Union Point of View.60  Similarly, the 
Second Course clearly demonstrated a broad view was advocated with lectures 
including: British Foreign Policy, Islam, General strategy 1914-1918, Labour 
Problems and Economics.  Visits to units of the other Services were also arranged.  
 A library list is not available in the archives, however, Brooke-Popham loaned 
the College a very large selection of books from his personal library that provides an 
insight into the breadth of some of the reading material that was available in the 
college.61  Corbett, Ludendorff, Tirpitz, Churchill, Hindenburg, Clausewitz, Fuller, 
Liddell Hart, Corbett, Mahan, Wilkinson (Brain of an Army), Childers, Bismark, Lee, 
GFR Henderson and von Schellendorf were amongst the selection covering a wide 
variety of topics of both military and wider interest.62  Additionally, Fuller lectured at 
the RAF Staff College.63  Spaight was also an influence at the RAF Staff College as 
he was for Trenchard and the RAF more broadly.64  In the preface to the second 
edition of Air Power and War Rights, for instance, Spaight highlighted the honour of 
                                            
60 RAFM TNA AIR 69/19 ‘Programmes of Work – First Course’. 
61 AIR 69/46 Letter from Veesey to Brooke-Popham dated 20 March 1926. 
62 AIR 69/46 List of Books Left in the Directing Staff Room RAF Staff College by AVM 
Brooke-Popham, 30 March 1926. 
63 Fuller lectured at the College on Control of the Air, see AIR 69/50 and AIR 69/57.  The 
earliest lecture in the archive was in week 13 of the first term of the second course on 26 
July 1923, TNA AIR 69/30 ‘Programmes of Work – Second Course’. 
64 Spaight’s influence was previously referenced in Chapter V. 
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having his book recommended as RAF Staff College material.65  Of note, contrary to 
popular belief, it is highly unlikely that Douhet had an influence on the early years of 
the RAF Staff College; Higham conducted an extensive search and could find ‘no 
evidence of Douhet’s works in Britain until the mid to late 1930’s.66 
 The 1919 Memorandum, Trenchard’s address to the RAF College on its 
opening day and Brooke-Popham’s address all underlined that the RAF Leadership 
and the Commandant of the College all supported the need for joint operations.67 
 We must put aside from our minds any idea that we are omnipotent and that 
we, and we alone, are the people that cannot be argued with.  For practical 
purposes of the defence of the Empire the three Services are really one 
Service, and all of you must realise that whatever happens, whatever 
discussions arise, it is all three that will defend this Empire.68 
 
 In terms of course content, joint activity was well represented and is further 
evidence that the College succeeded in broadening students’ minds.  Modules 
covering Naval and Army Organisation were taught alongside those of the RAF.69  
The Supply and Lines of Communication module involved understanding ‘the 
relative strategic value of L of C [Lines of Communication] to the 3 Services’.70  The 
Transportation module examined railways, shipping and the Army transport systems 
in the First World War.  Modules were devoted to The Nature of War, Naval 
Strategy, Naval Tactics, Land Strategy, and Land Tactics demonstrating a clear 
                                            
65 Gray, The RAF Bomber Command Offensive from Inception to 1945, p.55.  Parton also 
provided useful detail on Spaight and the influence he had on the legal position with respect 
to strategic bombing.  Parton, ‘The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine: 1919 
– 1939’, pp.141-145.  See also Gray, Air Warfare.  History, Theory and Practice, p.22. 
66 For Douhet, see Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, p.257. 
67 RAFM MFC 76/1/21 (2 of 9), ‘Royal Air Force College Opened.  Sir Hugh Trenchard’s 
Address’, Royal Air Force Intelligence, No 57.  Liddell Hart Archives, BrookePopham 1/5-7, 
‘Commandant’s Address 4 April 1922’. 
68 Ibid. 
69 RAFM AIR 69/19 ‘Programme of Work 1st Course’.  AIR29/527 Staff College Operations 
Record Book, ‘Notes on the Course of Study: 1922’. See also See Also AIR 69/30 
‘Programme of Work – Second Course’.  AIR 69/47 ‘Notes on Fifth Course’. 
70 AIR29/527 Staff College Operations Record Book, ‘Notes on the Course of Study: 1922’.   
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intent to teach broadly.71  Technical developments in the other services were also 
considered such as radiotelephony.72  It should also be remembered that significant 
numbers of RAF personnel at the time were involved in both RN and Army co-
operation and the syllabus taught at Andover reflected that. 73  The output of course 
essays in AP 956 is also testament to the RAF Staff College not concentrating 
exclusively on RAF independent strategic capabilities. Of ten essays published from 
the First Course, only one specifically examined independent operations.74 
 The Staff College also encouraged development beyond the formally 
structured lectures, discussions, appreciations and exercises.  Much like the RAF 
College and the apprentice system, social activities and sport were very important to 
Staff College life. 75   This was extremely important to the development of RAF 
culture, particularly in its early stages.  It was here at Andover that many of these 
officers who had completed their early training with either the RN or the Army, were 
brought together and formally indoctrinated into an RAF way of thinking for the first 
time.  The, social norms encouraged at the College would be important as the 
officers returned to the wider RAF.  Given the higher rank of the officers, the social 
                                            
71 Ibid. 
72 RAFM TNA AIR 69/19 ‘Programmes of Work – First Course’.  TNA AIR 69/30 
‘Programmes of Work – Second Course’. 
73 The figures from the Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence on National and 
Imperial Defence shows that the RAF, even after the Geddes cuts, in 1924 was operating 
13 flights of aircraft embarked on carriers, 1 flight of Naval co-operation flying boats, 2 
squadrons of UK based Army co-operation squadrons and 2 reserve squadrons that had a 
co-operation role Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence on National and Imperial 
Defence, HMSO, 1924, reproduced in Air Power Review Special Edition (Spring 2013), 
pp.308-309.   
74 Although this could have been due to many factors such as the academic quality of the 
essays Air Publication 956, A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of Officers 
Attending the First Course at The Royal Air Force Staff College, 1922-1923 (Air Ministry, 
1923), JSCSC Library, Shrivenham. 
75 KCLMA Liddell Hart Brooke-Popham Papers 1/5/4 highlighted the importance of sport, 
particularly horse-riding and hunting.  Staff College Joining Instructions for 1939 in AIR 
69/291 included the sporting facilities available as Squash Cricket, Hockey, Football, Tennis 
and Golfing facilities available at Andover in 1939. 
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structure at the Staff College was more relaxed than at the other two RAF 
institutions of initial indoctrination; this is clear from the humour exhibited in The 
Dodo and in The Hawk. 76   Nevertheless, Brooke-Popham saw it as the Staff 
College’s role to set high standards for the wider RAF to follow: 
 There is so much we can do by way of example…show officers how to 
economise on weekends, cocktails, port and cigarettes, and so save money, 
not to invest, not to buy a motor cycle, but to keep a horse.  I hope I shall not 
be accused of harping too much on the question of horses.  I know there are 
good men who don’t hunt and bad men who do, but I am certain that every 
man is improved by hunting or even by keeping a horse and riding it.77 
 
 Mason wrote that, Brooke-Popham’s ‘social and military attitude’ was ‘firmly 
rooted in the 19th century’.78  English, meanwhile wrote that: 
 As a graduate of the Army Staff College at Camberley, Brooke-Popham 
wanted Andover to take on some of the same traditions and gentlemanly 
pastimes as its sister college, such as riding, hunting, and a dinner club.  He 
also encouraged the 'Public School Spirit', levelling, and teamwork that were 
fostered at Camberley.79 
 
 Consequently, despite being tasked with cogitating on the employment of 
cutting edge aerial technology, the RAF Staff College was set up along very 
traditional lines. Brooke-Popham’s inaugural speech reflected of how important 
class was to British society and the type of man who was considered worthy officer 
material.80   In order to earn the RAF respectability within the services, the pressure 
was on to make the Staff College as similar as possible to the RN and Army Staff 
                                            
76 The Dodo was the first unofficial Staff College magazine that was replaced by the official 
Hawk.  These are held at JSASC Library, Shrivenham.  Despite the humour, it is clear that a 
Directing Staff/Student divide existed, a feature that continues in the modern Staff College.  
This appears to have been good-humoured.  
77 KCLMA Liddell Hart Brooke-Popham Papers 1/5/4 ‘Commandant’s Address, 4 April 
1922’, p.4. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, p.92. 
78 Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1972, p.6.   
79 English ‘The RAF Staff College’, p.410. 
80 Kirke’s cultural stripe theory expands on external influence of culture on a military 
organisation, Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine, p.190. For comments on the importance of 
class within the British Army see Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-
18, pp.14-16.  See also Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army, pp.8-12. 
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Colleges.  But at the same time, Brooke-Popham did go some way towards 
breaking the mould.  
 Sheffield pointed out that ‘modern scholarship has confirmed the essential 
accuracy of J.F.C. Fuller’s view that the pre-war Regular Army was ‘recruited from 
the bottom of society’ but ‘led from the top’.81   Wilkinson used supporting arguments 
by Cannadine and Rubenstein to demonstrate that the officer cadres of in Britain’s 
armed forces underwent a gradual reduction in the representation of the landed 
gentry and aristocracy between the end of the Nineteenth Century and the 
beginning of the Second World War.82   She noted that: 
 Prior to World War I 50% of the officers in the army were drawn from the 
landed classes.  However, throughout and after the war, there was a marked 
shortage of young men from the landed gentry and as a result, it was the new 
elites coming out of the public school system, made up of both landed and 
bourgeois families that became the new dominant social group within the 
army.83 
 
 Clearly, changes occurred during the First World War when the pressures of 
mass conscription had resulted in a much wider range of classes being given officer 
status.84  Sheffield wrote that ‘an officer’s leadership skills, competence, paternalism 
and courage determined his relations with his men, not his social class’.85  However, 
snobbery remained strong among the regular Army; Robbins highlighted significant 
frictions that emerged from members of the regular Army looking down upon their 
                                            
81 Sheffield, Command and Morale, p.176. 
82 Wilkinson, ‘The Territorial Air Force 1925-1957, p.20.  David Cannadine, Aspects of 
Aristocracy, Grandeur and decline in Modern Britain, (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1994), p.189.  W D Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture and Decline in Britain, 
1750-1990, (London: Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2003 [London: Routledge,1993]), 
pp.102-139. 
83 Wilkinson, ‘The Territorial Air Force 1925-1957, p.20. 
84 Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine, p.182.   
85 Sheffield, Command and Morale, p182. 
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civilian colleagues, highlighting a ‘professional exclusiveness’ of the old Army.86  
 Following the First World War, the RAF Cranwell Character Book indicates 
that there was a reversion to recruit the officer cadre from a ‘narrow band of schools’ 
similar to that which existed in the Army before the war.87  However, an aspect that 
remains largely un-explored in the historiography, with respect to the RAF, is that 
the employment of temporary officers in the First World War had, nevertheless, 
broken some paradigms as Sheffield pointed out.  Despite Brooke-Popham’s 
traditionalism, he recognised that the First World War was a watershed in terms of 
the understanding of morale and spirit.  His teachings heralded a small but 
significant shift that undermined the idea that patriotism and idealism were not just 
the prerogative of the officer classes.  He noted that little real study had gone into 
morale but he established that ‘we must, therefore, investigate the subject 
ourselves’.88  It was not just Trenchard, then, who was promoting early shoots of 
meritocracy.  However, Brook-Popham’s teaching on morale should not be over-
emphasised as transformational.  This represented only a small change in mind-set.  
The majority of his other teaching and speeches continued to indicate he was of a 
very traditional mould, except, of course, his attitudes towards aviation itself and that 
to die would be ‘an awfully big adventure’.89 
 In his inaugural speech, Brooke-Popham highlighted an RAF insecurity: 
                                            
86 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, pp.14-17. 
87 The RAFC Character Book reflects the narrow band of schools referred to by Robbins.  
See also Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18, p.11. 
88 AIR 69/23 Morale.  ‘Some Notes on Morale by Air Commodore Brooke Popham’.  
January, September and December 1923. p2.  See also AIR 69/35 ‘Morale 3rd Course’. 
89 See Chapter II. 
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This reputation for being social failures still clings to us (the RAF) to some 
extent and is hard to kill but it is up to us to hasten its death and to ensure its 
speedy burial.90 
 
  It has already been seen that Trenchard had similar concerns.  That 
insecurity was doubtless compounded by the constant state of siege under which 
the RAF existed in the interwar period.91  And it was not just at senior levels that this 
instability was felt.  When questioned about whether he felt that the RAF was under 
threat, Ellwood, a front line pilot at that time, replied: ‘Yes I think we were all 
conscious of it’. 92  Joubert de la Ferté also expressed a sense of embattlement and 
its effect upon morale and recruitment.93  Ferris also commented on insecurity as a 
trait in the RAF: ‘RAF officers, coming from a socially insecure service, emphasized 
personal behaviour, sportsman-like behaviour and natty grooming’.94  In addition to 
breadth of teaching and being the exemplar for RAF officer standards, Brooke-
Popham hoped, in his final address to the First Course, that the Staff College had 
helped to provide continuity and tradition to the new Service: 
 …and I should like people to regard this place to some extent as a home in 
the same way Army officers regard Camberley.  We lack stability in the Air 
Force, that's not to be wondered at when one thinks of squadrons disbanded 
to-day in India, re- formed tomorrow at Gosport, and split up next week into 
autonomous flights. But here we have something more lasting more 
continuous and it might well become a temple for the traditions of our 
service.95 
 
                                            
90 KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham Papers 1/5/4,. ‘Commandant’s Address 4 April 
1922’, p.4.  
91 This is clear from files in TNA AIR 8/42 CAS Archives,  
92 IWM Audio files, Catalogue 3167, Ellwood 13:38-14:03. 
93 Joubert de la Ferté, The Third Service, pp.72-81. 
94 John Ferris, ‘Student and Master: Airpower and The Fall of Singapore, 1920-1941’ in 
Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited, eds Farrell B and Hunter S, (Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 2002), pp.94-121.  
95 KCLMA Liddell Hart, BrookePopham 1/5/7, ‘Final Address 29 March 1923’, p.7   
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 He also said that he had been most anxious to ‘see to the right spirit develop 
in the College and thanked the course for their contribution to that.96  The Hawk 
demonstrated that the RAF College was certainly contributing to that spirit in a way 
that would not have been possible had RAF officers been trained by the other 
services.  It showed what students and Directing Staff were writing but also provided 
a window on the more informal contemporary attitudes and humour of the students 
and staff.  The Hawk evolved from a publication called The Dodo, an unofficially 
endorsed publication that was written by the fifth course on 1 July 1927 at Andover.  
The following year, it was decided to start a more formally endorsed publication that 
would be read beyond the Staff College.  The editorial began as follows:  
 The Hawk opens its first page with a word in memory of The Dodo, the very 
entertaining magazine produced as a memento of the Fifth Course.  The 
Dodo stands on record as the very first of its kind at Andover, and The Hawk 
feels a twinge of regret at replacing so gallant a pioneer. 
 
It was felt, however, that a magazine could be produced that would be of 
interest to others besides the thirty or so officers on the course.  Quite apart 
from records of domestic interest, there is a fund of material written during the 
course that would make interesting reading.  The principle on which The 
Hawk has been published therefore, is that its contents shall consist, for the 
most part, of work produced in the ordinary run of duty at the Staff College’.97 
 
 The Hawk is an important publication for the modern researcher as Mahoney 
identified: 
 As well as being a useful indicator about how the RAF thought about its role, 
The Hawk also included some very helpful personal reminisces about life at 
the Staff Colleges.98 
 
 The contents of the first issue included serious articles that broached air 
power issues, for example, Volume 1 included articles on topics such as Aircraft in 
                                            
96Ibid. 
97 JSCSC Library, ‘Editorial’, The Hawk, Vol 1, No1, (Christmas 1928), p.3.   
98 Mahoney Ross, ‘Useful sayings for the D.S.’, 18 Feb 2016, Air Power History 
https://thoughtsonmilitaryhistory.wordpress.com/2016/02/18/useful-sayings-for-the-d-s/, 
accessed 22 April 2016. 
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Army Exercises, A Hill Station in Iraq, The South African Air Force, The University 
Air Squadrons, Night Flying, H.M.S. Furious with the Grand Fleet 1918, Seaplane 
Patrols in the Channel, 1916-1918.  As well as items of interest to those on the 
course such as Sport during the Course, The Staff College Emblem and The Staff 
College Dinner Club, the first issue also included some humour such as in an article 
entitled “Discussions after the Lecture”.99 
 Trenchard’s interest in the Staff College Magazine and its output was 
expressed in the first edition: 
Dear Commandant, 
I understand you are about to publish a Royal Air Force Staff College Journal.  
I hope this Journal will fulfil a wide felt want in the Royal Air Force, and that 
all ranks will find it matter that will be both interesting and useful to them.  I 
myself shall read it with the greatest interest. 
Yours sincerely H.M. TRENCHARD.100 
 
 Thus, The Hawk was far more than an internal publication.  It was an artefact 
through which developing air power ideas as well as the cultural values and beliefs 
of future leaders were made available to the wider RAF.  The magazine helped 
reinforce RAF independence, co-operation with the other services as well as 
independent strategic action.101  The magazines also showed a playful side of the 
RAF; that it was an organisation infused with humour and also that the RAF had its 
own fast emerging language.  Thus, the RAF Staff College certainly succeeded in 
delivering the breadth of training, in the classroom and socially, that Brooke-
Popham hoped for. 
                                            
99 JSCSC Library, ‘Editorial’, The Hawk (Vol 1, No1, Christmas 1928), Contents page. 
100 Ibid. p.4. This strengthens the argument that Trenchard’s interest was genuine, although 
even this was likely written by a staff officer.  
101 Independence when referring to the RAF is sometimes interpreted to mean independent 
strategic force.  Here this means simply RAF separateness i.e. independence from the 
other two services.   
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 Brooke-Popham’s third objective was ‘to found a school of thought and to 
assist in solving problems regarding the organization, training or employment of the 
Air Force’.102  Trenchard and Brooke-Popham’s opening speeches have caused 
some confusion in the historiography of the RAF Staff College regarding what they 
set out to achieve.  In 1996, Meilinger wrote that ‘the role of the Staff College in 
doctrine formulation and education has not been adequately examined’ citing only 
English and Mason as subject matter experts. 103   Mahoney wrote that the 
intellectual innovation of the RAF Staff College, particularly with respect to doctrine, 
has been over-emphasised: 
 This doctrinal view emerged from a misinterpretation of a phrase in 
 Andover’s opening address, which described officers attending Andover as 
‘the cradle as I call it, of our brain’.  Linked to the idea of a school of thought 
for the RAF, and while an aspect of military education, this was not Andover’s 
primary purpose. This phrase had much broader pedagogical connotations, 
which linked education and leadership development by creating leaders able 
to lead the RAF.104 
 
 Mahoney was correct to highlight that the term ‘School of Thought’ referred to 
a broader set of principles than just the creation of doctrine.  Trenchard and Brooke-
Popham did indeed intend that the ‘School of Thought’ and the Staff College would 
involve intellectual exploration in order to establish well thought out air power theory, 
and to develop in line with the Wilsonian tradition that had been established at 
Camberley.  In an address at the Air Conference in 1920, Trenchard had highlighted 
the lack of an RAF Clausewitz, Hamley or Mahan to express the principles of tactics 
or strategy for the air and said ‘the need for a Royal Air Force Staff College to 
                                            
102 KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham Papers 1/5/4, ‘Commandant’s Address 4 April 
1922’, p.1.  
103 Meilinger, ‘Trenchard and "Morale Bombing"’,p.262.  See also Meilinger, ‘The 
Historiography of Airpower’, p.483. 
104 Mahoney, ‘The Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’, p.218. 
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analyse principles and create a school of thought is obvious’.105  Brooke-Popham’s 
inaugural address and his subsequent activity certainly encouraged innovation in 
the first three courses such as dissecting the newly written doctrine and passing 
conference papers to CAS.  As Parton pointed out, the Staff College led in some 
key areas of doctrinal development such as air policing and control of the air.106  
Thus the RAF Staff College was genuinely established to have a conceptual role 
regarding doctrinal development in addition to preparing the students to be good 
staff officer.107  Trenchard engaged the Staff College with the actual work of the Air 
Staff and used the output.108  It is reasonable, therefore, to think that Trenchard, or 
the staff writing his speeches, really did mean that ‘the cradle… of our brain’ would 
herald the beginning of a truly thinking and questioning organisation that would 
contribute to policy, doctrine and strategy.109   This was also backed up in his 
inaugural speech in which he referred both to the importance of staff work, but also 
introduced the idea that students would be called upon to think about much bigger 
issues.  Regarding ‘the development of the Air’ he did not want pre-judged solutions 
but asked for investigation that ‘must be carefully studied and investigated’.110 . 
                                            
105 Trenchard, ‘Aspects of Service Aviation’, The Army Quarterly, pp.10-21. 
106 Parton, ‘The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine: 1919 – 1939’, p.99. 
p.223. 
107 Rewriting the doctrine was referred to in ‘On The Royal Air Force Staff College’, The 
Aeroplane, (13 December, 1922), p.458.  See also ‘The Royal Air Force Staff College’, 
Flight (7 December 1922), p.720.  It was also referred to directly by the students of the First 
Course in their end of course play RAFM Air 69/28 ‘No 1 Staff Course – Script of End of 
Course Play, ‘Jenkins My Hat and Coat’, 28 March 1923, p.2.   
108 For example, Staff College appraisals were used by Trenchard to inform discussions 
about the balance of fighter and bomber squadrons in the RAF in 1923.  Higham, The 
Military Intellectuals in Britain, p.177. 
109 See Parton, ‘The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine: 1919 – 1939’ p.16.  
See also Trenchard, ‘Aspects of Service Aviation’, p.18. 
110 RAFM Trenchard Papers MFC 76/1/21(7 of 9) Sir Hugh Trenchard’s Address. 
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 Gray’s view was that ‘the courses were not specifically academic in nature 
and were certainly not the degree awarding institutions of recent years’.111  The 
officers on the first course were experienced, meaning that their views and the 
discussions that were taking place at the Staff College were of use to the Air Staff 
and CAS.  The essays published in AP 956, A selection of Lectures and Essays 
from the Work of Officers Attending the First Course at the Royal Air Force Staff 
College 1922-1923’ demonstrate that a broad range of air power topics were 
broached and also that the experiences from the First World War were being 
exchanged by airmen who had executed different roles.112  Culturally, this served to 
encourage common understanding between these men.  It appeared, therefore, that 
there was a genuine effort to develop intellectual thought about air power but it had 
more of a practical rather than an intellectual slant.  According to Mason, students 
held conferences on Egypt, the Official Operations Manual, Fighting in the Air, 
Attack on Ground Troops, Home Defence.113  The results of those discussions were 
taken to CAS conferences that Mason said demonstrated ‘views of the Staff College 
on fundamental issues of Air Policy were both sought and listened to’.114  However 
this did not last.  Mason noted that after only 3 courses, ‘The RAF discovered its 
own identity of form and doctrine the students would tend to become much more the 
learners and rather less the contributors’ and that the ‘Air Council does not again 
                                            
111 Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from 
Inception to 1945, p.42. 
112 Air Publication 956, ‘A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of Officers 
Attending the First Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1923. 
113 Mason R, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922-1972, p.10. 
114 Ibid., p.11. 
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seem to have sought students’ opinions on matters of fundamental air power 
doctrine’.115 
 What did continue, however, was an RAF way of thinking that would still be 
useful to the students in future staff appointments.  The College was also 
encouraging a deep sense of air-mindedness in which students were developing a 
common language regarding air power.  The value of this is extremely important, as 
they would serve in the wider RAF where the fusion of their experiences would help 
to write policy and doctrine in their roles as staff officers. 
 However, Trenchard’s obsession with reproducing RAF institutions in the 
image of those of the other services also ensured that many of the faults of those 
organisations would be reproduced.  The narrow demographic pool of public 
schooled military men imbued with the military culture of their former service 
resulted in both staff and student adopting processes and practices similar roles to 
those at the other Staff Colleges.  These included the relationship between the DS 
and the students, the general structure of the courses and also adopting terminology 
such as DS, pinks and whites.116  
 From the second course onwards examinations were introduced which, with 
time, would result in an emergence of dogmatic adherence to established doctrine 
and policy as the process involved cramming from the endorsed documents.117  
During the courses the conservatism and a formulaic approach to the course also 
resulted in increasing unquestioning adherence to the ‘pink’ by both staff and DS. 118   
                                            
115 Ibid, p.14. 
116 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914. 
117 The Staff College examinations were introduced on the second course. Mason R, The 
Royal Air Force Staff College, p.16. 
118 The ‘pink’ refers to the Directing Staff approved answer.  It was written on pink paper as 
opposed to the question which was written on white paper.  See Slessor, The Central Blue, 
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Furthermore, as students returned as DS, the views that had emerged in the early 
Staff College years were further reinforced and the officially endorsed view of 
doctrine and policies became increasingly entrenched and internalized among the 
students. 119  This is another example of Giddens’ structuration theory.  This 
internalized view was then transmitted more broadly across the RAF when the Staff 
College students progressed to staff duties in the ‘real’ RAF.   Real questioning, 
therefore, was not to prove an outcome of the Staff College beyond the first few 
courses.   
 The distribution of AP 956 and subsequent versions which had their own AP 
numbers, as well as The Hawk across the wider RAF was an intentional move to 
spread the ‘School of Thought’ beyond Andover. 120   That would serve to 
institutionalise, even further, the RAF’s ideas supporting Biddle’s claims that the 
RAF Staff College recycled ‘the accepted organization viewpoint’.121  She pointed 
out that 'internal ideologies perpetuated themselves' as the RAF Staff College 
matured and former students returned as instructors.122  Meilinger also provided a 
similar view: ‘Trenchard’s instinctive beliefs on this subject [airpower] found form in 
the official doctrine manuals of the RAF.  It was in turn taught and institutionalized in 
the Staff College’.123  In some respects, perpetuation of ideologies worked well for 
the RAF.  It helped the RAF speak with one voice, thereby ensuring that the logic 
                                                                                                                                       
p89.  The term ‘don’t fight the white’ means don’t fight the question, this is an example of 
Staff College slang. 
119 The schemes of work in AIR69 reveal that changes from year to year were few.  RAFM 
AIR 69/19 ‘Programme of Work 1st Course’.  See AIR29/527 Staff College Operations 
Record Book, ‘Notes on the Course of Study: 1922’.  See also RAFM AIR69 30 ‘Programme 
of Work – Second Course’ and RAFM AIR 69/47 ‘Notes on Fifth Course’. 
120 Air Publication 956, A Selection of Lectures and Essays. 
121 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, p.92. 
122 Ibid p.92. 
123 Meilinger, ‘Trenchard and "Morale Bombing’, p.263. 
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behind independence, for example, was ingrained in the members of the 
organisation.  It also ensured that staff work conducted in the defence of the RAF 
was coherent during the various assaults on whether the RAF should remain as a 
single service.  However, the conformity did little to encourage the emergence of the 
Clausewitz, Hamley or Mahan Trenchard desired for the RAF. 
 The major downside of this perpetuation of ideologies was that there was 
little questioning of Trenchardian thought.  When the RAF arrived in the Second 
World War, the lack of specialised navigators and suitable navigation equipment left 
the RAF poorly placed, despite the parallel doctrinal emphasis within the 
organisation on the value of strategic bombing.  Strategic effect obviously required 
the aircraft to reach the correct target and for the bombs to be aimed appropriately, 
yet that appears to have been missed, most likely due to the evolution of an 
unquestioning system that spoke with one voice, the Trenchardian voice, but failed 
to question some of the flawed logic behind it.  Ayelmore, nicely summed up the 
operator’s perspective on the poor state of navigation equipment and training, 
something that Biddle also referred to.124 
 In the years between the world wars, the RAF had not tackled the problem of 
developing a system of aircraft navigation for operations by day or night that 
could cope with the difficult European conditions.  There was the vain hope 
that bombers would be able to defend themselves on day operations with 
their power operated gun turrets, and that aircraft could adopt marine 
navigation with Dead (ded./deduced) Reckoning (DR) and sextant. This was 
a difficult task at ship speed, but it was almost impossible in an aircraft for 
such a system to provide the precise navigation required for target finding.125 
 
 Aycliffe, a serving flight lieutenant speaking at the RAF Historical Society, 
attributed the deficiencies as follows: ‘the real problem, I believe, lies with over 
                                            
124 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, p.88.  
125 George Aylmore, ‘The Good Guts, WW2 People’s War, 9 Feb 2004, 
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ambitious RAF doctrine and dogma and with Trenchard’s spirit and willpower with 
which the RAF was imbued’.126  Jefford similarly wrote that ‘had there been a sound 
foundation upon which to build, it might have coped, but, as a result of the neglect of 
the 1920s, there was not’.127  The RAF Staff College was partly responsible for 
promoting and not questioning such doctrine and dogma.  Loss of life and poor 
capability in the early stages of the Second World War were direct consequences of 
a lack of questioning in the inter-war RAF. 
 Free thought at the Staff College was further stifled by the following Air Staff 
instruction to the Staff College referred to by Parton: 
The view of the Air Staff is that it is not considered advisable for serving 
Officers to contribute articles to the public Press. Any article so written would 
have to be censored, and even after that, the views set forth might have 
exception taken to them and raise a controversy, which at the present time is 
greatly to be deprecated, and in any event, there are at present no Officers 
capable of writing a [sic] article in the first place, or to censor it when written 
in the second place. [emphasis added by Parton].128 
 
 Parton’s view of this was that ‘Trenchard’s oft-quoted desire to produce a 
Mahan of the air seems to have been at odds with the actual approach taken 
regarding publishing any thoughts in public from serving members of the Air 
Force.’129 
 Clearly, such censorship, combined with some of the rigid College processes 
and practices referred to earlier further prevented an atmosphere of genuine 
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questioning emerging.  This supports Gray’s view that ‘The consistent 
‘Trenchardian’ doctrinal themes were reinforced through the full circle in lectures not 
only to the Staff College students, but also more widely’.130 
 Mason, English, Parton and Hall came under particular criticism from 
Mahoney for overly concentrating on the RAF Staff College’s conceptual role:  
‘Distorted by a misunderstanding of its purpose, the historiography on Andover 
focuses on a narrow element of its curriculum; the development of air power 
doctrine’.131  However, their writing was more nuanced than Mahoney suggested; 
while their output might be fairly narrow in answer to their chosen area of research, 
they were all clear about the overall aims of the course acknowledging that it had a 
broad remit and syllabus that was designed to produce staff officers and not just 
doctrine.  Mason’s writing, for instance, was about the broad nature of the course 
and did not overly focus on air power doctrine in The Royal Air Force Staff College, 
1922-1972.132  English specifically examined air power doctrine, however, he was 
very clear picture about the breadth of the course and by the time he wrote ‘The 
RAF Staff College and the Evolution of British Strategic Bombing Policy, 1922-1929’ 
in The Journal of Strategic Studies, he provided a balanced and broad ranging view 
of the College that largely supported the same stance that Mahoney took regarding 
the function of the College.  Indeed, he nicely summed up the value of the Staff 
College: 
 One can say the RAF Staff College produced a 'school of thought' in a limited 
way. The RAF at last had a 'professional' staff qualification equal to the Army 
and the Navy, which helped the threatened junior service appear more 
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permanent.  From 1923 on, trained staff officers crucial to the day-to-day 
running of the Air Force were becoming available. These men were to fine 
tune and interpret the strategy that Trenchard bequeathed to the Air Force on 
his departure in 1929.  The RAF Staff College debated, in-house, the 
contentious issues of the day, including strategic bombing doctrine, but 
produced little that was influential or significant to the world outside the RAF.  
But perhaps no more should be expected. The main purpose of the Staff 
College, after all, was to form staff officers not great thinkers’.133 
 
Conclusion 
 The separate RAF Staff College provided an environment in which air power 
could be taught and discussed as the dominant theme.  This allowed future high 
commanders of the RAF to develop into specially trained, air-minded officers.   The 
middle ranking RAF officers who arrived on the first courses had all originally been 
indoctrinated into the services through either RNAS or RFC channels and came to 
the RAF with preconceptions from their previous service. Thus, while the new 
recruits and cadets were being indoctrinated into the new RAF ways at Cranwell, 
Halton and various depots and flying training units, the future high commanders also 
needed an RAF specific indoctrination.  The Staff College brought these officers 
together and was, for many, the first real period of RAF acculturation on an official 
RAF training course.  Indeed, the first course was entirely protected with no 
exchange officers from the RN, the Army or from the Dominions present to iron out 
any problems to avoid embarrassment in front of outsiders.134  The early courses 
played a particularly important role in influencing the way the middle-ranking officer 
of the new Service interpreted their organisation and was a major part in the 
structuration process for them. 
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 Some 17 years after the establishment of the RAF Staff College, Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Cyril Newall said:  'the courses were regarded as the most instructive 
and progressive of any institutions in the country'.135  Whether the Staff College 
helped bolster what Cranwell was doing in generating an 'Air Force spirit' amongst 
the officer corps is in no doubt.  It provided a broad ranging education for its officers 
that prepared them for the staff duties that they would be required to conduct RAF 
following graduation.  Through lectures, reflection, conferences, appreciations, 
exercises, sport and social interaction the Staff College reinforced RAF values and 
beliefs.  The RAF Staff College also contributed to the permanence and stability of 
the RAF in accordance with Trenchard’s 1919 Memorandum as a physical symbol 
but also, more deeply in the cultural layers, through its role in spreading the 
accepted doctrinal and policy views of the organisation.  The Staff College also 
underlined the supreme importance of independence and the need for specifically 
trained air-minded personnel to deliver air power.  The course also underlined the 
growing cultural belief that the RAF was a technical service.  It provided a broad 
ranging military education that helped prepare the students for the range of modern 
military aspects of warfare they might encounter.  This included looking at some of 
the latest advances in technology and science, which was an area of pride around 
which the RAF coalesced.  
 However, the structure, processes and practices at the RAF Staff College, 
many of which had been borrowed from Camberley and Greenwich, reinforced 
traditionalism both in terms of behaviour and intellectual freedom among the officer 
cadre. 
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 The RAF Staff College did succeed in establishing a ‘School of Thought’.  
However, after the third course, Biddle’s view that it served 'more as a 
disseminating station for the accepted organization viewpoint than it did a centre for 
critical thinking' became increasingly true.136  The limited nature of free thinking 
within the college probably came about for two reasons.  Firstly, the RAF's leaders 
were paranoid about the external threats to the Service.  Thus, questioning 
accepted RAF principles and policy was actively discouraged.  Secondly, the RAF 
inherited both the ‘anti-intellectualism’ and conservatism from its parent services.  
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the RAF actively tried to emulate many of the 
processes and practices associated with the other Staff Colleges such as the 
language used, the entrance examination process and also the methodology 
surrounding exercises and discussions.  That proved extremely useful in aligning 
views where they needed to be aligned, especially for subjects relating to the 
continued independence of the RAF and staff work processes.  However, the 
exploratory aspect of the course seemed to be stultified and the Staff College 
contributed little to the immediate development of policy and doctrine the exploration 
after the third course. 
 Thus, the Staff College proved to be more than just a symbolic artefact; it 
was an institution that reinforced many elements of RAF culture through social as 
well as professional interaction.  The Staff College ‘School of Thought’ also played 
its part in spreading beliefs, attitudes and assumptions well beyond Andover.  
Furthermore, the inter-War Staff College graduates would become the key leaders 
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during the Second World War.  However, it was not the intellectual powerhouse that 
Trenchard envisioned. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
ARTEFACTS 
 The RAF quickly acquired an array of formally endorsed artefacts such as 
buildings, ranks, uniforms, RAF, unit and squadron badges, coats of arms, flags, 
colours, an Ensign, bands, music, mascots, medals, art work and memorials.1  In 
addition to creating new artefacts, it also continued to use ones that were previously 
in use by the RNAS and the RFC: the RFC motto, the “Wings” badge, the aircraft 
roundel, RNAS style buttons and RNAS officer cap badges. 
 Vigorous debates took place about what artefacts the RAF should and could 
adopt involving the King, Cabinet, the Air Council, the Air Staff, RAF personnel and 
the other services.  This highlights the importance of artefacts to the military 
establishment.  This chapter will not provide an exhaustive list of all RAF artefacts; 
Congdon, Hering, the RAF Museum and the archives cover this most adequately 
albeit with little analysis.2  However, it will explore some of the key artefacts that 
provide meaning and help explain the emergence of the distinctive RAF culture. 
Ranks 
 RAF ranks needed to be sufficiently different to underline independence from 
the parent services yet also needed to fit in to RN and Army equivalents within the 
established military hierarchy.  The subject of naming the ranks was cause of much 
debate; it would have a cultural effect on every person transferring to the new 
service.   A balance needed to be struck between rank names that were suitably 
military, had links between the two amalgamating services and also conveyed an 
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aerial theme.  The members of the armed forces dealing with the issue felt 
compelled to reach out to learned members of society for advice.  Lieutenant-
Colonel Leetham, who had been tasked with examining the issue, contacted the 
Society of Antiquaries.  The Secretary, C R Peel, expressed that he was ‘not very 
sanguine’ and appeared unable to offer suggestions except some words of caution 
advising against using the classical names Icarus and Daedalus given that they 
were ‘the reverse of happy’. 3  He also advised against using the names of birds as 
they ‘hardly seem quite appropriate’.4   Field Marshal Lord Nicholson was also 
unable to provide Leetham with any suggestions.5  Further examination of AIR1/26 
demonstrated that consideration was given to a breadth of themes including 
classical titles and inspirations from bird life.6  The ranks Reeve and Banneret from 
the English middle ages were also proposed along with the Gaelic Ardian, Second 
Ardian and Third Ardian.7  The ranks considered in AIR1/26 are at Appendix III.   
 Despite the early work completed on rank nomenclature in 1917, it was not 
until March 1919 that the Air Council discussed the scheme to allocate new rank 
names.  The President noted the importance of renaming the ranks both to highlight 
the need for ‘preserving a separate identity for the Royal Air Force, and to giving 
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dated 20 September.  Ironically, the RNAS Station at Lee-on-Solent was named HMS 
Daedalus. 
4 Ibid. 
5 TNA AIR1/26, Letter from Field Marshal Nicholson to Lieutenant-Colonel Leetham, dated 
14 September 1917.  
6 TNA AIR 1/26.  Letter dated 12 Sept 1917 to Mr Roberts.  (Originator unknown) 
7 Reeve and Banneret were proposed for what ultimately became Wing Commander and 
Group Captain respectively.  Ardian, Second Ardian and Third Ardian were proposed for 
what would become Air Marshal, Air Vice Marshal and Air Commodore.  ‘Ard’ – Gaelic for 
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that Force separate names for the commissioned ranks which, in after years, would 
be valued as having arisen out of the war’.8 
 The Air Council determined that: ‘the ranks as far as possible should 
correspond to actual functions’ and ‘that the ranks should be approximately the 
same in the three services and that there should be no repetition’.9  The scheme 
that was chosen opted not for some of the very original rank titles but took a mixture 
of naval and army ranks and give them an aerial theme.  Hering wrote that: 
‘centuries of tradition lay behind the rank titles enjoyed by the officers and men of 
the Royal Navy and of the Army, and it was the men from these two Services who 
would form the nucleus of the new Service.  There was a natural tendency to have 
some regard for their feelings’.10 
 The decision to opt for a rank nomenclature that also implied functionality 
made sense in March 1919 when the assumption was that all officers would fly.  
However, as early as May 1919, CAS pointed out at an Air Council meeting that that 
the ranks of Pilot Officer and Flying Officer were not appropriate for officers of the 
medical and chaplain services.11  CAS was overruled and the scheme, including 
both of those ranks, was the one that was decided upon.  However, there was a 
certain lack of logic to the scheme.  Frictions continued regarding the proposed 
ranks.  The King expressed objection to using Marshal of the Air on theological 
grounds, which prompted the change to Marshal of the Royal Air Force.12  The 
Army, meanwhile, expressed discontent over the use of Marshal at all, but Army 
concerns were overruled.  By the Second World War, when new officer branches 
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had been instituted and there were significant numbers of non-flyers, the ranks bore 
little meaning to the functions that the personnel performed.  This was also true for 
the non-commissioned ranks in which a flight sergeant would not necessarily fly and 
the term airman, implying someone involved either with flying in or maintaining 
aircraft, was to be used by all junior ranks including those who had nothing to do 
with aircraft at all. From the outset, then, RAF ranks were the cause of some 
confusion.  Terraine neatly summed up the illogical nomenclature as follows: 
 Like every British institution, the third Service had its curiosities.  It liked to 
emphasize its newness, and not unnaturally lost no time in giving itself new 
titles, some sensible, others quite amazing.  We have lived now for over sixty 
years with an air force in which the “airmen” are the ones who do not fly; we 
are used to this fact, but that does not make it less odd…A “flight lieutenant is 
not the lieutenant of a flight; he is – or generally was – its commander.  A 
“squadron leader” might or might not lead – or even command – a 
squadron’.13 
 
 To the external viewer, then, this symbol of rank led to confusion when a 
flying officer in the Second World War, for example, was not a flyer.  Internally, 
however, the rank structure was quickly understood and its illogical nomenclature 
became a source of light humour and a cultural oddity of its own perhaps giving the 
RAF a sense of mystique.  Choosing ranks that were a mixture of RN and Army 
ones with an aerial theme was quite a good choice.  It provided a blend of ranks 
names that were both recognisable to the other services and bore direct 
equivalence to the existing RN and Army ones, which was important when 
conducting combined operations.  Additionally, for the members of the new Service, 
the choice of recognisable ranks rather than the more esoteric ones such as Ardian 
and Banneret probably made the transition to the new service less of a wrench than 
perhaps it might have been.  The RAF ranks were not, too far removed from the 
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well-established ones in the RN and the Army.  Additionally, the ranks, squadron 
leader and wing commander had emerged during the First World War and provided 
historical links back to the RNAS and the RFC for the new RAF personnel. 
RAF Ensign 
 The RAF Ensign is a symbol that was appropriated from the RN and was a 
regular item in the Air Council Minutes over a three-year period 14   The 
historiography suggests that it was a subject of much discussion and friction 
between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty.15  On 4 July, it was agreed that the 
Secretary of State would make a personal representation to the First Sea Lord ‘with 
a view to overcoming objections which had been made by the Admiralty to the 
adoption of the White Ensign’.16  On 16 July 1918, Paine reported to the Air Council 
that ‘Admiralty experts were getting out a design’.17  The issue of the design and 
tensions between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry continued.  One design with a 
blue cross rather than a red one was flown on an airship around Windsor Castle but 
was rejected.18  In May 1920, Prince Albert expressed concerns about the first 
proposal to adopt an ensign as it was white and looked too similar to the RN 
Ensign. 19   Various altered designs were subsequently proposed with the final 
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version comprising the Union Flag and the Roundel on a blue background.20  The 
Ensign was finally signed off in King’s Council on 24 March 1921.21  The vigour of 
the proposal and RN rebuffs are symptomatic of how dearly the RN held the Ensign 
and also demonstrate the determination of the RAF to ensure that it adorned itself 
with recognisable, and thereby traditional, symbols.  This is unsurprising given the 
very narrow backgrounds and cultural pre-dispositions of those who were in 
decision-making positions as the RAF emerged.  They wanted the RAF to conform 
to their own views of what a military should look like. 
 The final design of the RAF Ensign included a union flag that conveyed 
national allegiance.  The Roundel made the historic link to the gallantry and sacrifice 
of both the RNAS and the RFC whilst the blue background evoked the sky. 
 In addition to being based on the original RN ensign, the Ensign is generally 
flown not from a vertical flagpole but from a flag mast that resembles a Naval mast.  
There is a ‘yard’ across the vertical mast, the ensign, meanwhile is hoisted using a 
‘halliard’ to which it is attached using ‘Inglefield’ clips, named after their RN 
inventor.22  The naval theme goes further, Ardley wrote that 
 The Ensign may be flown only at such places and on such occasions as the 
Air Council may direct or permit.  The flying of the Ensign in the Service is 
regulated by certain paragraphs of K.R.s; it is flown at the Headquarters of 
the R.A.F., at all permanent R.A.F. formation head-quarters and Stations at 
home and abroad, and on certain occasions on airships (rare in these days) 
on flying boats at moorings and in sea-going craft in Air Force service.23 
 
                                            
20 See Hering, Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force, pp.14-18.  The Royal Air 
Force Ensign, http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/theroyalairforceensign.cfm accessed 17 April 
2017.  AHB Ceremonial Box, ‘No Poaching’, Article held in AHB Ceremonial Box.   
21 Sargent, The Royal Air Force, p.34. 
22 DIOT Drill and Ceremonial Handbook, 1991 Issue, p.1.3-1 and Annex A to Chapter 3. 
23 AHB Ceremonial Collection, Ardley E L, ‘On Ensigns and Standards’, Royal Air Force 
Journal (n.d.), p.31.     
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 The Ensign is a good example of how a symbol can induce deeply held 
beliefs.  A simple piece of cloth on its own has no meaning.  However, in this case, 
a piece of cloth of naval origin was treated with reverence and raised and lowered in 
accordance with an intricate ceremony with a band and guard present.24  That 
process was inherited from the ‘hoisting and lowering colours’ ceremony instituted in 
1797 by Lord St. Vincent in response to the Spithead and Nore mutinies.25   The 
historic symbolism and ritualistic tradition give this simple piece of cloth great 
meaning and clearly demonstrate how artefacts inspire deep beliefs as the Roundel 
Model shows. 26  Since its inception, RAF personnel turn to face the Ensign and pay 
respects by coming to attention and saluting at both the raising and lowering 
ceremonies that are signalled with a whistle. 27   This daily official reverence is 
testament to it being, if not the most unifying ceremonial symbol of the Royal Air 
Force, certainly the most widely displayed.28  It is also sometimes draped over 
coffins of the fallen despite the use of the Union Flag being the correct protocol. 
 
                                            
24 Ibid.  For 1918 RAF procedure see: RAFM, ‘RAF Terminology and Ceremonial’, RAF Air 
Ministry Weekly Orders, Order 641, 18 July 1918.  See also Jarrod Cotter, ed, ‘Father of the 
Royal Air Force’ in Royal Air Force Celebrating 90 Years (Souvenir Edition, Key Publishing 
Ltd, 2008) p.3.  
25 Rick Jolly, Jackspeak, Cornwall, Palamanando Publishing, 2007 [1989], pp.107-108.  
TNA Digital Archive ‘RN Slang.  Colours’, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/training-and-
people/rn-life/navy-slang/covey-crump-a-to-aye/cable-curry, accessed 21 Oct 2017. 
26 For a personal account of the ceremony see: Trenchard Museum, Emm, Tales of an 
Ancient Airman, p.17.  Hand written personal account held in the Trenchard Archive NB the 
Title is not obvious – it is most easily found under Preamble and the author’s name is at the 
back of the paper. 
27 Initially only officers saluted the Ensign, as in the RN.  However, all RAF personnel now 
salute.  AHB Ceremonial Collection, Ardley E L, ‘On Ensigns and Standards’, Royal Air 
Force Journal, p.31. For current RN procedures TNA Digital Archive ‘RN Slang.  Colours’, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/training-and-
people/rn-life/navy-slang/covey-crump-a-to-aye/cable-curry, accessed 21 Oct 2017. 
28 The author lowered the RAF Ensign at Deployed Operating Base Dakar in 2014 for the 
final time.  The emotion associated with this is deep. 
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Uniform 
 The detailed history and precise designs of the RAF uniform is a vast subject 
and the chronological detail of intricate uniform change is adequately covered in 
specialist uniform histories, the RAF Museum and by examination of the archival 
record.29  However, the cultural impact of the development of RAF uniform has not 
previously been broached in any meaningful way and will be addressed here. 
 Uniform is the most obvious cultural artefact of a military organisation.  Used 
for centuries by military and para-military organisations, they distinguish between 
combatants and have powerful unifying effects. The uniform was a particularly 
powerful force in the British military psyche at the turn of the 20th Century and is 
examined by GFR Henderson.30  The leaders who determined what the RAF would 
wear were from that era and it is of little surprise that they placed particular 
importance on how the RAF should look.   
 The etymology of uniform is Latin; ‘uni’ means single and ‘form’ meaning 
shape.31  A uniform is a powerful symbol in any organisation because members are 
required to wear it.  That practice of putting on uniform represents a daily 
submission by individuals to rules and practices of the organisation.  Nathan and 
Nicholas wrote: ‘the uniform is a symbolic statement that an individual will adhere to 
group norms and standardized roles and has mastered the essential group skills 
                                            
29 Cormack and Cormack, British Air Forces 1914-1918 (2), (Oxford: Osprey, Publishing, 
2001).  Hobart, Badges and Uniforms of the Royal Air Force.  Congdon, Behind the Hangar 
Doors.   Hering, Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force.  RAF Museum special 
collections can be viewed by arrangement.  For detailed archival record outlining the 
discussion and debate see particularly TNA Air 1/29.  
30 Henderson GFR, The British Army in The Science of War, p.387. 
31 Matthew Ortiz, ‘Deconstructing the Uniform’, Psychology Tomorrow Magazine, Issue 7 
(July 2013).  http://psychologytomorrowmagazine.com/deconstructing-the-uniform/, 
accessed Nov 7 2015.  
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and values.  Gross derelictions of duty will result, at an extreme, in discharge from 
the group and deprivation of the uniform’.32 
 Hertz underlined that a military uniform is more than a symbol and is 
responsible for deeper acculturation: ‘the common definitions of the uniform used by 
scholars reflect the attempted control and regulation of human bodies and minds 
through clothing.  This objective to gain disciplined, external control over members 
is as much a factor of military training as it is about uniforms as symbolic markers’.33 
 Kreuger’s chapter ‘Psychological Issues in Military Uniform Design’ identified 
other effects of uniform: 
Military uniforms are standardized, distinctive forms of dress that distinguish 
soldiers and sailors from civilians.  There are many psychological implications 
of military uniforms, including the importance of style, appearance and color, 
as well as insignia, decorations, and so on.  These contribute to 
togetherness, orderliness and discipline, and add to the soldiers’ sense of 
camaraderie, cohesion, and esprit de corps. Some features contribute to 
formal patriotic displays.  Other important human factors relate to practicality, 
functionality, utility, comfort, and bodily protection, which may affect soldier 
performance.34 
 
 Ortiz, meanwhile, provided a view on the psychology of uniforms and that 
they convey so much about the wearer both to him/herself and others.  He argued 
that: 
 The uniform and the schema behind it make life and social interactions 
easier, and they allow your attention to move on to something of more 
importance… Acquiescence is a requisite of the uniform.  In this 
understanding, the uniform is essentially a dress code to which you agree to 
adhere; a schema, even if it is more cognitive than deliberate.  It is 
                                            
32 Joseph Nathan and Alex Nicholas, ‘The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective’, American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 4, (Jan 1972), p.723.  
33 Carrie Hertz, ‘The Uniform: as Material, as Symbol, as Negotiated Object’, Midwestern 
Folklore.  Journal of the Hoosier Folklore Society, Special Double Issue Press, ‘Costume, 
and Bodily Adornment as Material Culture’, Indiana State University Vol 32, Nos 1/2 
(Spring/Fall 2006), pp. 46-47.  
34 G P Kreuger, ‘Psychological Issues in Military Uniform Design’, in ed E Sparkes, 
Advances in military textiles and personal equipment (Cambridge: Woodhead Publishing, 
2012), p.64. 
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understood how this schema helps us to identify who is who and what it is 
that they do.35 
 
 The military uniform also bears the symbols of rank that not only makes 
interactions and standing within the organisation straight forward, but also acts to 
reinforce the formal hierarchy of the organisation.36  
 In the early development of the RFC, the underlying importance of what a 
uniform meant and the impact of introducing one would have on the RFC was not 
lost on Sykes: 
 We were all in different kit and I was convinced that both for efficiency and 
esprit de corps a distinctive uniform was essential.  I accordingly got the War 
Office to approve a double-breasted khaki uniform and folding cap…let no-
one decry the real value of a well-thought-out uniform and well-worn uniform.  
It helps self-respect and corporate strength… The underlying thought at the 
time was partly reminiscent of the lancer plastron- the cavalry of the air – and 
partly practical utility.  It had no buttons to catch in wires or other 
contraptions, and was a valuable chest protection in the open aircraft of those 
days.  I have always held that it was a mistake that the double-breasted 
jacket was abandoned’.37 
 
 Once the RNAS separated from the RFC following Admiralty Circular Letter 
CW.13964/14, steps were taken to provide alternative RNAS uniforms, although 
they were very much less of a departure from a traditional RN uniform than the RFC 
uniform was from an Army one.38  Existing officers of the RN adopted an additional 
eagle on the sleeve.  New direct entries to the RNAS had eagles ‘replacing the 
anchors on the cap badge, button, epaulettes and sword belt’.39  In the run up to 
                                            
35 Ortiz, Deconstructing the Uniform, Psychology. 
36 Buss similarly commented on how deeply uniform regulates military behaviour.  Arnold H 
Buss, Social Behaviour and Personality, London and New York: Psychology Press, (2015), 
p.108. 
37 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.97. 
38 Admiralty Circular Letter CW.13964/14, Royal Naval Air Service – Organisation’, Roskill, 
The Naval Air ServiceI, p.156. TNA ADM 1/8349/139 ‘Organisation of the Royal Naval Air 
Service’ (NB various draft iterations of this are in the same file).   
39 TNA ADM 1/8349/139 ‘Organisation of the Royal Naval Air Service’.  See also 
ADM1/8349/139 Letter Seuter to Unknown, dated 11 June 1914.  Also, Roskill, The Naval 
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amalgamation, the Air Council considered the importance of imbuing the new force 
with spirit in Air Force Memorandum No 3 dated 18 March 1918: 
 The Air Council have the confidence that the whole of the personnel, officers 
and men, will do their duty in the new Air Force as they have done it in the 
Services from which they have come, and will be animated by the same 
spirit.40 
 
And underlined the importance of appearance: 
There is nothing that shows so much the state of order that exists in a Corps 
as smartness on the part of the personnel, good order in materiel, and the 
making and returning of proper salutes by officers and men alike.41 
 
 As the RNAS and RFC merged, uniform would prove a very important aspect 
of transition.  The transfer was a wrench as Ellwood, a proponent of a unified 
Service, highlighted: 
 I think none of us in the RNAS wanted to be amalgamated and nor, I expect 
did the RFC wish to be amalgamated.  We were accustomed to our own 
traditions and our own customs and so forth we had grown up with for the last 
couple of years…by that time we had learned that the air had a definite 
function of its own to perform apart from just supporting the Navy or the Army 
and that the obvious thing was to get together and make a do of it.42 
 
 All transferring personnel had previously been indoctrinated into their former 
respective service and the adoption of a new uniform would be the most obvious 
physical representation of being in a new Service.  For the officers, the transition 
represented not only a change but also a financial burden as they paid for their own 
                                                                                                                                       
Air Service, p.161.  Also Eric Grove, ‘Seamen or Airmen.  The Early Days of British Naval 
Flying’ in British Naval Aviation.  The First 100 Years, ed Tim Benbow, (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2011), p.24.  
40 Trenchard Museum Archive, (loose document - not accessions).  Air Force Memorandum 
No 3, dated 18 March 1918. 
41Ibid. 
42 IWM Audio files, Catalogue 3167, Ellwood 9:54-11:29.  Ellwood retired as an Air Marshal 
having been Deputy Director of Bomber Operations and AOC 18 Gp in the Second World 
War.  Air of Authority – A History of RAF Organisation’, Ellwood biography, 
http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Ellwood.htm, accessed 12 April 2017.   Transition was 
also a matter of extensive debate in the Houses of Commons.  See, for example, Transfer 
and Attaching to Air Force of Members of Naval and Military Forces, HC Deb 16 November 
1917 vol 99 cc749-778 also AHB Air Council Minutes Collection, 1918-1919. 
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uniforms.  It was imperative, therefore, that the uniform appealed to both services 
and that it would not place an unnecessary financial strain on personnel. 43 
 Cooper wrote that ‘the actual creation of the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918 
was something of a formality.  A nominal change of allegiance made little difference 
to front-line units, most of which were committed to intensive operations on the 
Western Front in the wake of the German spring offensive’.44  This was reflected 
upon by the editor of the Piloteer who noted, of the day of transition, that ‘there was 
really nothing fearfully exciting about it’.45  However, later in the same edition, the 
editor commented about how the RNAS uniform would soon change, highlighting 
the attachment that personnel feel towards uniform and also the sense of loss that 
the transition would bring.46 
What do these flocks of tailors on the Camp portend?...As I write most of us 
have got the blues – on our backs and heads.47  But before we go to Press 
the tailors will have made a change, and some well-known figures will be 
metamorphosed.  And so on, until our copies of the R.N.A.S. Piloteer and an 
odd pair of spiral puttees…will be our sole means of contact with the Navy 
that flew – and flies.48 
 
 The changes highlighted in the Piloteer should not be underestimated.  
Writing about British Army regimental mergers, Kirke wrote that: 
The loss of identity of old units could arouse bitter feelings among their 
erstwhile members, and there could be serious barriers between the soldiers 
of different unit origins in the new unit.  Such things can be ascribed to a 
forcing together of two different loyalty/identity structures.49 
                                            
43 TNA AIR 1/29 (Buff File Original AHB Ref 15/1/141/4) D18369, Weekly Order Application 
Form entitled ‘Dress’ dated 23 Nov 1918.   
44 Cooper, ‘Blueprint for Confusion’, p.440. 
45 RAF College Cranwell Archive CRN/D/2013/113 The Piloteer.  Special Souvenir Number 
(April 1918).  
46 The transition for RNAS personnel was more dramatic than for Army personnel whose 
uniform was khaki. 
47 Referring here to Navy blue. 
48 RAF College Cranwell Archive CRN/D/2013/113 The Piloteer.  Special Souvenir Number 
(April 1918).  
49 Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine, p.98. 
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 This may go a long way to explaining why personnel were, in a lot of cases, 
somewhat dilatory in adopting the new uniform; allegiances ran deep.  Furthermore, 
early changes in uniform regulations were many and somewhat vague.50 
 Initially RAF uniform was khaki in colour, and would be for the duration of the 
war, but the decision to adopt a blue uniform was promulgated in the Air Force 
Memorandum No 2 in March 1918. 51   That document highlighted that uniform 
elements came directly from the RFC and RNAS.52  For instance: 
 JACKET.  The pattern is that of the Military tunic Service Dress modified as 
 follows:- 
(a) No shoulder straps. 
(b) In lieu of Sam Browne belt a cloth belt is sewn on the back of the 
coat, which fastens in front with a bright buckle of gilt metal. 
(c) The buttons are the R.N.A.S. type, i.e., gilt metal with Bird 
surmounted by Crown.53 
 
 The removal of the Sam Browne belt and introduction of a cloth belt was, 
according to Hering, one of the ‘rare “customs” introduced by the Royal Air Force 
later to be adopted by another Service’.54  From the RNAS, the RAF inherited the 
eagle motif buttons on the tunics and the officers’ cap badge with eagle.  Initially, the 
RAF officers’ jacket also had gold rank braid similar to the RN with no curl.  
However, that was later changed to blue braid.55 
                                            
50 Jefford, Observers and Navigators and Other Non-pilots Aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and 
RAF p.106.  NB the lack of detail in TNA Air 10/172.  Uniform for the R,A.F. Memorandum 
No 2.   
51 TNA Air 10/172 ‘Uniform for the R.A.F.’, Memorandum No 2.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. p1. 
54 The Army adopted a similar cloth belt just prior to the Second World War Hering, 
Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force, p.214. 
55 Hering, Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force, p.209.  Jefford, Observers and 
Navigators and Other Non-Pilot Aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF, p.106. 
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 The transition to the wearing of the RAF uniform was not quite as smooth as 
perhaps the various memoranda and orders suggested.  Cormack noted of the 
tropical dress jacket, for instance, that: 
It is more common to see incorrect transformations than correct ones.  Many 
officers continued to wear their Sam Brownes; some changed the buttons on 
their jackets but not the rank badges; some removed their old rank badges 
but applied the new lace to the cuff not the shoulder strap.  Photographs 
indicate that the permutations were many and varied’.56 
 
 The subject of the transition to blue uniform was being discussed by the third 
Air Council meeting on 11 January 1918 and was a regular item on the Agenda 
through 1918 and 1919.57  In accordance with RAF Memorandum No 2 the blue 
uniform was authorised initially as optional mess dress for officers for the duration of 
the War. 58  However, RAF Memorandum No 2 was light on detailed regarding the 
blue uniform as its final design was still in a state of flux.59 
 In May 1918 a proposed uniform was paraded by a cadet and a non-
commissioned officer in front of the Air Council.  The latter approved the new blue 
design recommending only small alterations. 60   That design was subsequently 
approved by the King on 21 June 1918.61  A detailed description that also showed 
some of the comments regarding of the evolution of the early blue uniform for 
Officers and Men can be found in Memorandum 4668 orders which detailed officer, 
non-commissioned officer and OR uniform cuts, styles and accoutrements. 62  
                                            
56 Cormack and Cormack, British Air Forces 1914-1918 (2), p.13. 
57 AHB, Air Council Minutes, 11 Jan 1918, Item 1. 
58 TNA Air 10/172. ‘Uniform for the R,A.F.’ Memorandum No 2.   
59 Ibid.   
60 AHB, Air Council Minutes, 30 May 1918, Item 8. 
61 AHB, Air Council Minutes, 21 June 1918, Item 17. 
62 TNA AIR 1/29 (Buff File ref 15/1/141/4) Memorandum 4668, ‘R.A.F Officers Uniform’, 
Undated (also includes all ranks uniform description and differences between RAF Officer 
and Sergeant and above Jackets).  See also TNA AIR 1/29 (Buff File ref 15/1/141/4), Draft 
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 The price of blue RAF material was initially extremely high, presumably given 
war-time shortages, and the relatively recent decision to use a blue material even 
though Sir Charles Sykes, the Director of wool textile production, assured that it 
would be possible to meet the demand for the total production of necessary 
material.63  The final date for achieving a fully blue RAF was set at 1 October 1919 
to allow for the price of material to be regulated and for Khaki uniforms to be worn 
out, thereby reducing unnecessary spending by officers and easing potential 
resistance to the introduction of the new blue uniform.64 
 Although RAF Memorandum No 2 indicated a high all round collar for WOs 
and NCOs of Sergeants, only three months later, Minute 4668 removed the high 
collared jacket and introduced a shirt and tie.  Warrant Officers and NCOs the rank 
of sergeant and above thus wore the same jackets as officers with minor alterations 
to the hip pockets.65  This rapprochement with the officer corps represented a 
cultural departure from the contemporary norm for the Army and was, according to 
James, a relic ‘of the privileges of the petty officers of the RNAS’.66  This underlined 
a greater sense of equality between the senior WOs, senior NCOs and officers in a 
technical organisation such as the RN or the new RAF.  During the discussion on 
this matter, given the increased cost of the officer jacket pattern, an intriguing 
                                                                                                                                       
of Proposed Air Ministry Order ‘Officers Uniform – Blue to Replace Khaki, dated 4 July 
1918. 
63 See TNA Air 1/29 Memo: ‘R.A.F Officers Uniforms’.  Undated but immediately precedes a 
letter from Dir Quartermasters Services to the Controller Wool Textiles Production, dated 29 
June 1918 in buff folder original ref 15/1/141 (1-5).  See also letter from TNA 1/29 (Buff 
folder original AHB Ref 15/1/141/4, ‘Uniform – light blue to replace Khaki for officer R.A.F.’,  
Air Ministry Orders regarding 1918-1919), Dept of Wool Textile production to the Air Ministry 
dated 29 May 1918. 
64  See TNA Air 1/29 Buff folder original AHB Ref 15/1/141/4, ‘Uniform – light blue to replace 
Khaki for officer R.A.F.’  Air Ministry Orders regarding 1918-1919.  Air Ministry Order Form 
53, ‘Dress’, dated 18 November 1918. 
65 TNA Air 1/29 (Buff File ref 15/1/141/4) Memorandum 4668, ‘R.A.F Officers Uniform’. 
66 James, Paladins, p.182. 
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proposal was made in a minute that underlined the importance placed upon pilots 
suggesting that only WO and NCO pilots should wear the same jackets as officers.67  
The Minute that followed it highlighted, probably correctly, that ‘this would, it is 
thought, create dissatisfaction and ill-will amongst the other W.O.’s. and NCOs in 
the Service’.68  However, the collar and tie remained for all WOs and NCOs above 
the rank of Sergeant. 
 According to Brownlow, ‘tradition is inseparable from events, facts, figures 
and some imaginative folklore’.69  Howard, meanwhile, wrote that myth is ‘a creation 
of an image of the past, through careful selection and interpretation, in order to 
create or sustain certain emotions or beliefs’.70  RAF uniform contributed to some of 
that folklore.  The RAF ‘Rumour Mill’, or oral tradition, has it that the blue uniform 
was decided upon because there was a job lot of blue material, spun in British Mills 
and destined for the Tsar’s army, that was surplus to requirement in 1917 following 
the Bolshevik revolution.71  The research for this thesis has uncovered no evidence 
of this.  Indeed, the archival material points towards an entirely normal, but 
challenging, procurement process for the purchase of the blue cloth and there is no 
                                            
67 TNA AIR 1/29 Buff Folder Original File No AH 15/1/141/4, ‘Uniform – Light Blue to 
Replace Khaki for Officers R.A.F.’, Response 4 (signed by R Brunton – barely legible) to 
Minute 48457/1918.  
68 TNA AIR 1/29 Buff Folder Original File No AH 15/1/141/4, ‘Uniform – Light Blue to 
Replace Khaki for Officers R.A.F.’, Response 5 (signed by O W Latimer for A.A.Q.S dated 
11.6.18.) to Minute 48457/1918. 
69 Brownlow B, Foreword to Behind the Hangar Doors in Congdon P, Behind the Hangar 
Doors, p.5. 
70 Michael Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History’, Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution, Vol 107 No 4, (Feb 1, 1962), pp.4-10. 
71 Aside from this being common currency in the RAF Rumour Mill the only other references 
available were in Hering, who suggests this is folklore, on Wikepedia where it is an 
unreferenced assertion, and on the aviators’ rumour website where it also has no founding 
reference, http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-69713.html, accessed 25 March 2016.  
See also Congdon who refers to the early ‘Ruritanian’ blue but is unable to provide proof 
stating ‘fact or fiction? The records are unclear’, Congdon, Behind the Hangar Doors, p.29.  
This myth is presented as accepted fact in the guided tour at RAF College Cranwell. 
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indication that a convenient supply of Russian material was available.72  Thus, until 
positive proof can be found, this will remain one of the RAF myths along with the 
origin of piano burning and ghosts in control towers.   
 However, myths are important.  Howard wrote of ‘the young soldier that  
‘‘myth’ can and often does sustain him, even when he knows, with half his mind, that 
it is untrue’ and that ‘the myth does have a useful social function’.  In the case of the 
RAF, such myths helped enrich RAF mystique.73 
 Referring to the early blue uniform, Hering pointed out that the: 
  …light blue turned out to be a sky blue, and with it gold lace rings were worn 
around the cuffs of the tunic to denote rank.  The flying badge was also of 
gold embroidery.  The combination produced what Hering and Jefford 
referred to as a ‘Ruritanian’ effect’.74   
 
 This is, perhaps, why the Tsarist cavalry myth emerged.  Slessor wrote 
disparagingly that it ‘brought irresistibly to mind a vision of the gentleman who 
stands outside the cinema’.75  The sky blue was toned down in accordance with Air 
Ministry Weekly Order 1149 on 1 October 1919.76 
 Except for the adoption of an entirely new colour, the uniform was not a 
startling innovation for the Service that was at the cutting edge of technology.  
Indeed, it was a step backwards towards Edwardian dress compared to what the 
RFC had instituted.  The maternity jacket, which had been specifically designed for 
flying and working around aircraft, was removed and in its place a jacket introduced 
                                            
72 See TNA Air 1/29 Buff folder original AHB Ref 15/1/141/4, Uniform – light blue to replace 
Khaki for officer R.A.F.  Air Ministry Orders regarding 1918-1919. Air Ministry Order Form 
53 entitled Dress, dated 18 November 1918. 
73 Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History’, p 4. 
74 Hering, Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force, p.209.  Jefford, Observers and 
Navigators and Other Non-pilots Aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and RAF, p.106. 
75 Slessor, The Central Blue, p.31. 
76 Jefford, Observers and Navigators and Other Non-pilots Aircrew in the RFC, RNAS and 
RAF, p.106. 
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that was, according to James, a relic from the Boer War. 77    For pilots the 
constrictive collars, ties and buttons were ill suited for a cockpit or for maintaining 
aircraft. 78   Specialist flying clothing was first introduced in 1912 and gradually 
refined until March 1917 when the ‘Sidcot’ suit came into production following 
experiments by Flight Sub-Lieutenant Sidney Coton. 79  This was the most effective 
of the suits available and was used by aircrew well into the 1930s.80  However, as 
cockpits became enclosed and depending on temperatures, aircrew frequently wore 
their service dress under flying jackets or even under specialist flying kit despite how 
inappropriate it was. 
 For the junior ranks, the service dress was equally poorly suited to ground 
operations.  The early high collar was constricting and uncomfortable, as were 
puttees.  Local orders allowed for undress uniform to be adopted through loosening 
of the collar and the wearing of slacks.  The ensemble was not well suited to 
engineering roles which often require personnel to climb into constricted spaces and 
conduct vigorous engineering activity.  This dress continued largely unaltered until 
1936 when the airmen’s high collar was removed and all ranks began wearing open 
necked tunics with collar and tie.  Puttees were also withdrawn and trousers were 
introduced for all ranks for formal and informal wear.  The forage cap, used by the 
RFC, was also re-introduced in the 1930s. 
                                            
77 James, Paladins, p.182. 
78 Buttons can easily detach and cause restrictions to aircraft controls.   
79 IWM EQU 4015, ‘Flying Suit, 1930 Pattern ‘Sidcot’: RAF’.  See also Cormack and 
Cormack, British Air Forces 1914-1918 (2), p.37.  For a history of flying clothing in the RAF 
see also Graham Rood, ‘A Brief History of Flying Clothing’, Journal of Aeronautical History 
Paper No 2014/01 (n.d.), pp.3-54.  In particular, regarding the SidCot suit and its many 
iterations see pp.3-15. https://www.aerosociety.com/publications/jah-a-brief-history-of-flying-
clothing/, accessed 18 June 2017. 
80 Cormack and Cormack, British Air Forces 1914-1918 (2), p.37. 
 250 
 Whilst the cut and the utility of the uniform may not have been suited to flying 
or maintaining aircraft, it became a strong organisational symbol.  The blue was 
distinctive and represented the new technology of aviation that also proved popular 
in broader society.  Viles, an apprentice, rigger and air-gunner in the RAF expressed 
superficially but proudly of his uniform that ‘we were the elite with all the ladies’.81  
Francis identified deeper sentimental effects during the 1940s: 
The most beguiling emblem of the flyer’s allure was their ashy-blue uniform, 
with the Flying Badge worn above the right upper jacket pocket.  The blue 
uniforms of the RAF were a dramatic contrast with the drab brown uniform of 
the army, as resentful army officers knew only too well’.82 
 
 This is a further example of Francis’ unfamiliarity with the RAF that 
undermines his otherwise valid argument; the Flying Badge is worn above the left 
jacket pocket.  He noted that the uniform could have distinctly ‘elitist connotations’ 
but also underlined associations of ‘heroism and sexual magnetism’.83  The uniform 
even transformed the way that injured or disfigured pilots were viewed as an 
account by a double amputee, Colin Hodgkinson highlighted: 
 Air Force Blue at that time was the most famous colour in the world…I 
smoothed the wings above my left breast pocket, prinked like a mannequin 
up and down before a glass.  My God! Nothing could stop me now.  I was 
irresistible’.84 
 
 Following the Battle of Britain, the RAF came of age in the eyes of the British 
public having demonstrated the critical value of air power.  Images of fearless, 
youthful, nonchalant pilots were very compelling and with them, the uniform became 
gained iconic status.  Thus, a uniform based on a design for fighting in Africa at the 
turn of the century that was unsuitable for flying and ground operations came to 
                                            
81 IWM Audio Catalogue 4549, Viles S Interview 2:49-2:53.  See similar comment in 
Lawrence, The Mint, p.45. 
82 Francis M, The Flyer. p.23. 
83 Ibid., p.23. 
84 Ibid., pp.24-25. 
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represent the RAF’s ‘finest hour’ and became a symbol of the aviator identity.85  
However, the uniform was also ritualistically worn incorrectly; RAF personnel had a 
counter-institutional relationship with it that was not straightforward and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
Badges 
 During the inter-war period, badges were introduced to denote rank, 
achievement and belonging.  They were already of contemporary importance in the 
RN and the Army and their introduction represented an extension of and compliance 
with existing norms for the British fighting forces.  It is not intended to describe all 
badges, they are adequately covered by Hobart, Congdon, Hering and Jefford.  
However, the cultural themes of badges are important.86 
 The badges of rank in the RFC were similar to those in the wider Army, 
although stars were introduced to differentiate between flight and squadron 
commanders.  The RNAS, meanwhile, made use of existing RN rank but also used 
stars to denote flight and squadron command.  Upon amalgamation, RAF rank 
insignia was initially based on Army rank but was then converted to a system that 
broadly followed the RN rank system for the officers except the bands were blue 
and had no RN curl.87  For the ORs, the RAF ranks badges largely followed Army 
                                            
85 Winston Churchill, Speech 18 Jun 1940,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schoolradio/subjects/history/ww2clips/speeches/churchill_finest_hour, 
accessed 15 Mar 2016. 
86 Hobart, Badges and Uniforms of the Royal Air Force.  Congdon, Behind the Hangar 
Doors. Hering, Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force.  Jefford, Observers and 
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lines although Warrant Officers and Air Mechanic 1st Class had aviation related rank 
insignia, the former wore a gilded metal eagle and crown while the latter wore a red 
twin bladed propeller on a khaki patch.88  The aviation theme for all ORs was 
reinforced with a red eagle shoulder-flash on the uniform that was originally of naval 
origin.89  That would, later, become a light blue eagle on a blue background.90  The 
Eagle was an intrinsic link with the air.  However, the eagle motif became part of 
RAF folklore.  A myth evolved that the bird was an Albatross that would cause 
significant confusion, argument and humour.91  However, archival evidence is clear 
that the eagle was originally worn by the RNAS.92  The use of the Eagle was 
continued and ratified by the Air Council and was approved by the College of Arms 
on 26 January 1923 following formal Royal approval.93   
 For RAF officers, it was intended that they would all be pilots, would wear 
“Wings” and would, therefore have a visible symbol that linked them with the air. 94  
However, after the branch system was introduced in the 1930s, ground branch 
officers had no badges except the blue rank rings that have no tangible association 
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with flying.  This presented the strange situation that ground branch officers were 
the only personnel in the RAF with no obvious badge linking them to flight.  That 
they had no badges such as ‘Wings’ delineated them as not being members of the 
aircrew elite that had formed in the officer corps.  This remains the case today and 
is a point of humour and occasionally friction.  For instance, ground branch officers 
are known to use the term ‘two-winged master race’ as a politically incorrect term for 
aircrew. 
 A small number of trade badges was introduced following the formation of the 
RAF, the first being the Wireless Operator Badge authorised on 19 September 1918 
by Air Ministry Order 1066.95  This was a red fist gripping 6 red lightning flashes and 
was worn immediately below the eagle shoulder flash.  Like the Eagle, the colour 
would later become blue.  A brass Physical Training Instructor badge showing three 
arms holding Indian clubs making a circular shape was approved in 1923.96  These 
badges served both to underline the importance with which the RAF viewed those 
two trades and gave personnel a symbol that set them apart.  It is, a little perplexing 
that the obvious iniquity for the other ground trades was not addressed.  During the 
Second World War as more specialised trades were introduced, more trade badges 
were introduced such as Ground Gunner in 1940 and Bomb Disposal in 1941.97  
However, that still left many trades un-badged creating a two-tiered system in which 
some trades were recognised while others were not.  Sherbrooke-Walker, used to 
the Army regimental system, noted that RAF allegiance was not as strong as in the 
Army particularly for ground personnel.98   Had a practice been introduced in which 
                                            
95 Hobart, Badges and Uniforms of the Royal Air Force, p.76.   
96 Ibid., pp.77-78. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Sherbrooke-Walker, Khaki and Blue, p.9. 
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all trades were given a badge, it would, perhaps, have enhanced the career-long 
sense of belonging to a trade rather than the temporary sense of belonging to a 
Station. 
 The ‘Flying Badge’, more commonly known as ‘Wings’, was introduced and 
worn on the left breast following a design that Sykes claimed he and Henderson 
drew on an office blotter.99  Sykes’ design may have been inspired during his visit to 
France by the winged arm-bands, or ‘brassades’, that French aviators were wearing 
as testament that they had their ‘brevet’ or certificate.100   The French metal Wings 
badge or Macaron (Macaroon) worn on the right breast was not introduced until 
1916 supporting the RAF Museum’s claim that the RFC Wings were the first of such 
emblems in the World.101 
 The RFC ‘Wings’ were approved by the King on the 11th design presentation 
and were based upon those of a Swift.102  The location of the RFC ‘Wings’ on the 
left breast gave them particular prominence both in terms of frontal visual impact 
and also being in the area normally reserved for medals and gallantry awards.  This 
gave the Flying Badge greater currency than other badges worn on shoulders or 
                                            
99 Sykes, From Many Angles, p.97.  The AHB has a box entitled Ceremonial and Various 
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sleeves.  On transition, the RAF Wings altered slightly in shape and became those 
of an Eagle and the central letters RFC were replaced by RAF.103 
 Initially, it was intended that qualified RFC pilots would only wear the ‘Wings’ 
whilst they remained qualified as ‘efficient pilots’ whilst on active flying duty.104 
 The Air Council reserved the right to remove the Flying Badge when flying 
standards were breached giving the Flying Badge added gravitas. Hering, Wells and 
Wilson referred to, instances of Lack of Moral Fibre resulting in public degradation 
including the stripping of ‘Wings’.105  This was not official policy and Cox expressed 
some doubt over whether they actually took place or were myth.106  The research for 
this thesis found no further evidence of degradation ceremonies suggesting that if 
they did occur, they were infrequent.  Whether true or myth this further underlines 
the symbolic reverence accorded to the ‘Wings’ within the Service. 
 The presentation of a brevet was, and still is, one of the most memorable 
events in an aviator’s career.  Grinnell-Milne wrote of his pride when he received his 
‘Wings’ in 1915: 
 The squadron commander beamed, offered congratulations.  I was no more a 
fledgling, he said, I was a pilot, a member of the Corps, entitled to wear the 
badge and uniform, sic itur ad astra and so on.  But to me it meant even more 
than that.  I felt I was no longer attached to the Flying Corps; I was 
permanently devoted.107 
 
                                            
103 AHB Ceremonial Collection, Submission Letter from War Office to the King dated 24 
June 1912.  See also AIR 10/172 Air Force Memorandum No 2. 
104 AHB Ceremonial Collection, Letter from Captain Ellington, for the Director of Military 
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 Similarly, Parker wrote that gaining his ‘Wings’ on completion of the Central 
Flying School Course was the ‘most exciting step’ of his training and it was ‘a proud 
moment when this distinctive feature was attached to the left side of one’s tunic’.108 
In the Second World War, Evans, reported his feelings at his graduation parade: ‘I 
got my coveted wings, one of the six out of ten.  It was a wonderful feeling’.109  The 
Pathé footage of the public award of ‘Wings’ in Montreal attended by guest of 
honour Billy Bishop VC highlights the deeply symbolic nature that the badge had 
accumulated as well as its historical link.110  Francis, examined the significance of 
‘Wings’ in a section of The Flyer entitled ‘A Pair of Silver Wings: The Constituents of 
Flyboy Glamour’.111  In addition to referencing the RAF pilots’ attitudes of pride 
towards their ‘Wings’, he also referred to contemporary literature that recognised the 
importance of the ‘Wings’ to the pilots, but also highlighted the reverence with which 
they were viewed by wider society in novels.112   Hering, meanwhile, summed up the 
power of the Flying Badge as follows: 
 Throughout the world there can be no badge which is so highly prized and so 
much sought after than the out-stretched wings that form the basic design of 
the pilot’s badge’113 
 
 However, while the ‘Wings’ were valued as symbols, some of the processes 
and practices that emerged surrounding them underlined the importance that was 
accorded to the pilots of the RFC, RNAS and the RAF and were also the cause of 
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friction.  Mahoney’s theme of ‘pilot ethos’ was relevant to the policy regarding the 
award of ‘Wings’.  The ‘Wings’ demonstrate the pre-eminence of the pilot and 
underline how one of the strongest sub-cultures of the RAF emerged in the early 
days of the aerial services.114  Observers and other personnel who undertook duties 
in the air during the First World War were unrecognised until 1915 as this account 
by Jefford highlighted: 
…there was clearly perceived to be something ‘second class’ about being an 
observer, this perception being reinforced…by the very real constraints which 
were imposed on his advancement by the RFC’s administration’.115 
 
 In 1915 Mr Joynson-Hicks addressed the Houses of Parliament calling for 
observers to be recognised for their role, a position supported by Flight during 
Parliamentary discussions.116  Henderson had already proposed for observers to be 
recognised in a letter to GHQ BEF written on 15 June 1915, a few weeks before 
Joynson-Hicks and Flight brought this into the public sphere.117   However, on 23 
Aug 1915, Army Order 327/1915 established an observer badge with a half wing 
and an ‘O’ at its base.118  Jefford wrote that ‘the not so subtle implication of a single-
winged badge was plain enough.  An observer was simply not considered to be a 
fully-fledged aviator’.119  The badge remained in use after the First World War but 
Trenchard’s 1919 Memorandum actively underlined that the RAF was to be 
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officered only by pilots.120   Thus the numbers of observers wearing the badge 
gradually diminished.  This arose because of the undervalued view of observers in 
the RFC.  This was less prevalent in the RNAS which conducted operations over the 
sea.  That, according to Page, Goulter and Biddle, required much greater 
navigational skill.121  Furthermore, navigational expertise was treasured by of the 
Executive Branch.   
 However, navigation in the RAF during the inter-war period was a 
specialisation undertaken by pilots; the ramification of undervaluing the observer 
would be that navigation skills in the RAF were left to wither.  This resulted in the 
RAF being on the back foot when navigation skills were essential to the operational 
effectiveness of the Force in the Second World War.122  In 1934, observers were 
formally reintroduced into the RAF. 123   From 1939, new aircrew brevets were 
gradually introduced with a single wing and different letters at the base denoting 
specialisations.124  However, the controversy over the single wing badge continued.  
In 1942, despite the then CAS, Portal, proposing that all aircrew be given a two-
winged badge, the views of the five UK based AOC’s opposed the idea and the 
single winged badge for all aircrew other than pilots was continued underlining the 
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continuing pre-eminence of pilots in the RAF, thereby reinforcing the cultural silos 
that existed in the Service between RAF aircrew.125 
Decorations and Medals 
 Orders, Decorations and medals are an intrinsic part of military life.  Ribbons 
and medal are worth so little yet convey great meaning.  Simple tokens or symbols 
to the casual observer, they have deep connotations for the wearer as well as those 
around him or her within a military organisation.   Those awarded with gallantry 
awards often feel a range of deep and, sometimes, conflicting emotions including 
pride, incomprehension, feelings of having earned the award for the team, ‘I was 
only doing my job’ and even responsibility or guilt at having been singled out.  In 
1944, Churchill said: 
The object of giving medals, stars and ribbons is to give pride and pleasure to 
those who have deserved them.  At the same time a distinction is something 
which everybody does not possess.  If all have it is of less value.  There 
must, therefore, be heartburnings and disappointments on the border line.  A 
medal glitters, but it also casts a shadow.  The task of drawing up regulations 
for such awards is one which does not admit of a perfect solution.126 
 
 Frey noted how widely the giving of awards is in human cultures: 
Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations, prizes, and titles are 
ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, and not-for-
profit and profit-oriented firms.127 
 
 Medals and stories of gallantry, in particular, arouse significant public interest 
and there is a corresponding wealth of non-academic literature on the subject.128  
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Much of that genre tends to have a formulaic approach of providing a basic 
description of the awards and medals and then giving a series of accounts of the 
events leading up to the award of the medal.  However, they tend to celebrate the 
medals and awards at a superficial level concentrating on their symbolic value 
rather than digging into the deeper significance of what the awards and medals 
mean to the wearer and for the organisation more broadly. 
 While the popular literature market is well served, academic studies on 
medals and their effect on the wearer and the organisations, despite being a 
potentially rich area of multidisciplinary research, are surprisingly few.  Frey 
highlighted of award giving, in general, is an understudied area in the social 
sciences: 
Nevertheless, this kind of nonmaterial extrinsic incentive has been given little 
attention in the social sciences, including psychology.  The demand for 
awards relies on an individual’s desire for distinction, and the supply of 
awards is governed by the desire to motivate. 129 
 
 However, what does emerge from the academic literature are some themes 
that underline the importance of medals beyond simply being symbols of ‘bling’.130  
Holmes wrote that: 
Gallantry medals recognised brave deeds, rewarding those who performed 
them and encouraging others to do likewise…For all the occasional cynicism 
expressed by officers about decorations, there is no doubt that campaign 
medals and gallantry awards played their own part in the complex web of 
motivation.131 
 
 It was decided to introduce new RAF specific decorations and medals to 
bring the RAF into line with the other services, thereby reinforcing that the third 
service was to be on a par with the other two.  The decorations and medals that 
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were designed for the RAF were, in both design and name, intended to underline 
what the RAF was all about: flying or support of flying operations.  
 While other gallantry decorations such as the Victoria Cross and George 
Cross and the Distinguished Service Order were still available to be awarded to 
RAF personnel, the new decorations were intended to recognise actions conducted 
specifically in an aerial environment.  The new decorations that were introduced 
were the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) and the Distinguished Flying Medal 
(DFM) for ‘an act of valour, courage or devotion to duty performed whilst flying in 
active operations against the enemy’.132  The Air Force Cross (AFC) and the Air 
Force Medal (AFM), meanwhile, were introduced for ‘an act or acts of valour, 
courage or devotion to duty while flying, though not in active operations against the 
enemy’.133  These decorations were heavily adorned with symbols and motifs that 
represented the new aerial domain, the new Service and also portrayed the history 
of the aerial services from which the RAF had emerged.134 
 The DFC and DFM ribbons bore a distinctive purple horizontal stripe, while 
the AFC and AFM bore a red horizontal stripe.  The stripes were later altered to the 
diagonal.135  The DFC, DFM, AFC and AFM designs were all departures from the 
RN and Army equivalents and were successful in conveying the modernity of the 
new Service.   The awarding of these decorations was tightly controlled, as it was in 
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the other services, and could, predictably, be divisive.   The crew environment was 
problematic and saw pilots, in particular, more likely to receive DFCs and DFMs as 
Aylemore summed up in his personal account: 
Pilots were automatically awarded a DFC (referred to as a NAAFI gong) on 
the completion of a tour, whilst other crew members would only get an award 
for some extraordinary act or achievement’.136 
 
 While this tendency to award the pilots the gallantry decoration was largely 
done in recognition of their role as aircraft captains, it served to further underline the 
value the RAF placed on the pilot and could be a source of friction or bad feeling 
between pilots and the other aircrew specialisations.  
 In addition to services wide campaign and other medals, The RAF 
Meritorious Service Medal, for Warrant Officers, NCOs and Men, was also 
introduced in June 1918 and was intended to recognise service on the ground, 
bearing the words ‘For Meritorious Service’.137  It was replaced by the British Empire 
Medal in 1928. 
 On 1 July 1919, the RAF Long Service and Good Conduct Medal was 
introduced for the award to the ranks of Warrant Officer and below of ‘irreproachable 
character’.138  The conspiratorial humour of forces humour results in this frequently 
being referred to as ‘the undetected crime medal’.139 
 The gallantry decorations and medals, together, helped affirm both the 
independence and permanence of the new Service.  Made of metal of little value, 
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hung on colourful ribbons and identifiable at a glance to those in the know, they 
represent far more than their material worth.  They convey the deep values of the 
Service and modestly acknowledge selflessness, sacrifice, duty and loyalty.   Their 
symbolic value also extends beyond the individual upon whom they are conferred.  
The citations written for both decorations and medals were a means for the Service 
to celebrating its heroes and to allow its members to look back at those who have 
gone before as both inspiration and a yard-stick of their own performance.  This 
helped maintain values and standards across time and reinforced the values upon 
which military service relies so much.  However, they were, and are still, a source of 
friction. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined some of the key artefacts of early RAF culture.  
These easily observable features of the RAF demonstrate several features of its 
espoused culture.  Firstly, even while the First World War was raging, the RAF 
rapidly created a very extensive and complex web of artefacts. 
 Despite the novelty of this mode of warfare, artefacts reveal an underlying 
conservatism in the early RAF.  The rank nomenclature, for instance, could have 
made use of some of the more exotic proposals, however, the ones that were 
adopted were recognisable and conventional.  Apart from the new colour, the 
uniform was also very conservative.  Indeed, the removal of the specially designed 
maternity jacket could be considered a retrograde step.  Despite being unsuitable 
either for flying or engineering work the uniform came to represent the glamour and 
modernity of flying with the silver ‘Wings’ assuming great significance, particularly 
outside the Service.  The uniform represented submission to the rules of the Service 
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but also, through the various badges encapsulated both the aviator identity and the 
pride in different technical trades.   
 The artefact choices such as medals, awards and badges underline the 
desire by the nascent Service both to adopt the historical narrative of the RFC and 
RNAS and to celebrate the history of the new Service as it emerged. 
 Certain artefacts that have been examined reveal some of the sub-cultures 
and frictions that emerged very early in the development of the Service.  For 
instance, the ‘Wings’, which evoked so much pride in the pilots they were awarded 
to, also underlined the different cultural silos that existed and served to marginalise 
the aircrew with a single wing or those who had no badges of belonging.  The single 
‘Wing’ issue delineated a divide between the different aircrew specialisations and 
underlined the special position of pilots within the Service as did the perceived 
process of awarding decorations in which pilots appeared to be favoured over other 
aircrew. 
 Analysis of the artefacts in this chapter has provided a valuable insight into 
attempts to ease the traumatic transition process for the amalgamating personnel.  
For instance, significant thought was invested in the design of the new uniform and 
the result was a fairly equitable amalgamation of RNAS and RFC features.  
Nevertheless, the transition was still a wrench and trench coats and vestiges of old 
uniform were retained by personnel for as long as they could get away with it. 
 The development of symbols and artefacts, while conservative, was 
extensive and complex.  The historical record demonstrates that the Air Council and 
the Service invested great thought in producing an organisation that looked and felt 
like a fighting force.  The uniform looked the part and the rank structure was both 
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recognisable, if not wholly logical, and fitted in with those of the other Services.  The 
RAF quickly accumulated similar symbols and artefacts to the other two services 
such as the RAF Ensign, as well as Colours and Standards.  With time and as the 
RAF proved both itself and air power, particularly during the Second World War, 
these artefacts began to exercise increasingly deep sentiment both within and 
outside the Service.  This chapter has demonstrated the power that pieces of 
material, ribbons and small pieces of metal can have when incorporated into a web 
of complex processes and practices that are steeped in history.  This bears out the 
important feature of the Roundel Model that highlights the dynamic interaction 
between the concentric rings.  Thus, easily observable artefacts, when influenced by 
the processes and practices of the second ring cause deeper cultural beliefs and 
allegiances to emerge. 
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CHAPTER IX 
TRADITIONS, CUSTOMS AND RITUALS OF THE RAF 
 Traditions, customs and rituals have been an obvious manifestation of 
military culture for centuries.  Their central importance to fighting forces transcends 
political, religious and ideological beliefs.   They have been common to the fighting 
forces of monarchies, democracies, oligarchies as well as armies of the people and 
non-state fighting and even mercenary forces such as the Swiss Guard.  Deal and 
Kennedy, Brown and Brooks all underlined the importance of traditions, customs 
and ritual in organisations.1   Deal and Kennedy wrote that ‘without expressive 
events, any culture will die’.2  Brooks wrote that ‘rituals help give the culture its 
identity; they reinforce the ‘way things are done around here’ and indicate what is 
important and valued by employees’.3  Brown wrote: ‘rather like stories and myths, 
ritualised behaviour is important not just for the messages it communicates to 
individuals who participate in the culture but also for the power it exercises over 
them’.4  These academics all highlighted the importance of tradition, custom and 
ritual, however, during the research for this thesis, it became clear that these areas 
of culture were relatively superficial in the civilian organisations they referred to, 
compared to those in the military environment.  Kier underlined the importance of 
ceremony and ritual to organisations such as the military.5  She emphasised the 
exclusive nature of a ‘total institution’, however, interestingly, she did not underline 
                                            
1 Terry Deal and Allan Kennedy, Corporate Cultures.  The Rites and Rituals of Corporate 
Life (New York: Basic Books, 2000 [1982]), pp.59 and pp.14-15.  Brooks I, Organisational 
Behaviour. (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd, 2009 [1999]), 
p.268.  Brown A, Organisational Culture, p.13.  These academics referred to tradition, 
custom and ritual in subtly different ways. 
2 Deal and Kennedy, Corporate Cultures, p.63.   
3 Brooks, Organisational Behaviour, p.268. 
4 Brown, Organisational Culture, p.21. 
5 Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine’, p.69.  
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the fundamental reason for the importance of these elements of culture.   Military 
organisations need to develop a very deep sense of belonging and selflessness for 
the simple reason that the organisation may require an individual to sacrifice his or 
her life for the greater good of the team, unit, or nation.  With such high stakes, 
military organisations need to ensure that belonging and selflessness are 
unquestioning and, if the organisation is to be successful, these beliefs should be 
the deep structures as depicted in the Roundel Model.  Tradition, ritual and custom 
play an important role in this.6    
 In his article ‘Defining Military Culture’, Wilson also emphasised the deeper 
importance of tradition, custom and ritual in a military context.7  He highlighted the 
importance of official and unofficial rituals to military organisations noting that: ‘all 
institutions depend on the interaction of their members who are guided by informal 
customs and procedures as well as explicit written norms’.8   He also identified that 
military organisations are very different to civilian counterparts as their primary 
mission is to ‘take life and destroy property’.  However, he also did not address how 
military organisations succeed in conditioning individuals to become indoctrinated to 
a point that they are prepared to die for a cause.  Wong et al examined the 
motivation for soldiers to fight and wrote that: ‘social cohesion remains a key 
component of combat motivation’.9  Tradition, ritual and ceremony play a significant 
role in cementing this.  Wilson and Kier’s views pointed towards the deep 
                                            
6 In civilian or para-military organisations such as police, fire services, lifeboat and coast 
guard services, tradition, ritual and custom are similarly important.   
7 Peter H Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, The Journal of Military History, Volume 72, 
Number 1 (January 2008), pp.11-41. 
8 Ibid. p.15. 
9 Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen et al, ‘Why They Fight: Combat 
Motivation in the Iraq War’ (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Paper, July 2003), 
p.13. 
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importance of tradition, ritual and ceremony.  Kirke’s approach provided a broader 
view of the importance of tradition, ritual and custom and incorporates deep 
understanding formal and informal rules regarding how military organisations work.  
He melded business school theory with anthropology which, combined with his 
military experience, provided useful analysis of British Army organisational culture 
and its importance at the individual level.10  However, material examining such 
aspects of air force cultures is scarce.  Lee, Wells and Mahoney are the only 
academics to have addressed this in any meaningful sense and their work is 
limited.11   This chapter sets out to address this lack of material and to examine the 
importance of tradition, custom and ritual to the culture of the RAF.   
 It will be demonstrated, that informal mechanisms, in particular, played a 
significant role in the establishment of a new and distinctive RAF culture-in-action.  
The aviator identity and technical mind-set were significant influences on how those 
informal mechanisms emerged. 
Formal Rituals, Traditions and Customs 
 It is evident that the RAF sought rapidly to establish legitimacy by 
establishing or borrowing tradition, ritual and ceremony. 12   Sykes’ original 
organisational influence of the RFC played a particularly strong part in this.  Many 
aspects of the formal RAF tradition, ritual and ceremony reflected those that had 
                                            
10 Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine, particularly chapters 3, 4 and 9. 
11 Lee, ‘Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos’, Wells, ‘Tribal Warfare’.  Mahoney, ‘The 
Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’. 
12 Cmd. 467, ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’. 
RAFM MFC 76/1/98, ‘Independent Force Dinner’, 1919, p.7.  RAFM MFC 76/1/98 ‘Airship 
Officers’ Dinner’, p.3 and p.5.  Brooke-Popham wrote that the RAF borrowed or modified its 
traditions from the RN and the Army.  KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham 9/6/35, Brooke-
Popham, ‘Notes on the Traditions of the Royal Air Force’, ATCP No 55. 
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emerged in the RFC.13  As previously identified, the adoption of processes and 
practices was weighted towards the Army due both to the weight of numbers of RFC 
personnel in the RAF as well as the fact that Henderson, Sykes and Trenchard were 
the key decision makers in the formation of the RAF.  Nevertheless, some traditions, 
such as the raising and lowering of the RAF Ensign, use of port and starboard whilst 
flying, the RN concept of a Station Officer of the Watch, semaphore and log keeping 
were clearly of direct RN origin.14  The Odd Hint to the RAF, written in the early days 
of the existence of the RAF, provided a valuable insight into some of the customs of 
the Service from 1918.15  Congdon and Hering, meanwhile, both provided excellent 
accounts of the formal traditions, rituals and ceremonies that emerged in the RAF 
between the wars, they need not, therefore, be discussed in great detail here, 
however, the result of adopting such conservative tradition, ritual and custom is 
worthy of analysis.  King’s Regulations, Air Ministry Weekly Orders as well as lower 
formation orders provided an insight into the officially sanctioned traditions, customs 
and rituals that formed the espoused culture of the RAF.16  At the time of the 
emergence of the RAF, Britain had enjoyed a significant period of global hegemony 
                                            
13 ‘Wing Commander’, The Odd Hint to the R.A.F.   Hering, Congdon and Hobart provided 
excellent accounts of the formal traditions, rituals and ceremonies that emerged in the RAF 
between the wars Hering, Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force.  Congdon, Behind 
the Hangar Doors and Hobart, Badges and Uniforms of the Royal Air Force.  Stradling’s 
Customs of the Service provided a contemporary view on the traditions and outlook 
required of a junior officer towards the end of the period considered by this thesis. A H S 
(Stradling), Customs of the Service (Advice to those Newly Commissioned), (Aldershot: 
Gale and Polden Ltd, 1939 and 1943).  TeeEm, the training memoranda that were designed 
to maintain standards in the 1940’s included a guide to saluting in 1941.  ‘Saluting’ Tee 
Emm, (May 1941), CFS Archive, unaccessioned, p.20. 
14 RAFM, ‘RAF Terminology and Ceremonial’, RAF Air Ministry Weekly Orders, Order 641, 
18 July 1918.  For RN procedure history see: ‘Cable-Curry’, RN Website, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/training-and-
people/rn-life/navy-slang/covey-crump-a-to-aye/cable-curry, accessed 13 Nov 2017. 
15 ‘Wing Commander’, The Odd Hint to the R.A.F.    
16 RAFM, King’s Regulations for the Royal Air Force.  RAFM Air Ministry Weekly Orders, 
TNA AIR72/1 Air Ministry Weekly Orders 1918-1920. 
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and the traditions, rituals and customs were deeply entrenched in both the RN as 
well as the British Army.  It was, therefore, natural for the new leaders to adopt the 
elements of established tradition, ritual and custom that they knew worked.   
 Thus, many aspects of the espoused culture, saw the RAF conform with 
existing naval and military paradigms.  Kirke’s work is useful in explaining the 
importance of the established norms of the British Army.17  For example, to RN and 
Army officers, ceremonial drill helped underline military values and cohesiveness 
and had tradition within both services.  Accordingly, the RAF adopted drill despite it 
having no real application in a modern aerial fighting force.  Similarly, the RAF 
adopted and paraded colours and standards, thereby copying the regimental 
traditions that came from the battlefields where they had a previous military 
application.  Adoption of such old-fashioned rituals and customs included mess and 
dining etiquette, saluting rules, Ensign ceremonies, paying of compliments, dress 
regulations and standards concerning appearance which reinforced the RAF’s 
conventional military traits.  This helped ease the transition for personnel from the 
RNAS and the RFC and it also ensured that the RAF was recognisably martial to 
those of the other services.  However, it also resulted in RAF personnel adopting a 
fundamentally conservative outlook as outlined earlier in this thesis.   
 Given that the RAF leadership set out to replicate many of the structures, 
traditions, rituals and customs of the older services it would have been logical to 
conclude that the RAF would develop a similar culture to the Service that it took 
most of its cultural elements from, the Army.  However, the emergence of unofficial 
                                            
17 Kirke, Red Coat, Green Machine. 
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tradition, ritual and custom made a significant contribution to the RAF developing its 
own distinctive culture. 
Unofficial Traditions, Rituals and Customs 
 The aviator identity and technical mind-set of the RAF had a significant effect 
upon the manner in which the unofficial tradition, ritual and custom emerged in the 
RAF.   As the unofficial aspects of RAF culture, or the culture ‘between the ears of 
the people’, evolved they, in circular fashion through structuration, reinforced both 
the aviator identity and technical mind-set.18   This was an extremely important 
factor in the divergence of the RAF culture away from its parent services.   Key 
examples worthy of discussion here are:  informal ceremonies and traditions and 
high jinks, slang, rejection of uniform, moustaches and unofficial badges  
Informal Ceremonies, Traditions and High Jinks 
 Informal ceremonies emerged particularly on squadrons and sections 
surrounding arrivals, departures and marked achievements such as solo flights or 
promotions.  The lack of funds combined with the isolation of stations, a lack of 
personal transportation and restrictions on leaving stations, particularly for the junior 
ranks, meant that such entertainment was often self-made.  “Contact” described a 
First World War evening of self-entertainment in a mess, including cards and a 
gramophone that ends in a sing-song of a favourite RFC song: ‘The young aviator 
was dying’ that incorporated typically dark services humour.19  Parker referred to the 
isolation of Upavon in 1915 and the need to ‘make their own amusement which 
consisted mainly of drinking and larking about’.20 
                                            
18 Kirke, ‘Organizational Culture And Defence Acquisition’, pp.97-99. 
19 “Contact”, An Airman’s Outings, (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 
1918), p.232. 
20 CFS Archive, Major S E Parker, Memoirs, Vol 1 (1962), p.11.  Unaccessioned. 
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 During the expansion period, RAF stations evolved to provide a lot of 
amenities, however, entertainment was still often home grown.  Station newspapers 
and magazines, plays, sports, showing of films and sing-songs played a significant 
role in station life.  It has already been established that singing was important to 
apprentices; this was an RAF wide tradition.  Indeed, ‘H.G.’ noted that given how 
much singing was done in the RAF that it really should have been of a better 
standard.21  He described well-known songs that were modernised to fit in with RAF 
technology such as ‘The Ansons fly over the Ocean, The Ansons fly over the Sea…’ 
to the tune of ‘My Bonny Lies over the Ocean’.  In his 1945 book Ward-Jackson 
wrote: 
Why are airmen’s songs written and sung?  For two reasons: to entertain 
audiences often far removed from any sort of professional theatrical show, 
and to “let off steam.”  Almost all squadron songs belittle and laugh at death 
and crashes or they grouse at whatever is the cause of the singers’ browned 
off state.22 
 
 Laughing at death and ‘grousing’ were a means of reinforcing the 
nonchalance that was a common trait amongst the aircrew fraternity and featured 
heavily in their language and the high jinks the younger aircrew took part in.  Much 
is made of pilot revelry.  Miller contended that the ‘no empty chair policy’ contributed 
to the ‘philosophy’ that ‘it was considered morale-boosting for aircrew to let off 
steam at the end of the day and so impromptu raucous parties in themes, no matter 
how incongruous in the middle of a bitterly fought battle were not uncommon’.23  His 
emphasis on the extent of the socialising was an overly populist view of the First 
                                            
21 H G, RAF Occasions (London: The Cresset Press, 1941), pp.130-131. 
22 Ward-Jackson C, Airman’s Songbook (London: Sylvan Press, 1945).   
23 No empty chair policy was encouraged by Trenchard.  When a pilot died the chair was 
removed from the Mess to prevent others from feeling morose, Miller, Boom, p.161.   
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World War that was challenged by Hamilton-Paterson and needs to be examined.24 
 As identified in Chapter II, there is plenty of evidence of parties.  Hamilton-
Patterson, Lewis, Gould Lee and Baring, all referred to raucous evenings being very 
much an accepted part of RFC life.25  Such activity, including high jinks, heavy 
drinking and a peculiar dark humour became entrenched and survived the transition 
to the RAF.  Wallace wrote an account of a drunken party of RAF officers, following 
the ending of hostilities, that drove a taxi into the Criterion Hotel in London where it 
jammed in the entrance and caught fire.  They subsequently made a bonfire in 
Trafalgar Square.  The result was that London was made ‘Out of Bounds’ to all 
officers and men the following day.26  However, while raucous behaviour and rowdy 
nights are well-documented features of both the RFC and the RNAS, they were, by 
no means a daily event during the First World War.  Hamilton-Patterson’s chapter 
entitled ‘How they Lived’ provided several useful personal accounts depicting an 
aircrew life in which the pressures of fighting resulted in aircrew who were ‘too 
exhausted or tense…to stomach revelry.27  Morris wrote of a pilot that ‘the moment 
he pushed the throttle his survival depended on a clear mind, split second reflexes 
and smooth muscular co-ordination.  To be hung-over on dawn patrol was 
equivalent to attempted suicide’.28  He did, however, note that there was enough 
bad weather to allow the parties to take place.29   Gould Lee wrote of drink fuelled 
                                            
24 Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death, p.158. 
25 Lewis, The Great War Interviews, BBC, 33:50-34:16 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p01tczfx/the-great-war-interviews-4-cecil-arthur-
lewis#group=p01tbj6p, accessed 16 Oct 2017.  Grinnell-Milne, Wind in the Wires, p.86, 
p.213, p.233.  Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, p.83. 
26 Wallace, R.A.F. Biggin Hill (London: Tandem Publishing Limited 1975 [Universal-Tandem 
1969, First published Putnam &Co Ltd 1957], p.29. 
27 Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death, pp.151-176 
28 Morris, Bloody April, p.144.  
29 Ibid. 
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Mess nights, however, it can be seen from the diary format of his book that they 
were the exception rather than the norm.30   
 Lewis, meanwhile, highlighted Dawn Patrol as a tempering factor that 
resulted in aircrew generally turning in early.  He noted that the because of the 
losses, the atmosphere in the messes themselves were not ‘gay’ but professional in 
contrast to the binges in the towns.31  Indeed, he said that ‘it was only in the towns 
that the binges occurred’ particularly after a squadron had experienced a ‘bad time’ 
or a ‘particularly good time’; ‘either was an excuse to go in and hoop it up a bit’. 32  
However, the binges Lewis spoke of took place two or three times a week and 
lasted only until about midnight.33  Limitations on drinking appear, however, to have 
been determined by personal refrain and local habit rather than through orders or 
example.   Parker, in a section entitled ‘Heavy drinking in the Royal Flying Corps’ 
wrote that drinking took place on squadrons ‘without a word of censure from Senior 
members’.34  
 A tradition of boyish pranks emerged from the early days of the aerial 
services that endured transition to the RAF.   During the inter-war years, according 
to James, the ‘traditions of boyish enthusiasm and high jinks’ were reinforced both 
through the College at Cranwell with its distinctly public school feeling and also 
through the reservist system which James believed created a ‘rake-hell’ outlook 
                                            
30 Gould-Lee, No Parachute (London: Grub Street, 2014 [2013]). 
31 Lewis, The Great War Interviews, BBC, March 2014, 34:35-34:42. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p01tczfx/the-great-war-interviews-4-cecil-arthur-
lewis#group=p01tbj6p, accessed 16 Oct 2017. 
32 Lewis, The Great War Interviews, BBC, 33:50-34:16 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p01tczfx/the-great-war-interviews-4-cecil-arthur-
lewis#group=p01tbj6p, accessed 16 Oct 2017. 
33 Lewis, The Great War Interviews, BBC, March 2014, 34:43-35:02. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p01tczfx/the-great-war-interviews-4-cecil-arthur-
lewis#group=p01tbj6p, accessed 16 Oct 2017. 
34 CFS Archive, Major S E Parker, Memoirs Vol 1 (1962), p.62. 
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particularly amongst aircrew.35   Indeed, aircrew penchant for high jinks is clear from 
many of the personal accounts of the time.  Reach for the Sky described Officers’ 
Mess life as follows: 
Games of rugger in the ante-room with a waste-paper basket for a ball; or 
highcockalorum; or “desert warfare,” when they grabbed the assegais off the 
wall and stalked their fellow-men through the oases of aspidistras on the floor 
while others beat tom-tom rhythms on the table-top’.  Life was idyllic, with 
flying, games and fellowship.36 
 
 The official position of mess rules, Kings Regulations and publications 
offering advice to officers such as Customs of the Service advocated that officers 
and leaders should be an example to their men.  Pranks and high jinks did not, 
theoretically, fit into that model.  For instance, both the 1939 and 1943 editions of 
Customs of the Service, officially sanctioned by the Air Ministry, advised newly 
commissioned officers thus: 
There is no traditional custom that an officer must be a heavy drinker…by all 
means enjoy yourself when a special occasion justifies it...a curious custom, 
or rather habit, has grown among junior officers of treating Mess property in a 
most light-hearted manner.  This is not only extremely foolish but ill-
mannered and objected to by all other members of the Mess37. 
 
However, the hierarchy was aware of, and implicitly sanctioned, such 
behaviour.  In the First World War, for instance, Maurice Baring, Trenchard’s right 
hand man, was regularly seen with ‘a wine glass nonchalantly balanced on his bald 
domed head, a posture long familiar to R.A.F. officers who had ever celebrated any 
special occasions with him’ that was, in all likelihood a version of ‘The Muffin Man’.38 
Meanwhile, Baring’s diary entry of 4 March 1915 reveals that the Headquarters 
Mess of the RFC senior leadership was a place of some revelry where over the 
                                            
35 James, The Paladins, p.171. 
36 Brickhill, Reach for the Sky, p.41. 
37 A.H.S. (Stradling), Customs of the Service, pp.12-13 and 13-14 respectively. 
38 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.375.  A bobbing action with a glass on an officer’s head while 
others sang was called ‘The Muffin Man’. 
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previous 2 days ’16 glasses, 10 tumblers, 12 coffee cups, 12 liqueur glasses, and 1 
soup tureen had been broken in the Mess’.39   Patterson wrote that ‘the example of 
heavy drinking was set by Senior officials and filtered down to the youngest and 
lowest ranks.40 
In the Second World War, Guy Gibson’s Enemy Coast Ahead which 
highlighted a lot of parties, drink driving and general antics was officially sanctioned 
and Harris wrote the following in the Introduction: 
It may well be that the references to “parties” and “drunks” in this book will 
give rise to criticism, and even to outbursts of unctuous rectitude.  I do not 
attempt to excuse them, if only because I entirely approve of 
them….Remember that these crews, shining youth on the threshold of life, 
lived under circumstances of intolerable strain…If there is a Valhalla, Guy 
Gibson and his band of brothers will be found there at all parties, seated far 
above the salt.41 
 
 USAF pilot Burgon highlighted, in his book Piano Burning that many USAF 
traditions ‘were born in the ranks of the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and 
subsequently passed on to the American pilots who came to join them in their 
efforts.  British influence is seen in the traditions we honour today’.42  He wrote of 
the tradition of alcohol related games and also highlighted the fundamental principle 
of fighter pilot games was based upon the need for them to express their 
competitive edge. 
Competition is a critical part of a fighter pilot’s life.  Without it we would wither 
and die.  Fighter pilots play games for one reason, and one reason only: to 
show you how much better we are than everyone else!43 
 
                                            
39 Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, p.83. 
40 CFS Archive, Major S E Parker, Memoirs Vol 1 (1962), p.62. 
41 Guy Gibson, Enemy Coast Ahead (Manchester: Crécy Publishing Limited, 2007 [1986]), 
p.8. 
42 Burgon, Piano Burning and Other Fighter Pilot Traditions, p.18. 
43 Ibid., p.60. 
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 Although he expressed a modern USAF attitude, his sentiments are very 
much a reflection of the high jinks behaviour in Enemy Coast Ahead.   Piano burning 
is an RAF tradition that is mythologised in the modern force.  Common oral 
mythology accounts attribute this to cadets rebelling against being forced to play 
pianos in an attempt to instil refined tastes whilst they were at Cranwell.  Other oral 
accounts suggest that this emerged in the Second World War as a tribute to aircrew 
that did not make it back to the ‘piano keys’ of their home base runway.44  The latter 
can be discounted as piano keys were not introduced until after the Second World 
War.  It is more likely that this ‘tradition’ forms a mythology structure of aviator 
identity and was simply justification of boyish mess vandalism.  For instance, 
Wallace wrote of officers at Biggin Hill in the First World War being charged for 
deliberate drunken smashing of windows during the First World War in a ‘rowdy 
session’ in the Officers’ Mess that also resulted in the disembowelling of a piano the 
tone of which one of the officers objected to.45 
 The way the RAF had been formed created many discrete silos or sub-
cultures either through formal structures such as Stations, squadrons or flights, or 
through sub-cultures that emerge for other reasons such as belonging to a different 
aircraft type, branch or trade.  Gibson provided enlightening ritualistic differences 
between two of the major sub-cultures in his description of the Battle of the “Snake-
Pit” in which the intense rivalries between fighters at Digby and bombers at 
Waddington were played out.  It involved lavatory paper bombing runs over Digby, a 
wing commander kidnapped in a commandeered Blenheim with squadron markings 
painted out and made to collect the lavatory paper, extremely low ‘beat ups’ as a 
                                            
44 The ‘piano keys’ are the markings on a modern RAF runway.   
45 Wallace, R.A.F. Biggin Hill, p.49 
 278 
distraction for hats to be stolen from Waddington Mess all convey the fighter/bomber 
rivalries.46  His account also conveyed the extent to which ‘high jinks’ took place and 
the fact that they were considered amusing and even the misuse of His Majesty’s 
aeroplanes condoned with no resultant disciplinary action despite the Group Captain 
knowing.47  Thus, not only did high jinks occur in the bar, they were part of the 
daytime rituals of RAF life too. 
 High jinks also took place amongst the ground-crew, however, accounts are 
more difficult to find than for aircrew.   This is because the system was far more 
accommodating of aircrew deviance than it was of such behaviour by the ORs.  
However, those that can be found, such as Ron Bower’s account of dropping a 
thunder-flash into a pit latrine while the Sergeant ‘Discip’ was using it, indicate that 
the sense of humour among the RAF ranks was strong and similarly boyish to that 
of the officers.48  The different trades groups in the RAF for non-commissioned 
personnel evolved into natural silos in which their own sub-cultures flourished with 
trade nicknames and their own subtly different traditions, rituals and ceremonies that 
defined them and were sources of immense pride.  RAF armourers, for instance, 
like members of the artillery, adopted St Barbara as their patron saint and 
traditionally celebrate her saint’s day on 4 December each year. 49   This has 
traditionally included significant ritualised alcohol consumption.   
 The sub-cultures that emerged across the different trades and branches 
resulted in deeply held beliefs and values that represented both strengths and 
weaknesses for the RAF.  The strong sense of brotherhood that arose out of the 
                                            
46 A ‘beat up’ is a very low flypast. 
47 Gibson, Enemy Coast Ahead, p.102-105. 
48 R C Bowers, Seeing Life from a New Angle (Honiton: Courtney Books, n.d.), p.63 
49 ‘History of St Barbara RAF Armourers’,  https://rafarmourers.wordpress.com/history-of-st-
barbara/, accessed 17 April 2017. 
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tradition, ritual and ceremony of squadron, branch, trade or social group can equally 
be termed tribalism.  While this exclusivity enhances unit cohesion which is 
considered by Wong et al as a ‘key component of combat motivation’, it also 
encourages the establishment of deeply held divisions, jealousies and mistrust 
across the broader organisation.50  Seabright highlighted that the RAF is ‘divided 
into a variety different branches (and sub-specializations for officers) and trade 
groups all focussed on their specific roles’ and concluded that there are similarities 
with Smith’s conclusion about the USAF that ‘there is much less ‘glue’, much less 
single mission simplicity and less physical contact than is seen in the other 
Services’.51  For RAF leaders it remains a challenge to understand the balance 
between encouraging silo rivalries and intervening to reinforce overall RAF 
cohesion,  
RAF Slang 
 Shared language plays an important role in any culture or sub-culture.  The 
morphing of language from the wider culture within an organisation demonstrates 
exclusivity.  Military organisations display a noticeably strong tendency to adapt 
language or slang in this manner. At transition, Air Ministry Orders officially 
established the blending of different terms from the RNAS and the RFC.52  The 
majority of the choices were Army biased such as the use of cookhouse over galley 
and rations over victuals.  Port and starboard over left and right and Air Mechanic 
                                            
50 Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen et al, ‘Why They Fight: Combat 
Motivation in the Iraq War’, p.13. 
51 Squadron Leader Anthony J Seabright, ‘RAF Ethos and Culture in the 21st Century’, Air 
Power Review, Vol 7 No 1 (2004), p.99. 
52 RAFM, ‘RAF Terminology and Ceremonial’, RAF Air Ministry Weekly Orders, Order 641, 
18 July 1918. 
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over Technical Private were chosen from RN lexicon.53  Thus some aspects of RAF 
language can be considered part of the espoused culture. However, the really 
colourful terms emerged from culture-in-action.  Partridge in his dictionary of RAF 
Slang suggested of the services’ language that: 
The richest of all is that of the Army; yet the Army has added only a small 
number of words and phrases to those inherited from the First World War.  
The Navy slang, not quite so extensive as that of the Army, is even more 
traditional.  The Air Force had a small body of slang even when it was the 
Royal Flying Corps.  The RAF has many more slang terms than were 
possessed by the RFC.54 
 
 Partridge’s assertion that the Navy slang is less extensive than that of the 
Army needs to be challenged.  Such is the richness and historical importance of 
Royal Naval slang that a great deal of it entered mainstream English language over 
time making some of it invisible, perhaps giving the impression that the Army, in 
1945, had a more extensive lexicon.55  However, his points about the novelty and 
rate of change of RAF slang are important.  The entirely new forms of aerial 
machinery that the RFC, RNAS and RAF began to operate required new words to 
be invented, appropriated and in certain circumstances misappropriated.56    
 Added to the practicalities of inventing new terms for aeroplanes and 
procedures, the experience of the new military aviators also coloured linguistic 
development. Baring commented about the conversations between pilots being 
                                            
53 Ibid. 
54 E Partridge, A Dictionary of RAF Slang (London: Pavillion Books Ltd, 1990), p.8. 
55 Jolly wrote a guide to Royal Naval slang that includes the Naval etymology of many 
words or phrases in common modern parlance that do not appear to be of obvious naval 
origin eg: cuts very little ice, p.124, devil to pay, p.132, codswallop, p.106, clean slate, 
p.101, chock-a-block, p.96, chew the fat, p.92, let the cat out of the bag/not enough room to 
swing a cat, p.85, the bitter end, p.41, to binge, p.39, show/shake a leg, p.398, toe the line, 
p.459. 
56 Many terms for aeroplane parts and navigation were appropriated either from the navy or 
from France eg port and starboard and nacelle (for nose of an aircraft).  The RAF still uses 
the term punkah louvres to mean air conditioning ventilation ducts derived from Hindi and 
the RAF in India.     
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‘Greek to me’ as he departed by train with Salmond for France.57   This underlines 
both that the early slang was already well established by 1914 but also, his fear of 
asking questions highlights how exclusive the band of aircrew had already become. 
The language conveyed nonchalance laced with an easy humour that helped 
aircrew shrug off danger.  The pace of change of that language reflected the rate of 
change of the new technologies and roles that emerged in aviation between 1912 
and 1945.  The early aircrew were also very much aware of their new language, 
celebrated it and reinforced it.  A writer under the moniker HC, in the first editions of 
The Piloteer shed light upon some of the slang terms in use by the RNAS: 
Ailerons – pieces of fabric hinged on afterwards.  The best pilots always 
waggle these violently when on the ground, the object being to impress the 
mechanics.  Used largely in banking but somewhat rare in Lombard Street 
 
Aerodromes – Places to meet lady friends and have tea.  Generally contains 
large number of motors.  Aeroplanes may be seen here at long intervals, 
which depend upon (a) the crowd in the mess, (b) The congestion in the 
tennis courts, (c) The number of machines available, (d) The inclination of the 
pilots.  The weather doesn’t matter, it is never flying weather.58 
 
 The Piloteer also published the Cranwell Alphabet A-Z that gives a useful 
insight into the both the use of language and humour: 
A is for aircraft, all sizes and patterns: 
Some nimble and slender, some sluggish and fat ‘uns. 
 
B is the bump: puts wind up the quirk, 
Sometimes brings you to earth with a horrible jerk. 59 
 
 An article in the Daily Mail, meanwhile, entitled Airmen in the Making, The 
New Vocabulary, gave an insight into how rich the language of the air services 
already was in 1917: 
                                            
57 Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, p.12. 
58 The Piloteer, 1st edition (n.d.), RAF College Cranwell Archive, CRN/0/2013/90, p.2. 
59 A Quirk was a BE2c aircraft.  See Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death, p.157. ‘The 
Cranwell Alphabet’, The Piloteer, 2nd  Edition (n.d.), RAF College Cranwell Archive, 
CRN/0/2013/91, p.2.  
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While all branches of the Army since the commencement of the war have 
contributed their share of new words to our language, no one can claim the 
invention of so many strikingly original terms as the air services.  The 
explanation lies in the fact that it is a new game, played for the most part by 
youngsters.60 
 
 The article highlighted of the exchange between pilots that ‘to the outsider it 
must be entirely meaningless.61  To the initiated it is full of expressiveness and 
beauty’.62  The article reported the use of the following words and phrases: 
Zoom – ‘a soul-satisfying word – describes the action of an aeroplane which 
while flying level, is hauled up abruptly’. 
Quirk – ‘disrespectful slang for a certain type of machine much in use 
overseas’. 
Joystick – ‘the central lever by which the pilot works the wing and tail plane 
controls’. 
Aerobatics – ‘are “stunts” and “stunts” are, well, “aerobatics”’63 
 
 Francis wrote that aircrew ‘connected through their shared knowledge of the 
RAF’s highly particular verbal idiom.  Outsiders were both fascinated and baffled by 
the flyer’s esoteric slang’.64   
 Francis only concentrated upon aircrew, however linguistic quirks were 
common across the entire rank structure and different silos were delineated through 
the use of subtly different slang.65  In the inter-war period, for instance, Lawrence 
highlighted that aircrew were not alone in adopting slang.  He also underlined how 
language represented a divergence from the parent services: 
In its virtue we resist the gas of militarism, which is breathed at us by our 
sergeants: - eight in ten of whom are old soldiers or old sailors, transferred in 
authority to the R.A.F. till the baby service had bred its own veterans.  They 
                                            
60 ‘Airmen in the Making. The New Vocabulary’. Daily Mail, 19 July 1917, Issue 6643, p.4. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., This exchange and article was also used in Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death, 
p.156. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Francis M, The Flyer, p.36. 
65 Other Ranks’ extensive use of idiom was highlighted in Missed Date, Analysis Films 
Limited, compiled on The Royal Air Force at War, the unseen films.  Imperial War Museum, 
the official Collection. 1943-1944. 
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do their best with us men-in-the moon, do these minds, which were set 
before ever they transferred: but we and they speak different languages: their 
traditional eyes cannot see even how far from their pasts we have diverged.66 
 
 RAF slang transcended the divisions of rank and helped to bind the RAF in a 
common shared and very specific language. 67  By the Second World War, this was 
clearly evident in the majority of personal accounts of RAF service from across the 
rank structure. 68   The different trades had earned a wide variety of monikers: 
‘Snoops/Snoopers’ for RAF Police, ‘Chain Gang’ for Aircraft hands General Duties, 
‘erk’ for a recruit, apprentice or sometimes any junior ‘rigger’ or ‘sooty’, ‘Paraffin 
Pete’ for those involved in airfield control duties, ‘Plumber’ for armourer, ‘Senior 
Scribe’ for NCOs in the orderly room, ‘Sid Walker’s Gang’ for members of aircraft 
salvage parties, ‘Sparks’ or ‘Wop’ for wireless operator, ‘Trenchard Brat’ for an 
apprentice or ex-apprentice. 69  The slang was, in itself, a source of pride that 
highlighted and celebrated the RAF’s independence.  Ward-Jackson underlined this 
in the following apprentice song: 
It has been true, I'm told, ever since the days of old, 
That the language which we use is apt to vary, 
And the slang which we invent 
Will form a supplement 
To the next issue of the Oxford Dictionary.70 
 
 The slang was an indication of a very deeply entrenched culture.  Its intricacy 
                                            
66 Lawrence, The Mint, p.192. 
67 Other sources of RAF Slang can be found in HW, What’s the Gen? (London: John 
Crowther Ltd, 1942). James MacIsaac, ‘Glossary of WWII R.A.F Slang and Terminology’, 
http://natureonline.com/37/56-ap4-glossary.html, accessed 23 Mar 2016.  J Hunt, A Pringle 
and Flying Officer C Morgan, Service Slang (London: Faber and Faber, 2008 Edition 
[1943]).  Partridge E, A Dictionary of RAF Slang. 
68 See, for instance, Gibson, Enemy Coast Ahead.  Paul Richey, Fighter Pilot (London: 
Cassell 2003 [Originally published anon, B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1941]).  Geoffrey Wellum, First 
Light (New Jersey:  Hoboken, 2003 [Viking, 2002]). Currie, Lancaster Target (Bodmin: 
Goodall Publications Ltd, 1988). 
69 Partridge E, A Dictionary of RAF Slang, p.8, p.52, p.61 and p.62.  
70 Ward-Jackson, Airman’s Songbook. 
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and technical nature highlight a way of life with deep complex structures, traditions, 
rituals and ceremonies which bonded personnel yet also in which deep silos existed. 
Rejection of Uniform 
The power of a uniform was discussed in the last chapter.  However, 
although a uniform is designed to make an organisation appear as one, members of 
uniformed organisations often begin to wear the uniform in subtly different ways. 
The apprentices did this as highlighted in Chapter VI.  Hertz wrote that: 
Deviations from a uniform code may exist for a variety of reasons. They may 
be intentional (out of defiance or necessity), unintentional (out of sloppiness, 
inexperience, or misinterpretation), or unavoidable (due to insufficient 
supplies, finances, or communication).71 
 
 She continued by emphasising that making such changes alter the symbolic 
message of the uniform itself: 
While uniforms may regularly be altered physically for a variety of reasons, 
their symbolic communications may also be manipulated, thus calling into 
question exactly who has control of a uniform, its meanings, purposes, and 
messages.72 
 
 This is particularly important; certain unofficial alterations to RAF uniform 
resulted in some deeply held beliefs ranging from the negative such as 
dissatisfaction or acquiescence through to positive deep feelings of affiliation to 
certain sub-cultures.   
Instances of all of these motives for deviations from the wearing of the 
prescribed uniform can be identified in the RFC, RNAS and RAF.  Early in the RAF, 
for instance, personnel were slow to adopt new RAF uniforms either out of 
                                            
71 Hertz, The Uniform: as Material, as Symbol, p.46. 
72 Ibid. p.47. 
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attachment to the former uniform or due to the financial penalty of buying new 
ones.73 
The inadequacy of the uniform was touched upon in the last chapter and 
there were a number of modifications and additions to uniforms that emerged from 
necessity such as pilots wearing silk scarves to counter chafing of the neck.  
However, Hertz’ explanation of intentional motive being rooted only in defiance or 
necessity is a little simplistic.  Some of the very significant departures from RAF 
standard uniform, that will be examined later, were made intentionally, but with 
motives that were better explained by Nathan and Nicholas.  They provided the 
following explanations about why members of uniformed organisations reject 
uniforms: 
 One of the objections may be that uniforms create obstacles to 
performance…Another objection to uniforms may be their denial of 
individuality… Smaller elites within larger uniformed groups attempted to 
distinguish themselves from the run-of-the-mill member by introducing 
unofficial modifications of the uniform…Another form of rejection may be an 
expression of discontent, not with the uniformed status itself, but with it as the 
key status… Finally, the rejection of the uniform may represent opposition to 
the group itself. The altered uniform is worn, in this instance, to express 
dislike of the group and constitutes an interesting effort to oppose the group 
short of leaving or destroying it.74 
 
 Both the aviator identity and technical mind-set of personnel encouraged 
individualism.  The tendency to ignore trifling rules and to dress slightly differently 
reinforced the special place they saw for themselves.  Hamilton-Patterson described 
uniform trousers worn with tennis shoes as well as pyjamas worn under uniform in 
                                            
73 TNA Air 1/29 (Buff File Original AHB Ref 15/1/141/4) D18369, Weekly Order Application 
Form entitled ‘Dress’, dated 23 Nov 1918.   
74 Joseph Nathan and Alex Nicholas, ‘The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective’, American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Jan 1972), pp.727-728. 
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the First World War.75  Meanwhile, illegal adoption of Eagle insignia on sleeves and 
shoulder straps by RNVR Officers attached to the RNAS attracted outraged 
correspondence from Vaughan-Lee and an Admiralty Weekly order proscribing such 
activity.76   
 The unofficial RFC and RNAS regard for military discipline and interesting 
clothing choices was inherited and accentuated by the RAF.  Bamford wrote that 
‘there were subtle changes to dress and uniform that affected everyone, but in most 
cases dress regulations would not be strictly enforced for some time’.77  He went on 
to note that: 
The formation of the RAF was not to have an immediate effect upon the 
flamboyant taste and sense of dress that many pilots and observers had 
openly flaunted for a number of years…it was thought to be important for 
morale that officers should be allowed to express themselves in their own 
fashion.78 
 
 By the time the RAF arrived in the Second World War, the somewhat ‘slack’ 
approach to uniforms appears to have spread from the aircrew cadre across the 
rank structure such that Sherbrooke-Walker, previously a pilot in the RFC, described 
RAF-wide approach to uniform as follows: 
Another aspect of the R.A.F. dress which struck “the brown job”, as they 
called their brothers in the Army, was the way in which so many officers and 
airmen wore their uniforms, and here I noticed that aircrew were usually the 
worst offenders.  One could perhaps forgive the undone top jacket button of 
the “Fighter Boy”, but not the slovenliness so widespread on some R.A.F. 
Stations – the flapping jackets, the crushed and dirty caps, the undone 
buttons.79 
                                            
75 Hamilton-Paterson, Marked for Death, p.157. 
76 R.N.A.S. and R.N.V.R Officers – ‘Titles and Uniforms’, Admiralty Weekly Order No 756, 
21 April 1916, Roskill, The Naval Air Service, p.296. And ‘Memorandum by Rear-Admiral 
C.L. Vaughan-Lee’, Director of Air Services, dated 12 February 1916 in Roskill, The Naval 
Air Service, pp.295-296. 
77 Joe Bamford, Surviving the Skies.  A Night Bomber Pilot in the Great War (Stroud:  
Spellmount, 2012), p.108. 
78 Ibid., p.108. 
79 Sherbrooke-Walker, Khaki and Blue, p.4. 
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 The film Missed Date, an internal RAF training/propaganda film intended to 
highlight the dangers of loose talk, provided an interesting backdrop of what had 
become acceptable in terms of dress.  It depicted incorrectly worn uniform with the 
forage caps set at remarkably rakish angles and worn indoors.80  The haircuts were 
long and unruly, living up to the RAF ‘Brylcreme Boy’ moniker.  Even the RAF 
Standard fluttering as the credits rolled was frayed.  Paradoxically, the film suggests 
that the personnel in the film are extremely proud of their Service and revel in their 
technical expertise and argot. 81   Given this was an officially endorsed film, it 
highlights the circular reinforcement of Giddens’ structuration theory; the counter-
institutional dress standards appear to have been tacitly condoned by the chain of 
command. 
 In addition to uniform ‘objection’ on grounds of expressions of difference or 
elitism, it appears some instances of ‘objection’ based upon discontent with the 
uniform occurred.  Currie, a sergeant pilot, described a particularly extreme 
approach the approach to uniform by his bomber colleagues thus: 
It was true that we had grown rather lax; we wore the most comfortable 
clothes that came to hand, and we didn’t always shave in the morning.  
Saluting was generally avoided…Most of us wore one of two items of flying 
gear.  I was dressed in a US Army shirt, silk scarf, sweater, basketball boots 
and battledress with no cap.82 
 
Currie’s account is extreme and the rich photographic evidence from the 
Second World War demonstrates that, while some aircrew had a distain for uniform, 
the vast majority wore a uniform that was entirely recognisable as an RAF one.  
There were, however, some isolated incidents in which uniform was rejected more 
                                            
80 Missed Date, Analysis Films Limited. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Jack Currie, Lancaster Target, p.74. 
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fundamentally during a series of discipline breakdowns in the India and the Far East 
as RAF personnel expressed opposition to the organisation in what were termed 
mutinies. 83   However, the majority of uniform rejection was in the form of 
modifications that affirmed the owner’s membership of an elite. The RAF blue with 
silk scarf, red silk lined jacket and top button undone was, for instance, symbolic of 
the romanticism, dash and élan of the fighter pilot. 84   A scruffy crushed hat, 
meanwhile, was typical of bomber aircrews.  Different ways of wearing the uniform 
were representations of the strong silos that existed between subcultural elements 
of the RAF.  RAF personnel across the ranks, meanwhile, appeared to revel in 
perching the forage cap at what became known as a ‘rakish’ angle. 85  Meanwhile, 
the scruffiness of mechanics and aircrew and their blasé poses came to epitomise 
British defiance in the Battle of Britain and was endorsed by the chain of command 
and used as publicity material.86 
Moustaches 
 Any discussion regarding iconic RAF appearance needs to include the 
subject of facial hair and the origin of the RAF handlebar moustache.  An aspect of 
                                            
83 Duncan referred to personal accounts of an incident in Karachi that involved the rejection 
of the wearing of blue uniform.  David Duncan, ‘Mutiny In The RAF – the Air Force Strikes of 
1946’, Socialist History Society, Occassional Papers Series, No 8, 
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/50/a5969550.shtml, accessed 12 Dec 
2017. ‘Flt Sgt Steventon’, The Wartime Project – The Second War, 
http://www.wartimememoriesproject.com/ww2/view.php?uid=1205832, accessed 12 Dec 
2017. ‘Battle of Britsain’, https://www.rafa.org.uk/blog/2015/08/14/battle-of-britain-15-
august-1940/, accessed 12 Dec 2017.  See also Eric Kennington’s portrait of Wing 
Commander Geoffrey Tuttle at the RAF Museum. 
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a British military organisation that needs to be understood is its wry humour and the 
moustache epitomises that.  The development of the handlebar moustache allowed 
its owner to stretch the interpretation of regulations to achieve individuality within a 
constraining military structure.  It is an example of a counter-institutional ritual that 
ultimately worked in favour of the organisation helping give the RAF its own special 
image that underlined its independence.   
 During the Eighteenth Century facial hair became common in the RN and the 
Army for the practical reason that shaving as sea was problematic in the RN and for 
reason of cultural acceptance in Empire combined with a need to keep warm during 
the Crimea War.  In 1869 the RN chose to repeal previous rules that sailors be 
clean shaven following  
 representations having been made to their Lordships that it would conduce to 
the health and comfort of men, under many circumstances of service, were 
they to be permitted to discontinue the use of the Razor on board Her 
Majesty's Ships’.87  ‘In all cases, when the permission granted in Clause I is 
taken advantage of, the use of the Razor must be entirely discontinued.  
Moustaches are not to be worn without the Beard, nor is the Beard to be worn 
without the Moustaches88   
 
 Thus, the RN personnel were allowed to grow a full beard or a ‘full set’.89   
 Photographic evidence demonstrates the Victorian British Army sporting full 
and impressive beards and whiskers and the Army regulation that all officers were 
to leave the upper lip unshaved was only repealed in 1916 following a Memorandum 
from General McCready to the Army Council following much consternation following 
                                            
87 Beards and Moustaches in the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, Admiralty Circular No. 
36.-LMM, Admiralty, 24 June 1869, 
http://www.pbenyon.plus.com/Navy_List_1870/Beards_Moustaches.html, accessed 7 Jan 
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88 Ibid. 
89 Jolly, Jackspeak, p.185. 
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changes in fashion.90  Thus, in the early days of the RFC all personnel, technically, 
were under orders to wear a moustache while members of the RNAS were able to 
wear a full set.  The Air Council, in 1918, initially decided that ‘there was no 
objection to hair on the face if kept within moderate limits’.91  Kings Regulations from 
1918 indicated, meanwhile, that ‘the Hair of the Head will be kept short.  The chin 
and underlip will be shaved’. 92   Technically that would have allowed for long 
sideburns to be worn, but by 1927 regulations were tightened up such that ‘the face 
will be shaved with the exception of the upper lip which will be shaved or left entirely 
unshaven’.93  Referring to the RAF and the Army, James wrote:  
 Both services drew the line at beards. Like the naval beard worn at the time 
mostly by aviators and submariners, the RAF moustache became the mark of 
a corps d’élite.  It was the only way in which these men could express their 
individuality.94    
 
 James was incorrect about moustaches being the only way RAF men could 
express their individuality; as has been demonstrated, they were doing a good job of 
that in many other areas.  It was, more correctly, one of many of the unofficial ways 
in which they were expressing their individuality and ironically, in doing so they 
created a tradition of pushing the boundary of the rules on facial hair that gave the 
RAF another symbol of its slightly rebellious nature but also a symbol of its 
independence.   
                                            
90 Christopher Oldstone-Moore, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Military Moustache’, Wellcome 
Library Collection, 20 November 2015, http://blog.wellcomelibrary.org/2015/11/the-rise-and-
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93 Trenchard Museum, ‘Standing Orders for the Apprentice Wings Stationed at RAF Halton’ 
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94 James, The Paladins, p.183. 
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 Sherbrooke-Walker noticed an RAF officer travelling on board a troopship 
‘distinguished by an immense pirate’s moustache, a shock of bobbed hair and a pair 
of side-whiskers.  He was an offence to the eye’. 95    Once again, a cursory 
inspection of photographs of groups of RAF personnel from the Second World War 
reveals the handlebar moustache was far from a universal facial adornment.  
Indeed, it was worn by a minority of personnel and, probably, limited to the more 
eccentric members of the RAF.  However, the fact that it became so strongly linked 
to the RAF highlights the power of symbols, traditions and rituals and is also another 
example of culture-in-action morphing the original intentions of the officially 
espoused culture.96 
Unofficial Badges 
 Aircrew dominated the production of unofficial badges with some gaining 
iconic symbolic status such as the ‘Late Arrivals’ badge, a winged boot, for those 
who walked back across the lines from enemy territory and ‘The Goldfish Club’ 
badge, with a white winged goldfish motif, for those rescued from the sea.97  Some 
unofficial trade badges also emerged such as the RAF Dispatch Rider badge but 
these were less prevalent in the ranks, presumably because the Station Warrant 
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Hering, Customs and Traditions of the Royal Air Force, p.127.  
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Officer had greater sway over the ORs than over the aircrew.98  The unofficial 
badges that emerged underline two aspects of the RAF.  Firstly, that certain trades, 
branches and sub-cultures of the RAF did not feel that they were sufficiently 
recognised.  Secondly, according to Hering, given the humorous designs of many of 
such badges, this was a further manifestation of Service humour.99 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that tradition, ritual and custom are particularly 
important to military organisations in creating the bonding or social cohesion 
necessary to overcome the intense visceral fear of going into armed combat. The 
formal traditions, rituals and ceremonies that surrounded the RAF structure were an 
amalgam of those from the RN and the Army or a continuum of many of those that 
had been introduced to the RNAS and the RFC when they were part of those parent 
services.  Thus, it would not be unreasonable to expect the RAF culture to be very 
close to that of the Army and the RN.  However, this chapter has demonstrated that 
it was largely through the emergence of informal traditions, rituals and ceremonies 
that RAF Culture diverged away from that of its parent services and it did so quite 
markedly.   This is in line with Giddens’ theory of structuration.  Kirke noted of the 
Army that: 
 The informal aspects of soldiers’ lives were not governed by any written 
regulations – indeed in some areas they contravened them.  These informal 
                                            
98 IWM INS 40252, Uniforms and Insignia, badge trade, British.  ‘Unofficial Royal Air Force 
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aspects comprise the most complex and diverse area of British military 
life’.100 
 
 The very specific environment in which aviators operated combined with the 
new stresses that they were under, the type of person that was attracted to aviation 
and that the model for going into combat had been completely changed to one in 
which a few warriors, predominantly officers, went forward leaving the bulk of the 
force in support, totally transformed the way combat was executed.  The aviator 
identity that emerged had resulted in a significant change in the new warriors’ views 
and behaviour.  Meanwhile, in the hangars and support buildings, the technical 
mind-set also drove the emergence of new cultural norms.  
 The unofficial traditions, rituals and ceremonies were not homogenous across 
the RAF.  Silos emerged, either as a result of the official structures, or as a result of 
more informal sub-groupings.  In those silos, traditions, rituals and ceremonies 
developed in different ways, shaped and reinforced by the participants in the 
groups.  The most culturally powerful silo, as highlighted by Mahoney, was that of 
the pilot.  That sub-group developed very strong traditions, rituals and ceremonies 
as has been outlined and were a direct result of the aviator identity.  However, 
elements of their culture-in-action spread across the wider force, not least because 
it was from there that the leadership emerged, giving the RAF a marked youthful, 
humorous and modern approach to service which was starkly juxtaposed against 
the more traditional and stuffy aspects of the Service.  Those aspects emerged due 
to it having structures, rules, regulations and recruitment that were largely 
conventional as already examined earlier in this thesis.   However, the emergence 
of silos was not restricted to the aircrew fraternity.  A wide range of other silos 
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emerged that engendered belonging and pride.  However, they also caused 
parochialism across the RAF which, in some cases, could be corrosive such as 
across the aircrew/ground crew, the bomber/fighter or the pilot/other aircrew divides. 
 The culture-in-action or the culture ‘between the ears of the people’ resulted 
in the unofficial development of strong silos and reinforcement of the aviator identity 
and technical mind-set that encouraged the divergence of RAF culture away from 
the cultures of the Army and the RN.101  The Inter-war RAF officer cadre assumed a 
devil-may-care approach to life juxtaposed against overt public school traditionalism.  
The self-effacing nonchalance and modernity that arose from operating cutting edge 
technology and blasé humour saw the Force develop its own distinct lexicon that 
varied across silos.  The counter-institutional activity such as high jinks, unofficial 
wearing of badges, scruffy appearance, rejection of uniform, rakishly angled forage 
caps and handlebar moustaches and typified a Service that had developed its own 
unofficial customs traditions and rituals.  In particular, this counter-cultural activity 
emphasised the importance of practicality over pomp and circumstance.  The 
Service particularly valued its technical mind-set in the cockpit, hangar, cookhouses 
and HQ’s of this cutting-edge organisation.  
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CHAPTER X 
RAF ARCHITECTURE 
 
 
Fig 6 - RAF College Cranwell 
Sharr contended that ‘it remains important for architects and architectural 
historians to appreciate buildings as the material embodiments of culture (or multiple 
cultures), and to read the stories that they contain’.1  His research pointed to a body 
of evidence that indicated the strong inter-relationship between culture and 
architecture that would make bypassing buildings and architecture quite an 
impossibility when a considering the development of RAF culture.  Brown wrote that 
                                            
1 Adam Sharr, Architecture & Culture, Researching buildings spaces and documents (New 
York: Routledge, Kindle edition, 2012), Loc 385 of 6638.   
 296 
'buildings are often intimately bound up with the history and development of an 
organisation, and changes in location often mark radical alterations in the strategic 
direction or general character of a company'.2  
Unwin proposed that ‘architecture has the potential to establish and influence 
relationships, elicit emotional responses, even to affect how we behave and who we 
think we are'.3  More functionally, Berg and Kreiner, highlighted how deeply affected 
people continue to be by the buildings that surround them:  
A basic proposition of corporate architecture is that the architectural, 
 interior, and environmental design of corporate buildings and settings 
 has a profound impact on human behaviour in general ... and on human 
 performance in particular'.4 
 
 As the military services were convinced of a need to explore air power, they 
needed places to fly from and gradually required ‘places’ to store fuel, to sit, to sleep 
and to shelter.  The fields and balloon launching sites established at Farnborough, 
Larkhill and Upavon required mess halls, women’s hostels, barracks, offices, supply 
stores, dope sheds, gas plants, kitchens and headquarters.  By 1918 the air 
services had already established an impressive array of air stations, training and 
operational bases, repair depots, logistical units and HQs across the UK and 
overseas.  According to Higham, airfield construction was ‘the largest civil 
engineering project in the United Kingdom since the construction of the railways in 
the nineteenth century’ and took place between 1934 and 1945’.5   This chapter will 
examine the important aspects of RAF buildings and facilities. 
                                            
2 Brown, Organisational Culture, p.15. 
3 Simon Unwin, Analysing Architecture (London and New York: Routledge, Fourth Edition 
2009), p.5. 
4 Per Olof Berg and Kristian Kreiner ‘Corporate Architecture: Turning Physical Settings into 
Symbolic Resources’ in ‘Symbols and Artifacts: views of the Corporate Landscape’, ed 
Pasquale Gagliardi (Berlin, New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1990), p.46. 
5 Highham, Bases of Air Strategy. 
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Trenchard’s Vision 
 Following the end of the First World War, the lack of permanent buildings was 
of significant concern to Trenchard: 
I … decided – and gradually convinced my Secretary of State – that we ought 
to defy the other services and risk unpopularity by building foundations with 
nothing much else to show – but foundations that it would be hard to destroy.  
I wanted very few squadrons – just enough to gain experience and carry out 
domestic roles in our overseas territories when local emergencies arose.6 
 
 A key part of Trenchard’s plan was to build separate RAF infrastructure and 
institutions.  He aimed ‘to really make an air service which will encourage and 
develop airmanship, or better still, the air spirit, like the naval spirit, and to make it a 
force that will profoundly alter the strategy of the future’. 7 
 In the 1919 Memorandum, Trenchard underlined the lack of permanent 
infrastructure: 
Though some of the wartime buildings can be made to serve for a year or two 
in their present state, the Air Force does not possess one single permanent 
barracks. …a large capital outlay on the provision of new buildings and the 
adaptation of the most suitable of the temporary buildings is inevitable during 
the first few years.8 
 
 In fact, the RAF did possess some buildings that were permanent structures.9  
However, Trenchard envisaged well-provisioned stations that would be more than 
functional and a source of pride for the new Service.  He said at an Independent 
Force dinner that: 
I ask you to picture to yourselves – as I hope to see it even in my time – 
Permanent Stations with their cricket grounds, tennis courts, polo grounds, 
                                            
6 Boyle A, Trenchard, p.341. 
7 Ibid. p.343. 
8 Cmd. 467, ‘The Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force’. 
9 RAF Wittering, RAF Cranwell and RAF Henlow all have examples of First World War era 
buldings that were permanent enough to remain in use today.  RAF Henlow, in particular, 
retains impressive and listed First World War hangars.   
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etc. with comfortable living conditions for officers and men, in which all can 
take a pride, and an interest, and feel that they have got a home.10 
 
 Given concerns that demobilisation might sweep away the RAF, the 
proposed building could be viewed as an exercise of Trenchardian aggrandisement 
in order to secure the future of his Service.   If that were the only motivation for 
building, then it worked.  The RAF College stands as physical embodiment of 
Trenchard’s determination to build permanence.  The columns, rotunda, parade 
ground, impressive railings and front gate proclaimed that the RAF College had its 
own Dartmouth or Sandhurst.  But the programme was not simply about producing 
grand edifices.  It also provided HQ’s, aerodromes, training centres and depots that 
would prepare the RAF both for expansion and future operations.  The building 
programme would also have a deep cultural effect on the personnel.  What is 
perhaps most surprising is that this building project came at a time of tight financial 
constraint and at a time when the Royal Air Force might have been tempted to 
spend its meagre budget on aerial vehicles.  Faced with some difficult choices, 
Trenchard preferred to dig solid foundations that would last a great deal longer than 
the bi-planes he could have bought. 
 The expansion period of the RAF is the most obvious manifestation of how 
the culture of the RAF was expressed in its buildings and infrastructure and that 
period is particularly well covered in Works and the Official Narrative on the 
Expansion of the RAF. 11   While these acknowledged that the conceptual and 
political roots of expansion were to be found in the earlier phase, they failed to 
                                            
10 RAFM MFC 76/1/98 Speeches: Drafts and Notes 1919-1927, ‘Independent Force Dinner 
Speech B’, p.11. 
11 Documents such as the ‘RAF Narrative on the Expansion of the RAF’ and Works 
emphasise this period in particular. ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of the Royal Air Force 
1934-1939’. Works, p.24  
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underline just how important the early years of aviation were with respect to RAF 
culture.  Higham’s Wave Theory of airfield development provided a useful thread in 
which 1914 is referred to as infancy, 1914-1919 as puberty, 1919-1939 as 
manhood, 1939-1945 as middle age and 1956 as peacetime equilibrium.12   The 
infancy stage, 1914-191 was, clearly an important period of expansion in which the 
RFC and RNAS took over aerodromes in the UK that would become important 
bases for the RAF.   Aerodrome procurement and building was initially ad hoc but 
impressive nevertheless and conducted on a relatively large scale during the First 
World War.  In that initial period, the buildings did not reflect anything truly 
revolutionary with the exception, perhaps, of enormous airship hangars such as 
those at Cardington.13   
 In France, most fixed wing aircraft operations during the early part of the First 
World War needed little in the way of specialised buildings given that the aircraft 
operated from grass strips.  Dye highlighted the importance and complexity of the 
logistical system’s Aircraft Depots, Air Parks, Lorry Park, Port Detachments, Aircraft 
Repair Depots, Stores Depots, Airship Depots.  They formed part of a network that 
also included detailed reporting and accounting of the movement of aircraft and 
materiel.  That, Dye claimed, was key to ‘delivering strategic success, facilitating 
‘modern warfare’ and anticipating the management practices that now form the 
global supply chain – an immense legacy for a small military organisation that 
flourished for just five years at the beginning of the last century’.14  From a cultural 
perspective, the First World War architecture offers little for consideration in this 
                                            
12 Highham, Bases of Air Strategy, p.27 
13 The scale of these can be seen at Cardington where two First World War era airship 
hangars remain standing.  See ‘Cardington Number 1 Shed at RAF Cardington’, 
https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1114165, accessed 19 Feb 2017. 
14 Dye, Air Power’s Midwife, p.329. 
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thesis except that the broadly accepted layouts of aerodrome, separate messing, 
the need for a parade square, the choice of nomenclature for buildings emerged and 
can be observed at locations such as Stow Maries.15 
 The period from 1918 until 1922 was defined by demobilisation and insecurity 
for the RAF.  The RAF reduced from 291,175 personnel in 1918 to 31,500 by 1920 
and from 204 squadrons in 1918 to 29 by Mar 1920.16  For RAF personnel, futures 
were uncertain.  The insecurity, lack of existential national threat, poor living 
conditions and demobilisation delays resulted in dissatisfaction that, in the case of 
Biggin Hill, was sufficiently serious that it resulted in a strike. 17   Meanwhile, 
personnel who wished to stay in the RAF faced uncertain careers with the future of 
the RAF under scrutiny.  Although Works referred to 1920 to 1935 as ‘the 
comparatively comatose years’ of estate expansion, some of the acquisitions and 
plans made between 1918 and 1922 would be of marked cultural significance to the 
future RAF. 18   The Air Ministry, initially in Hotel Cecil on the Strand and then in 
Adastral House on Kingsway, Bentley Priory (Fighter Command HQ) and the Halton 
Estate were all procured during those years.  Meanwhile, in this period, the RAF 
College and Halton were respectively built and bought.  Their significance as 
training centres has already been explained.  However, as buildings, they became 
very important as physical manifestations of both permanence and independence. 
                                            
15 ‘Stow Maries Great War Aerodrome, Essex’.  http://www.stowmaries.org.uk/history/, 
accessed 11 May 2015. 
16   Jones H, The War in the Air, Appendices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), 
Appendic xxxv.  See also ‘From World Power to Colonial Policeman’, 
http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/history-of-the-battle-of-
britain/from-world-power-to-colonial-policeman.aspx, accessed 14 May 2015. 
17 Wallace, R.A.F. Biggin Hill, pp.56-60.  See also ‘1919: The RAF Biggin Hill mutiny’  
 https://libcom.org/files/1919%20The%20RAF%20Biggin%20Hill%20mutiny.pdf, accessed 
17 Mar 2017.  See also ‘Biggin Hill History’, http://bigginhill.co.uk/history.htm, accessed 17 
Mar 2017.   
18 Works, p.24. 
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In 1921, the final of the three Geddes reports was completed that placed 
enormous strain on military defence spending.  The Air Staff’s deft footwork, 
Churchill’s belief in air power and the employment of the RAF in a colonial policing 
role appeared to have demonstrated that air power was a cheap method of 
maintaining order in the Empire.  Despite fears about how the Geddes axe might 
fall, the decision to maintain the RAF as a separate service was announced by 
Chamberlain in the House of Commons in March 1922.19  The RAF’s defence of 
both Halton and Cranwell was particularly robust and they remain extremely 
important RAF cultural icons.20 
 The decision to expand in 1922 arose from an enquiry conducted by the 
special Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence set up on 9 November 
1921 to “go fully into the question of the vulnerability of the British Isles to air attack 
and the measures necessary to provide for meeting such an attack” with the primary 
focus of threat considered, by the Committee, to be France. 21  Balfour suggested 
                                            
19 ‘Mr. Chamberlain's Announcement’, 
HC Deb 16 March 1922, vol 151 cc2474-2476, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1922/mar/16/mr-chamberlains-
announcement#S5CV0151P0_19220316_HOC_379, accessed 16 Oct 2017. 
20 TNA 8/42 CAS Archives, Geddes Committee Memoranda Appendix to the ‘Memorandum 
on the Recommendations of the Committee on National Expenditure’, Prepared by the Air 
Ministry For Mr Churchill’s Cabinet Committee Jan 16 1922, pp.2-4 and pp.9-13. See also 
TNA 8/42 CAS Archives, Appendices to ‘Report of Cabinet Committee appointed to 
examine Part I (Defence Departments) of the Report of the Geddes Committee on National 
Expenditure’, Appendix III, p.3, pp.6-7 and pp.11-13.  See also TNA 8/42 CAS Archives, 
‘Cabinet Committee to Examine Part I of the Report of the Geddes Committee on National 
Expenditure so far as it Affects “Defence Departments”’, Minutes of the Second Meeting, 10 
Jan 1922.  Trenchard’s statement summary, p.2, Guest’s statement summary, p.4.  Also, 
TNA 8/42, CAS Archives Vol 3, Letter from the Air Ministry to the Secretary of State dated 3 
Dec 1921. 
21 CID 106-A, 26 April 1922 ‘Report of the Sub-Committee of Imperial Defence on 
Continental Air Menace’ in ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of the Royal Air Force 1934-
1934’, p.2.  See also T C G James, Growth of Fighter Command, 1936-1940: Air Defence of 
Great Britain, (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2013 [Frank 
Cass 2002]), p.1.  
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that not expanding the RAF would ‘put temptation in the way of French statesmen 
which would find it hard to resist’.22   
 The Committee advised that the establishment of the Air Force ‘should be 
increased in order to enable an offensive organization to be built up’ and ‘the 
organization of a zone of defence should be proceeded with’.23  Trenchard was not 
entirely convinced of the likelihood of attack by the French, nor was Lord Gorell.24  
However, while the French threat was somewhat doubtful, it served as a yardstick 
by which to judge the strength of the RAF.  Thus, aerodrome building in the UK 
would be based upon a perceived and flawed axis of attack from France until 
1934.25 
 On 3 August, 1922, Lloyd George duly accepted ‘to adopt a scheme 
submitted by the Air Ministry providing a force of 500 machines for home defence at 
an increased cost of £2,000,000 per annum.  £900,000 out of the total of £2,000,000 
will be found by economies in the Estimates of the Air Ministry’.26   This allowed for 
the expansion of the Force by 20 Squadrons with the axis of build towards France.27  
In due course, under Baldwin’s Conservative Government in 1923, the Imperial 
Defence Committee’s recommendation for allocating 52 Squadrons to Home 
                                            
22 Note by Lord Balfour on the ‘Report of the Sub-Committee on Continental Air Menace’, 
CID 180-A, 29 May, 1922 quoted in ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of the Royal Air Force 
1934-1934’, p.5.   
23 ‘Report of the Sub-Committee of Imperial Defence on Continental Air Menace’. CID 106-
A, 26 April 1922 in ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of the Royal Air Force 1934-1934’, p.2. 
24 For Lord Gorrell’s view, see ‘The Air Force’, Hansard, HL Debate, 27 July 1922, vol 51, cc 
902-44, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1922/jul/27/the-air-
force#S5LV0051P0_19220727_HOL_101, accessed 21 Oct 2017. For Trenchard’s view 
see: ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of the Royal Air Force 1934-1934’, p.5.    
25 RAFM AIR 69 Freeman W, ‘Air Strategy’, Précis of Lecture, p.2.  The change in this 
perceived axis of threat is reflected in Freeman’s lecture to the Staff College in 1935.   
26 ‘Committee for Imperial Defence, Air Defence, Prime Minister’s Statement’, Hansard, HC 
debate, 03 August 1922, vol 157 cc 1661-3,  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1922/aug/03/prime-ministers-statement, 
accessed 01 June 2017. 
27 Francis P, British Military Airfield Architecture, p.16. 
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Defence was accepted.28  The building process initially consisted of modernising 
First World War airfields and providing them with permanent buildings.  Part of the 
problem at this stage, however, was that despite comparing the RAF with the 
French Air Force, the real prospect of fighting them did not seem entirely credible 
and was, perhaps, a reason for the lack of any real urgency in forces build-up.  
However, after Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany, a far more credible threat 
to the United Kingdom began to emerge and RAF infrastructure building. 
 Before 1934 the RAF possessed 52 aerodromes, however, the increasing 
German threat saw exponential growth.  In 1934 there were 5 sites for which ‘action 
was inaugurated to acquire’.  This increase to 17 in 1935, 18 in 1936, 12 in 1937, 27 
in 1938, 63 in 1939, 126 in 1940, 106 in 1941, 91 in 1942 and 3 in 1943.29  Thus, by 
1944 there were 432 aerodromes in the United Kingdom and 111 satellite 
aerodromes.30  This period of expansion took place by means of schemes denoted 
with the letters A to M, however, a number of them failed to get off the ground or 
were surpassed by subsequent schemes.  Ultimately the schemes that were 
approved were: A, C, F, H, J, K, L and M.31 
Higham contended that the schemes did not go far enough, however, whilst 
the expansion programme was slow to start, this period of construction nevertheless 
provided the RAF with enough stations, command and control systems and 
                                            
28 ‘Strength’, Hansard,  HC written answer, HC Deb, 19 July 1923, vol 166 c2509W, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1923/jul/19/strength#S5CV0166P0_1
9230719_CWA_1, accessed 16 May 2015. 
29 ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of the Royal Air Force 1934-1934’, p.145.  The figures do 
not include the acquisition of some of the advance landing grounds or relief landing 
grounds.  
30 98 of the aerodromes were in use by the United States Army Air Force.  Figures from 
Geographical Index of RAF Units quoted in ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of the Royal Air 
Force 1934-1934’, p.146.   
31 See TNA AIR 8/238 ‘British Air Re-armament’. 
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logistical arrangements to fight the Second World War. 32  The hangars, technical 
and administrative buildings of the 1930s expansion period continue to dominate 
RAF stations today underlining how well designed and built they were.  Buildings 
such as hangars, guardrooms, morgues, decontamination units, parachute packing 
facilities and station headquarters were was not only practical, they were built to 
standard patterns that gave RAF stations a very distinct identity or cultural stamp.33  
Works highlighted that: 
The expansion of the Royal Air Force, provided the Works Directorate in 
1935, with its first real opportunity to design and construct, on a 
comprehensive basis, permanent buildings of character and uniformity and 
planned to a standard of efficiency in keeping with the modern service they 
served.34 
 
The expansion plans resulted not only in modern robust war fighting 
establishments but also recognised the importance of establishing a sense of 
community spirit and pride in its personnel.  The RAF recognised the need to 
provide married quarters, leisure facilities, places of worship, shops, bars, post 
offices and the other paraphernalia associated with running a community. 35   
Beyond the utilitarian working buildings, the most obvious trait of ‘character’ was the 
                                            
32 Higham, Bases of Air Strategy, pp.15-28.  For further comment on the weaknesses of the 
expansion schemes see: ‘RAF Narrative: The Expansion of the Royal Air Force 1934-1934’, 
p.162-3. 
33 For a detail on the various patterns of technical and domestic buildings including 
guardhouses, operations buildings, workshops, hangars, control towers, squash court, 
water supplies, synthetic training facilities, barrack blocks, huts and married quarters see 
Francis P, British Military Architecture. 
34 Works, p.26  
35 The rigours of isolation and the need for married quarters for this was articulated in TNA 
AIR 8/42 CAS Archives, Geddes Committee Memoranda Air Ministry Memorandum for 
Committee on National Expenditure, October 1921, Section V, ‘Married Quarters for 
Officers and Men’, p.32.  Meanwhile, the importance of leisure facilities was identified in Air 
Council Minutes, 9th meeting, Item VIII ‘Supply of Tennis Courts etc to aerodromes’, 19 
March 1918, AHB.  See also the importance placed on community facilities in ‘Effective 
Striking Strength’, Hansard, HC Deb, 25 Feb 1926, vol 192 cc813-75, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1926/feb/25/effective-striking-
strength#S5CV0192P0_19260225_HOC_402839-842, accessed 17 Mar 2017. 
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adoption of faux Georgian styles for many buildings such as messes, guardrooms, 
married quarters and headquarters. That all plans were ‘subject to review and 
approval by the Royal Fine Arts Commission’ is testament to how seriously the 
development of Stations was taken by the RAF as well as wider institutions. 36   
Congdon wrote that ‘in the planning of barrack blocks, Mess and married quarter 
buildings a ‘Georgian’ influence can be seen in the architects’ attempts to provide 
dignified restful lines that would blend in with their surroundings but remain in 
keeping with the character and purpose of the building’.37  The story of RAF building 
was not, however, simply one of buildings and technology being harmoniously 
developed amid a bucolic idyll.  The procurement and building of airfields was a 
serious and contentious issue.38  Such issues persisted throughout the inter-war 
period into the Second World War and were a significant cause of friction between 
the Air Ministry and the public.39  The Society for the preservation of Rural England 
was involved in approval of airfield designs and even dictated the use of certain 
materials at some stations to ensure that they fitted in better with local 
                                            
36 Francis P, British Military Architecture, p.18 and Works, p.26. 
37 Congdon, Behind the Hangar Doors, p.13. 
38 For problems identified by Henderson that arose between the needs of the aerial services 
and those of the Food Controller and local agricultural communities in 1918 see AHB, Air 
Council Minutes, 2nd meeting, Item VII ‘Works at Loch Doon’, January 1918.  See similar 
comments by Admiral Kerr in AHB Air Council Minutes, 9th meeting, Item VII ‘Aerodromes 
Committee.  Interim Report’, 1 February 1918.  Turner highlighted the issues of airfield 
construction emerging as airfields grew in size, AIR 69/101, Turner J F, Lecture Notes to 
lectures to 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Staff Courses entitled ‘Works and Buildings’, 1934.  
39 See TNA AIR 2/2067 ‘Design of Aerodromes – Future Requirements’.  Also, ‘Air Ministry 
Accused of Extravagance.  An Aerodrome Demolished and Then Rebuilt', The Times, (Nov 
18 1925), p.16 Issue 44122, Col C.  ‘Government and Hendon’ The Times (Dec 29 1925 p 
10 Issue 44155 col E). ‘Dorset as "An Armed Camp".  Opposition to Proposed R.A.F 
Aerodrome’, The Times, (Nov 22, 1935), p.20; Issue 47228; Col E.  ‘Hampshire 
Aerodrome’, The Times, (Saturday May 30 1925), p.9 Issue 43975 col E.  AHB, Air Council 
Minutes, 8th meeting, Item IV ‘Employment of Agricultural Labour on Aerodromes’, 29 Jan 
1918, ‘Preservation in Wiltshire’, The Times, Aug 31 1936, p.9; Issue 47467; col E. 
‘Proposed Aerodrome Near Swindon’, The Times, (Feb 25; 1939), p.8; Issue 48239; col C.   
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architecture.40  For the personnel, this contributed to RAF airfields having a more 
pleasing visual aspect than they might otherwise have had which helped make RAF 
airfields more homely. 
Meanwhile, the context of the modernity of RAF stations is important to the 
culture.  Schofield noted that: ‘in the lead up to the Second World War new airfields 
were spread across a countryside where horses remained the chief source of 
motive power'41.  ORs came from urban households in which internal privies were 
not the norm.  Thus, the RAF Station airmens’ blocks with indoor ablutions were a 
relative luxury. 42   A 1938 investigation into barrack blocks, in particular, resulted in 
barrack accommodation becoming increasingly comfortable with an increase in floor 
area per man in barrack rooms, a reduction in height of rooms, a reduction to a 
maximum of 12 men per room and provision of a sitting room for entertainment, 
reading and radio.43   When combined with the fact that these stations were at the 
cutting edge of technology, these RAF stations were extremely impressive 
installations for the era. 
                                            
40 Francis M, The Flyer, p.18 and Works pp.26-28.  . 
41 John Schofield et al, ‘Artists and Airmen: Documenting Drawdown and Closure of RAF 
Colitshall (Norfolk)’, http://medieval-europe-paris-2007.univ-
paris1.fr/J.Schofield%20et%20al..pdf, accessed 17 Mar 2017. 
42 For a view on the relative luxury of an RAF station from the perspective of a working class 
airman see: ‘How the hell can you privatize water?’ The Guardian 24 November 2014, 
www.the guardian.com/society/2014/nov/24/harry-leslie-smith-nhs-great-depression-ed-
miliband-advice.  Accessed 17 Mar 2017. 
43 Works, p.30-31. 
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Fig 7 - RAF Henlow Officers’ Mess  
 
Fig 8 - RAF Henlow Officers’ Mess Wing with Reproduction Faux 
 Georgian windows 
Meanwhile, RAF officers’ messes represented a high degree of comfort.  
During the Second World War, Sherbrooke-Walker noted:  'the quarters in these 
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large messes, built in peace-time, were extremely comfortable by army standards'.44  
According to James, Officers’ Mess design was unashamed in underlining the status 
of the officers: 
There were 2 types of Lutyens designed messes, two-storey and three-
storey… Ceilings are high and the cost of heating therefore enormous, but 
that did not matter in 1933…The impression which these buildings attempt to 
give and the way of life they encourage, is something between the country 
house and the large hotel.45 
 
 James made a common error regarding Lutyens’ involvement in RAF 
architecture.  The Expansion period architect for such buildings was actually 
Archibald Bulloch.  Lutyens, the architect of many country houses, did, however, 
play a role as advisor to the Fine Arts Commission providing advice on airfields. 46  
‘While Lutyens had a considerable influence on the looks and layout of the airfields 
during this critical expansion period, Bulloch and others designed the actual 
buildings’. 47   Works highlighted that Messes were designed to have a ‘Club 
atmosphere’ and that: 
The buildings as erected were dignified and in all respects in keeping with their 
purpose.  Internally, much was done by way of good class fittings of modern 
design and character, selected decorations and, in conjunction with the 
Directorate of Equipment, for curtains and furnishings of appropriate character, 
to improve the atmosphere and comfort of this accommodation.48 
 
 This functional but distinctive RAF building programme was indicative of an 
organisation that was reconfiguring and was sending out a message to its people, 
as well as the public, that the RAF was modern, youthful and highly technical.  This 
served several purposes: it enhanced military capability through modern streamlined 
                                            
44 Sherbrooke-Walker, Khaki and Blue, p.8. 
45 James, The Paladins, p.171. 
46 Lutyns Martin, ‘Lutyns and the Expansion of RAF Airfields in the 1930s’, The Lutyns 
Trust, http://www.lutynstrust.org.uk/portfolio-item/lutyns-expansion-raf-airfields-1930s/, 
accessed 16 Oct 2017. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Works, p.33. 
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infrastructure efficiencies, it served to attract suitable recruits to a military life that 
was both exciting and offered technical qualifications and, finally, it helped signal, 
externally, the modernity and capability of the RAF to the British public as well as 
potential enemies. 
However, the RAF buildings still also conformed to military expectations of 
the time with parade squares and functionality being very much in evidence.  Thus, 
whilst representing the modernity of the RAF, the buildings also maintained many of 
the traditions, cultural predispositions and institutionalisation inherited from the 
senior services.  This allowed the RAF, whilst developing its own high-tech culture 
to retain a military character which was not too far removed from that of the other 
services and, of course, vital in ensuring that the RAF produced robust fighting men 
and women able to survive the rigours of life in the outposts of Empire as well as on 
expeditionary campaigns. 
Expansion gathered pace when the emerging German threat emerged.  Lake 
wrote that: 'the marked improvement in the quality of design of stations built under 
the post 1934 schemes reflected government and Air Ministry reaction to public 
concerns over the issues of rearmament and the pace of environmental change.'49  
However, Higham underlined that the approach in the inter-war years was, ‘ad-hoc’ 
and ‘typically British.  It was not so much a well-planned effort as a muddling 
through to victory’.50  Higham’s point is valid to an extent.  The complexity of airfields 
themselves and the complicated logistical requirements that they require to allow 
them to be effective had been underestimated.  However, the thought and attention 
                                            
49 Jeremy Lake, ‘Conserving Military Airfields’, Institute of Historic Building Conservation, 
Context 66, June 2000. http://www.ihbc.org.uk/context_archive/66/airfields/airfields.html, 
accessed 9 Jul 2017. 
50 Higham, Bases of Air Strategy, p.16. 
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to detail that went into the design of aerodromes in the interwar period should not be 
entirely dismissed.  The Air Ministry Works Department was a well-organised 
department and the 1934-9 expansion stations it had planned would help prepare 
the RAF for the Second World War in two ways.  The experience of building the 
stations allowed the Air Ministry to hone its procurement, design, contracting and 
building processes.  The buildings were also a statement of RAF independence.  
James summed up the relationship between the isolation of the aerodromes and the 
emerging culture of the RAF.  The Station was: 
A closed community, or two communities, one of officers and one of airmen, 
with the sergeant pilots occupying a slightly ambiguous position.  In this and 
in many other closed groups, virtually isolated from civilian life, during the 
time from autumn 1937 to summer 1939, the ethos of a new Air Force was 
hammered out, with a small legacy from the old short-service days; and with 
the ethos came a vocabulary, a new language of understatement and 
technical reference which in the 1940’s everybody was to learn.  These men 
in their isolated stations were the men who fought the Battle of France and 
the Battle of Britain.51 
 
The RAF had come of age and emerged from the legacy of the RFC and 
RNAS.  It now owned modern, distinctive airfields from which to fight a modern war.  
However, it did not yet own enough of them. 
 The declaration of war in 1939 resulted in a distinct change in emphasis 
regarding the architectural design of aerodromes.  Buildings that was already in 
progress had ‘austerity measures applied’, fixtures and fittings became utilitarian 
and the building of married quarters ceased. 52   The scale of the expansion during 
this period was dramatic.  At the peak in 1942, a new RAF airfield was being 
constructed every 3 days in the UK by a workforce of 60 000 men.53  The logistical 
                                            
51 James, The Paladins, p.175. 
52 Works p.72. 
53 Works p.76.   
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pressure on delivery of air power was immense and resulted in rapid advancement 
of distribution systems and logistics mechanisms.  Higham’s model of the invisible 
infrastructure required to support air power proved most apt in this respect.54  The 
construction methods also became increasingly complex as technological advances 
saw the introduction of the four-engined bomber.  In 1939 only 9 airfields had 
concrete runways, however, during the period 1939-1945, over 175,000,000 square 
yards of hard surface were laid in the UK to provide hard runways allowing the RAF 
to overcome problems of waterlogged fields, particularly for its bomber forces.55  
 Meanwhile, for RAF personnel, accommodation became very much more 
austere and huts predominated.  Brickwork was increasingly left un-rendered 
internally, the floors were concrete and usually covered in linoleum and as the war 
effort gathered pace, so emphasis on comfort rapidly reduced.56  Bathhouses were 
no longer necessarily collocated with sleeping accommodation, causing significant 
inconvenience.57  Communal buildings such as messes, dining rooms and airmens’ 
institutes were reduced by 25% in their main rooms but ancillary rooms, halls and 
corridors were significantly reduced.  In 1943 seating in dining halls was reduced to 
50% of manning establishment resulting in the need for 2 sittings at most meals.58  
                                            
54 Higham, Bases of Air Strategy, p.22. 
55 Works p.76. 
56 In 1939 scales were 120sq ft per officer, 70 sq ft per sergeant and 45 sq ft per corporal or 
airman. By 1942 this was reduced to 96 sq ft per officer, 58 sq ft per sergeant and 38 sq ft 
per airman.  In July 1943, this was further reduced to 32 sq ft per airman. Works, p.118.  
57 For an insight into the inconveniences of life on a dispersed RAF airfield see Jack Gillard, 
‘Life in an RAF Spitfire Station’, WW2 People's War, BBC, 25 May 2005, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/15/a4115215.shtml, accessed 17 Mar 
2017.  For a view of life of a Wireless Operator see: Mass Observation Report, Royal Air 
Force.  Assorted material sent in by other Observers in the RAF.  Letter Dated 1942.  
Redacted and address removed, 
http://www.massobservation.amdigital.co.uk.ezproxyd.bham.ac.uk/Documents/Images/Topi
cCollection-29/1708#Sections, accessed 17 Mar 2017. 
58 Works, p.117 
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 Thus, with this enormous expansion, the RAF UK war-time experience for the 
vast majority of personnel involved sleeping in draughty huts with pot-bellied stoves, 
allocated meal sittings, outside ablutions, and working on fairly basic satellite 
aerodromes or in hutted RAF support installations, life on an RAF Station involved a 
fairly tedious routine in order to keep aircraft maintained and airborne.  Dislocation 
between personnel working on different sections was particularly notable.  However, 
the main 1930s expansion era RAF stations appeared to act as flagships of RAF 
standards and vindicate James’ claim that it was on such stations that the ethos of 
the RAF was ‘hammered out’.59  The following account highlights the effect of the 
1930s Station at Abingdon at that time: 
This was a real pukka RAF Station, peace time built, with all the buildings for 
HQ, and Officers and Other Ranks housing…here we had to be on parade, in 
correct uniform, all buttons and boots ablaze, correctly shaven, and with 
proper haircuts. The good old peacetime discipline was kept up with all the 
necessary and appropriate punishments.60 
 
 Thus, the very distinctive 1934-39 expansion airfields helped maintain 
espoused RAF culture with less formal satellite stations proving more likely locations 
for culture-in-action to emerge. 
The picture of overseas architectural development of the RAF is much more 
varied than that which took place in the UK.  It is all too easy in the post-colonial era 
to ignore the importance of Empire to the British psyche and the role that the RAF 
played in its defence.  The performance of the RAF in colonial policing helped 
secure the future of the RAF.  Across Empire the decision about where to 
emphasise RAF presence fell out of policy decisions made in Whitehall.  However, 
                                            
59 James, The Paladins, p.175. 
60  Caygill, ‘Nearly a Somebody’.  For comment about formal vs informal RAF Stations see 
Essex-Lopresti ‘Memories of a Wartime Erk in the RAF’.  
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the building materials and designs were much less standardised than those of the 
UK and subject to local design, material procurement and contracts.  That said, 
many former RAF buildings across the Commonwealth exhibit readily identifiable 
features common with the RAF expansion buildings with a local twist and 
conceptual layouts and functional buildings included at airfields were not far 
removed from those in the UK.61  The RAF’s physical presence at its stations in 
Empire would also ensure that elements of the culture of Empire would shape the 
wider RAF.  The word station is thought to have originated arisen from the self-
sufficient hill stations of India.  Meanwhile, the RAF slang still retains words and 
phrases from its time Empire such as ‘dhobi’, ‘dhobi dust’ ‘punkah louvres’ and 
Wadis62.  Thus, the inter-war RAF physical presence in Empire made a significant 
and lasting linguistic contribution to the RAF. 
When the Second World War came, the Works Directorate overseas 
operations would become increasingly important.  The experience in France and the 
advances of North Africa and the lessons learned in both theatres would pave the 
way for the rapid advance across Europe.  That demonstrated a very different skill 
set to the one originally envisaged while the Directorate built its expansion era 
aerodromes during the 1930s, demonstrating that flexibility really is the key to air 
power.  Without the developments in expeditionary airfield construction techniques 
and the adaptation of logistical support to effect high-speed airfield development 
                                            
61 RNZAF Ohakea, RNZAF Whenuapai, RAAF Pearce are examples of airfields that bear 
many close similarities to UK RAF Stations.  
62 Dhobi is an Indian word for washing.  This had been used for many years by anyone 
associated with India.  This continues to be used in the RAF, probably as a consequence of 
the RAF’s time in India.  See also Hunt, Pringle and Morgan, Service Slang, p. 27. Dhobi 
dust means washing powder; a term that is now in decline.  Punkah Wallahs operated fans 
in India; air vents in RAF aircraft continue to be called Punkah louvres.  The term Wadi is 
often used by RAF aircrew to refer to a river. 
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and resupply, the tempo of the advances in those three theatres would have been 
significantly undermined.  The Airfield Construction Service and workforce, 
ultimately numbered over 60 000 UK based personnel.63  These were hand-picked 
personnel some of whom were trained for expeditionary airfield building in hostile 
areas.  Their skill sets included plant operation, well boring, mechanical, electrical 
and construction skills.  In addition to building the landing grounds in Normandy, 
their skills were also adapted for road building and other support functions such as 
keeping the dust levels down by spraying roads and airfields with an oil mix to allow 
fighters to take off to provide essential air cover.64  Their first continental airstrip to 
be laid, B.19 was an agricultural site bearing crops that were harvested by the ACS 
and airfield laid within 5 days of the first site recce on 22 July 1944.65 
The human dimension of airfields needs examination. Higham was very clear 
of the need for airfields to be more than utilitarian undertakings: 
Airfields… are also human communities with all the special and normal needs 
of such establishments… The story of airfields as the bases for air strategy 
cannot simply be told in terms of the construction of runways.  It had to 
include food and housing, hangars, amusement facilities, and above all fuel 
storage and distribution.66 
 
 Disappointingly, however, Higham provided little further analysis on that 
human dimension.  Early in the development of aerodromes, the RFC and the 
RNAS had identified that airfields needed to be self-contained and relatively self-
sufficient.  They also noted the need for them to develop basic domestic and leisure 
facilities but the First World War developments prioritised accommodation for the 
immediate war needs resulting in them being largely for unaccompanied personnel.  
                                            
63 This was the 1945 total. Works p.76. 
64 Ibid. p.464. 
65 Ibid. p.466. 
66 Higham, Bases of Air Strategy, p.21. 
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In Oct 1921 the Air Ministry Memorandum for Committee on National Expenditure 
referred to married quarters as follows: 
The R.A.F. at the end of the First World War found itself with no married 
establishments, and to all intents and purposes no married quarters…Their 
provision is vital.  R.A.F. Stations in the United Kingdom are necessarily 
situated in the most cases in sparsely inhabited agricultural localities where it 
is almost impossible to obtain existing accommodation.67 
 
 Lord Gorell identified in July 1922 that the Royal Air Force needed more than 
utilitarian provision: 
There are examples of officers who are living with nothing more than packing 
cases in tents. There are married families with not a single washing place 
except tents. And the Air Ministry has planned as far as possible to steer 
between extravagant expenditure on building and making the conditions of 
life tolerable for those in its charge. It has, therefore, adopted the policy of 
building here and there married quarters.68 
 
 The provision of married quarters began to increase throughout the 
expansion period; the faux Georgian appearance, ‘restful lines’ and the fact that 
they would usually be arranged in groupings away from the technical site gave them 
a sense of domestic normality.69  However the location of aerodromes, in particular, 
meant that families lucky enough to be allocated a quarter would still feel a sense of 
isolation from the ‘real world’.  This could make for a goldfish bowl existence in 
which families were subject to series of regulations as well as social pressures to 
conform to the RAF life.  However, during times of operational stress, the mutual 
support that the RAF community offered for those who were able to live on or near 
                                            
67 TNA AIR 8/42, CAS Archives No 3, ‘Air Ministry Memorandum for Committee on National 
Expenditure’, Oct 1921, Section V, para 18, ‘Married Quarters for Officers and Men’, p.32. 
68 ‘The Air Force’, Hansard, HL Debate, 27 July 1922, vol 51 cc 902-44.   
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1922/jul/27/the-air-
force#S5LV0051P0_19220727_HOL_101, accessed 21 Oct 2017.  See also Brig Gen 
Warner’s similar view on the need for married quarters: ‘Effective Striking Strength’. 
Hansard, HC Deb, 25 Feb 1926, vol 192 cc813-875, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1926/feb/25/effective-striking-
strength#S5CV0192P0_19260225_HOC_402839-842, accessed 17 May 2017. 
69 Congdon, Behind the Hangar Doors, p.13. 
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stations, was very valuable.  It allowed spouses to be immersed in a community that 
understood the pressures that operational flying behind enemy lines can bring.  
Humour and comradeship helped alleviate this as reflected by Enid Mackay whose 
husband, John, was a pre-Second World War regular who went on to fly in Coastal 
and Bomber Command:  ‘Life in His Majesty's services during wartime was helped 
on many occasions when a good sense of humour saved the day’.70  For his first 
1000 bomber raid on 31 May 1942 over Cologne she highlighted the value of living 
on a station where the wives all waited together for the safe return of the aircrew.71 
It was not only married quarters in which it was deemed necessary to invest.  
Leisure and sporting facilities were believed to be an essential part of life on a 
modern military installation.  This was identified as early as March 1918 in an Air 
Council meeting: 
The question of the supply of tennis courts, squash racquet courts, etc., to 
aerodromes was considered by the Council.  Stress was laid on the 
importance from the point of view of health of providing the flying centres with 
the proper amenities of life such as baths, and to provide recreation in the 
shape of tennis courts etc.72 
 
 The provision of recreational facilities was not simply to keep the men fit, it 
was also to ensure that they were kept busy as the following account highlights life 
in India during the Second World War for Donaldson during an instructional tour in 
Madras between other much busier front line duties: 
The hours were light with Wednesday afternoon and all Sunday off, and of 
course with such a lot of spare time, sport became very important.  Football, 
tennis and badminton clubs were organised as well as swimming.  The 
powers that be are very keen on the men having as much exercise as 
                                            
70 Enid Mackay, ‘Life as the wife of an RAF Pilot’, WW2 People's War, BBC, 23 Sep 2005, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/33/a5877633.shtml, accessed 24 May 
2015. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Air Council Minutes, 9th meeting, Item VIII ‘Supply of Tennis Courts etc to aerodromes’, 
19 Mar 1918, AHB. 
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possible it is so necessary to physical fitness in a country such as this, and 
so every facility was granted.73 
 
 As aerodromes increased in size, complexity and permanence in the 1934-
1939 period, so the need for airfields to develop into communities was increasingly 
needed, and recognised.  These stations were not idyllic capsules of perfect RAF 
espoused culture.  Just like any community, military units were composed of people 
and, with that, comes human emotional response.  While the building programme of 
the RAF provided a place to work, a place to live, and a place for the RAF to 
develop the official processes and practices from which the espoused culture 
emerged it also allowed the emergence of the side of the RAF culture that was not 
officially sanctioned.  The reality of a military existence is that it can be hard, lonely, 
stressful, dangerous and boring.  In parallel to the emergence of cultural coping 
mechanisms such as the banter, aloof disinterest and the black RAF humour, other 
darker responses such as depression emerged due to separation from family, 
communal life, being bombed and the rigours of living in harsh conditions in the field 
or in places such as Burma or India.  The pressures of life were accentuated when 
living in an isolated community, particularly in wartime.  While the commonly 
accepted view of RAF life is one of carefree aircrew enjoying banter and 
camaraderie, the reality was that RAF personnel would serve out their time in 
isolated bases unhappy, lonely and in some cases, suicidal.   
 In some instances, the culture-in-action morphed to an extent that even 
military discipline measures were overcome.  At the end of the Second World War in 
India and South Asia in 1946, as conditions on their remote stations and the slow 
                                            
73 JJW Donaldson, 1943: Life and Work in Madras; Heat; Tea Party; 'One Starry Night', 
WW2 People's War, BBC, 23 Sep 2003, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/74/a1289874.shtml, accessed 9 July 
2017. 
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demobilisation became too much for personnel to bear, mutinies took place at 
Maripur near Karachi, followed by Ceylon and then at five RAF other stations in 
India before spreading to Seletar and then Kallang in Singapore.74  There was also 
an incident in Burma when the airmen of 194 Squadron stopped work. 75  Thus while 
the RAF did develop a very strong espoused culture that would prepare its 
personnel for war fighting, the architectural planning that recognised that a base is 
more than a place of work still could not overcome all of the harsh realities of 
military life, particularly pertaining to isolation and all that comes with it.  
Exacerbated by additional operational and/or societal stresses, such tensions can 
have profound effects on personnel that can easily boil over and they continue to 
require careful leadership both to recognise and overcome. 
Conclusion 
In the beginnings of aviation, aircraft and airships needed locations to 
operate from.  Unwin referred to this as ‘place’.  Those locations were developed by 
the military mind-sets of the men and women of the RFC and RNAS and were very 
much adaptations of extant military thinking on what constituted a military unit.  To 
military minds of the time, a unit needed a parade square, HQ, technical buildings, 
separate messes, accommodation and even in the early days, leisure facilities.  
However, the new technology also dictated what form the aerodromes and air 
stations would assume.  As the technology progressed, so airfields became part of 
an increasingly complex network that required advanced logistical processes, well 
networked command and control systems, highly technical training schools, and a 
                                            
74  Group Captain T C Flannagan, ‘Demobilisation from the RAF 1945-47.  Plans and 
Pains’. Air Clues article held at AHB (date unreadable).  See also Joyce E, ‘Remembering 
the Mutiny’, Aeroplane Monthly (Jan 1987), p.12.  See also AHB, Service record of 
Cymbalist Norris held at ‘discharged with ignominy 25/2.46’  
75 Ibid. 
 319 
host of new support and administrative processes.  In the isolation of bases and 
immersed in the operations of a rapidly changing cutting edge technology, the 
members of the RFC and RNAS began to develop their own processes, practices, 
norms, language and humour that, through physical and technological isolation was 
very much their own.  The RAF was led and made up of people from those two 
organisations and their preconceptions and ways of doing things would influence the 
culture for a generation.  It is, therefore, of little surprise that the RAF buildings and 
facilities would conform to look recognisably martial and were simply follow on 
projects from the RFC and RNAS.  In many ways, the basic provision on an RAF 
station was not formed out of particularly innovative new thinking but simply adapted 
wisdom with some new twists.  Nevertheless, the building programme helped both 
secure the RAF as an organisation and provided an environment in which the 
culture would flourish and continue to diverge, a culture that would, as seen in 
previous chapters, borrow from other traditions but also develop its own.  
 Trenchard’s vision to embark on the building programme embodied in the 
1919 memorandum appears irrational given the straitened economic environment.  
However, the Air Staff pursued projects such as an ornate College, the apprentice 
scheme and buildings at Halton and the Staff College.  The structures left no doubt 
in the minds of the other services, politicians and the general public of both the 
independence and permanence of the RAF. 
The building programmes of the expansion era followed.  The style of the 
buildings, the modern airfields, impressive messing facilities, distinctive hangars and 
comfortable married quarters sent the message that the RAF was modern, serious 
and permanent.  Aircraft have proved to be relatively transient RAF assets due to 
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rapid technological advances.  However, the infrastructure has proved to be more 
enduring.  Thus, today, the RAF maintains a direct historical link to the successes of 
the Second World War through the bases it fought from.  
The 1924-34 expansion period prepared the way for the RAF to develop its 
own architectural identity but it was the 1934-39 period that RAF architecture had its 
heyday.  It was, indeed, on those aerodromes that ‘the ethos of the new Air Force 
was hammered out’.76  The scale of the building programme gave the RAF a sense 
that it had arrived, was modern, that it looked after its personnel but had, 
nevertheless, all the trappings of a credible efficient British military fighting force.  
The aerodromes, training establishments and other installations set the stage for all 
of the RAF’s professional activity as well as its pomp and ceremony.   The uniformity 
of the buildings and facilities gave the Force a very strong identity and the faux 
Georgian style gave it a manufactured sense of history that appears to have worked 
quite well.  This, combined with the isolated nature of most locations and the other 
aspects of culture-in-action, discussed in the other chapters, helped contribute to 
the evolution of an RAF culture with its own processes, practices, language, stories, 
deeper loyalties, assumptions and preconceptions.  The legacy of such a large 
building programme is that the RAF, by 1939, was housed in an infrastructure that 
was largely well designed and, crucially, part of a modern logistical and C2 structure 
that was fit for fighting a modern war.  The only problem was that, impressive and 
well-appointed as it was, there was simply not enough of it. 
The expansion during the Second World War returned the RAF to a much 
more utilitarian footing and, with it, a tendency for satellite airfields to be increasingly 
                                            
76 James, The Paladins, p.175. 
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task oriented, but it would appear that the expansion era airfields exerted a 
stabilising influence over the wider RAF to ensure that the newly acquired and 
manufactured RAF traditions would be more likely to be observed.  The systematic 
building processes and practices that the Airfield Construction Service established 
as well as the use of common building patterns would serve the Force well as the 
wartime expansion took place.  Making use of the far more utilitarian style of 
buildings, airfields and infrastructure ultimately allowed the RAF to return to 
expeditionary warfare on a remarkable scale in North Africa, Italy, Normandy and 
the Far East. 
But the RAF aerodromes and stations were far more than places of work and 
operational platforms.  They were also places where personnel and their families 
lived side by side.  Due to their isolation and without good leadership, they could 
easily become microcosms of discontent, boredom or even mutiny.  Overall, though, 
the RAF architecture and building programmes have produced a very identifiable 
and efficient model that balanced work, play and family life and given the RAF a 
very distinct cultural stamp.   James identified the lasting value of airfields: ‘the 
Lutyens-Stations, as we must call them, proved more durable and useful pieces of 
military equipment than cruisers’.77  In addition to their operational value, they had a 
significant impact upon those who have worked, lived on them and also fought from 
them.  The stations are physical evidence of the culture that made them but they 
also played a significant role in shaping that culture. 
  
                                            
77 James, The Paladins, p.172. 
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PART IV  
CHAPTER XI - CONCLUSION 
 The culture of a military organisation, such as the RAF, is extremely 
important given that its people live an immersive existence and risk their lives in the 
course of duty.  The RAF deeply values its culture; it engages in a wide array of 
processes and practices that bear witness to this: wearing of uniform, parades, 
dinner nights, disciplinary processes, wearing of badges and the recording of its 
history.  That very little academic study had been conducted into the social aspects 
of air power, and RAF culture is surprising given such investment.  Gray identified 
‘social and cultural aspects of military history’ as ‘a rich field for study’. 1   The 
literature review further underlined not only the paucity of cultural academic material 
relating to the RAF, but that broader military culture is an area that has not been 
invested in to any great degree.  Thus, in addition to making a ground-breaking 
foray into a study of the cultural origins of the RAF, this research has also provided 
a valuable contribution to the field of study of military culture more broadly.  
Furthermore, organisations rarely begin life with detailed archival records.  Whilst 
this thesis is primarily of interest to air power historians, it also provides a rare case 
study of an organisation with a highly-documented archive that was established 
even prior to the inception of the organisation itself.  The archival evidence and the 
analysis in this thesis will be of value to academics researching organisational 
theory and organisational culture, particularly of a military organisation.  Additionally, 
this research also underlined the lack of presence in the historiography of both 
Henderson and Sykes.  Their contributions to both the RFC and the RAF have been 
                                            
1 Gray, Air Warfare, Bloomsbury, London, 2016, p 13. 
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overshadowed by the Trenchard story; this was particularly notable in the case of 
Sykes.  This research has, then, added to a growing body of evidence that restores 
to the historiography, the contributions they made to the development of the RFC 
and the RAF.  It has also examined Trenchard from a new angle that centres upon 
the social aspects of the RAF. 
 The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this research is that a distinct 
culture emerged in the RAF with quite remarkable speed.  Paradoxically, that 
distinctive culture appeared to emerge in an organisation that was overwhelmingly 
conventional.  However, by the time the new Service arrived in the Second World 
War, it had a distinguishing infrastructure, it had developed a very special patois, its 
personnel had established behavioural patterns, traits and value sets that were 
distinct from those of the other services. 2   Given how traditional the official 
processes and practices of the RAF were, it was important to reach back and 
examine how the RAF came into being in order to understand the emergence of this 
distinct culture. 
 Organisationally, the RNAS and the RFC were established along very 
traditional lines within their respective parent services, the RN and the British Army.  
Referring to the RFC, Pugh noted that the ‘Corps reflected the doctrine, practices 
and wider cultural identity of the British Army’.3   Pugh was correct to highlight this; in 
many ways the RFC did look very similar to other units and formations within the 
Army.  The research in this thesis has demonstrated the important role Henderson, 
Sykes and Trenchard played in setting the conditions in which RAF espoused 
                                            
2 Sherbrooke-Walker provided some excellent contextual observations about the 
differences between the RAF and the Army that underline some of these.  Sherbrooke-
Walker, Khaki & Blue. 
3 Pugh, ‘David Henderson and Command of the Royal Flying Corps’, p.266.   
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culture would emerge.  Henderson and Sykes played a very important role in 
ensuring that the RFC fitted in with the existing norms of the British Army.   The fact 
that they were both officers with promising post-staff college careers helped secure 
a strong place for air power within the Army.  Together, they mounted a highly 
successful ‘corporate communications’ campaign that allowed the RFC to become 
accepted within the British Army so that it was not seen either as a threat or a 
subservient and renegade capability.  Their astute networking and promotion of the 
RFC saw it integrated into wider Army training and, by the time the BEF went to war, 
the RFC and its capabilities were understood and had patronage within the teeth 
arms of the BEF.   
 The RNAS did not have officers with such a high profile or an understanding 
of the need to work within the confines and strictures of the RN in order to ensure 
acceptance.  Seuter, in particular, had a gift for understanding the tactical and 
operational potential of air power but had a troubled relationship with the Admiralty.  
When the RNAS stripped away from the RFC, it too assumed traditional structures, 
processes and practices.   
 On the surface, then, both aerial services were extremely traditional.  
Somewhat ironically however, it was the very conservative Henderson, initially only 
able to view air power in terms of its intelligence gathering value, who became the 
visionary able to see the strategic value of creating an independent service.  
Henderson, with the assistance of Sykes, successfully integrated one of the most 
significant technological military advances in history into the British Army.  In turn, 
he played a major role in bringing an independent Service to bear.  He effected 
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these changes by adapting this cutting-edge technology and exploiting the existing 
culture in the British Army with enormous effect. 
 Danger, glamour and perception that military flyers formed part of a new 
chivalric order played a very important role in the emergence of the culture-in-action 
of the aerial services.  The aviator identity played a fundamental role in how this 
new breed of warrior viewed the world and also how they were viewed externally.  
Henderson, Sykes, Trenchard and Seuter were all pilots and were all influenced by 
their experiences in the third dimension.  While they largely conformed to the norms 
of British military processes and practices from an organisational perspective, they 
all appeared to understand the need to modify and adapt in order to underpin the 
professional needs of the new aerial services.  Thus, while the organisational 
structures were traditional, a new mental approach to the new technology was 
required.    The leaders understood the need to develop air-mindedness and for the 
aerial services to develop a technical mind-set.  The RNAS was formed in the RN, 
which had a tradition for being a technical service.  All three of the key leaders 
examined in this thesis understood the need for the RFC and the RAF to become a 
technical service somewhat like the RN.  Morris’ quotation about Trenchard 
admonishing an officer and underlining that ‘this is a technical corps’ and ‘you’re not 
in the Army now, you know’ is important.4  It underlined that a new thinking process 
was in place that set the aerial services on the road to cultural divergence from their 
parent services.  The leaders had, quite rapidly, adopted the aviator identity despite 
their traditional pre-dispositions.  Brooke-Popham was another example of this; he 
had extremely traditional in his views of officer-like qualities evidenced in the speech 
                                            
4 Morris, Bloody April. p.144. 
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that found him ‘harping on’ about the importance of officers riding horses and 
avoiding spending money on port and cigarettes.5  This arose from his original 
training as well as the expectations of the wider class based society.  However, his 
view on the spirit of the RAF being a Peter Pan-like carefree and youthful 
organisation, demonstrates that even those early leaders had bought into the aviator 
identity that was outlined in Chapter II.  The apparently chimeric approach of the 
early senior leaders is unsurprising.  While they embraced the new technology, they 
had previously been accultured by their various parent services and were deeply 
traditional.  As they built the new aerial services they fell back on what they knew.  
For Sykes, this equated to establishing a structure, artefacts, rituals, traditions and 
customs that equated to those in the Army; they had served the Army well in Empire 
so why should they not work for this new Service?  However, he and Henderson 
also recognised the need to integrate representative training from the lessons 
learned out of the Boer War and to introduce new symbol such as the Wings, the 
Roundel and to create new rituals such as flypasts that chimed with the new aviator 
identity that had emerged.  For Trenchard, it was clear from his previous experience 
that a new Service would need to establish a new spirit.  Quite what he thought that 
was will never be known; spirit was intuitively understood in Edwardian military and 
naval circles.  Wrapped up in his interpretation of spirit, articulated in his 1919 
Memorandum, were many traditional plans, most of which actually borrowed from 
others. 
 The establishment of the RAF College, a Staff College and a training system 
were, for instance, nothing new and were largely conformist when they were brought 
                                            
5 KCLMA Liddell Hart, Brooke-Popham Papers 1/5/4 ‘Commandant’s Address, 4 April 1922’, 
p.4.  Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, p.92. 
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in.  However, Trenchard understood that this technical service needed to have a 
different approach.   
 The apprentice system was a traditional idea but Trenchard’s interpretation of 
it was novel.  The apprentice system saw the best apprentices automatically sent to 
the RAF College each year; the Character Book highlights how well they performed 
and, combined with their colleagues that went to flying training schools, the 
apprentices gradually gained recognition and promotion including to Air rank. 6  
Thus, ‘Trenchard’s Brats’ helped create a distinct and strong sub-culture within the 
RAF that emphasised its independence, infused a sense of technical superiority 
over the other services that gave great pride to the chosen ones and established the 
beginnings of social mobility in the RAF that would, with time, become increasingly 
pronounced. 
 The apprentice system was probably the most innovative part of the training 
system laid out in the 1919 Memorandum.  However, the other institutions, 
traditional as they were, in concept, were inhabited and used by personnel who 
were also heavily influenced by the aviator identity and the Service-wide value that 
prized role based technical professionalism.  Training institutions were separate 
from the other services allowing flying, air power and the independence of the force 
to be underlined to RAF personnel.  Thus, the aviator identity and technical mind-set 
of the RAF became increasingly reinforced.  Additionally, whilst the espoused 
culture was built upon traditional processes and practices, the culture-in-action saw 
unofficial artefacts, traditions, customs and rituals emerge that resulted in very 
                                            
6 RAF Cranwell College Archive, CRN/D/2011/71, Character Book, Entry date 26/8/20. 
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distinct behavioural patterns developing within the new Service that also reinforced 
both the aviator identity and the technical mind-set of the RAF. 
 In the Staff College, the RAF senior officer cadre followed a syllabus that was 
traditional, and similar to what was being taught at Camberley.  Nevertheless, with 
its own institution, the students could explore air power and its potential and were 
encouraged to do so.  However, while the Staff College had an early influence on 
doctrinal thought, it rapidly became an institution that recycled Trenchardian 
thought.  Indeed, while Trenchard sought out a Mahan for the RAF, its traditional 
hierarchy, processes and practices as well as Trenchard’s own enormous 
personality traditional stifled a truly intellectual approach to the development of air 
power at the Staff College as well as more broadly across the officer cadre.   
Paradoxically, this traditional mind-set pervaded the Service at the same time as the 
aviator identity that gave the Service its youthful aspect. 
 Officers at Cranwell learned to march, followed traditional syllabi, hunted on 
horseback and played sports that were deemed to encourage the attributes required 
for imperial leadership.  They were cast in a very traditional mould and contributed 
to the stuffiness of the inter-war RAF.  However, the independence of a separate 
officer training school allowed the focus of Cranwell to be on flying.  The emphasis 
of the aviator identity was gradually reinforcing a different cultural identity in the new 
recruits.  Air-mindedness, the technical mind-set of the Service, high jinks, unofficial 
traditions and a new language were all reinforced through the process of 
structuration and emerging out of culture-in-action. 
 The new bases, messes and married quarters gave the RAF a very 
distinctive and modern home that was quite grand and signalled the RAF’s 
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independence as well as its modernity as a deliverer of cutting edge technology.  
The architectural patterns gave RAF infrastructure a very distinctive look that 
imprinted a very strong corporate stamp on the Service.   With its faux Georgian 
windows, columns, and messes and barrack rooms that were almost identical on the 
inside and very comfortable for the era, the RAF provided impressive working and 
operating spaces for its personnel throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  James referred 
to the stations as ‘two closed communities, one of officers and one of men’ on which 
‘the ethos of a new Air Force was hammered out’. 7   The expansion period stations 
served to reinforce the expected standards of RAF deportment and ceremony that 
helped maintain the RAF as a peer of the other services.    
 Intricate ensign ceremonies took place at dawn and dusk while Station 
Warrant Officers ensured that ‘good old peacetime discipline’ for personnel such as 
Richard Caygill were ‘in correct uniform, all buttons and boots ablaze, correctly 
shaven, and with proper haircuts’.8  However, on those stations and, particularly on 
the more far flung dispersed airfields counter-institutional behaviour also took place 
that originally emerged as a product of the aviator identity and focus on technical 
professionalism but became increasingly accepted and reinforced.  Whilst a distinct 
professionalism in engineering and flying skills emerged, so did a thread of 
disregard amongst some personnel towards military traditions and norms such as 
saluting, dress standards and the length of haircuts.  This can be identified from the 
very early days of the RFC and the RNAS and, with time became a self-sustaining 
                                            
7 James, The Paladins, p.175. 
8 Caygill, ‘Nearly a Somebody’ underlined the differences between formal RAF stations and 
less formal ones.  See also Essex-Lopresti ‘Memories of a Wartime Erk in the RAF’.  
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reality that was reinforced with each generation and also by the popularisation and 
mythology of the Service.    
 Many aspects of the framework that Henderson, Sykes and Trenchard 
established still retain enormous cultural significance a century after they were 
established such as symbols, buildings, orders, doctrine, structures, ranks and 
uniforms.  This supports Schein’s argument, that ‘cultures begin with leaders who 
impose their own values and assumptions on a group’, certainly within the military 
context.9  However, in addition to the emergence of a culture espoused by the early 
RAF leaders, culture-in-action also exercised a very strong influence on the way 
overall RAF culture developed.  The aviator identity and the technical mind-set that 
flourished in the Service gave the RAF its own colourful language, distinctive 
personality and enormous pride.  With time these aspects would be reinforced 
through structuration.  However, some of the structures of the espoused culture as 
well as some of the darker aspects of culture-in-action would also stifle the 
organisation in various ways.  The RAF struggled to develop as a constructively 
questioning organisation capable of really analysing air power principles and 
Trenchard did not grow the Mahan or Clausewitz he hoped for.  Meanwhile, a series 
of deep silos emerged that encouraged competition and pride but were also sources 
of divisions within the Service.  Nevertheless, an ‘Air Force spirit’ emerged that was 
young, vibrant and strong enough to see the RAF survive the challenges of the 
inter-war period and vanquish the Luftwaffe in total warfare over the skies of Britain 
in 1940.  The blueprint from which the RAF culture grew has been emulated by 
                                            
9 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, p.2, 
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other air forces around the world and has sustained the RAF through to this 
centenary year. 
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APPENDIX I – APPRENTICE GRADUATION RATE - F540 RAF HALTON 
 
 
Date of Entry Cadets Graduates Suspensions 
1st Jan 1920 235 227 8 
2nd Sept 1920 242 224 18 
3rd Jan 1921 329 320 9 
4th Sept 1921 409 393 16 
5th Jan 1922 514 NOT RECORDED NOT RECORDED 
7th Jan   1923 453 396 57 
8th Sept  1923 575 503 72 
9th Jan   1924 668 576 108 
10 Sept 1924 515 437 78 
11th Jan 1925 350 305 45 
12th Sept 494 425 73 
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APPENDIX II - RAF HALTON APPRENTICE DAILY ROUTINE IN 1927. 1 
0630 hours  Reveille (Sundays 0700 Hours) 
0730 hours   Sick Parade (Sunday 0800 hours) 
0800 hours  Colour hoisting 
Retreat (as detailed) 
1800 hours  Duties Parade. 
2115 hours Tattoo (A/As)2 
2120 hours “Still” (A/As)3 
2130 hours  Lights Out (A/As) 
2200 hours  Tattoo Corporals and Aircraftsmen 
2210 hours  Staff Parade 
2215 hours Lights Out (Aircraftsmen) 
2300 hours Lights Out (Corporals) 
2315 hours  Sergeants (and above) Lights Out). 
 
i) Beds will be made up and kits folded within 15 minutes after Reveille.  Beds may not be made down before 1700 hours on  
 Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays, and not before 1200 hours on Wednesdays, Saturdays and Sundays. 
ii) “Still” will last for three minutes.  Silence will be observed during this period. 
iii) All Airmen will make themselves acquainted with trumpet calls and answer them punctually. 
 iv) All Barack Rooms are to be ready for inspection by the time of the first Working Parade, and on Sundays by the time ordered  
  for Church Parade. 
                                            
1 Trenchard Museum Archive, ‘Standing Orders for Apprentices’ Wings Stationed at Halton Camp, 1927’. 
2 A/A denotes Airman Apprentice. 
3 “Still” was a period of silence that the apprentices were to observe lasting for three minutes.  
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APPENDIX III - SUGGESTIONS FOR RAF RANK NOMENCLATURE – COMPILATION FROM TNA AIR 1/26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 Ardian is from Gaelic.  Ard= Chief.  Ian=Bird 
2 Banneret – Origin fromMiddle Ages.  Rank above a knight allowing him to command a number of knights. 
Equivalent 
RN Rank 
Equivalent 
Army Rank 
Modern 
RAF Rank 
Proposed 
RAF Rank 
  13/14th C Bird Life – Roman Greek 
Admiral of 
the Fleet 
Field Marshal Marshal of 
the RAF 
Air Marshal Ardian in 
Chief1 
Air Marshal Marshal Millavian Legatus 
Legionio 
Polemarchs 
Admiral General Air Chief 
Marshal 
Capt 
General 
of/at Air 
Ardian Ardian Bannerets Centavian Centurions  
Vice Admiral Lieutenant 
General 
Air Marshal Aviator 
General 
Wing 
Ardian 
Second-
Ardian 
Constable Trigintavian Primus Pilus  
Rear 
Admiral 
Major General Air Vice 
Marshal 
Deputy 
Aviator 
General 
Squadron 
Ardian 
Third Ardian Millenar Vintavian Optio  
Commodore Brigadier 
General 
Air 
Commodore 
Master 
Aviator 
Flight 
Ardian 
Fourth 
Ardian 
Centenar Decennavian Tesserarius Lochages 
Captain Colonel Group 
Captain 
Squadron 
Master 
Wing Ariel Banneret2 Ventenar Septavian Matator Pentekonters 
Commander Lieutenant 
Colonel 
Wing 
Commander 
Squadron 
Leader 
Squadron 
Ariel 
Reeve Dextrarii Sexavian Librarius Enômotarchio 
Lieutenant- 
Commander 
Major Squadron 
Leader 
Flight 
Master 
Squadron 
Leader 
Squadron-
Leader 
Servientes Quinquenavian  Enômoty 
Lieutenant Captain Flight 
Lieutenant 
Flight 
Leader 
Flight 
Leader 
Flight-
Leader 
Pauncenars Primavian   
Sub-
Lieutenant 
Lieutenant Flying Officer Aviator Aviator Lieutenant Hobelars Avian   
Midshipman Sub-Lieutenant Pilot Officer Sub-aviator Sub-Aviator Ensign  Sub-Avian   
Cadet Probationary 
Officer 
Officer Cadet Aviator 
Cadet 
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RN Rank – Other Ranks RFC Army Rank – Other Ranks Proposed RAF – Other 
Ranks 
Modern RAF Ranks – 
Approximations 
Chief Warrant Officer   CAS Warrant Officer 
Warrant Officer Master Mechanic/Craftsman Chief Mechanic Master 
Mechanic 
Warrant Officer 
Chief Petty Officer Chief Mechanic/Craftsman Foreman 
Mechanic/Craftsman 
Sergeant Flight Sergeant/Chief 
Technician 
Sergeant 
Petty Officer Leading Mechanic/Craftsman Corporal Corporal 
Junior Tech 
Leading Seaman Air Mech/Craftsman1st Class Air Mech/Craftsman1st 
Class 
Senior Aircraftman Tech 
Senior Aircraftman 
Able Seaman Air Mech/Craftsman 2nd Class Air Mech/Craftsman 2nd 
Class 
Leading Aircraftman 
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